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This doctoral work is divided into two parts: an exegesis dealing analytically with the 
idea of writing nonfiction works about scientists and an accompanying creative 
nonfiction work on the Australian scientist Sir Mark Oliphant. Both the exegesis and the 
creative nonfiction seek to question the standard historical version/portrait of this scientist 
which usually presents him as politically naïve and belligerent. The study questions this 
view and focuses on his earlier career in physics: at Cambridge and Birmingham 
universities; his involvement in British government scientific research during the Second 
World War; his contribution to the development of the atomic bomb; and the postwar 
years Oliphant spent in Britain until his return to Australia in 1950. It clarifies the extent 
to which Mark Oliphant’s scientific career and his later scientific reputation were shaped 
by the particular social and political context of his time. It situates Oliphant within a 
specific socio-political context, namely the ‘British scientific Left,’ and establishes 
Oliphant’s scientific and political formation as a member of this group in order to 
apprehend the implications of the inevitable clash between Left-wing scientists and 
American security forces during the early Cold War and the swing to the Right during the 
McCarthy era.
The creative non-fiction component, Mark Oliphant in Atomic Wonderland, seeks to 
contextualize the events of this period through following Mark Oliphant’s adventures in 
nuclear physics. A second narrative thread recreates conversations Oliphant’s former 
biographers had with his scientific colleagues in their quest to uncover the ‘real’ Mark 
Oliphant. The twin narratives seek to provide a frame for understanding when trying to 
place Oliphant as a major player in the events that unfold. It is not only a story about an 
individual but about the practice of science, its culture, its politics and its intellectual 
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Mark Oliphant: Radical activist and scientist, 
hero or victim?
Introduction
‘Alas,’ said the mouse, ‘the world is growing smaller every day. At the beginning it was 
so big that I was afraid, I kept running and running, and I was glad when at last I saw 
walls far away to the right and left, but these long walls have narrowed so quickly that I 
am in the last chamber already, and there in the corner stands the trap that I must run 
into.’ ‘You only need to change your direction,’ said the cat, and ate it up. 
Franz Kafka
‘A Little Fable’ (1946, p. 151)
The creative nonfiction work of this thesis which follows the exegesis is a chronicle of 
the events and some of the personalities involved in the race to the heart of the nucleus 
with Australian physicist Sir Mark Oliphant as the link who connects people, countries, 
laboratories and cultures. Oliphant’s life spanned the twentieth century: he was born in 
October 1901 and died in July 2000. Until the advent of the Australian National 
University (ANU) in 1946 which became Australia’s first university offering 
postgraduate studies, Australians wanting to pursue doctoral studies needed to do so at 
overseas universities. The narrative begins with Oliphant’s arrival at Cambridge 
University in 1927 to undertake his doctorate at the Cavendish Laboratory and ends with 
the refusal by the American State Department to grant Oliphant a visa to attend an 
international physics conference in Chicago in 1951, the height of the pervasive culture 
of McCarthyism that had gripped the United States. The narrative looks at the 
momentum of events which overtook Oliphant during the first twenty four years of his 
life in international science. In choosing these years, the focus is on the critical, life-
affecting event of Oliphant’s involvement in the making of the atomic bomb and its 
aftermath.
In 1947 when MGM released the film The Beginning or the End? it was described in the 
accompanying press kit as ‘the story of the men and women who solved the atomic 
mystery, and who helped America win a life and death race to become the first nation to 
build an atom bomb … a story of our own times that is so vital and so spectacular that no 
fiction could match it’ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1947). British audiences were not 
enamoured with Hollywood’s efforts. When the film premiered at the Palace Theatre in 
London an editorial in the British science journal Nature declared it ‘disappointing’: 
[I]t confines itself solely to the development of the atomic bomb in the United 
States. This will assuredly lead the non-scientists into believing that most atomic 
energy research has been American … the characters are all American … Meitner, 
Oliphant, Blackett, Cockcroft, Bohr and other important persons were not 
mentioned at all (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1947).
While some famous non-American scientists were portrayed in the film, notably Albert 
Einstein, the group of scientists representing the British government who had worked on 
the bomb were distilled into two invented characters, Dr Chisolm and Dr Wyatt, who 
represented ‘the British scientists called to America on atomic research’ (Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer 1947). What was left out of the film was any acknowledgment of the 
extent of nuclear bomb research begun in Britain and any mention of British-based 
scientists. The official American history of the project, the Smyth Report released in 
August 1945, also downplayed the contribution of non-American scientists. The result of 
the campaign of reclassification of the atomic bomb as an American invention excised 
any ownership of prior knowledge by non-American scientists. 
At Cambridge University’s Cavendish Laboratory under the directorship of Ernest 
Rutherford, Oliphant made fundamental discoveries into the structure of the nucleus 
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including the discovery of tritium and thermonuclear fusion (Oliphant, Harteck & 
Rutherford 1934, p. 413). In March 1940 when Oliphant was director of physics at the 
University of Birmingham, German refugee scientists Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, 
while working on nuclear fission at Oliphant’s instigation, devised the Frisch-Peierls’ 
Memorandum: the proposal outlining that the construction of an atomic bomb was 
feasible. Frisch and Peierls’ calculations were based on the discovery of fission by 
German scientists at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin in 1938. With Britain at war 
with Germany, Oliphant was instrumental in getting Frisch and Peierls’ proposal taken 
seriously by government. Later, on a visit to the US in September 1941, Oliphant kick-
started the Manhattan Project through doggedly pushing the US to expand the 
preliminary research that had begun under Oliphant’s supervision at the University of 
Birmingham.
With the transfer of British-based scientists to the US to work on the Manhattan Project 
in 1943 Oliphant was appointed second-in-charge of the entire British contingent of 
scientists. In addition to this position, Oliphant also led the largest British team, the 
‘Oliphant Group,’ all of whom worked on the electromagnetic separation of uranium at 
the University of California, Berkeley, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee producing Uranium 
235 for use in the Fat Man bomb subsequently dropped on Hiroshima. Before the end of 
the war, in April 1945, Oliphant returned to Birmingham and began building the world’s 
first proton synchrotron particle accelerator. A particle accelerator is a scientific 
instrument designed to allow physicists to study the smallest subatomic particles. 
Oliphant devised this new type of particle accelerator during long hours spent on ‘Owl 
Watch’ duty at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where he speculated on the challenge for 
fundamental physics when the war was over. In Ernest Lawrence’s original cyclotron 
accelerator, particles could not be kept in constant orbit. Instead, beams followed a spiral 
trajectory outwards. The cyclotron also had a relativistic energy limit due to the increase 
in mass. Oliphant had devised a new type of accelerator which would send particles 
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spinning in constant orbit close to the speed of light through the application of electric 
and magnetic fields. His innovative design minimised costs while extending the ion 
energy capacity. He sent a plan and details of his new machine to government officials in 
the UK (Oliphant to Akers, 1943). Oliphant’s proposition was unsympathetically 
dismissed and he was advised to forget about the future and concentrate on the job in 
hand.
The synchrotron particle accelerator has since proven to be a fundamental tool for 
scientific research. A synchrotron accelerates a beam of particles which is then kept in a 
storage ring where particles are bent and focused to orbit at a constant energy. A 
standard tool in particle physics, synchrotron ‘light’ (electromagnetic radiation) is a 
source of x-rays and infrared light and can be channelled to individual experimental 
stations for use in experiments involving such diverse subjects as atomic and molecular 
physics, archaeology and forensic science, chemistry and materials science, Earth, 
environmental and planetary science, nanoscience and medical and life sciences. While 
most synchrotrons accelerate electrons, Oliphant’s original proton-based machine is the 
prototype for the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. The LHC circulates two 
proton beams via a number of synchrotrons in order to accelerate the beams up to an 
energy of 7 tera-electron volts. The two proton beams are eventually forced together in 
collisions. Physicists then analyse the products of these collisions. During its first run in 
2009, the LHC confirmed the existence of the Higgs boson, the rare quantum wave in the 
Higgs field and a missing piece in the confirmation of the Standard Model of particle 
physics. 
Conceived by scientists in the early months of the Second World War in Oliphant’s 
laboratory at the University of Birmingham, the atomic bomb project was initiated as a 
reaction to the fear of a German bomb. German scientists Otto Hahn and Fritz 
Strassmann, working at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, had discovered nuclear 
fission in December 1938 as confirmed by Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch. In April 
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1940 French intelligence informed British scientists that the Germans were attempting 
their own fission bomb experiments under the directorship of Werner Heisenberg 
(Meeting of Sub-Committee on U Bomb, 10 April 1940). The British atomic bomb 
project was stepped up in response to the threat that a similar German project was 
underway. 
After the defeat of Germany, eminent Danish physicist Niels Bohr tried to convince 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill not to deploy the bomb against Japan 
but to provide a demonstration of its power instead. Mark Oliphant helped Bohr draft a 
report to this effect. Bohr’s intervention proved unsuccessful. When he heard about 
Hiroshima Oliphant experienced ‘a feeling of utter frustration … that the message hadn’t 
got across’ (Oliphant 1992). Oliphant channelled his frustration into a lifelong crusade 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Oliphant embodied Edward Said’s contention that the purpose of a public intellectual ‘is 
to be embarrassing, contrary, even unpleasant’ (Said 1994, p. 12). Nuclear scientists such 
as Oliphant believed their involvement in the development of the atomic bomb was an 
ethical response to the impending war in Europe. In the immediate postwar period 
Oliphant, dubbed in the press ‘Britain’s leading atomic bomb expert,’ was often called 
upon to give his view (Egan 1945, p. 38). Oliphant, as one of the scientists who helped to 
build the atomic bomb, felt that he had authority to call for its abolition and urged his 
fellow scientists to do the same. As an example among many, in October 1945 Oliphant 
was quoted in the press stating that: 
British scientists haven’t got the guts to make a declaration against the bomb. 
They’re so tied up with the Official Secrets Act they’re afraid that if they open 
their mouths they’ll land in jail … perhaps I will find myself in jail but I feel these 
things have to be said (Oliphant cited in The Advertiser, 26 October 1945, p. 1).
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This widely reported statement incurred the ire of British politicians. Then Leader of the 
Opposition Winston Churchill and Labor Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin made 
statements in the House warning ‘scientists of the consequences of independent action’; 
a response reported in the New York Times as initiated with ‘Professor Oliphant’s 
statements in mind’ (Gruson 1945, p. 3). 
Oliphant’s protests were often dismissed by his more conservative British colleagues. 
Cambridge physicist John Cockcroft coined the term “Oliphantic’ to describe Oliphant’s 
many statements in the press (Cockcroft cited in Farmelo 2013. P. 196). Historian 
Margaret Gowing, author of the official British history of the atomic bomb, Britain and 
Atomic Energy, 1935-1945 (1964), describes Oliphant’s statements as expressing a ‘full-
throated protest’ articulating a British conservativeness where Oliphant is often 
portrayed as uncultured in comparison (Gowing 1964, p. 110). Oliphant, similarly to 
contemporaries such as JD Bernal, Patrick Blackett and Bertrand Russell, continued to 
use his position as a public intellectual to voice his opposition where he thought it 
necessary, speaking, as Said expresses it, ‘truth to power, a crusty, eloquent, fantastically 
courageous and angry individual for whom no worldly power is too big and imposing to 
be criticized and pointedly taken to task’ (Said cited in Curthoys & Ganguly 2007, p. 
22). 
General Leslie Groves, the conservative American in charge of the wartime Manhattan 
Project, ‘had supreme contempt for [the] long-haired doctors of philosophy’ in his charge 
(Oliphant cited in The Argus, 5 March 1947, p. 4). Mark Oliphant fitted the stereotype of 
a bohemian, a left-wing ‘long hair’: he was a vegetarian with a passion for Modernist 
architecture, he was outspoken and not afraid to disregard rules and challenge authority 
if he believed it necessary. He was, however and significantly, a brilliant physicist. 
Tolerated because the Americans needed his expertise up until the end of the Second 
World War, by the time the world embraced the communist/democratic divide in the 
period known as the Cold War, Oliphant and liberal scientists like him were persona non 
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grata. Although Oliphant’s talents led in 1945 to General Groves recommending him for 
the highest American award, the Medal of Freedom with Gold Palm (the only foreign-
born, Manhattan Project scientist to be recommended for this honour), a decade and a 
half later, Groves made no mention of Oliphant in his memoir, Now It Can Be Told: The 
Story of the Manhattan Project (1962). The impact on the international scientific 
community of the postwar political climate was pervasive and far reaching. Scientists 
labelled as security risks were targeted and harassed by security services. The American 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had Oliphant under surveillance throughout the 
late 1940s and 1950s and passed their concerns to both the British and the Australian 
intelligence agencies by repeatedly requesting information on his political leanings 
during his years at Cambridge University, the University of Birmingham and in 
Australia. 
In 1947 Mark Oliphant was appointed to the Academic Advisory Committee (AAC) of 
the planned Australian National University along with fellow committee members, Sir 
Howard Florey, Sir Keith Hancock and Raymond Firth. The Chifley Government had 
high hopes that all members of the AAC would accept the offer to head up the four 
faculties: Physical Sciences, Medical Research, Pacific Studies and Social Sciences. In 
1950 Oliphant, the first of the AAC members to accept the government’s offer, returned 
to Australia from Britain to take up the position of director of the School of Physical 
Sciences with the specific undertaking (and with the promise of adequate funding) to 
build a state-of-the-art proton synchrotron as a showcase for the new university. At this 
time, the newly-elected conservative Menzies Government, following US Senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s anti-communist agenda, demonised anyone with even the suggestion of 
Left-wing political leanings (Buckley-Moran 1986, p. 11). Having introduced the 
Communist Party Dissolution Bill in April 1950, the rejection of this Act by the High 
Court was a trigger for a double dissolution and a new election. In April 1951 the re-
elected Menzies Government called for a referendum to validate the Act. During the 
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often bitter campaigning accusations were thrown at the fledgling ANU, with one anti-
communist politician describing it as ‘a nest of communists who are busy building up 
their own organizations to subvert the institutions of this country’ (Keon cited in 
Greenwell 2009).
Like their American counterparts, communist accusations ousted many progressive 
scientists from government institutions including Oliphant’s contemporaries such as Eric 
Burhop. During this time Oliphant, as an eminent ‘British’ scientist, was invited to attend 
the ‘International Conference on Nuclear Physics and the Physics of Fundamental 
Particles,’ at the University of Chicago. He was refused a visa by the US State 
Department branding him, if not a communist, then a communist sympathiser in the 
public domain. Despite protestations by many including Opposition Leader, HV Evatt, 
the Australian government refused to intervene on Oliphant’s behalf (Cockburn & 
Ellyard 1981, p. 189). The damage to Oliphant’s reputation continued throughout the 
1950s and beyond. 
Perhaps not unrelated to these rumours, in 1961 an article published under the title, ‘The 
White Oliphant,’ mounted a critical attack on his decision to try to build a synchrotron in 
Canberra. Oliphant, this article suggested, ‘had failed in his promise to do not only good 
but “spectacular” physics’ (Roberts 1961, p. 14). The attack on Oliphant and the 
Research School of Physical Sciences festered. Criticism had been directed towards 
Oliphant even before his return to Australia in 1950. State universities, already 
dissatisfied with the amount of funding directed to Canberra, complained that the ANU 
would also ‘starve the State universities of their best men’ (Roberts 1961, p. 13). Despite 
Oliphant’s modest funding demands compared to other accelerator projects overseas, 
funding was still a sore point eleven years later. Oliphant’s ‘critical fellow-scientists,’ the 
article stated ‘were concerned at the amount of money which this ill-starred venture is 
diverting from the whole field of Australian scientific research’ (Roberts 1961, p. 15).
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In 1993 a reappraisal of Oliphant’s synchrotron project countered this view, instead 
advocating that it was well-founded and significant, and affirmed its place as ‘extending
the performance of accelerators for high-energy physics’ (Montague 1993, p. 527). The 
European Council for Nuclear Research (CERN) high energy physicist Bryan Montague 
posited that Oliphant’s Canberra machine, despite its unconventional design, had some 
‘remarkable features’ and must be praised for its innovation:
The incentive to build such an extraordinary machine arose from the limited 
resources … in an environment with little interest in large projects … [this project] 
deserves an honourable mention in history … because at the time of its conception 
… the idea of a slow-cycling high-energy proton synchrotron, for leisurely nuclear 
physics studies in a university context, was a perfectly respectable aim (Montague 
1993, p. 530).
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Analytical framework and key concepts 
A focus of this study was to determine the answer to the key question: How far could 
Mark Oliphant’s problems with security be blamed on his personality or, as a Left-wing 
scientist with the onset of the Cold War, did they stem from a political/ideological base? 
I also wanted to explore whether international rivalry among university scientific 
research centres impacted on his reputation and his scientific standing. In order to find an 
answer to these questions, the research involved exploring how scientific research was 
shared prior to 1939 and the subsequent move towards secrecy during the Second World 
War and later with the onset of the Cold War. It also involved gaining an understanding 
of the pressures (if any) exerted on scientists in both the US, British and Australian 
laboratories within the context of the cultural, political and economic environment in the 
immediate postwar era.
Interrogating the relationship between text and context involved the analysis of player 
scientists’ recollections found in oral histories and in autobiographies and cross-
examining the often contradictory accounts. This examination was informed by works 
investigating rivalries, both domestic and international, between laboratories. Daniel 
Kevles provides insights into the tensions between American university and national 
laboratories in The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America 
(1995). These tensions concerning international rivalries between laboratories and also 
the directorial styles of laboratory leaders surfaced in oral history interviews such as 
those held at the American Institute of Physics Niels Bohr Library and Archive which 
holds an extensive collection of interviews with twentieth-century physicists. These 
rivalries were often not flagged in official histories and biographies. Texts such as John 
Heilbron and Robert Seidel’s Lawrence and his Laboratory: A history of the Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory (1989), and also Gregg Herken’s Brotherhood of the Bomb: The 
tangled lives and loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence and Edward Teller 
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(2002) and The Winning Weapon: The atomic bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (1980) 
omit criticisms of Ernest Lawrence and the culture of the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. 
Historian David Bodanis describes the culture of the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory as 
‘amoral’:  ‘Lawrence collected students who thrived in this environment. Many stole 
from each other or snipped out each other’s names from original copies of experimental 
reports’ (Bodanis, 2000, p.278). 
The research involved gaining a historical perspective of the major discourses and key 
turning points concerning scientific research and the impact of Cold War politics on 
scientists and their work. The analysis underlined the seemingly inevitable collision 
between left-leaning scientists and security forces as the Cold War progressed. Particular 
works relating to an American perspective on Cold War science include John Krige’s 
American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (2006), 
David Kaiser’s paper ‘The Atomic Secret in Red Hands: American Suspicions of 
Theoretical Physicists in the early Cold War’ (2005), Paul Forman’s significant 1987 
paper, ‘Behind quantum electronics: National security as basis for physical research in 
the United States, 1940-1960’ and Ellen Schrecker’s No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and 
the Universities (1986). Works which deal with the British perspective on Cold War 
science include Christoph Laucht’s Elemental Germans: Klaus Fuchs, Rudolf Peierls
and the Making of British Nuclear Culture, 1939-59 (2012) and Graham Farmelo’s 
Churchill’s Bomb: How the United States overtook Britain in the First Nuclear Arms 
Race (2013). To gain a perspective of the French scientists’ contribution to physics and 
also postwar security problems, Spencer Weart’s Scientists in Power (1979) proved 
invaluable. David McKnight’s Australia’s Spies and their Secrets (1994) gives 
considerable attention to Oliphant’s problems with security at the Australian National 
University. 
The research involved gaining a perspective on the significance of the paradigm shift 
from pre-war ‘Small Science’ to postwar ‘Big Science’. Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of 
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Scientific Revolutions (1962) provided the informing logic to understand the dynamics of 
this switch in science practice. Conflicts over scientific discovery can be seen as a 
consequence of the institutional norms of science (Kuhn 1962; Merton 1973), the extent 
of these conflicts, in the context of the atmosphere of the Cold War, had national 
significance. Important texts exploring the sociological culture of laboratory practice 
both before and after the ‘Big Science’ revolution, to use Kuhn’s term, are informative. 
Peter Galison’s Image and Logic: A material culture of microphysics (1997), Hugh 
Gusterson’s People of the Bomb: Portraits of America’s Nuclear Complex (2004) and 
Andrew Pickering’s Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics
(1984), provide invaluable insight into scientific culture and practice. Pierre Bourdieu’s 
essay, ‘The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of 
reason’ (1975) is another important text pointing to the sociological implications of 
scientific research and, in particular, the rewards accompanying research (Bourdieu 
1975, p. 19).
Research conducted in Australia and overseas accessed primary archival sources. 
Research was conducted within the Oliphant Papers at the Barr Smith Library, 
University of Adelaide; the National Archives; the American Institute of Physics digital 
oral history collection and the oral history collection at the National Library of Australia, 
Canberra, holder of the collection of interviews with Australian and international 
scientists conducted in 1980 by Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard for their 1981 
biography of Mark Oliphant, Oliphant: The Life and Times of Sir Mark Oliphant. Two 
research trips were undertaken. In the UK research was conducted within collections 
held at the National Archives at Kew; the Fellow archives of the Royal Society; the 
Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge; the archives 
held in the Special Collections, University of Birmingham. In the US research was 
conducted within the archives held at the Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley; the National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Region, San 
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Francisco and the Mandeville Special Collections Library, University of California, San 
Diego. A Freedom of Information request to the FBI gave access to Oliphant’s FBI file. 
Particularly useful has been the recent release of previously closed security files held by 
the UK National Archives, including those of Oliphant’s colleagues Frédéric and Irène 
Joliot-Curie, Maurice Wilkins, Lew Kowarski, Frank Oppenheimer and Eric Burhop. All 
made extensive mention of connections to Mark Oliphant.
The Exegesis: Science and politics
The exegetical component of this thesis, which comes before the creative nonfiction 
component, seeks to place Mark Oliphant’s career in a socio-political context. It 
questions whether reports of Oliphant’s failures represent legitimate criticism or 
ideological positioning, and examines whether past criticisms of Oliphant’s scientific 
contribution need to be redressed. The exegesis will also demonstrate that the times in 
which Oliphant lived out his life were ones in which power and politics had a 
particularly insidious relationship. The fear of one’s enemy, the fact of atomic power 
alongside the need to argue for aggression as a form of defence created an environment 
of prejudice, intolerance for difference and clear rules for engagement in ‘the Cold War’.
Its aim is to address the key criticisms levelled at Oliphant: his ‘difficult’ personality, his 
perceived political naivety and his inability to adjust to the new technological paradigm 
of ‘Big Science’.
The exegesis is comprised of three chapters:
Chapter one, ‘”Eureka!” The Deus ex Machina of scientific discovery,’ looks at the 
biographical portrayal of Left-wing mid-twentieth century physicists, in particular those 
who influenced or worked on the Manhattan Project, and the enduring practice of 
appropriating well-developed fictional tropes to classify them.
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Chapter two, ‘Frankenstein’s ghost in the machine,’ scrutinises criticisms of Oliphant by 
looking at various portrayals of him written through a ‘Big Science’ lens and questioning 
whether these portrayals represent legitimate criticism or ideological positioning. It 
argues, following the thesis of Catherine Westfall, that judging scientific success through 
the frame of Big Science is unsatisfactory.
Chapter three, ‘How the atomic west was won,’ places Oliphant within the group of 
scientists known as the ‘British scientific Left’ alongside his Cambridge contemporaries 
such as Patrick Blackett and JD ‘Sage’ Bernal and highlights Oliphant’s close 
association with French scientist Frédéric Joliot-Curie. This chapter considers the 
illogicality of the argument that scientists with a Left-wing political outlook during the 
Cold War were idealistic and naïve.
What is creative nonfiction?
The title of the creative nonfiction component of this thesis, Mark Oliphant in Atomic 
Wonderland, references George Gamow’s iconic Mr Tompkins in Wonderland series 
which itself references Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s adventures in Wonderland (1865). The 
first Mr Tompkins story was published in 1940. Through Tompkins, Gamow explains 
nuclear structure. While providing an account of Mark Oliphant’s career in nuclear 
physics beginning with his arrival at Cambridge University over eighty years ago, Mark 
Oliphant in Atomic Wonderland is not a work about nuclear science but about scientists 
and how discoveries happen. It also chronicles the postwar clash between science and 
politics in a format that, hopefully, breathes life into these long-dead characters. It is a 
work about a scientist whose career is often framed by a project that is considered to 
have failed, the Canberra synchrotron. Through Oliphant the darker side of scientific 
practice—competition, ambition and rivalry—that surrounded the splitting of the atom 
and the development of the early nuclear industries, is investigated. The problematic 
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relationship between Left-wing leaning scientists, Right-wing governments and security 
forces in the postwar world is also scrutinised. It is also intended to challenge existing 
nuclear scholarship that downplays Oliphant’s scientific and political input; indeed it 
provides a countering discourse.
The roots of creative nonfiction as a literary form lie with the New Journalists of the 
1960s and 1970s: writers such as Tom Wolfe, Gay Talese, Cornelius Ryan, Norman 
Mailer and Truman Capote. Creative nonfiction, as with New Journalism, uses literary 
technique in crafting scenes, dialogue and description to tell factual stories. Just as Ernest 
Hemingway had used novelistic techniques to write news articles while on assignment 
during the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s, the New Journalists employed ‘devices 
that gave the realist novel its unique power’ (Wolfe 1975, p. 46). Wolfe breaks these 
novelistic devices down to four: telling a story by moving from scene to scene; using 
dialogue; using point-of-view to give the reader an emotional agency in the scene via the 
perspective of individual characters; and, finally, detailing elements of what Wolfe calls 
a character’s ‘status life’—‘the entire pattern of behaviour and possessions through 
which people express their position in the world’ (Wolfe 1975, p. 46).
Creative nonfiction, as an experimental form, is a melting pot of methodologies without 
being specific to any. Therefore, it should not be assessed as pertaining to any particular 
methodology other than what has been achieved in relation to creative nonfiction. The 
creative non-fiction piece, Mark Oliphant in Atomic Wonderland, is narrative-focused: a 
chronicle of events using known dialogues that have occurred between the main players. 
It attempts to engage with each of the stories that were pivotal to the unfolding of all that 
led to the splitting of the atom and the ramifications of this historically and politically for 
the world and personally for those most involved. As proponent of creative nonfiction 
writing Lee Gutkind states: ‘”[C]reative” … [refers to] how the writer conceives ideas, 
summarizes situations, defines personalities, describes places—and shapes and presents 
information’ (Gutkind 2012, p. 7). 
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Key texts which influenced the narrative style of the creative work included Wolfe’s The 
Right Stuff (1979) and Cornelius Ryan’s The Longest Day (1960). Wolfe’s text,
chronicling the rivalry and competition between test pilots and astronauts and the clash 
between competing national narratives and the political consequences, resonated with the 
story of nuclear science, scientists, the atomic race and the inevitable clash with the 
politics of the Cold War. In addition, the scientific long-form journalistic style of Gary 
Taubes’ Nobel Dreams: Power, Deceit, and the Ultimate Experiment (1986) and Bad 
Science: The short life and weird times of Cold Fusion (1993), with their emphasis on 
unfurling drama and suspense in narratives incorporating science, were formidable 
models. In particular, the weaving of politics, personal ambition and competition in a 
nonfiction format were also influential in determining a narrative style. 
In this excerpt from The Longest Day (1960) Ryan, a war correspondent for the London 
Daily Telegraph during the Second World War, introduces character (the ‘real’ German 
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel) and story through recreating a scene.
In the ground-floor room he used as an office, Rommel was alone. He sat behind a 
massive Renaissance desk, working by the light of a single desk lamp. The room 
was large and high-ceilinged. Along one wall stretched a faded Gobelin tapestry. 
On another the haughty face of Duke François de la Rochefoucauld – a
seventeenth-century writer of maxims and an ancestor of the present Duke –
looked down out of a heavy gold frame. There were a few chairs casually placed 
on the highly polished parquet floor and thick draperies at the windows, but little 
else. In particular, there was nothing of Rommel in this room (Ryan 1960, p.2). 
Ryan’s attention to descriptive detail and his ability to connect small stories to the 
overall and bigger unfolding narrative became a model to filter and to organise the vast 
amount of material uncovered. It also became a way to ‘show’ rather than ‘tell’. I was 
struck by how easily I could imagine the story in scenes through the utilisation of 
description and anecdote. For example, this excerpt from Mark Oliphant in Atomic 
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Wonderland not only shows the eccentric Cold Warrior who was Ruth B Shipley, but 
also conveys the ideological divide between Left-wing scientists and the postwar United 
States government. Shipley, notorious chief of the United States’ State Department’s 
Passport Division from 1928 to 1955, had total, unreviewable control over the issuing of 
passports and visas  granting her, in the words of the then Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, ‘absolute power to decide who might leave and enter the country’ (Acheson 
cited in Kahn 2011, p. 822).
On the fifth floor of the Winder Building on Seventeenth Street in Washington, 
DC, Mrs Ruth B Shipley determined—not for the first time—that no communists 
were going to get past the gatekeepers in her department on her watch. She made 
this promise to herself while standing in a certain position next to her office 
window on a particularly worn patch of carpet. Here, Shipley had a view of the 
White House. This visual reinforcement helped to steel her resolve and encourage 
her unyielding and constant vigilance against appeals by undesirables. Despite the 
250-plus staff under her, the Chief of the US State Department Passport Division 
took great pride in the fact that every single application was submitted to final 
scrutiny by her eyes alone. Looking up from the letter she held in her hands, 
Shipley gazed at Number One, Pennsylvania Avenue before returning to her desk. 
After carefully pressing a stamp on a red ink pad, she transferred its message to 
the paper: ‘passport denied’. Shipley placed the letter in a bulging, buff-coloured 
folder in her out-tray, where, in due time, it would be filed along with 12,000,000 
others just like it in the bowels of the building—the old Civil War dungeons. 
Martin Kamen duly received a letter from the Chief of the Passport Division. ‘[It] 
is not in the best interests of the United States that you go abroad at this time,’ 
Shipley advised.
In the foreword to the The Right Stuff (1979), Wolfe states that his book ‘grew out of 
some ordinary curiosity’. That same sense of curiosity propelled my quest to learn more 
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to understand about the rift in science brought about by the atomic bomb. With the 
‘thunderclap’ of the bomb reverberating around the world, as physicist and science writer 
JH Rush stated at the time, ‘Science had become politically interesting, and scientists 
had become interested in politics’ (JH Rush cited in Smith 1965, p. ii) British scientists 
had been grappling with the response of science and scientists to the economic and 
political crises gripping the world during the 1930s. ‘[T]here was nowhere else a 
comparable movement among scientists so vigorous and influential’ one commentator 
recalled (Wood 1959, p. 121). Directly or indirectly involved, Mark Oliphant had 
contributed his interest, time, knowledge and often membership to many groups 
influenced by what has become known as the Social Relations of Science movement:  
groups such as the British Association of Scientific Workers, Cambridge Scientists Anti-
War Group, World Federation of Scientific Workers and the Atomic Scientists 
Association. Yet so often Left-wing politics is trivialised and dismissed by writers from 
Right-wing positions and this trivialisation began to have more credence with the end of 
the Cold War. Oliphant’s commitment to socialism is misread therefore by Right-wing 
thinkers as a kind of naïve, middle-of-the-road Fabianism. In order to understand Mark 
Oliphant, I needed to see that his politics and his science were in symbiosis. That he was 
a socialist scientist needed to be comprehended to understand him. Engaging critically 
yet sympathetically with his world view required placing the narrative in a political as 
well as a historical context.
Mark Oliphant in Atomic Wonderland is sympathetic to Oliphant and to other scientists 
who struggled to sustain their careers and projects in the politically and intellectually 
hostile climate of the early years of the Cold War. It underlines the dynamic aspect of 
Oliphant’s personality in addition to investigating the forces that shaped his career in 
science through the creative nonfiction medium by employing conversations, anecdotes 
and descriptive detail. It is made up of two parts and comprises of thirteen chapters. Part 
1 ends with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Part 2 begins with Jean Paul 
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Sartre delivering his famous lecture, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’. The war, Sartre 
said, ‘divided my life in two … I became aware of the weight of the world and my ties 
with all the others and their ties with me’ (Sartre cited in Watson 2000, p. 407). At its 
core, the narrative’s central conflict is existential. The realisation of the bomb 
represented a turning point for Oliphant. This schism caused by the development and 
ultimate success of the atomic bomb, an event which presents Oliphant with a moral 
dilemma, gives the narrative its two-part structure. Mark Oliphant, faced with a 
developing Cold War, is impelled to act having been forced to re-examine his values.
Flash forwards and flashbacks: a strategy
One of the key narrative devices Wolfe stated that he employed was to attempt to re-
create a scene from a ‘triple point of view:’ ‘the subject’s point of view, my own, and 
that of the other people watching’ most notable in The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test
(1968) (Wolfe cited in Marcus 2011, p. 63). Borrowing the idea of the ‘triple point-of-
view’ from Wolfe, the narrative device of framing is used to tell the Oliphant story in 
different times as flash forwards and flashbacks. It is also utilised to create doubt, to 
build suspense and conflict. 
Science historian Hugh Gusterson contends that American security practices ‘should be 
analysed … as … symbolic practices with social, as well as military, functions and 
consequences’ (Gusterson, 1996: 80). Beginning the recreated narrative with the release
of the Smyth Report in August 1945—arguably the birth of the ‘American secret’—
places the story in its time and context, as well as highlighting the security aspect of the 
narrative. By using flashback then to go back in time to Oliphant’s arrival in Cambridge 
in 1927 sets up mystery and interest in the unfolding narrative to follow. The 
juxtaposition of scientists’ recollections, taken from the interviews conducted by 
Oliphant’s biographers Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard in 1980, with the running 
narrative gives space for the reader to question what he/she is being told and perhaps to 
recognise human agency—individual jealousies and international rivalries—operating 
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within the oral record. Individual action may be observed from several different points of 
view and separated by time. This ‘frame breaking’ metafictional device calls attention to 
the construction of a biographical narrative reminding the reader to question the 
dominance of one interpretation over another. ‘The idea of novelizing an event,’ novelist 
and historian Richard Slotkin states, ‘is to see it from within, from the limited and 
contingent perspective of those who are caught up in the action’ (Slotkin 2005, p. 225). 
In his autobiography, Physics and Beyond (1971), German physicist Werner Heisenberg 
suggests that, although scientific practice is dictated by experimentation, ‘its results are 
attained through talks among those who work in it and who consult one another … 
science is rooted in conversations’ (Heisenberg, 1971, p.xvii). Although, as Heisenberg 
cautions, ‘conversations cannot be reconstructed literally after several decades,’ 
throughout the narrative I have tried to reconstruct these conversations by utilising direct 
quotes from the trove of memoirs and letters left behind (Heisenberg, 1971, p.xvii). 
Some of this dialogue is comprised of reconstructions of reports of direct conversations, 
some are comprised of extended exchanges in letters. My objective is the same as 
Heisenberg’s, a ‘wish to reconstruct … the broader picture’ and to show that ‘science is 
quite inseparable’ from all-encompassing ‘[h]uman, philosophical and political 
problems’ (Heisenberg, 1971, p.xvii). 
At its core, Gutkind asserts, creative nonfiction is ‘true to the facts’ and relies on a 
principle that the factual information provided is verifiable (Gutkind 2001, p. 175). 
Matthew Ricketson believes that the attribution of information sources should be a major 
characteristic that sets creative nonfiction apart from fiction (Ricketson p. 94). As with 
biographers and historians, Ricketson asserts, creative nonfiction writers ‘need honestly 
to report what they have found in their research’ (Ricketson 2010, p. 96). To cement the 
distinction between fiction and nonfiction, each chapter in Mark Oliphant in Atomic 
Wonderland, is followed by notes detailing the sources of information. The endnotes 
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provide a supportive framework flagging that this version of the Oliphant story is a ‘true’ 
account’. 
The boundaries of truth and accuracy
Woven into the reconstructed narrative are new findings unavailable to Cockburn and 
Ellyard in 1980 when they undertook research for the Oliphant biography. These include 
the discovery of Mark Oliphant’s 1943 proposal for what has become known as the 
synchrotron (Oliphant 1943). The inclusion of different time frames also serves to 
highlight the fragility of conclusions drawn by the ‘omniscient authorial voice’ when 
writing about actual people and past events that, as Ricketson contends, ’in all likelihood 
are contested, contingent and still unfolding’ (Ricketson 2010, p. 101). The creative 
nonfiction medium then, provides a mode for the writer to question and reinterpret past 
events ‘within the boundaries of truth [and] accuracy’ by reconstructing past worlds as 
stories without the need, Gutkind argues, for balance or objectivity (Gutkind 2012, p. 34)
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Chapter 1: ‘Eureka!’ The Deus ex Machina of 
scientific discovery
I am narrating this incident in all its details because – not immediately, but afterward – it
was considered a premonition of everything that was to happen, and also because all 
these images of the period must cross the page … All these oblique lines, intersecting, 
should define the space … where our story can emerge from nothingness, find a point of 
departure, a direction, a plot.
Italo Calvino 
If on a winter’s night a traveller … (1998, p. 79)
In Writing Lives: Principia Biographica (1984), the literary critic and biographer, Leon 
Edel, proposed that a writer attack the vast archive armed with a preconceived idea of 
what the archive will reveal based on narrative tropes: ‘The mythological keys help guide 
us through the mazes … [When] the biographer can discover a myth, he has found his 
story’ (Edel 1978, p. 2). In accord with the analysis of literary and cultural theorists, such 
as Roslynn Haynes, Christopher Frayling and others, this chapter will argue that the 
narrative trope of the mad scientist—an individual who resorts to any method that will 
bring new knowledge and power no matter what the consequences—is a familiar literary 
device overly represented to characterise scientists in literature and film. It is also 
commonly appropriated as a model in biographies dealing with scientists. It also looks at 
the dilemma facing a writer in writing the scientific life, in particular the life of a 
Manhattan Project scientist and all that an analysis brings with it given the social and 
political context of the development of the atomic bomb.
1.1 Future proofing
In the ‘telling’ of a life the choice of narrating which events taken from the life of the 
subject, the causal—chronological order and arrangement of motifs, is devised by the 
writer. In addition to the filtering process undertaken in order to present historical events 
as a narrative, narrative elements need to be employed; the narrative ‘has to be troped and 
emplotted and sustained by argumentation’ (Jenkins 2009, p. 119-20). Having a subject 
‘front and centre’ by necessity, reduces a complex life trajectory into a number of events 
whose purpose is to trace a path of cause and effect through a residue of incidences and 
archival remnants. The imposition of a narrative structure on archival material, while 
necessary, is not a neutral function. The biographical aim is to conceal ambiguities or 
absences in the record. The use of supposition and the techniques of fictional narration 
are often utilised implicitly without acknowledging that other versions exist. As 
biographer Lyndall Gordon contends, ‘documentary truth is limited and needs the 
complement of imaginative truth’ (Gordon 1998, p. 370). Not only is continuity 
subverted by leaving gaps unfilled, the narrative is disrupted when the story either does 
not make sense or feels forced. 
The range of material available to a writer, Richard Holmes highlights, includes that 
which is constructed and reinvented—‘inevitably biased’ memoirs, letters ‘slanted 
towards their recipients,’ private diaries and journals—which are ‘literary forms of self-
invention’; these sources are, Holmes affirms, ‘inherently unreliable’ (Holmes 1995, p. 
17). When writing the life of a Manhattan Project scientist there exists an abundance of 
material, both personal and historical emanating from both sides of the ideological 
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political divide. In addition, there is often more than one version of historical ‘truth’. 
‘Versions,’ as historian Klaus Hentschel points out, ‘partially conflict with one another, 
without there being any clear-cut way of coming to a definite decision’ (Hentschel 2001, 
p. 2).
Science writer Roald Hoffmann believes that readers ‘crave’ the traditional hero’s quest 
trope—‘[the] archetypal myth … of the hero-scientist, singlehandedly overcoming 
obstacles’—as a structure for writing about scientists (Hoffmann 1992, p. 4). Added to 
the heroic character is the preference for scientists to be presented as somehow 
overwhelmed by miraculous insight where scientific discovery is often presented as a 
lucky accident or moment of insight. This myth of the ‘Eureka Experience,’ is harnessed 
to explain the creative thinking of scientists (Gruber 1981, p. 41). Howard Gruber 
contends that Eureka experiences are perceived to be ‘rare … rapid, like a millisecond 
flash, having no inner structure, and … [mark] a rupture with the past’ (Gruber 1981, p. 
42). In reality these moments of creative insight occur regularly and exponentially as new 
scientific knowledge is accrued, and are a regular component of scientific endeavour. As 
Augustine Brannigan states, ‘”gestalt shifts” or “flashes of insight” are nothing more than 
situationally contingent changes in our awareness of topics’ (Brannigan 1981, p. 180). 
Nevertheless, their ‘uniqueness’ is a staple of biographical science writing (Gruber 1981, 
p. 42). Thomas Söderqvist illustrates this contention in commenting on his biography, 
Science as Autobiography: The Troubled Life of Niels Jerne (2003): ‘[w]hat matters … is 
the significant moment—the moment of discovery, the moment when a new model of 
Nature was conquered and possessed’ (Söderqvist 1996, p. 73).
In his biography of Manhattan Project physicist Richard Feynman, James Gleick ponders 
whether future genius can be foreseen well before the creative ‘flash’:
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Could one have guessed while he was still a child that Richard Feynman would 
become perhaps the greatest, and probably the most beloved, physicist of the last 
half of the twentieth century?’ (Gleick 1992, p. 3)
Albert Einstein represents the archetypal scientific genius. Einstein’s five papers 
published in 1905 are presented as an annus mirabilis of scientific achievement, 
symbolised by the equation, E=mc2. An article on the NASA website asking ‘Was 
Einstein a Space Alien?’ also makes the claim that the last scientist to have had an 
equally ‘creative outburst’ as Einstein was Sir Isaac Newton two centuries previously 
(Phillips 2005). In contrast to this perception of Einstein’s 1905 output, Peter Galison 
contends that Einstein ‘was a man of his time … [those papers] would have been written 
in some form, eventually, by others’ (Galison in Phillips 2005). Yet Einstein’s propensity 
for abstract thought, his anti-authoritarianism and his unconventional character have been 
co-opted and mythically reimagined as eccentric and other-worldly. Einstein is cast as the 
prototypical, politically naïve, childlike genius despite his involvement throughout his life 
in political causes: Einstein supported Zionist causes; he was prominent in organisations 
assisting German Jews escaping Nazi Germany; he was vocal in his support of the civil 
rights movement in America; he campaigned for a socialist world government and was an 
active campaigner for nuclear disarmament after the Second World War until his death in 
1955. A typical portrayal of his perceived political ignorance is illustrated by this passage 
from Jürgen Neffe’s Einstein: A Biography (2007):
Calculations about power politics were not Einstein’s forte … He had trouble 
acknowledging that the bond between the two adversarial partners, the Soviet 
Union and the United States, came unglued in what seemed like the blink of an eye 
once their common goal had been attained … Einstein hoped the Allies would be 
able to remain in an alliance … Idealism may appear naïve, but that is what makes 
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it refreshing and liberating in the face of ideology and practical restraints (Neffe 
2007, p. 387). 
This teleological reading of Einstein’s political leanings in the years after the end of the 
Second World War but prior to the Cold War is typical of a master narrative of Cold War 
left political naivety that emerged at this time—one, in fact, that informs a great deal of 
Mark Oliphant’s experiences both at home and abroad. The collective anxiety triggered 
by the atomic bomb contributed to a new narrative emerging: nuclear scientists through 
the power of their intellect had brought the world to the brink of disaster. The popular 
perception of a benign Einstein before the Second World War was replaced by postwar 
censure. ‘Einstein’s genius,’ a postwar Time magazine cover story warned its readers, had 
given the world the atomic bomb and, with this new discovery, had ‘blasted man’s 
complacent pride in the power of unaided intellect’ (Time 1946, p. 54). Old myths were 
redeployed; as Faust, Frankenstein and Prometheus had discovered, the possession of 
knowledge is dangerous.
1.2 Dreaming of the American Nuclear Frontier
Although the creative nonfiction piece of this thesis is not conceived as a biography, 
nevertheless, it includes biographical elements by necessity. Bernadette Bensaude-
Vincent suggests that biographies of scientists ‘are a very efficient instrument to 
emphasise the cultural meanings of scientific activities and their part in the construction 
of national memories’ (Bensaude-Vincent 2007, p. 182). The adoption of national myths 
to shape scientist narratives contributed towards a particular view of American 
‘exceptionalism’ during the Cold War (Pease 2009, p. 7). As historian Donald Pease 
states, ‘the belief in America as the fulfilment of the national ideal to which other nations 
aspire … supplied a prerequisite horizon of intelligibility for the understanding of 
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American events’ (Pease 2009, p. 7). This framing had consequences for those scientists 
who did not fit within the ideal of an American myth. In his biography Tesla: Inventor of 
the Electrical Age (2013), Bernard Carlson argues that Serbian-born engineer, physicist 
and inventor of the alternating current electrical system, Nikola Tesla, was excluded from 
mid-twentieth century American history books because he could not be co-opted to 
advance the myth of ‘Yankee ingenuity’: the idea that Americans possessed extraordinary 
practicality and were ‘technologically creative’ embodied in people like Thomas Edison, 
Henry Ford and Ernest Lawrence (Carlson 2013, p. 397). Uninterested in the commercial 
exploitation of his inventions, Tesla, who was characterised as ‘effete, elitist and … 
eccentric,’ could not contribute to a Cold War American frontier national narrative and 
therefore, ‘was best ignored—a curious outsider who could be forgotten’ (Carlson 2013, 
p. 397).
Whereas American Manhattan Project contemporary with an equal disregard of 
authority, Richard Feynman, might be described as bohemian, a rebel, dynamic or 
energetic, these same qualities in connection to Oliphant are labelled as belligerence, 
crash-through, politically naïve or subversive. Yet Oliphant was equally as passionate, 
enthusiastic and compelling. An audience member remembers him speaking at a public 
lecture in Sydney in the early 1950s: ‘I can’t even remember what he said—something 
about atoms—but he was the sexiest man I’ve ever heard speak’ (Henderson 2012).
Misrepresentations of the historical record in relation to Mark Oliphant are also to be 
found. Despite being listed as the primary researcher in all of the papers relating to the 
discovery of helium 3, Oliphant’s discovery is ignored in some American publications 
which instead give the credit to Luis Alvarez and Robert Cornog (Alvarez and Cornog 
furthered the original discovery by proving that hydrogen 3 was radioactive and that 
helium 3 was stable) (Oliphant, Harteck & Rutherford 1934, pp. 393-428). 
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The provenance of the invention of the synchrotron is a subject where Oliphant’s 
contribution is not always recognised. Gordon Fraser, in The Particle Century (1998), 
states that Mark Oliphant’s invention of the synchrotron in 1943 ‘opened the way for an 
ever-increasing series of circular accelerators and storage rings’ of which CERN’s LHC 
is an example of the latest generation (Fraser, 1998, p. 173). Despite many citations 
giving Oliphant credit for making the first proposal for a synchrotron accelerator using a 
ring magnet with varying electric and magnetic fields beginning as early as 1946, many 
histories do not acknowledge him. These contradictory narratives of the invention of the 
synchrotron are illustrated by the following examples. American historian Robert Seidel 
claims that Oliphant took the synchrotron idea from fellow physicist Edwin McMillan 
stating that ‘Oliphant … embarked on a project inspired by his wartime stint at the 
Radiation Laboratory and McMillan’s principle of phase stability’ (Seidel 1983, p. 393). 
In fact, Oliphant’s proposal predates McMillan’s by two years (Oliphant to Akers, 1943). 
In contrast, David C Cassidy argues that McMillan took the synchrotron idea from 
Oliphant who was still bound by the Official Secrets Act: ‘Drawing upon an idea put 
forth by Australian physicist Marcus Oliphant … Edwin McMillan solved the problem of 
altering the strength of the magnetic field and the frequency of the accelerating electric 
field in synchronization with each other and with the increasing masses of the particles’ 
(Cassidy 2011, p. 94).
Another example of the contradictory nature of narratives dealing with Oliphant relates to 
the University of Birmingham cyclotron. In From Nuclear Transmutation to Nuclear 
Fission, 1932-1939, Per F Dahl states that ‘the onset of World War II stopped 
construction of the Birmingham cyclotron, and it was obsolete when it started up in 1950’ 
(Dahl, 2002, p. 166). Dahl cites Heilbron and Seidel’s Lawrence and His Laboratory
(1989) as his reference. Heilbron and Seidel, both highly respected American historians, 
in their reference to the Birmingham cyclotron state that ‘war stopped construction, and 
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Lord Nuffield’s cyclotron was obsolete when it started up in 1950’ citing Cockburn and 
Ellyard’s 1981 biography of Oliphant as their reference (Heilbron & Seidel, 1989, p. 
350). Cockburn and Ellyard, as the original source of this reference state ‘[a] beam of 
particles was set circulating in the [Birmingham] cyclotron early in 1950. The first 
external beam was obtained the following July’ (Cockburn and Ellyard, 1981, p. 136). 
There is no mention that the Birmingham cyclotron was obsolete when it produced its 
first beam. In fact, Cockburn and Ellyard go on to state that ‘[t]hirty years later the 
accelerator was still in use. It was one of the most successful early cyclotrons in Europe’ 
(Cockburn and Ellyard, 1981, p. 136).
Pierre Bourdieu contends that scientific behaviours are directed towards the acquisition of 
scientific authority manifested in scientific reputation and prestige; ‘the locus of a 
competitive struggle’ where the reward is the ‘monopoly of scientific authority’ 
(Bourdieu, 1975, p. 19). Looked at with regard to the American acquisition of atomic 
knowledge, Bourdieu’s premise can help to explain why Oliphant is so often sidelined. 
As historian Alex Wellerstein states, beginning with the publication of the Smyth Report, 
the official American history of the Manhattan Project released in August 1945, , the 
United States was first with ‘historicizing its nuclear program’ the result of which is ‘a 
very skewed nuclear historiography [where] the United States is … vastly 
overrepresented’ (Wellerstein 2012, p. 236). Coupled with the employment of national 
myths, postwar nuclear history was retold through ‘archetypal patterns of growth and 
decay, salvation and damnation, death and rebirth’ (Slotkin 1986, p. 70). 
Britain was recast as a junior ally needing a saviour rather than a victorious nation that 
had won the European war. As historian David Edgerton contends, narratives concentrate 
with ‘almost obsessive fascination’ on British pluck at facing the German Blitz, the 
evacuation of Dunkirk and rationing (Edgerton 2011, p. 1). Despite celebrating ‘Britain’s 
technical genius, exceptional mobilization and emergent welfare state, histories insist on 
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Britain’s economic, industrial, technical and military weakness and its saving by the 
USA’ (Edgerton 2011, p. 1). 
Britain during the 1930s saw the introduction of significant nationalisation and social 
welfare reforms which were stepped up with the election of the Atlee Labour 
Government in 1945. The postwar British socialist government was an anathema to an 
American ideal for political development in Europe. In the American psyche, postwar 
socialist Britain was cast as ‘a decrepit industrial basket case, a national community 
whose identity centred to an unhealthy degree on nostalgia for the finest hour’ (Edgerton 
2011, p. 1-2). Having lost government and the Prime Ministership, Churchill cannily 
aided in the construction of this myth most compellingly in his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech of 
March 1946 delivered in Fulton, Missouri, where he called for the Americans to take the 
lead in the fight for civilisation against Russia.
The United States foreign policy of ‘long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment 
of Russian expansive tendencies,’ articulated in American diplomat and advisor George 
Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ of 1946, represents another defining strategy which came into 
play in American historical and biographical narratives. ‘[I]nternational Marxism,’ 
Kennan declared, ‘with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world 
… is more dangerous and insidious than ever before’ (Kennan 1946). As Robin Wood 
contends, in American popular culture throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century Marxism is ‘render[ed] indistinguishable from Stalinism’ (Wood 1986, p. 75).
The policy of containment during the Cold War, Alan Nadel contends, also acted as a 
cultural ‘strategy … function[ing] to disclose consent, pre-empt dialogue, and preclude 
contradiction’ (Nadel 1995, p. 14). Within the confines of this strategy, leftist scientists 
are always depicted as ‘Other’. Those scientists who objected to the demonisation of the 
Soviets were summed up by Kennan’s gendered inference: they were ‘politically … as 
innocent as six-year-old maidens’ (Kennan 1947). Cold War narratives conscripted the 
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informing logic of the American frontier trope to create a new nuclear mythopoeia. As 
Richard Slotkin argues, drawing on this long-standing trope the lone American hero 
fighting a war between savagery and civilisation is: 
[A]bsorbed into the ideological conception of the Cold War … slogan, “Better 
dead than red” [which] takes off from the same premise as the nineteenth-century 
cavalryman’s “Save the last bullet for yourself’ (Slotkin 1998, p. 363). 
Historian Richard Rhodes calls on this familiar frontier trope in distinguishing between 
American and European scientists at Los Alamos: ‘The Europeans … complained of the 
barbed wire … the Americans accepted the fences around their work and their lives as a 
necessity of war’ (Rhodes 1986, p. 464). Employing the frontier trope to single out the 
Americans at Los Alamos signifies ‘a national becoming … genetically European but 
better’ (Fussell 1965, p. 15). The Americans having abandoned isolationism in practice, 
were determined to retain a nuclear monopoly. The Los Alamos fence not only 
represented the imaginary boundary between Americans and ‘Other,’ it also represented a 
divide between the new world industrial ingenuity and the spent old world. As Mark 
Oliphant pointed out in 1948, in the postwar world America’s sense of exceptionalism 
had yet to be challenged.
America’s attitude towards atomic energy and towards war and peace, would be 
modified in a healthy way if Great Britain also, as a result of our own initiative, 
possessed atomic weapons (Oliphant 1948). 
In the immediate postwar period American physicist Ernest Lawrence fitted the image of 
the ideal frontiersman overseeing his two giant pro-nuclear weapons labs out in the West,
Berkeley and Livermore. A conservative Republican, Lawrence was a member of the 
exclusive Bohemian Grove where he rubbed shoulders with heads of government and 
wealthy industrialists. An attempt was made to recast nuclear physicist J Robert 
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Oppenheimer within the boundaries of the frontier narrative. A 1948 Time article 
describes Oppenheimer as a cowboy setting out from his ‘crude ranch house in the middle 
of nowhere’ to ride his horse through New Mexico’s Sangre de Cristo Mountains ‘[w]ith 
a Stetson on his head and a bar of chocolate in his pocket’ (Time 1948, p. 72). This 
reimagining of the elite, Jewish, theoretical physicist, however, could not overcome the 
distrust by the public of scientists as the adoption of a ‘nuclear consciousness’—the 
inescapable influence of the nuclear awakening on American social, cultural, political and 
technological culture in the late 1940s and 1950s—began to infiltrate as a threat of 
nuclear war (Boyer 1985, p. xix). 
Between 1948 and 1953, the US House Un-American Committee (HUAC) hearings into 
‘Communist infiltration’ of US institutions subpoenaed physicists as ‘unfriendly’ 
witnesses in higher numbers than any other group (Kaiser 2005, p. 29). Twenty-seven 
HUAC hearings were devoted to physicists, double that of any other academic field 
(Kaiser 2005, p. 29). Academics, in general, comprised around twenty per cent of all 
witnesses called to testify in HUAC hearings (Schrecker 1986, p. 10). In 1950 the HUAC 
committee, while interrogating American nuclear physicist, Ed Condon, expressed their 
collective distrust of physicists and the tacit knowledge they possessed.
Dr Condon, it says here that you have been at the forefront of a revolutionary 
movement in physics called “quantum mechanics”. It strikes this hearing that if 
you could be at the forefront of one revolutionary movement … you could be at the 
forefront of another (HUAC committee quoted in Sagan 1995, p. 248). 
1.3 Prometheus De-livered
Biographer Thomas Söderqvist declares that a ‘romantic Faustian theme runs through’ his 
narrative of of the Nobel prize-winning scientist Niels Jerne (Söderqvist 2003, p. xxvii).
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As commonly seen as the story of Faust, Mary Shelley’s familiar tale of Victor 
Frankenstein, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus (1818), is deeply embedded in 
the cultural collective consciousness in relation to portrayals of scientists. Shelley’s novel 
begins as a cautionary tale: the scientist, Dr Victor Frankenstein, implores the narrator to 
‘[L]earn … by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge’ (Shelley 
2001, p. 54). Two centuries after it was first published Frankenstein is still regularly 
exploited as a rhetorical trope in scientific discourse both for its representation of an 
obsessed genius unable to see the implications of his creation as well as an indication 
that, like Faust, the scientist will sell his soul for new knowledge and that loss of soul 
relates to the incapacity to work through what a discovery might do to a world. This 
linkage of scientists to the mad scientist trope in biography provides the modus operandi 
for censure. This persistent fictional stereotype has, as Roslynn Haynes asserts, ‘provided 
a model for the contemporary evaluation of scientists and, by extension, of science itself’ 
(Haynes 1994, p. 4). 
The cautionary tales of Faust and Frankenstein are often alluded to in contemporary 
biographical science writing. For example, in his biography of Werner Heisenberg, 
Uncertainty (1991), David J Cassidy states that Heisenberg’s story ‘warns us of the 
potential dangers and dilemmas of scientific research’ (Cassidy 1991, p. 410). Historian 
John L Heilbron’s biography of German physicist Max Planck, Dilemmas of an Upright 
Man: Max Planck and the Fortunes of German Science (1986), declares that Planck’s 
story has all ‘the elements of heroic tragedy. His life is a lesson’ (Heilbron 1986, p. x). J 
Robert Oppenheimer, in particular, looms large as the archetypal symbol representing 
both perpetrator—‘father of the atomic bomb’—and its victim in the wake of his being 
branded a security risk largely due to McCarthyist forces in 1954. Upon his death in 
1967, an article in Life magazine described him as having been:
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[O]ne of the most famous men in the world … the fabulous and fascinating 
archetype of a brand new kind of hero … living symbol of the new atomic age. 
Then, suddenly, all the glory was gone and he was gone, too: alive … but no longer 
seen (Coughlan 1967, p. 35). 
Michel Foucault posited that with the swing to the conservative Right in the charged 
atmosphere of the Cold War, the Left intellectual was no longer spokesperson for ‘a 
universal consciousness, a free subject … counterpoised to …those in the service of the 
State or Capital’ (Foucault 1980, p. 127). Instead, Foucault asserts, these intellectuals had 
become a political threat ‘no longer on account of a general discourse which he 
conducted, but because of the knowledge at his disposal’ (Foucault 1980, p. 127-8). 
Foucault posits the switch to the ‘specific intellectual’ transpired after the Second World 
War and singles out the atomic scientist—‘in a word, or rather a name: Oppenheimer’—
as the trigger for the paradigm shift (Foucault 1980, p. 127). In 1954 Oppenheimer was 
stripped of his government security clearance and consequently dropped from his position 
as advisor to the United States Atomic Energy Commission due to his opposition to the 
development of the hydrogen fusion ‘Superbomb’ and his alleged influence on committee 
members to follow his lead. The Security Board members concluded that, in relation to 
future expert advice, ‘[c]aution must be expressed with respect to judgments that go 
beyond special and particular competence’ (USAEC 1971, p. 1016). 
The Promethean myth is omnipresent in biographies of Robert Oppenheimer: the 
cautionary tale reminding us that stealing fire from the gods necessitates a price to be paid 
is often paralleled with Oppenheimer’s spectacular fall from grace. Oppenheimer the man 
is consistently conflated with Oppenheimer as myth exemplified in the title of Kai Bird 
and Martin J Sherwin’s Pulitzer-prize winning biography of Oppenheimer American 
Prometheus (2005). In his review of Ray Monk’s biography of Oppenheimer, Inside the 
Centre (2012), historian Richard Rhodes criticises Monk’s interpretation for not framing 
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it around the Promethean myth: ‘[Monk] misses the deep alignment of Robert 
Oppenheimer's life with Greek tragedy, the charismatic hubris that was his glory but also 
the flaw that brought him low’ (Rhodes 2013, p. 1). 
In what is described as a ‘Bourbakification’ of atomic history—so named after Carl 
Djerassi’s 1996 novel, The Bourbaki Gambit, where a group of scientists publish under 
the nom de plume, Nicolas Bourbaki—Oppenheimer stands in for not only the atomic 
bomb project itself, but also the failure of Western liberalism in the face of Right-wing 
conservatism during the Cold War ‘enforced by the conjoint workings of military secrecy 
and Big Science’ (Gusterson 2004, p. 282). The many scientific, political and military 
players involved in the Manhattan Project are collapsed into the figure of one scientist, 
Robert Oppenheimer, who alone is charged with both the development of and the 
consequences of the atomic bomb. Biographies such as Charles Thorpe’s Oppenheimer: 
The Tragic Intellect (2006), illustrate this positioning. Thorpe’s argument is centred on 
the figure of Robert Oppenheimer who stands in for the whole nuclear scientific 
community. The ‘real’ Oppenheimer, Thorpe contends, cannot and should not be 
separated from the Oppenheimer of myth. Despite a lack of primary evidence 
(Oppenheimer left few personal papers), the ‘fractured’ persona emerges in ‘the roles of 
the scientific specialist and the broadly cultivated humanist’ (Thorpe 2006, p. 16, 300 n
44). Science has always been co-opted by the State, in particular in the development of 
weaponry. Yet, Thorpe condemns nuclear scientists for having compromised themselves 
by inventing the atomic bomb therefore facilitating ‘the way in which science became … 
a central instrument of violence, transforming the capacity and scope of violence, and, in 
so doing, becoming a vital source of state power’ (Thorpe 2006, p. xi). 
1.4 Scientists from Central Casting 
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Andrew Tudor lists three recurrent thematic features of postwar science fiction cinema: 
‘the threat of alien invasion, the risks of nuclear power, and the roles of science and 
scientists’ (Tudor 1997, p. 458). The interlinking of these themes in 1950s cinema echoes
the public anxiety and ‘articulate distinctive American fears [of] xenophobia, anti-
communism [and] anxiety about technocracy and mass society apparent in both the public 
discourse and private lives of the period’ (Tudor 1997, p. 458). Two years before the 
release of The Beginning, or the End? Hollywood, with the assistance of the security 
agencies, had been drafted into participating in the program of misinformation. The 
docudrama, The House on 92nd Street (1945), its production completed months prior to 
the atomic bomb blast over Hiroshima on August 6, was released on 10 September. One 
of the first semi-documentary films, it was made with the cooperation of the FBI and 
featured the Bureau’s director, J Edgar Hoover, as well as the acting abilities of several 
uncredited FBI agents. Shot on location in New York, the film opens with an omniscient 
narrator declaring that that the American bomb program began in 1939 with American 
scientists working at heavily guarded secret laboratories developing ‘Process 97 … the 
secret ingredient of the atomic bomb’. Enemy foreign agents, Nazi fifth-columnists, 
having learned of the existence of Process 97, intent on stealing ‘the most important 
American military secret in history,’ are eventually discovered by the diligent efforts of 
the American security service. No mention is made in the film of any input from the 
British. The film was a success in the United States winning an Oscar for ‘best original 
story,’ but panned by British newspapers for its exclusion of British scientists in the 
development of the atomic bomb: ‘US film robs Britain of credit’ an outraged Daily 
Mirror front page headline told its readers (Daily Mirror 1945, p. 1).
Just as American cinema contributed to the shaping of history and the development of 
censuring discourses around scientists as public figures, British filmmakers, although not 
as prolific as Hollywood’s, also attempted to produce films that addressed Cold War 
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fears. Arguably, the most prominent film in this regard is Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 satire, 
Dr Strangelove or how I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb. The very first 
postwar British film to address the fear of rogue scientists armed with nuclear weapons 
was John and Roy Boulting’s 1950 thriller, Seven Days to Noon. The film tells the story 
of a nuclear scientist, Professor John Willingdon, who, having stolen an atomic bomb ‘the 
size of a small typewriter’ from the research facility where he works and hidden it in a 
Gladstone bag, sends an ultimatum to the Prime Minister that unless the government 
destroys its nuclear arsenal and ends atomic bomb research he will obliterate London. 
The film’s narrative trajectory follows the manhunt for the increasingly desperate 
professor and his eventual death followed by the ‘just-in-time’ defusing of the atomic 
bomb. The threat that a small atomic bomb could be smuggled into the country and 
surreptitiously deployed under the noses of the security forces was an idea that had 
gained traction throughout the late 1940s. Following the release of Seven Days to Noon,
the Daily Express journalist, Chapman Pincher, fuelled the public’s anxiety by declaring 
that ‘enough bombs to cripple Britain’s defences could be brought into the country 
without the knowledge of police, Customs or the Secret Service’ (Pincher cited in 
Bingham 2012, p. 619). In the US, the Coast Guard were issued with Geiger counters to 
assist in the search for smuggled atomic bombs (‘Search for smuggled A-bombs,’ 1950, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol 6, no 8/9, p. 288).
Seven Days to Noon was made with the cooperation of the War Office; the production 
had unprecedented access to locations around London. Special permission was granted to 
the film’s producers to enable the use of the police force to hold up traffic, to 
commandeer railway stations and to enable the evacuation of Piccadilly Circus for 
filming. The scientist protagonist in the film, Professor Willingdon, is not a spy, yet, in a 
Churchillian radio address, the Prime Minister reminds the audience of the emergent Cold 
War zeitgeist:
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Were we to bow to [Willingdon’s] threat, we might well be exposing this country –
indeed the whole free world – to a danger far greater than any that confronts us 
now … Our recent history has taught us that to make ourselves weak provides an 
irresistible temptation to the tyrant (Seven Days to Noon 1950).
The use of documentary-style realism in scenes of hordes of resolute Londoners queuing 
for mass evacuation emulates images of the Second World War. The line between 
entertainment and propaganda was further blurred when Time revealed that American 
civil defence planners had attended advance screenings in order ‘to pick up some pointers 
on how to evacuate a metropolis under the threat of an atomic bomb’ (Time 1950, p. 58).
The protagonist bears an uncanny resemblance to the real scientist Mark Oliphant. While 
the film does not use Willingdon’s first names, the script lists three: John Malcolm 
Francis. Oliphant also had three first names: Marcus Lawrence Elwin. In the film 
Willingdon is described as a former Assistant Director of the Cavendish Laboratory at 
Cambridge, a member of the British team sent to join the American Manhattan Project 
from 1943-45, and as holding the Oliver Chair in Physics at the University of 
Birmingham. Oliphant was a former Assistant Director of the Cavendish Laboratory at 
Cambridge University, head of the British team seconded to the Radiation Laboratory, 
Berkeley under the Manhattan Project from 1943-45 and held the Poynting Chair of 
Physics at Birmingham. Willingdon, while following the characterisation of a typical mad 
scientist, is introduced as ‘a troubled man who lost faith in the value of his work’. The 
narrative following Willingdon’s increasing desperation and descent into madness 
subverts any principled stance he attests to; the scientist-hero transforms into villain. As 
Stephen Guy states: 
In contrast to unstable and misguided intellectuals such as Willingdon, the 
established figures of British authority—the police, military leaders, the political 
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elite … quietly and relentlessly protect the nation from the madness of the Cold 
War world (Guy 1999, p. 151). 
Any comparison with the fictional Willingdon and the real-life scientist Mark Oliphant is 
speculation on my part, however, the similarities between them seem more than 
coincidence. Described in the New York Times at the time as ‘Britain’s leading atomic 
bomb expert,’ it is hard not to read this film as censure of scientists such as Oliphant who 
was an outspoken opponent to nuclear proliferation after the war regularly featuring in the 
popular press espousing his view that the only failsafe way to avoid a nuclear arms race 
was to outlaw nuclear weaponry (Egan 1945, p. 38). Whereas Einstein is cast as naïve 
and unworldly and Oppenheimer is seen as a pitiful and tragic figure, a dissenting 
scientist such as Mark Oliphant, in the guise of Willingdon, is cast as architect of his own 
disaster. Willingdon’s ‘liberal-pacifist views’ and his stance against nuclear proliferation 
are not portrayed as a legitimate political position and are, instead, depicted as dangerous. 
Willingdon, who serves to represent Oliphant and scientists like him, has proved
unpredictable and unable to be controlled. On the second anniversary of the destruction of 
Hiroshima, Mark Oliphant acknowledged this displeasure at nuclear scientists wielding 
their influence against the wishes of the conservative ruling class: ‘The task of 
enlightening public opinion has made some of us unpopular … in official circles’ 
Oliphant declared in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, before again pressing for 
disarmament, and end to secrecy and the resumption of scientific collaboration with the 
Russians (Oliphant 1947b, p. 235). 
Following the success of Seven Days to Noon, the Boulting brothers released a more 
strident anti-Communist film, High Treason (1951), focussing on a fifth column made up 
of largely British intellectuals. Seven Days to Noon and High Treason, film critic 
Raymond Durgnat states, ‘show a decreasing faith in the common man, and an increasing 
reliance on authority’ (Durgnat 1970, p. 235). Whereas Seven Days to Noon was a critical 
40
and box office success, High Treason was a failure despite, as the Manchester Guardian 
reported, reproducing the subject ‘quite as well as such American films as The Iron 
Curtain, the film of the Canadian spy ring case’ (Guy 1993, p.42). However, High 
Treason ‘had gone too far’ by co-opting ‘a McCarthyite position’ (Durgnat 1970, p. 235). 
As The New Statesman told its British readers, the ‘present American witch-hunt’ would 
not be reproduced in ‘this saner country’ (The New Statesman 1950, pp. 677–678). 
Communism was not viewed with the same degree of threat in Britain as it was in the US. 
The BBC, in opposition to government wishes, echoed this sentiment when in 1951 it 
declared that ‘Communists as speakers nor Communism as a subject’ would not be 
banned from broadcasts despite complaints about the policy from the Foreign Office 
(BBC Board of Governors cited in Jenks 2006, pp. 50-51). On the other hand, in the wake 
of the various sensational atomic spy cases—Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, the defection 
of Pontecorvo and the Rosenbergs—nuclear scientists having launched the atomic bomb 
on the world were still suspect.
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Chapter 2: Frankenstein’s Ghost in the Machine
At a certain point you remark: “This sentence sounds somehow familiar. In fact, this 
whole passage reads like something I’ve read before.” Of course: there are themes that 
recur, the text is interwoven with these reprises, which serve to express the fluctuation of 
time. You are the sort of reader who is sensitive to such refinements; you are quick to 
catch the author’s intentions and nothing escapes you.
Italo Calvino 
If on a winter’s night a traveller … (1998, p. 25)
In Australia, Mark Oliphant’s scientific career is viewed through the lens of the 
unfinished ANU synchrotron project and, consequently, as a scientist he is often 
portrayed as a failure. This view is not shared by scientists in the UK. Oliphant was still 
being described as a ‘visionary’ by British scientists in the years following the 
abandonment of the project despite all the criticism which followed in its wake (Frisch 
1967). A great deal of previous research has focused on Oliphant’s postwar career in 
Australia as director of Physical Sciences at the ANU. In this chapter I draw from three of 
these texts: Stewart Cockburn and David Ellyard’s 1981 biography Oliphant; The life and 
times of Sir Mark Oliphant, Steven Foster and Margaret Varghese’s The Making of the 
Australian National University published in 1996, and Stuart Macintyre’s ‘The Poor 
Relation: Establishing the Social Sciences in Australia, 1940-1970,’ published in 2009. 
This chapter will pay particular attention to the ways in which these portrayals, despite 
being written in different decades, are teleologically driven and reinforce the perception 
of failure in connection to not only the synchrotron project but to Oliphant himself by 
ignoring positive appraisals of Oliphant’s scientific achievements as they did not fit 
within a current ‘Big Science’ model. As Catherine Westfall has argued in her account of 
Berkeley’s Bevalac accelerator: ‘If we continue to frame discussions in terms of Big 
Science, in fact, there will continue to be many untold tales and therefore many missed 
lessons’ (Westfall 2003, p. 56). 
2.1 Divine retribution, or blame the parents
After historical change confirming a conservative worldview such as happened during the 
Cold War, writers often draw a distinction between political conservatism and liberalism 
concluding that belief in political liberalism is not only idealistic but also naïve. In 
Oliphant: The life and times of Sir Mark Oliphant (1981), Stewart Cockburn and David 
Ellyard argue that Oliphant’s parents’ embracing of Fabianism, theosophist and humanist 
philosophies, led later to Oliphant’s ‘naïve, childish idealism’, and is used as an 
explanation of his anti-war and nuclear disarmament stance. Cockburn and Ellyard set up 
a model for reading Oliphant at the paratextual level; the foreword, written by a 
conservative politician Sir Paul Hasluck, describes Oliphant as possessing ‘an almost 
incredible naïveté in respect of politics’ (Cockburn & Ellyard, 1981, p. vi).
Cockburn and Ellyard point to Mark Oliphant’s father as the cause of this naiveté. Harold 
Oliphant is described as ‘[p]olitically … a child’ and who ‘was a great admirer of the 
Labor Party and its battling leaders’ who ‘despise[d] many of the policies of the long-
reigning Liberal Party leader R G Menzies’ (Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, p. 11). 
The inference here seems to be that Mark Oliphant’s political allegiance to the Left, like 
that of his father, must therefore be naïve. This contextualising sets the ground rules for 
what follows. Rather than attributing to Mark Oliphant any political determination, in 
particular any connection to the British scientific Left of the 1930s, Cockburn and Ellyard 
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declare that ‘the genial and talkative Oliphant’ supplied the Press with ‘colourfully 
expressed information’ regardless of Cold War security implications whenever he was 
asked to (Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, p.158). Having been forewarned, the reader is asked 
to accept by a process of cause and effect that it is Mark Oliphant’s destiny is to repeat 
the errors made by his politically naïve father (which in fact have not been proven). Any 
future political utterings made by Oliphant and recounted in the biography are seen in this 
light without providing evidence of any erring on Harold Oliphant’s part, apart from his 
socialist values. Having set up the tragic irony—the flaws in Oliphant’s character—the 
reader foresees a tragic outcome from Oliphant’s statements and the consequences of 
future events yet to unfold. For example, Cockburn and Ellyard speculate that Oliphant 
was left off the reformed British ‘Tube Alloys’ atomic bomb development committee in 
1941 due to his ‘lack of discretion’: ‘already there may have been whispers that 
Oliphant’s hearty manner and weakness for provocative statements …  made him less 
than an ideal member of such a sensitive committee’ (Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, p. 102). 
There is no evidence to suggest this. In fact the prerequisite for inclusion on the 
reconstituted committee was predominantly that a scientist had a connection to the 
industrial firm Imperial Chemical Industries.
Cockburn and Ellyard are at pains to suggest that Mark Oliphant held naïve liberal views. 
In defence of this argument, the biographers provide testimony from another source, ‘a 
recognised anti-Communist,’ Sir Keith Hancock, assuring readers that: ‘Specifically, 
[Oliphant] agreed with the stand … that a university must always be objectively cautious 
in appointing known Communists to academic posts’ (Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, p. 57). 
There is no evidence to support the contention that Oliphant shared Hancock’s view. On 
the contrary, Oliphant does not seem to have considered politics when appointing staff; 
many of the staff and postgraduate students appointed by Oliphant at both Birmingham 
and Canberra were open members of the Communist Party in the 1930s and beyond 
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including Reinet Maasdorp, John Fremlin, Eric Burhop, Leonard Hibbard and Maurice 
Wilkins.
Cockburn and Ellyard extrapolate their assessment of Oliphant’s naive political idealism 
to posit a view that in his scientific judgement Oliphant was equally naive. In a review of 
the Oliphant biography American physicist Robert Seidel states that Cockburn and 
Ellyard ‘often fail to grasp the context of their subject’s work,’ in particular, singling out 
the 1933-34 deuteron experiments which led to Oliphant’s discovery of new isotopes of 
hydrogen and helium (Seidel 1986, p. 179) (Oliphant, Harteck & Rutherford 1934, pp. 
393-428). In 1933, Oliphant had disputed a finding by Ernest Lawrence and his team at 
the University of California Radiation Laboratory concerning Lawrence’s hypothesis of 
deuteron break-up. Despite Oliphant‘s questioning of Lawrence’s result, Lawrence 
published his findings in the Physical Review (Lawrence, Livingston & Lewis 1934, p. 
56). Later Oliphant confirmed Lawrence’s results were due to contamination (Oliphant, 
Harteck & Rutherford 1934, p. 413). 
Describing Cockburn and Ellyard’s discussion of this episode as a ‘bowdlerization’—an 
expunging of the record—Seidel argues that Oliphant’s biographers, ‘despite clear 
statements to the contrary in their subject’s own work … miss the point’ and the 
implications of these experiments (Seidel 1986, p. 178-9). What Cockburn and Ellyard 
also expurgate from their narrative is the refusal of the University of California’s 
Radiation Laboratory to admit their mistake. Lawrence’s reluctance to admit to error 
caused a rupture between the Radiation Lab and other American laboratories who had 
confirmed Oliphant’s finding. Lawrence’s stubbornness in conceding contamination in 
his results also meant that his team missed noticing the collisions between deuterons in 
the experiments (the nuclear fusion reaction) which were picked up by Oliphant and his 
team at Cambridge. The consequence of this omission by Cockburn and Ellyard is that 
they never come to grips with the importance of Oliphant’s early work at Cambridge and 
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so give the impression of a ‘never-ran’. Recounted in detail in chapter three of Mark 
Oliphant in Atomic Wonderland, Oliphant was subsequently nominated for a Nobel Prize 
for this discovery, a detail ignored by Cockburn and Ellyard despite having been alerted 
to this by one of the scientists they themselves had interviewed (McMillan 1980).
2.2 Frankenstein’s Ghost hovers 
In The Making of the Australian National University (1996), Foster and Varghese conjure 
up a familiar trope in their discourse on Oliphant and his contribution to the founding of 
the Research School of Physical Sciences. The Frankenstein myth informs, shapes and 
voices opposition, critiquing Oliphant’s synchrotron project as both as a misguided 
attempt and a monstrous creation. Foster and Varghese draw on archetypical character 
traits, those of the ‘mad scientist’—obsession, intellectual superiority, compulsion, and 
narcissism—in order to represent Oliphant as transgressor. Oliphant’s acceptance of the 
position of director of the research school of physical sciences is seen by Foster and 
Varghese as a quest for power: ‘Oliphant … saw himself from the outset as director of a 
school which would focus on research that he initiated … Oliphant was enthusiastically 
wielding the maestro’s baton’ (Foster & Varghese 1996, pp. 38, 50). His pursuit of his 
synchrotron ‘monster’ echoes Victor Frankenstein’s obsession to ‘penetrate into the 
recesses of nature … [and] ascend into the heavens’ (Shelley 2001, p. 48). To make 
certain that we understand the connection between Oliphant’s persistence in pursuing the 
synchrotron project as a quest for power overriding any scientific interest, Foster and 
Varghese suggest uncertainty about the validity of the project. 
From the outset, Oliphant had his critics … Harry Messel … declared that 
Oliphant’s approach to science was fundamentally wrong: Australia could not 
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compete with other countries in the big machine field and should avoid projects 
requiring massive money and manpower (Foster & Varghese 1996, p. 254).
What is omitted from this account is any questioning of Messel’s position or even any 
understanding of his position and what he means by the comment. There is also no 
acknowledgement of the intense rivalry at the time between state universities and the 
fledgling ANU. From the beginning of his appointment as the director of the University 
of Sydney’s School of Physics in 1952, Messel had lobbied against the transfer of federal 
funding from the state universities to the ANU. Establishing the Foundation for Nuclear 
Research, Messel pressed vigorously for the construction of a nuclear reactor at the 
University of Sydney, repeatedly requesting funds for the project only to be rejected on 
the grounds of safety. A report by an informant in Oliphant’s Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) file refers to ‘evidence of rivalry existing between 
Professors Messel and Oliphant’ and a ‘campaign … to discredit Oliphant and have him 
removed from his post, which would then be taken over by Messel’ (Oliphant ASIO 
1954). 
The original synchrotron project was not completed. Instead it was reworked to complete 
a homopolar generator. Alluding to the failure of the project as a result of Oliphant’s 
egotism, thereby echoing the failings of Victor Frankenstein, Oliphant is portrayed as 
self-absorbed and power-seeking, personality traits which inevitably lead to his downfall. 
Foster and Varghese surmise that the ‘problem’ of the synchrotron design was primarily 
‘an engineering one, for which Oliphant and his colleagues were unqualified and ill 
equipped [as Oliphant] considered engineers in general to be overcautious impediments to 
adventurous physics’ (Foster & Varghese 1996, p. 257). The project, according to the 
authors, ‘organised ‘on an amateur basis … held out many lessons for those who were 
willing to learn,’ concluding, in an allusion to T S Eliot’s The Hollow Men, that 
‘Oliphant’s plans for world-shattering discoveries had ended with a whimper’ (Foster & 
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Varghese 1996, pp. 257-59). Oliphant’s ‘true crime’ according to Foster and Varghese, 
was his refusal to take responsibility for his failure: 
[B]y shifting – or, at least, diluting – the blame, [Oliphant] managed to portray 
himself as a victim of his own misguided but well-intentioned optimism and of his 
compatriots’ failure to share his commitment and vision (Foster & Varghese 1996, 
p. 256). 
Foster and Varghese go further by extrapolating Oliphant’s failure to include the failings 
of science: ‘The demise of the [project] also challenged the authority of Science … 
scientists throughout the western world in the 1980s no longer stood on their 1950s 
pedestal’ (Foster & Varghese 1996, pp. 258-59). 
In contrast to the positioning of Foster and Varghese, a former Vice-Chancellor of the 
ANU, Sir Leslie Melville, conceded as early as 1954 to Oliphant’s British colleague Sir 
John Cockcroft, that Oliphant’s funding requests were restrained for the times:
Looked at on a world scale, I suppose that [Oliphant’s] demands of money for his 
machines were quite moderate. Other countries were spending 20 to 30 times as 
much in the same quest and the same cause (Melville to Cockcroft, 1954). 
With the success of the Manhattan Project, US laboratories garnered increasing financial 
support for high-energy physics by government agencies. In 1946 these US agencies—the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of Naval Research, the Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research, and the National Science Foundation—provided US$3.9 million for 
accelerator programs. Seven years later, this financial support had risen to US$26 million 
(Capshew & Rader 1992, p. 15). In Australian terms this amount represented the total 
expenditure on all universities across all faculties. In their investigation into the founding 
of the United States National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab), Catherine Westfall and 
Lillian Hoddeson explore the distrust between physicists and engineers during the 1960s. 
48
Manhattan Project physicist Robert Wilson overseeing the building of Fermilab, declared 
that research physicists ‘could design things that would be much prettier, sparser, and 
cheaper than … engineering types’ (Westfall & Hoddeson 1996, pp. 472-471). 
Dominique Pestre and John Krige note that even during the building of the giant 
European accelerator laboratory, CERN, during the 1960s, tensions erupted between the 
physicists and the engineers:
[I]n Europe the gap between physicists and engineers was still great, and this gap 
was inscribed in the structure of the laboratory and its power relations. The gap 
made it possible for the engineers and builders at CERN … to be relatively 
insensitive to the demands of the physicists for whom … having an “imperfect” 
piece of equipment ready at the right moment was often more important than 
having a “perfect” one ready when the dust of the battle had settled (Pestre & Krige 
1996, p. 90).
In Mark Oliphant’s case this ‘disdain’ for engineers is often extended to include architects 
citing the well-documented stoush Oliphant had with the architect appointed to design the 
ANU, Brian Lewis. What is often omitted in these accounts is that Lewis had a fractious 
relationship with not only Oliphant over the design of Oliphant’s house and the Research 
School of Physical Sciences, but also with Howard Florey over the design for the 
Research School of Medical Sciences. So toxic was the latter relationship that Lewis 
resigned as architect for the Medical Research buildings in 1953. Contrary to the view 
that Oliphant felt himself to be superior to the expertise of architects, Oliphant had a close 
working relationship with Cambridge architect Henry ‘Hugh’ Hughes. Hughes designed 
not only the Cavendish Laboratory’s Mond Building, but also the High Tension 
laboratory and had built the Oliphant house in Conduit Head Road, Cambridge, in 1934. 
One of the earliest examples of British International Modern-style architecture, this house 
has a Grade II listing on the English Heritage Buildings register. Hughes designed a 
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number of houses for Cavendish scientists and later collaborated with Oliphant to extend 
Oliphant’s Barnt Green house in Worcestershire. Oliphant oversaw (and largely designed) 
the University of Birmingham’s Nuffield Building which eventually housed both the 
cyclotron and the proton synchrotron.
The metonymic use of the ‘White Oliphant’ serves as a synecdoche for Oliphant’s entire 
career and frames it as failure. Foster and Varghese make the claim that not only was 
Oliphant’s Canberra project a failure, but, without providing any reference for the 
assertion, allege that ‘had anyone in the University or the government enquired closely, 
they would have learnt that Oliphant’s Birmingham accelerator had been labelled “the 
white Oliphant”’ (Foster & Varghese 1996, p. 259). Two points need to be considered. 
Firstly, the first mention of ‘the white Oliphant’ is recorded in an article published in 
Scientific American in November 1949 by the Canadian physicist, Leopold Infield and is 
not used as a criticism, but rather, it was a good-humoured nickname related to Oliphant’s 
appearance. Infield points to the ground-breaking nature of the Birmingham accelerator 
stating:
[W]hite-haired Marcus L E Oliphant, 48, one of Lord Rutherford’s most talented 
students … is a key man in England’s experimental work on atomic physics … The 
huge proton synchrotron under construction in Birmingham … is called “the white 
Oliphant”. When finished, it will be the biggest, most effective accelerator in 
existence  … Our century is witnessing a race in atomic artillery … “The white 
Oliphant,” a colossal doughnut-shaped metal structure, is the latest word in the race 
so far (Infield 1949, p. 42).
Secondly, as sociologist Robert Merton (1973) posited, ‘since institutionalized stakes of 
reputation are high’—as in Bourdieu’s acquisition of scientific capital—rivalries and 
jealousies between individual scientists and between national laboratories can have a 
deleterious effect on an individual’s scientific reputation. Merton states:
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One or another of the discoverers—or frequently, his colleagues or fellow-
nationals — suggests that he rather than his rival was really first … On some 
occasions this can lead to outright deceit in order to buttress valid claims (Merton 
1973, p. 314).
The existence of rivalry between the Berkeley and Birmingham laboratories is not 
examined by either Cockburn and Ellyard or Foster and Varghese. Evidence that such 
rivalry existed is found in Cockburn and Ellyard’s 1980 interview transcripts with the 
Berkeley Radiation Laboratory scientists. Martin Kamen alerts Cockburn to criticism of 
Mark Oliphant arising from ‘American dislike of the whole British culture and the British 
attitude’ interpreted by the Americans as condescension (Kamen 1980). Kamen singles 
out physicist Luis Alvarez as particularly vehement in his dislike of Oliphant. This is 
confirmed by Alvarez’s own testimony contained in the interview transcript: ‘After the 
war I visited Birmingham when Mark was there—the first proton synchrotron was an 
absolute disaster … There it was in Birmingham, White Oliphant Number One’ (Alvarez 
1980). Ed McMillan is scathing about Oliphant’s ability as a scientist describing him as a 
‘dilettante’ (McMillan 1980). Yet, Cockburn and Ellyard do not seem to want to 
investigate any ulterior motive despite testimony from other interviewees, notably, 
Kamen and Denis Robinson, that rivalry was the motivation for the comments (Robinson
1980).
American Manhattan Project physicist Philip Morrison, former Institute Professor at MIT, 
recalled that after the war Berkeley was ‘dominated by Lawrence’ who Morrison called 
‘[t]he dictator’ (Morrison 1967). Morrison particularly singled out ‘the political climate’ 
at Berkeley which he described had moved to the political far Right. Morrison endorsed 
Oliphant and his Research School as a leader in nuclear physics in the postwar period.
After the war … Birmingham … was now stronger than Cambridge … 
Birmingham had Peierls and Oliphant and even before the war, Birmingham was 
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beginning to come up … after the war, Birmingham was better than Cambridge 
(Morrison 1967).
Oliphant hosted the first international physics conference in the immediate postwar 
period. The conference drew leading scientists such as Niels Bohr, Edward Teller and 
Robert Oppenheimer, among many notable others, to the University of Birmingham.
The assessment of the worth of Oliphant’s Birmingham machine by Foster and Varghese 
does not stand up to scrutiny. In the USA, a consortium of nine Northeastern 
universities—Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, MIT, Princeton, Pennsylvania, 
Rochester and Yale—with initial funding provided by the Atomic Energy Commission 
established the Brookhaven National Laboratory and began construction of a proton 
synchrotron, the ‘Cosmotron,’ as ‘concern [had] been expressed that America is lagging 
behind the British’ (Seidel 1983, p. 397). An energy range of 2.5 billion-volts was chosen 
in order to surpass the Birmingham synchrotron to ensure ‘that the United States would 
retain the lead over Birmingham,’ not least due, as American physicist M Stanley 
Livingston put it, to ‘the political factors now involved in the decision’ (Seidel 1983, p. 
397). Jennet Conant in her history of philanthropist Alfred Lee Loomis and his support 
for American science, Tuxedo Park: A Wall Street tycoon and the secret palace of science 
that changed the course of World War II (2002), describes the competition with the 
British labs which drove Lawrence’s Berkeley lab: 
Lawrence wanted to build ‘the beam to end all beams’ ‘to weigh 2000 tons and to 
produce 100 million-volt particles’, one that would make the Brits Birmingham 
model look like a ‘toy’ (Conant 2002, p. 139).
Planning for the Birmingham synchrotron began in 1946 and for the Cosmotron in 1947. 
Brookhaven became operational in May 1953 some months before Birmingham at a cost 
of approx. US$7,000,000. Mark Oliphant’s grant to construct the Birmingham 
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synchrotron was just £140,000. Birmingham physicist Sir Rudolf Peierls states that the 
delay was due to continued shortages of materials and equipment caused by postwar 
rationing; the laboratory ‘struggle[d] to get allocations … which meant doing everything 
in the most economical way, which is not usually the fastest way’ (Peierls 1969). After 
many years of productive service and despite the discrepancy in their funding, both the 
Birmingham synchrotron and the Brookhaven Cosmotron were decommissioned within a 
year of each other in the late 1960s. As Len Hibbard, one of Oliphant’s Birmingham and 
subsequently, Canberra physicists recalled:
[T]he Birmingham Synchrotron, conceived by Oliphant in the depths of war, and 
realised … by the sweat of a batch of … students in an exhausted country, was … a 
success. This fact was unstintingly recognised and praised by the scientists from 
Europe and the USA … It was Oliphant’s greatest triumph (Hibbard 2003, p. 16).
It is also worth noting that nuclear engineering as a discipline did not begin to emerge 
until the late 1950s. In the UK only Manchester University offered a postgraduate nuclear 
engineering course. The first course to officially offer nuclear engineering at the 
University of Birmingham was the Reactor Physics and Technology course run in 
collaboration with the Physics, Metallurgy, Mechanical, Electrical and Civil Engineering 
departments. It began in 1956 with an enrolment of nine students. There was no 
equivalent nuclear engineering course offered academically in Australia during this time. 
In another text which draws heavily on the Cockburn and Ellyard biography, ‘The Poor 
Relation: Establishing the Social Sciences in Australia, 1940-1970,’ historian Stuart 
Macintyre reiterates the theme of Oliphant’s political naiveté, but also echoes the 
Frankenstein myth in relation to Oliphant’s character. Macintyre’s thesis is that 
Oliphant’s particular personal characteristics explain his public treatment during the Cold 
War. Interrogating the acrimonious relationship between Oliphant and Sir Douglas 
Copland, first vice-chancellor of the ANU, Macintyre asserts that the cause of the clash 
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between Copland and Oliphant was due to Oliphant’s elitism and hostility towards the 
social sciences stating: ‘Oliphant barely accepted the legitimacy of [the ANU’s] non-
scientific schools and treated university administrators with contempt’ (Macintyre 2009, 
p. 50). Macintyre fails to mention that Oliphant’s particle accelerator team were under 
increasing pressure from ASIO during this time. 
David McKnight, in Australia’s spies and their secrets (1994), cites political interference 
in the staff and student appointments made by Oliphant to the ANU. He gives specific 
examples of appointments made by Oliphant in which representations were made by Sir 
Charles Spry, head of ASIO, and also Sir Douglas Copland, Vice-Chancellor of the ANU, 
to Prime Minister Menzies to vet staff and to block appointments. In a memo to Prime 
Minister Menzies, the head of ASIO, Sir Charles Spry wrote about his concern with 
Oliphant and appointees to the ANU as security risks (McKnight 1994, p. 146). Spry’s 
list of scientists with adverse security records included most of the Birmingham 
synchrotron team personally appointed to the ANU by Oliphant. Copland proposed to 
Menzies and Spry that he would act as an agent for ASIO by vetting Oliphant’s 
appointees on their political views while on a trip to the UK in 1949 (McKnight 1994, p. 
146). One of the Birmingham physicists vetted by Copland revealed that Oliphant was 
aware of Copland’s interrogation of prospective ANU appointees. Seen in the light of 
Copland’s actions, Oliphant’s anger and subsequent clashes with Copland were more 
likely to have been from pressure to retract his support of ‘risky’ members of his team 
than merely his disdain for social scientists. In 1948 Oliphant, had found himself 
consistently blocked in his attempts to appoint staff. Oliphant failed to convince Canberra 
to withdraw restrictions under the White Australia Policy to his suggested appointment of 
Professor R M Chaudhri, a former Cambridge physicist and colleague. Oliphant retaliated 
by writing back to officials in Canberra stating: ‘The attitude expressed is as indefensible 
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as the Aryan restrictions in the Nazi universities’ (Oliphant cited in Cockburn & Ellyard 
1981, p. 157). 
Amid the increasing conservatism and tension of the beginnings of the Cold War, the 
Menzies opposition increased pressure on the Chilfley Labor Government. The perceived 
threat of communism was to become a major factor in the 1949 election. In December 
1948, Oliphant, still attempting to appoint physicists for the ANU, wrote to Copland 
noting the change in mood: 
I note that the Prime Minister has promised the House that he will investigate 
allegations that one or more of the research scholars appointed in Australia are 
active Communists … I presume the tendency of young men to move to the 
extreme left during their period of political adolescence will not be held against 
them (Oliphant cited in Cockburn & Ellyard 1981, p. 157).
While acknowledging that there may have been other reasons for the refusal of an 
American visa in 1951, Macintyre concludes that Oliphant’s political problems stemmed 
not from the repressive political climate of the 1950s anti-communist hysteria but rather 
from his personality: ‘principally because his impatience with security made him seem a 
security risk, [Oliphant] was denied entry to the United States late in 1951’ (Macintyre 
2009, p. 53). By emphasising Oliphant’s ‘impatience’ Macintyre ignores the political 
context of the visa refusal both domestically and in the US. The rigid application of travel 
controls by the US State Department following the passing of the Internal Security Act 
(1950), the Emergency Detention Act (1950) and the Subversive Activities Control Act 
(1950), resulted in half of all foreign scientists applying for entry to the US at this time 
experiencing difficulties in obtaining visas. Of the 24 foreign scientists invited to the 
University of Chicago’s International Congress on Nuclear Physics, the conference for 
which Oliphant had applied, ten scientists were refused visas. 
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Condemnation by the British on the idea of the US maintaining a monopoly on nuclear 
research was widespread. When the US Atomic Energy Act was passed in 1946 it forbade 
the dissemination of nuclear technological information with any other international 
power, including Britain, thereby ending any possibility of negotiating post-war sharing. 
The McMahon Act, as it came to be known, was seen by scientists as an attempt to 
uphold a US monopoly not only in nuclear weapons manufacture and energy production, 
but also to codify and classify as ‘secret’ basic experimental procedures. Oliphant, along 
with many British scientists, was quoted often in the press disparaging the idea of nuclear 
secrets. For example, in November, 1945, the New York Times reported him declaring 
‘the value of the secret that the Western Allies now hold will last only about six months 
by which time any industrial country will have solved the problem of manufacturing the 
atomic bomb’ (Oliphant cited in New York Times, 4 November 1945, p. 38). Their 
protests proved unsuccessful; it would take almost a decade, until the redrafting of the 
Act in 1954, for the Americans to begin to share nuclear technology with Britain.  
2.3 Ducks, Rabbits and Thomas Kuhn
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Thomas Kuhn argued that science 
consists mainly of stable periods of ‘normal science’ where scientists work within a 
“paradigm-as-set-of-shared” values where methods, standards and generalisations are 
shared by scientists …. A “revolution” occurs when scientists embrace a new paradigm as 
a new way of looking at the world’ (Kuhn 1996, p. 85). During the transitional period 
preceding paradigm change competing experimental subcultures could, and did, work in 
the same domain. ‘To the extent,’ Kuhn states, ‘that two scientific schools disagree about 
what is a problem and what a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when 
debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms’ (Kuhn 1996, p. 109). Scientists 
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working in competing paradigms practise ‘their trades in different worlds … groups of 
scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction’ 
(Kuhn cited in Preston, 2008: 63). As Kuhn puts it, ‘[w]hat were ducks in the scientist’s 
world before the revolution are rabbits after’ (Kuhn 1996, p. 111).
Andrew Pickering, echoing Kuhn, reflects that ‘in exploring the history of particle 
physics … as far back in the research literature … as the 1950s is to enter a strange land: 
it requires a considerable act of the imagination to figure out how physicists were 
thinking in those days’ (Pickering 1990, p. 721, n30). In trying to understand postwar 
physics from a contemporary position, a writer needs to realise that the ‘manifestations of 
incommensurability are stamped across the transition between the two regimes’ and 
constitute in a Kuhnian sense, ‘distinct and disjoint worlds’ (Pickering 1984, p. 409). 
Nonetheless, Pickering contends that during the transition period scientific practices 
operated legitimately as ‘two constellations of symbiotic research traditions’ (Pickering 
1984, p. 15).
Peter Galison equates the transition to ‘Big Physics’ with a shift in the definition of the 
experimental physicist and a revaluation of scientific work, describing this ‘as a shift 
from the “modern” to the “postmodern”’ in laboratory styles; both styles were legitimate 
working models until the 1960s when the concept of the postmodern laboratory 
dominates (Galison 1997, p. 553). As Galison points out, during the transitional period 
competing experimental subcultures could, and did, work in the same domain (Galison 
1997, p. 799). In the immediate postwar period and continuing through the 1950s, both 
‘small science,’ using the traditional prewar experimental methods and practices using 
small teams of scientists working on projects requiring innovative design in order to 
overcome funding and resource limitations, and ‘Big Science,’ large, hierarchically-
organised, requiring large teams of scientists and engineers as well as resources and 
funding, a model that had developed from the Manhattan Project laboratory structure, in 
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particular Lawrence’s Berkeley Laboratory, coexisted independently (Pickering 1995, p. 
43). To illustrate this, the history of the invention and development of the bubble chamber 
provided its two inventors with Nobel prizes in physics: for Donald Glaser in 1960 
working under a ‘small science’ model with a budget of around $3000, and Luis Alvarez 
in 1968 working under a ‘Big Science’ model with a budget of US$2.5 million (Pickering 
1995, p. 45).
The anxiety of US scientists over the path postwar science was taking signalled ‘the 
turmoil in border zones that suddenly joined physics to industry, military, and 
engineering’ (Galison 1997, p. 278). While the wartime industrialisation of physics 
research became the model for ‘Big Science’ and it, in turn, came to dictate technical and 
organisational culture, nevertheless, tensions arose in US laboratories between the Big 
Science/Manhattan Project team model and the individual researcher. During the 1950s, 
even in those labs that had converted to the ‘Big Science’ model, scientific practice, 
‘control over the workplace—the ability to manipulate and control the apparatus—was 
closely tied to the prewar definition of experimentation’ (Galison 1997, p. 306). In 
Australia working in the 1950s at the ANU, Oliphant retained the modernist ‘Small 
Science’ dynamic; the group ‘centralized around individual physicists … replicated … 
the dynamic of individuals competing in an earlier time’ (Galison 1997, pp. 555-6). He 
was not alone. American physicists also expressed their opposition to ‘Big Science’. In 
March 1957, M Stanley Livingston, physicist in charge of the Cambridge Electron 
Accelerator under construction at MIT, railed against ‘Big Science’ practices imposed on 
his lab by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the body supplying funding for the 
project, declaring them ‘rigid ruts of production-type operations’ which would hinder the 
‘flexibility in use of both personnel and equipment’ (Livingston quoted in Galison 1997, 
p. 354).
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2.4 The rehabilitation of the White Oliphant
When discussing the relative merits of the Canberra synchrotron project Macintyre, 
Foster, Varghese, Cockburn and Ellyard all infer a single, cumulative, universal scientific 
method of which Oliphant, in failing to follow this method, therefore transgressed. Their 
conclusions looking back from a position embedded in a ‘Big Science’ paradigm infer 
that Oliphant, in pursuing the construction of the synchrotron on his own terms and to his 
own design, had orchestrated his own downfall. The synchrotron had failed in its original 
proposal; Oliphant as a scientist was cast as a failure. This retrospection, however, 
ignores the pragmatic nature of scientific experimentation. As Pickering states, ‘no 
experimental technique (or procedure or mode of interpretation) is ever completely 
unproblematic’; scientists work with the knowledge of the ‘possibility, even the 
inevitability, of the “tuning” of experimental techniques’ (Pickering 1984, p. 14).
In the US where ‘Big Science’ would eventually dominate, not all large-scale science 
projects were successful. In 1950, Ernest Lawrence requested funding for the construction 
of a giant accelerator project, codenamed the Materials Testing Accelerator (MTA), at the 
Livermore Weapons Laboratory in California. This ‘monster atom-smasher’ was 
abandoned two years later. Its initial planning had cost the US AEC US$20 million 
(Armagnac 1958, p. 254). Plans for a 200 GeV proton synchrotron were hatched at
Berkeley during the early 1960s. When the final proposal was submitted in 1965, even 
the usually compliant AEC baulked at the proposed US$348 million price tag. 
Particularly as Ed McMillan, now director of the Berkeley lab, refused to allow equitable 
access to non-Berkeley scientists (Westfall & Hoddeson 1996, p. 464). The AEC and the 
National Academy of Sciences took the project from Berkeley and relocated it to Illinois 
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where it became Fermilab and was subsequently managed by a national consortium of 
universities.
In his reappraisal of Oliphant’s Birmingham synchrotron, David Ellyard (2011), one of 
Oliphant’s biographers, critically examines his earlier analysis. Ellyard now believes that 
‘the impact of the Birmingham project beyond its own university walls’ has been 
‘insufficiently recognised’ (Ellyard 2011, p. 446). Ellyard argues that Oliphant’s 
pioneering contribution to the invention and development of both the electron and the 
proton synchrotron has been consistently understated. Ellyard also now concedes and 
provides evidence that both Ed McMillan and Luis Alvarez—both of whom worked 
closely with Lawrence—are unreliable witnesses when recounting Oliphant’s influence 
and success as a scientist (Ellyard 2011, p. 417-419, 439-440).
Science often advances by building on former ‘failures’. In his appraisal of Oliphant’s 
Canberra synchrotron in 1993, Brian Montague posited that ‘advances in accelerator 
physics have come about indirectly from proposals which, though initially showing 
promise, were later abandoned’ concluding that Oliphant’s machine had some 
‘remarkable features,’ citing the ‘use of liquid sodium/potassium jets as contact brushes 
for the 1.6 mega-ampere peak current drawn from the rotor’ as an example of its 
innovation (Montague 1993, pp. 524, 530). Although the completion of the Canberra 
synchrotron proved a Sisyphean task for Oliphant, it was nevertheless a pioneering 
accelerator project. Montague’s appraisal came too late to be included in the Cockburn 
and Ellyard biography, it has subsequently been ignored by Foster, Varghese and 
Macintyre. 
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Chapter 3: How the Atomic West was won
Competition in the realm of science, intensified by great emphasis on original and 
significant discoveries, may occasionally generate incentives for eclipsing rivals by illicit 
or dubious means. But this seldom occurs in the form of preparing fraudulent data; 
instead, it appears in quite other forms of deviant behaviour involving spurious claims to 
discovery. More concretely, it is an occasional theft rather than forgery, and more often, 
libel and slander rather than theft that are found on the small seamy side of science.
Robert K Merton 
The Sociology of Science (1973, p. 311-2)
Mark Oliphant, as a progressive scientist at Cambridge University’s Cavendish 
Laboratory and later at the University of Birmingham during the 1930s, embraced the 
prevailing socialist ideals permeating through British academic circles. Despite having 
contributed to the development of nuclear weapons, he continued his political action 
against war and in particular nuclear proliferation throughout his life. The question of 
Oliphant’s political involvement in anti-war and nuclear disarmament post the Second 
World War has been interpreted as a radical break from his pre-war and wartime 
positioning. What seems to be overlooked is a recognition of a socialist commitment and 
world view that is treated sympathetically and situates Oliphant within the historical and 
political context of his time. For example, Oliphant’s biographical memoir as a fellow of 
the Australian Academy of Science describes him as being ‘notorious for his sometime 
public changes of opinion,’ giving as evidence that ‘he adopted a fiercely anti-nuclear 
stance after Hiroshima’ (Carver et al, 2003). The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to 
comprehend the legitimate implications of Mark Oliphant’s standing as a scientific Left 
intellectual in the British tradition of the 1930s and 1940s, an established group 
particularly centred around Cambridge’s Cavendish Laboratory. In addition, it will 
illustrate how the atomic bomb came into being as an American invention resulting in the 
downplaying of the extent of the involvement of non-American scientists, and in 
particular Oliphant. 
3.1 Whatever happened to the ‘scientific Left’?
Instead of treating a liberal political ideology as legitimate, the assessment consistently 
drawn concerning scientists who held a Left political inclination is that they were, at the 
very least, naïve idealists, or more sinisterly, undiscovered Soviet agents. Consider, for 
example, the conclusions drawn by Ray Monk in his biography of the American, New 
York-born, Left-leaning physicist, J Robert Oppenheimer, Inside the Centre (2012). 
Monk determines that Oppenheimer was a ‘secret’ communist based on a series of 
deductions, this despite Oppenheimer’s repeated denials. Monk states:
The question of whether Oppenheimer was a communist or not is thus rather like 
the question of whether he was or was not a German Jew. He did not consider 
himself to be German, Jewish or communist, and yet, as those words are commonly 
used, he was ethnically a German Jew and politically a communist … 
Oppenheimer’s silence about the ‘secret unit’ to which he belonged is impressively 
resolute and unyielding (Monk 2012, pp. 240-2). 
This reasoning replicates the pervasive ideological profiling used by the FBI in the early 
Cold War to identify Left-leaning intellectuals as potential communist spies. Oliphant 
was also profiled in this way by the security services. In 1951, the FBI, claiming an 
‘alleged leakage … of atomic secrets,’ contacted the British Foreign Office about Mark 
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Oliphant, known to have ‘Left wing views’. More information was requested from 
‘sources in Cambridge University … to supply an impression of [Oliphant’s] political 
views and character’ and whether he ‘may be of the Jewish faith’ (Wilkins 
KV2/3382/18a). Oliphant, along with eight other Australian and New Zealand scientists 
were profiled in many items in several of the Australian suspects’ security files. 
A shift to the Left dominated Cambridge science in Britain during the 1930s. Philosopher 
of science, Stephen Toulmin, writes that ‘in the 1930s … [t]hough it was the poets of the 
Popular Front era (Auden, Spender, Day Lewis) who took the public eye, the real focus of 
radical thought in the Britain of the time was among the scientists of Cambridge’ 
(Toulmin 1966). These scientists believed that it was their duty to campaign publicly in a 
tradition of scientific openness subscribing to an ideal of democratic science, as Bernal
defined it, ‘with a definite rejection of the ideal of secrecy’ (Bernal 1939, p. 151). Perhaps 
they could be called idealistic; however, all were part of the British scientific 
establishment and all were Fellows of the Royal Society. As David Wilson states: 
There was a robust set of left-wing, sometimes openly Communist, men among the 
scientific leaders in the 1930s. Blackett, Bernal, and Wooster were among the most 
‘advanced,’ but younger men such as Oliphant and C P Snow held views which 
were certainly socialist (Wilson 1983, p. 544). 
Strong ties were developed between British scientists of the Left and French Left 
scientists such as Paul Langevin and Frédéric and Irène Joliot-Curie during the 1930s. 
This was largely due to their mutual interest in the social benefits of science to society 
and the fight against fascism described by Gary Werskey as the ‘scientific popular front’ 
(Werskey 2007, p. 306). Most of the British scientific Left were seconded into high level 
government advisory positions during the Second World War including openly declared 
communists such as J D Bernal. The French scientists rescued the world’s entire stock of 
deuterium (heavy water which would be used as a moderator in a nuclear reactor) and 
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transported it to Britain as the Germans advanced into France. Joliot then spent the war 
working undercover for the French Resistance. The French scientists, in particular 
Frédéric Joliot-Curie, were felt by the British scientists to be owed a debt. The US, by 
contrast, refused to acknowledge any French interest in atomic research or to allow any 
‘information that had been developed by Americans with American money’ to be passed 
on to the French scientists (Groves 1962, p. 227). 
Oliphant shared a platform with such figures as Joliot-Curie, Blackett, Bernal, and others 
of the scientific Left. This was duly noted in Oliphant’s FBI file for at least the next 
decade and passed on to the Australian security organisations. For example, a 1955 report 
in Oliphant’s FBI file states that:
Oliphant, together with Joliot-Curie (French atomic scientist and admitted 
Communist), Henry Wallace, Phillip Morrison (an admitted Communist Party 
member), and Carroll L Wilson, were speakers at the Institute of World Control of 
Atomic Energy in July, 1946, at Washington, D C … It is believed desirable that 
we continue our policy of discreetly following Oliphant’s activities while in the 
United States (Oliphant 1955, FBI 105-HQ-36211).
In the United States, Hugh Gusterson asserts, the onset of the Cold War required ‘the
colonization of the university by the national security state … through increased funding 
for military research and through repression of “anti-American” dissent’ (Gusterson 2004, 
p. 86). Stemming from the massive mobilisation of funds, engineering and 
commandeering of scientists from what was the Manhattan Project, the adoption of ‘Big 
Science’ enabled the channelling of scientific research to be directed into the prevailing 
ideological sphere. Science was compartmentalised. National interests prevailed over the 
pooling of ideas across boundaries especially as science was largely funded by 
governments who further controlled the dissemination of information. In a memo in 1956 
64
scientist Samuel Goudsmit at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in the US endorsed the 
corporatisation of science stating:
[I]n this new type of work experimental skill must be supplemented by personality 
traits which enhance and encourage the much needed cooperative loyalty … we 
now must deny … anyone whose emotional build-up might be detrimental to the 
cooperative spirit, no matter how good a physicist he is’ (Goudsmit in Kaiser 2004, 
p. 862). 
Kuhn questioned whether progress went hand-in-hand with the advent of a scientific 
revolution. ‘[T]he member of a scientific community is, like the typical character of 
Orwell’s 1984, the victim of a history rewritten by the powers that be,’ Kuhn declared 
(Kuhn 2012, p. 166). Ideology underpinned philanthropic science funding in the US in 
the early post-war period. This had consequences for British and European scientists. 
Science administrators of US organisations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations 
which provided funding to scientists, were nervous of, and, often refused funding to 
British and French scientists who they saw as communist, fellow travellers or simply 
Left-wing (Krige 2006, p. 125). Warren Weaver, director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Natural Science Division, visited Europe in 1948 to find out the views of British and 
European scientists on those ‘very distinguished British or French scientists, who [are] 
known to be definitely communistic (members of the party) or, at least, Leftist’ (Krige 
2006, p. 125). In Britain the response from scientists, whether liberal or conservative, was 
universal; a scientist’s politics was irrelevant to good science. This viewpoint was 
summed up in Weaver’s response from the British Nuffield Foundation: ‘The Nuffield 
takes no account whatsoever of the political views of its applicants’ (Farrer-Brown cited 
in Krige 2006, p. 126). John Krige notes that Weaver, along with his fellow American 
foundation administrators, was unwilling to follow the British lead and instead decided 
on a ‘democracy/totalitarianism distinction’ which allowed the exclusion from access to 
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funding of ‘suspect’ scientists (Krige 2006, p. 118). In this way the foundations’ officers 
excised the problem by arguing that, as Krige states, ‘a Communist could not be a man of 
science. Thus he was not even eligible for a grant’ (Krige 2006, p. 118).  
3.2 Technopolitics and the ‘true’ story of the atomic bomb
Gabrielle Hecht has described the merging of scientific, engineering and industrial 
practices along with technological artefacts and political and ideological agendas that 
grew from the Manhattan Project as a ‘technopolitical regime’ (Hecht 1998, p. 56). 
‘Technopolitics,’ Hecht states, ‘describes the strategic practice of designing or using 
technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals’ (Hecht 1998, p. 56). Six days 
after the atomic bomb detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, 
the US government released the ‘official’ history of the atomic bomb project, A General 
Account of the Development of Methods of Using Nuclear Energy for Military Purposes 
under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945 (1945), which became 
known as the Smyth Report after its author, American scientist Henry de Wolf Smyth. On 
the day of its release, 12 August, US Secretary of War Henry Stimson laid claim to the 
atomic bomb project as an American invention and its success as part of an American 
national narrative by declaring: ‘Behind these concrete achievements lie the tremendous 
contributions of American science. No praise is too great for the unstinting efforts, 
brilliant achievements and complete devotion to the national interest of the scientists of 
this country’ (Stimson cited in New York Times 12 August 1945, p. 4).
The British government had been lobbying Washington for more acknowledgment of 
their input suggesting that Stimson’s statement recognise that British scientists ‘fully 
participated in the development of the project’ (cited in Kirstein 2009, p. 822). Interim 
drafts acknowledged Rutherford’s early research into the composition of the nucleus and 
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Chadwick’s discovery of the neutron. However, the lobbying was unsuccessful, these 
inclusions were dropped from the final draft (cited in Kirstein 2009, p. 822). A year later 
it was still a sore point with British scientists. In a review of a monograph on fission in 
Nature Oliphant expressed his disappointment, in particular the omission of the French 
contribution: ‘Like the official Smyth Report, the account given of the fission process 
fails to acknowledge the essential contribution to the subject made by Joliot and his 
colleagues in France. Their discovery of the neutrons emitted in the fission process was 
the crucial observation which made the chain reaction practicable’ (Oliphant 1946, p. 
751). The report was a sore point in France where the press were still criticising Smyth 
for ignoring the ‘vital contributions of French science to the discoveries leading to the 
making of atomic bombs’ two years after its release (New York Herald Tribune, 15 June 
1947).
General Groves set the parameters of what atomic information the Americans deemed 
‘secret’ and ‘non-secret’ in his foreword to the Smyth report:
All pertinent scientific information which can be released to the public at this time 
without violating the needs of national security is contained in this volume … 
disclosing or securing additional information by any means whatsoever without 
authorization are subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act’ (Groves in 
Smyth 1945, p. v).
In October 1945 while testifying at hearings conducted for the development of the US 
Control of Atomic Energy Act, Groves spelled out three classes of scientific ‘secret’. 
Groves’ first class consisted of ‘established scientific facts which were not secret at all’. 
Groves’ second classification was made up of ‘scientific developments which went 
beyond this,’ consisting of the ‘hundreds and hundreds of problems that had to be solved 
… [involving] all the research work … which was done in many laboratories by 
thousands of scientists’. Groves’ final class of secrets comprised of ‘the ingenuity and the 
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skill of the American worker and the American management, both the top management 
and the junior management, and that is a secret that I do not think any other nation has, 
and I do not think anyone is going to have it in a hurry’ (Groves cited in US Congress, 
House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs 1945, pp. 12-13). Although 
Groves asserted that scientific procedures outlined in his second classification ‘were not 
basic’ what he summarised to Congress was basic scientific problem solving. 
Having financed the development of the atomic bomb, and despite condemnation by the 
British, the US was determined to maintain its monopoly on nuclear research. In 
November 1945, in a joint communiqué with the British and Canadian Prime Ministers, 
Truman declared that ‘specialized information regarding the practical application’ of 
atomic energy would not be shared until controls were in place, including a prohibition of 
sharing between the three nations (Truman 1945). British opposition was widespread. 
Oliphant, in particular, was vocal in his opposition to a US nuclear monopoly. Having 
already earned the ire of British politicians through his collaboration with British MP, 
Captain Raymond Blackburn, Oliphant continued to goad political leaders to resist the 
constrictions imposed by the US. Britain, Oliphant said, needed to ‘play a part in the 
future in holding the balance between the unbridled extremes of American capitalism and 
Russian Communism’ (Oliphant cited in The Advertiser, 22 November 1945, p. 1). ‘Both 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Mr Churchill warned the scientists of the 
consequences of independent action, evidently with Captain Blackburn’s and Professor 
Oliphant’s statements in mind,’ The Times reported (Gruson 1945, p. 3). By 1948 
Oliphant’s statements already deemed subversive by those on the Right, now represented 
a political threat. ‘Russia,’ Oliphant declared: 
[M]ay have one or two small atom bombs but nothing to compare with America … 
the worldwide rumours of immediate war with Russia had no foundation … nations 
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should get together … to eliminate such … propaganda (Oliphant cited in Northern 
Standard, 19 March 1948, p. 2).
Oliphant’s widely reported comments highlight the differences of opinion between 
scientists and politicians in the UK and the US on the argument as to whether atomic 
‘secrets’ should be shared with Russia. Even the British conservative newspaper The 
Times argued against the idea of the US holding a monopoly on atomic information 
declaring that to do so would create a ‘precedent’ for the future relations between nations.
Long-term diplomatic drawbacks of secrecy in encouraging unwarranted suspicion 
and mistrust may well outweigh on any view of the transaction such temporary 
advantages as may be thought to derive from it (The Times cited in New York 
Times, 29 October 1945, p. 3). 
When the US Atomic Energy Act was passed in 1946 it forbade the dissemination of 
nuclear technological information with any other international power, including Britain, 
thereby ending any possibility of negotiating post-war sharing. The McMahon Act, as it 
came to be known, was seen by scientists as an attempt to uphold a US monopoly not 
only in nuclear weapons manufacture and nuclear energy production, but also to codify 
and classify as ‘secret’ basic experimental procedures. In 1953 the Harvard Law Review
was scathing about the repercussions of the Atomic Energy Act, describing it as ‘the most 
far-reaching government monopoly the United States has ever experienced’:
Under it a whole new science and technology were imprisoned … and walled about 
with secrecy … it included all peaceful developments and … In addition … 
inhibited not only research and development but also the free debate essential to a 
democratic society (Ruebhausen and von Mehren 1953, p. 1450). 
The subjugation of nuclear research under the control of the US was foreseen by Oliphant 
during his time spent working alongside Lawrence and his co-workers at the Radiation 
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Laboratory during the Manhattan Project. In 1934 in Cambridge, Oliphant had used the 
electromagnetic process to separate lithium isotopes at the Cavendish Laboratory 
(Oliphant, Shire & Crowther 1934, p. 922-929). Although the Berkeley program was 
conducted on an immense scale compared to the previous Cavendish experiment, the 
basic experimental process was the same. In September 1944 Oliphant sent an urgent 
memo back from Berkeley to London on his wariness of Lawrence’s push to turn the lab 
to begin developing the ‘peacetime applications’ of nuclear research:
According to the terms of the Quebec agreement, as understood by me, we are 
limited very definitely to work only on the military aspects of the … project … The 
position of the [British] Berkeley team becomes highly anomalous if we begin 
work here on a peace-time application … From the point of view of our future 
relations with USA it is very important that no misunderstanding should arise … 
From the inception of our own work in England I have had very clear ideas of how 
the electromagnetic process should be developed in the future (Oliphant to
Chadwick, 4 September 1944). 
Mechanisms to declare a US nuclear monopoly were pushed by the Americans to 
appropriate nuclear ‘inventions’ through the Manhattan Project Patent Division. In April 
1944 Wallace Akers, chair of the Directorate of Tube Alloys (the British nuclear bomb 
research committee) complained to the Foreign Office that ‘the Americans are usually a 
trifle uneasy on the subject of patents … we know that they are not particularly 
enthusiastic at the idea of the British owning important patents in this field’ (Akers to 
Campbell, 5 April 1944). Alex Wellerstein describes the Manhattan Project patent system 
used by the US as another form of international control of atomic weapons (Wellerstein 
2008, p. 84). The control of patents was a mechanism to head off legal challenges of 
American ‘technological sovereignty’ on the part of the government against the interests 
of foreign countries (Wellerstein 2008, p. 84). As Vannevar Bush, head of the US 
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National Defence Research Committee (NDRC), wrote to his British counterpart Sir John 
Anderson in September 1942, ‘[P]atent control in the hands of government will prove to 
be sufficiently strong so that this series of discoveries and inventions cannot be practiced 
at any point within our respective countries without government license based on the 
patent status’ (Bush cited in Wellerstein 2008, p. 149). In practise however, the 
Americans were reluctant to concede any inventions to non-Americans, including its 
allies. The head of the patent division Captain Robert A Lavender spelt out the project’s 
patent system to the British: 
[A]ny idea of a UK person, which was worked out in a practical sense after that 
person reported at a US laboratory, should necessarily be patented by the US 
machinery. This should be the case whether the idea sprung into the person’s head 
before or after joining the US laboratory … all ideas which might be thought to be 
solely UK could be regarded as springing up in an American atmosphere and 
therefore subject to influence by American thought and invention (Webster to 
Blok, 5 May 1944). 
The British, and in particular Mark Oliphant, were unhappy with the US ultimatum and 
were beginning to understand its implications:
The real danger … [is] that our British scientists’ contributions will not always be 
given the degree of originality which they deserve … Oliphant has already spoken 
to me about this with regard to Berkeley. There they evidently have a very 
powerful patenting section grinding out many inventions. This section so far seems 
to disregard the presence of British personnel (Webster to Blok, 5 May 1944).
The US patent system and Smyth Report were not the only tactics utilised to play down 
the contributions of the British scientists. In March 1944 Groves, through the Office of 
the Area Engineer, had written to Lawrence requesting the preparation of ‘a concise and 
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accurate account, in lay terms, of the history of the Y-12 Project’; the history of the 
electromagnetic process of uranium isotope separation conducted at the Radiation 
Laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley. The report that resulted from this 
request made no mention of Mark Oliphant’s September 1941 visit to the US, nor his 
efforts in trying to drum up support to begin a crash program to develop a fission bomb, 
in particular it doesn’t mention Oliphant’s visit to Lawrence. Despite the British having 
sent the Americans numerous reports – the Frisch-Peierls memorandum and Maud reports 
– this 1941 visit was the first Lawrence had heard of the British proposal. The report 
quoted passages lifted from both the Maud reports and a summary written by Oliphant for 
Lawrence without attribution. In addition, the report did not mention that Mark Oliphant 
was also officially second-in-command to Lawrence at the Radiation Laboratory (Office 
of the Area Engineer to Lawrence, 17 March 1945).
In his 1985 recollection of his leaving the Manhattan Project, physicist Joseph Rotblat, 
recalled a meeting with General Groves in 1944 where Groves, according to Rotblat, had 
said that ‘the real purpose in making the bomb was to subdue the Soviets’ (Rotblat 1985, 
p. 18). American historian Barton Bernstein has argued that Rotblat’s account is a 
misremembering and may have been influenced by postwar publications and of Groves’ 
own testimony to the Atomic Energy Commission during the Oppenheimer security 
clearance hearings in 1954 where Groves declared that ‘there was never from about two 
weeks from the time I took charge of this project any illusion on my part that Russia was 
our enemy’ (Groves cited in Bernstein 2003, p.903). Bernstein summarises his argument 
by stating:
[T]hat claimed memory—though very questionable, in the judgement of critics—
has long been much of the basis for [Rotblat’s] own repeated “revisionist” 
contentions that the bomb’s use on Japan in 1945 was not necessary, that American 
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policymakers understood it at the time, and that they used the bomb primarily to 
intimidate the Soviets (Bernstein 2003, p. 903).
Bernstein cites Groves’ biographer Robert S Norris as confirming that there is ‘no record 
of Groves ever making such arguments’ alluding to the intimidation of Russia as the 
primary focus of the atomic bomb (Norris cited in Bernstein 2003, p. 903). However, in 
affirmation of Rotblat’s contention, in September 1944 Groves declared that Russia, 
despite being an ally, was the primary enemy during a meeting with Oliphant at Berkeley. 
Groves outlined his thoughts on ‘the inevitable war with Russia,’ and an ominous 
indication of an American monopoly, which Oliphant then dictated in a memo sent back 
to officials in the UK. Oliphant summarised the conversation stating that it was Groves’ 
contention:
The preponderance of American contribution and the fact that the alliance was 
military in nature rather than political would enable the American Army and Navy 
to dictate policy on such questions as the new weapon. American policy would be 
to insist that no manufacture of the materials or storage of the weapon should be 
permitted outside the central portions of North American continent. He pointed out 
the danger of capture of a manufacturing or storage centre by paratroop attack and 
the grave results of the use against us of our own weapon. Pressed to give his ideas 
of the source of the attack he named Russia … So soon as normal communications
between America and Europe are resumed he believed that Russia would have full 
information about the project, either through her agents or through “Communist 
sympathisers among the American and British scientists on the project” (Oliphant, 
11 October 1944).
The arrival of Oliphant’s memo caused great consternation in the UK.
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3.3 A Cold War ghost haunts the present
The triumphalism of the Right during the Cold War and especially since its culmination 
has resulted in an illusory representation of Left scientists in general and in particular 
seems willing only to recognise as worthy the outwardly defeated and contrite such as 
Robert Oppenheimer. During the Second Cold War (1979-1985), a term referring to the 
resurgence of Cold War tensions in the late 1970s and 1980s coinciding with the 
conservative leadership of US President Ronald Reagan, the recurring American trope of 
the frontier was again employed in political discourse. The narrative of Kennan’s Long 
Telegram returned merging ‘cold war politics and science fiction film’ (Nadel 1995, p. 
30). Revisiting earlier Cold War rhetoric fusing socialism with communism, Reagan 
urged his audience not to ‘ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an 
evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove 
yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil’ (Reagan, 1983). 
The return to the frontier narrative of good versus evil diminishes nuanced political 
argument ‘to simple oppositions between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and moral crusades against 
“the other”’ (Kellner 2003, p. 61). 
Reacting against what Reagan termed the ‘Vietnam Syndrome,’ a ‘remasculinisation’ was 
underway defined as a ‘regeneration of the interests, values, and projects of patriarchy’
(Jeffords 1989, p. 51).  The backlash against the ‘feminists and ban-the-bomb peaceniks,’ 
the presumed feminisation of American culture in the wake of the Vietnam war, involved 
a resurgence of anticommunism, an escalation of nuclear weapons manufacture and a 
redefinition of those on the Left as a feminising and infantile force. Cold War narratives 
took on ‘gendered metaphors’: binaries such as ‘masculine/feminine, 
heterosexual/homosexual … good/evil … backward/advanced, sophisticated/naïve’ 
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(Nadel 1995, p. 34). Non-American Left scientific intellectuals such as Oliphant with his 
strong presence in the nuclear disarmament movement, as an original Pugwash 
conference member and his visibility within the anti-Vietnam protests were again suspect. 
In a direct link back to the policies of the early Cold War, the Reagan administration 
invoked a denial of visa policy in cases with ‘the potential for technological loss’ 
(Wallerstein & McCray 1984, p. 17). The American nuclear ‘secret’ was once more 
invoked in Cold War historiography in statements such as Robert Williams makes in 
Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy (1987): ‘members of the British mission had returned to England, 
with the accumulated knowledge of the Manhattan Project in their heads’ without noting 
that they had brought most of the knowledge with them to the US in the first place 
(Williams 1987, p. 96). 
Echoes of Cold War rhetoric continue to marginalise Mark Oliphant. On a history of 
atomic physics website funded by the United States National Science Foundation 
Oliphant is included on a page listing Soviet atomic spies without any evidence surfacing 
for this claim (Rossenfeld 2011). An obituary published at the time of Oliphant’s death 
also casts Oliphant as an inept would-be Soviet spy: ‘De facto agent … was probably a 
stretch, but … Oliphant … almost certainly did not mind if [his] work ended up in KGB 
hands’ (Perry 2000, p. 2). In his biography of Oppenheimer, Monk also alludes to 
Oliphant having been a Soviet spy. Accusing Oppenheimer of being ‘a member of a 
secret communist unit,’ Monk declares that Oppenheimer’s actions in concealing this 
information ‘do not begin to compare with the actions of real spies like the “Cambridge 
Five”, or even with Oliphant’s behaviour’ (Monk 2012, p. 308). Oliphant, Monk asserts, 
‘let slip to Oppenheimer the Allies’ most important and most closely guarded military 
secret,’ informing Oppenheimer of the British atomic bomb research in September 1941 
at Berkeley (Monk 2012, p. 308). However Oliphant’s visit was over two months before 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and therefore, before the Americans entered the war. 
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At this time radar, not fission bomb research, was considered the most top secret war 
project, a situation reflected in the name chosen for the fledgling radar program set up at 
MIT which was named the Radiation Laboratory ‘as a “cover” to mislead the curious into 
believing that its mission was in the field of nuclear fission’ which was not considered 
important or secret (Alvarez 1987. p. 26). 
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Conclusion
Few believe in the big picture any more, let alone in our ability to piece it together. The 
most we can do is try to make sense of fragmentary evidence, never forgetting that the 
story we tell about it is always contingent, is always going to be affected by our own 
particular standpoint, is only one of many possible stories.
Kitty Hauser 
Bloody Old Britain (2008, p. 45)
In an essay in New York magazine, ‘The year it came apart,’ Arthur Miller described the 
impact of the beginning of the Cold War and the onslaught of McCarthyism as a ‘political 
surrealism [which] came dancing through the ruins of what had nearly been a beautiful 
moral and rational world’ (Miller 1974/1975, p. 32). Nuclear physicists, notwithstanding 
ethical intentions, played their part in the ruining of Miller’s ‘moral and rational’ world. 
Left-leaning scientists occupy an ambivalent position with regard to the atomic bomb. It 
cannot be downplayed that fission for physicists at that time represented a rich new field 
of research; as Oliphant commented to a colleague ‘the problem intrigues me very much, 
and is just on my lines’ (Oliphant to Chadwick 2 June 1943). Physicist Leo Szilard gave 
credit to Oliphant for kick-starting the practical bomb project stating that:
If Congress knew the true history of the atomic energy project, I have no doubt it 
would create a special medal to be given to meddling foreigners for distinguished 
services, and Dr Oliphant would be the first to receive one (Szilard in Rhodes 
1986, p. 372). 
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Chair of the US wartime National Defence Research Committee, James B Conant, 
singled out Oliphant as the initiator of a group of ‘all-out advocates of a head-on attack 
on the uranium problem [who, in 1941] had become more vocal and determined’ (Conant 
in Rhodes 1986, p. 372). Yet, on August 6, 1945, the world had changed forever. Those 
same scientists who created the bomb began to campaign against nuclear weapons and 
against war once the scientific and destructive aspects of the project had been realised. 
‘The bomb,’ Oliphant wrote a decade later, ‘blew to pieces the world of disinterested 
science’ (Oliphant cited in Haddow 1956, p. 248).
The hounding of ‘fellow travellers’ during the Cold War reduced all dissent, whether 
legitimate or otherwise, to a simplistic ‘you are either with us or against us’ argument 
which has its own reverberations in the twenty-first century. As Alain Badiou states: 
The United States has become a hegemonic power in and through war … the USA 
won the day in the Cold War against the USSR … by the imposition of an 
exhaustive armament race … This should remind us … that power continues to be 
… military (Badiou 2003, p. 154-5). 
‘Science itself,’ one Manhattan Project physicist put it at the beginning of the Cold War, 
‘[has] been bought by war, on the instalment plan’ (Morrison 1946, p. 6). 
The scientific historical record of the development of accelerator physics and the 
development of the atomic bomb is dramatically underscored by the US/USSR Cold War 
contest, an epochal behemoth. The bomb, as Langdon Winner argues, is ‘an inherently 
political artefact’ (Winner 1986, p. 34). Writing about a scientist who helped to build the 
atomic bomb means writing about politics; it means writing about institutions, 
collaborations, disputes. The initial idea to develop the atomic bomb was a decision made 
on the cusp of war by scientists aware that Hitler’s scientists were already moving along 
the same path. An investigation of a scientist who worked on the Manhattan Project 
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cannot be deliberated neutrally, instead the discourse is framed by the atomic bomb. 
Those scientists involved in the making of the atomic bomb such as Mark Oliphant found 
themselves ‘linked to particular institutionalized patterns of power and authority’ and the 
politics of the bomb itself whether they wanted to or not (Winner 1986, p. 38). Mark 
Oliphant was a threat not only for his politics but also for the specific knowledge he 
possessed.
While its focus is on Mark Oliphant, the creative nonfiction component of this thesis 
chronicles the increasing encroachment of these forces into nuclear science and into the 
public lives of Left-wing scientists. As historian Eric Hobsbawm states: ‘The war fused 
political and scientific decisions and turned science fiction into reality, sometimes 
nightmare reality’ (Hobsbawm 2006).
This study set out to determine whether there was a case for reappraising Oliphant’s 
contribution to nuclear physics and to the development of particle accelerators. Using 
historical referents and newly-released archival material not able to be accessed by 
Oliphant’s biographers (and ignored by later writers) I will endeavour to portray Oliphant 
as an adventurer and a key contributor to early research in nuclear physics and accelerator 
development. In addition, the creative nonfiction narrative follows the trajectory of hot 
war to Cold War and the impact on Left-leaning scientists. In particular it confirms an 
ideological targeting of liberal scientists in the postwar period based on nothing more 
than spurious hearsay shedding new light on the reason that Mark Oliphant was refused a 
visa by the US State Department in 1951. It also chronicles the connections between the 
security agencies of the US, Britain and Australia. It firmly places Oliphant within the 
group known as the British scientific Left. One of the more significant findings to emerge 
from this study is the discovery of evidence (Oliphant, 11 October 1944) which confirms 
for the first time that General Groves did indeed reveal that he believed that Russia was 
the principal enemy prior to the atomic bomb being detonated over Japan. These findings 
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provide the following insights for future research. For example, research into the impact 
of the relationship between the security agencies and the effect this had on Oliphant’s 
tenure as head of the Research School of Physical Sciences at the ANU in Canberra. In 
addition the impact of the adverse FBI reports on the careers of the other eight Australian 
and New Zealand scientists has had little scrutiny.
Mark Oliphant earned the wrath of the nuclear ‘hawks’ for his actions in campaigning 
against nuclear weapons and against war. Oliphant like many others who came within the 
Cold War radar were left bruised and battered by the encounter. Yet Oliphant continued 
to campaign for nuclear disarmament within a climate of stifling political conformity at 
considerable cost to his career and reputation. Writer and fellow Cambridge physicist CP
Snow recalled the sense of disappointment and loss felt by Oliphant at the consequence of 
his involvement in the atomic bomb project. Snow stated:
[M]any longed for the peaceful days … which still glow as the golden age … Mark 
Oliphant, more eloquent and outgoing than most, spoke for them just after the war: 
“We couldn’t have done anything else, but we have killed a beautiful subject” 
(Snow 1981, p. 17).
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Part 2: Creative nonfiction component:
Mark Oliphant in Atomic Wonderland
Cast of characters
Akers, Sir Wallace: (1888-195). British industrial chemist and Board member of ICI. 
1941 appointed Director of Tube Alloys, the British atomic bomb project. 
Alvarez, Luis W: (1911- 1988) American physicist at Berkeley. 1968 Nobel Prize for 
Physics for the development of the hydrogen bubble chamber. Testified for the 
prosecution during J Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance hearing in 1954.
Anderson, Sir John: (1882-1958) British civil servant. Chancellor of the Exchequer 
1943-1945.
Appleton, Sir Edward: (1892-1965) British physicist.1947 Nobel Prize for Physics. 
1939-1947 Secretary of the British Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.
Arneson, R Gordon: (1916-1992) American State Department official. Secretary to 
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson’s Interim Committee on Atomic Energy 1945; Staff 
Member, U.S. Delegation to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, 1946-1948
Baruch, Bernard: (1870- 1965) American financier. Head of the United States mission 
to the inaugural United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946.
Blackett, Patrick Maynard Stuart: (1997- 1974) British physicist at Cavendish 
Laboratory. 1948 Nobel Prize for Physics for the development of the Wilson cloud 
chamber and the investigation of cosmic rays. Scientific advisor to British government 
during World War II. Postwar, campaigned against Britain’s development of nuclear 
weapons.
Beaverbrook, William Aitken, Lord: (1879-1964) British newspaper baron. Titles 
included the Daily Express, the London Evening Standard and the Sunday Express.
Bernal, John Desmond ‘Sage’: (1901-1971) British chemist at Cambridge. Specialised 
in X-ray crystallography. Scientific advisor to British government during World War II. 
2
Joined the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1923. Published influential The Social 
Function of Science in 1939.
Blackburn, Captain Raymond: (1915-1991) British Labour politician. Member for 
Birmingham Kings Norton 1945-1950.
Bohr, Niels: (1885-1962) Danish physicist. 1922 Nobel Prize for Physics for his 
investigations into the structure of atoms and of radiation. Conceived the 
complementarity principle, a foundation of quantum mechanics. Founded the Institute of 
Theoretical Physics, University of Copenhagen.
Boot, Harry: (1917-1983) Birmingham physicist. First Nuffield Research Fellow. Co-
inventor of the cavity magnetron with John Randall.
Briggs, George: (1893-1987) Australian physicist. Scientific adviser to Australian 
delegation, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 1946.
Burhop, Eric Henry Stonely: (1911-1980) Australian physicist. Gained his doctorate at 
the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge University, under supervision of Mark Oliphant. 
Secretary of the British Atomic Scientists’ Association.
Bush, Vannevar: (1890-1974) American engineer. President of the Carnegie Institute of 
Washington from 1938. Wartime head of US Office of Scientific Research and 
Development. Unsuccessfully pressed President Roosevelt against any collaboration with 
the British on the Manhattan Project.
Chadwick, James: (1891-1974) British physicist. 1935 Nobel Prize for Physics for his 
discovery of the neutron. Assistant director of research at the Cavendish Laboratory, 
Cambridge University, from 1932-1935.
Chamberlain, Neville: (1869-1940) British Conservative Prime Minister from May 
1937-May 1940.
Chifley, Ben: (1885-1951) Australian Labor Prime Minister from July 1945-December 
1949.
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Cockburn, Stewart: (1921-2009) Australian journalist and author. Co-biographer of 
Mark Oliphant.
Cockcroft, John: (1897-1967) British physicist. 1951 Nobel Prize for Physics with 
Ernest Walton for their pioneering work on artificially accelerating particles. In 1932, 
Cockcroft and Walton were first to split the atom by artificial means. Assistant director of 
research, Ministry of Supply, during early years of the World War II. Took over as 
director of the Chalk River Laboratories, Canada, from Hans Halban in 1944.
Conant, James Bryant: (1893-1978) American chemist. President of Harvard University 
1933-1953. Chair National Defense Research Committee 1941-1947. First US 
Ambassador to West Germany. Supporter of the Loyalty Oath and called for the dismissal 
of academics invoking the Fifth Amendment during the HUAC hearings.
Cooksey, Don: (1892-1977) American physicist. Associate Director Radiation 
Laboratory, Berkeley, University of California.
Coombs, Herbert Cole ‘Nugget’: (1906-1997) Australian Labor politician. Director-
general of the Department of Postwar Reconstruction 1943-1949.
Curtin, John: (1885-1945) Australian Labor Prime Minister from 1941-1945.
Dautry, Raoul: (1880-1951) French engineer and politician. Organised for the transfer of 
heavy water from Norsk Hydro, Norway, to Paris in 1940.
Ellyard, David: (1942- ) Australian science journalist and author. Co-biographer of Mark 
Oliphant.
Evatt, Herbert Vere ‘Doc’: (1894-1965) Australian Labor politician. Minister for 
External Affairs 1941-1949. First Chair United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 
1946.
Fermi, Enrico: (1901-1954.)Italian physicist. 1938 Nobel Prize for Physics for induced 
radioactivity by neutron bombardment and production of new radioactive elements.
Florey, Howard: (1898-1968) Australian pathologist. 1945 Nobel Prize for Medicine 
along with Ernst Chain and Alexander Fleming for the development of penicillin.
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Fremlin, John: (1913-1995) British physicist. Secretary of the Cambridge Scientists 
Anti-War Group. Supervised for doctorate at Cavendish Laboratory by Mark Oliphant. In 
1945 appointed Reader in Nuclear Physics by Oliphant at the University of Birmingham.
Frisch, Otto Robert: (1904-1979) Jewish Austrian-British physicist. Nephew of Lise 
Meitner. With Rudolf Peierls, devised the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum calculating the 
possibility of using nuclear fission for a bomb in Birmingham in 1940.
Fuchs, Klaus: (1911-1988) Jewish German-British physicist. Assistant to Rudolf Peierls 
on Tube Alloys project in 1941. Transferred to Manhattan Project with British contingent 
in 1943. Head of Theoretical Physics Division at British Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment, Harwell, from 1946. Convicted of atomic espionage in 1950.
Gamow, George: (1904-1968) Russian-American physicist. Defected from Russia in 
1933 while attending the 7th Solvay Conference in Brussels. Originator of the ‘Big Bang’ 
theory to explain the expanding universe.
Gentner, Wolfgang: (1906-1980) German physicist. Director of the Synchrocyclotron 
Department at CERN from 1956-58. Director of the Max Planck Institute for Nuclear 
Physics, Heidelberg, from 1958.
Gooden, John: (1920-1950) Australian physicist. Graduate student under Oliphant’s 
supervision at the University of Birmingham from 1945-1950. First Research Fellow of 
the Research School of Physical Sciences, Australian National University.
Gromyko, Andrei: (1909-1989) Soviet ambassador to the United States 1943-1946. 
Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations 1946-1948.
Groves, Lieutenant General Leslie Richard: 1896-1970. United States Army officer 
and engineer. Appointed Director of the Manhattan Project 1942.
Halban, Hans von: (1908-1964) Jewish Austrian-French physicist. Worked with 
Frédéric Joliot Curie and Lew Kowarski at the Collège de France from 1937. Escaped to 
Britain in 1940 with heavy water supplies liberated from Norsk Hydro in Norway. Head 
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of the Chalk River Laboratories, Canada, developing nuclear reactors for Manhattan 
Project. Not trusted by General Groves, Halban was replaced by Cockcroft in late-1944.
Harteck, Paul: (1902-1985) German physical chemist. Avoided being sent to the 
Russian Front in 1942 through the intervention of Werner Heisenberg. One of the 
captured German scientists incarcerated at Farm Hall in 1945.
Hasluck, Sir Paul: (1905-1993) Australian public servant and conservative politician. 
Australian Governor-General 1969-1974.
Heisenberg, Werner: (1901-1976) German physicist. 1932 Nobel Prize for Physics for 
the creation of quantum mechanics. Head of the German atomic bomb program during 
World War II.
Hoover, J Edgar: (1895-1972) Director of the United States Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) 1935-1972.
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC): US Congressional committee set 
up to investigate subversive activities and alleged Communists from 1938 to 1975.
Hunger Marches: Organised national protest marches of unemployed from all over 
Britain converging on London beginning in 1922 and culminating in the 1936 Jarrow 
Crusade. The 1934 Hunger March during the Great Depression protesting against the 
harsh unemployment benefits means test eventually succeeded in having the test 
suspended.
Joliot-Curie, Frédéric: (1900-1958) French physicist. 1935 Nobel Prize for Chemistry 
along with wife, Irène, for discovery of artificial radiation. Worked undercover for the 
French Resistance during World War II. Appointed France’s first High Commissioner for 
Atomic Energy 1945-1950.
Joliot-Curie, Irène: (1897-1958) French physicist. 1935 Nobel Prize for Chemistry 
along with husband, Frédéric, for discovery of artificial radiation. Appointed 
Undersecretary of State for Scientific Research in 1936. Director of the Radium Institute 
from 1946.
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Kamen, Martin: (1913-2002) Jewish American physicist. Co-discoverer with Sam 
Ruben of carbon-14. Dismissed from Manhattan Project by General Groves in 1945. 
Accused of atomic espionage throughout 1940s and 1950s. Refused a passport by State 
Department until he successfully sued Chicago Tribune for libel in 1955 for stating that 
Kamen was a spy.
Kapitza, Pyotr: (1894-1984) Russian physicist. Gained doctorate at Cavendish 
Laboratory, Cambridge University, under Rutherford. Detained in Russia by order of 
Josef Stalin in 1934 while on vacation from Cambridge.
Kasparov, Grigori: Station Chief, Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, 1944-1945
Kerst, Marylou: Wartime FBI secretary.
Kheifets, Grigori: Station Chief, Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, 1941-1944
Kowarski, Lew: (1907-1979) Russian-French physicist. Worked with Frédéric Joliot 
Curie at the Collège de France from 1934. Escaped to Britain with Hans von Halban in 
1940 with heavy water supplies liberated from Norsk Hydro in Norway. Worked on 
British atomic bomb program until transferring with John Cockcroft to Manhattan Project 
at Chalk River, Canada, in 1944. Supervised postwar French reactor program. Joined 
CERN in 1953.
Langevin, Paul: (1872-1946) French physicist. Director of the École de Physique et 
Chimie 1926-1942.
Lansdale, John: (1912-2003) United States Army colonel. Appointed Special Assistant 
for intelligence and security Manhattan Project 1942.
Lawrence, Ernest Orlando: (1901-1958) American physicist. 1939 Nobel Prize for 
Physics. Founded the Radiation Laboratory (now the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory) at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1930. Founded the Livermore 
Weapons Laboratory. Conservative Republican. Advocated for the development of the 
hydrogen bomb. Supporter of the University of California’s Loyalty Oath. Dismissed 
colleagues and students who refused to sign the oath.
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Lindemann, Frederick, Baron Cherwell: (1886-1957) British physicist. Director of the 
Clarendon Laboratory, Oxford University from 1919. Scientific Advisor to Churchill 
during World War II.
Livingston, M Stanley: (1905-1986) American physicist. With Ernest Lawrence, co-
inventor of the cyclotron (unacknowledged by Lawrence). Director of the accelerator 
project at Brookhaven National Laboratory from 1946.
Lofgren, Edward J: (1914- ) Berkeley physicist. Worked at the Radiation Laboratory, 
Berkeley, from 1938. Worked on Manhattan Project at Los Alamos during World War II. 
Returned to work at Berkeley on the Bevatron from 1948.
Lomanitz, Rossi: (1921-2003) American physicist. Graduate student of J Robert 
Oppenheimer at Berkeley. Dismissed from the Manhattan Project in late 1943 on order of 
General Groves and drafted into the Army. Later blacklisted.
Maasdorp, Reinet: Rhodesian physicist. One of Oliphant’s first Cavendish Laboratory 
graduate research students. National secretary of the British Association of Scientific 
Workers from 1937-1945.
Macarthur, General Douglas: (1880-1954) Appointed Supreme Commander of Allied 
Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area 1942.
Massey, Harrie: (1908-1983) Australian physicist. Earned doctorate at Cavendish 
Laboratory, Cambridge University. Transferred to Manhattan Project with Oliphant 
Group in 1943. Returned to Britain in 1945.
McCarthy, Joseph: (1908-1957) American Republican politician. Ardent anti-
Communist.
McCarthyism: Named after US Senator Joe McCarthy. The practice of discrediting 
opponents by making unsubstantiated accusations of disloyalty, particularly relating to 
Communism.
McMillan, Edwin Mattison: (1907-1991) Berkeley physicist. 1951 Nobel Prize for 
Chemistry along with Glenn Seaborg for their discovery of transuranium elements. 
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Worked on the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos during World War II. Co-inventor of 
the synchrotron particle accelerator with Mark Oliphant and Vladimir Veksler. Director 
of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley from 1958-1973.
Meitner, Lise: (1878-1968) Jewish Austrian physicist. Worked with Otto Hahn and Fritz 
Strassmann at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin until her escape from Germany to 
Sweden in 1938. With Otto Robert Frisch, explained Hahn and Strassmann’s results and 
concluded that nuclear fission had occurred in January 1939 for which Hahn awarded the 
1944 Nobel Prize in Chemistry.
Milward, Joy: Wartime British stenographer in the Cabinet War Offices.
Moon, Philip Burton: (1907-1994) British physicist. Worked with Mark Oliphant at 
Cavendish laboratory, Cambridge University. Joined Oliphant at the University of 
Birmingham in 1938. Transferred to Manhattan Project at Los Alamos during World War 
II. Returned to the University of Birmingham in 1946.
Morrison, Philip: (1915-2005) American physicist at Berkeley.
Murrow, Ed: (1908-1965) American broadcast journalist.
Nichols, Major General Kenneth D: (1907-2000) United States Army officer and 
engineer. Appointed District Engineer Manhattan Engineering District 1942.
O’Leary, Jean: Personal secretary to General Leslie Groves.
Oliphant, Mark: (1901-2000) Australian physicist. Gained his doctorate at the 
Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge University. Poynting Professor of Physics, the 
University of Birmingham 1937-1950. Head of the Oliphant Group during Manhattan 
Project based at the University of California, Berkeley, working on electromagnetic 
separation of uranium isotopes. Founding member of the Pugwash scientists against 
weapons movement along with Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein.
Oppenheimer, Frank: (1912-1985) American physicist. Worked on uranium enrichment 
with Mark Oliphant on Manhattan Project during World War II. Targeted by McCarthyist 
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forces during postwar period. Blacklisted from physics-related positions until 1957. 
Founder of the Exploratorium, San Francisco.
Oppenheimer, J Robert: (1904-1967) American physicist. Professor of theoretical 
physics at University of California, Berkeley, from 1936. Head of the Los Alamos 
Laboratory during World War II. Chair of the General Advisory Committee of the US 
Atomic Energy Commission from 1947. Had his government security clearance revoked 
in 1954 due to ‘disloyalty’.
Owens, Gladys: ‘Calutron girl’ recruited from high school to work on the Manhattan 
Project at the electromagnetic plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Pearson, Drew: (1897-1969) American journalist and broadcaster.
Pegram, George B: (1876-1958) American physicist.
Peierls, Rudolf: (1907-1955) Jewish German-British physicist. Gained doctorate at 
Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge University. Appointed Professor of mathematical 
physics at the University of Birmingham by Mark Oliphant in 1937. With Otto Robert 
Frisch, devised the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum calculating the possibility of using 
nuclear fission for a bomb in Birmingham in 1940.
Piel, Gerard: (1915-2004) American journalist. Publisher of Scientific American from 
1947-1986.
Perrin, Sir Michael: (1905-1988) British chemist. Assistant Director ICI.
Pincher, Henry Chapman: (1914-2014) British journalist.
Placzek, George: (1905-1955) Czech physicist.
Randall, John Turton: (1905-1984) British physicist. Co-inventor of the cavity
magnetron with Harry Boot. In 1946, appointed Head of Physics at King’s College, 
London. 
Robinson, Denis: (1907-1994) British physicist. In charge of TRE microwave research 
1940. British liaison on microwave research at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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from 1941. Postwar appointed Professor of Electrical Engineering at the University of 
Birmingham by Mark Oliphant.
Roosevelt, Franklin D: (1882-1945) American President 1933-1945.
Rutherford, Ernest: (1871-1937) New Zealand-British physicist. 1908 Nobel Prize for 
Chemistry for investigations into the disintegration of the elements. Director of the 
Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge University, from 1919-1937.
Sartre, Jean-Paul: (1905-1980) French philosopher. Awarded 1964 Nobel Prize in 
Literature which he refused.
Shipley, Ruth B: (1885-1966) Head of Passport Division United States Department of 
State 1928-1955. As Head, Shipley exercise absolute authority and decisions were not 
subject to judicial review. A fervent anti-Communist, Shipley denied passports to 
physicists such as Martin Kamen. Physicist Linus Pauling was unable to visit Sweden to 
accept his 1953 Nobel Prize in Chemistry due to Shipley denying him a passport.
Schrödinger, Erwin: (1887-1961) Austrian physicist. 1933 Nobel Prize for Physics.
Shurcliff, William: (1909-2006) American physicist. Patent censor for the Manhattan 
Project.
Simpson, Esther ‘Tess’: (1903-1996) Secretary of the Academic Assistance Council 
(renamed the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning in 1936) 1933-1978
Smyth, Henry DeWolf: (1898-1986) American physicist. Author of the Smyth Report.
Snow, CP: (1905-1980) English physical chemist, civil servant and author. Gave the 
1959 Rede lecture on ‘The Two Cultures’ sparking debate between the Sciences and the 
Humanities.
Stimson, Henry: (1860-1950) American Republican politician. US Secretary of War 
1940-1945.
Strauss, Lewis: (1896-1974) Chair of Atomic Energy Commission during time of Robert 
Oppenheimer’s security clearance hearings.
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Teeple, David: Security investigator Manhattan Project. Later special assistant to Lewis 
Strauss, Chair Atomic Energy Commission.
Thomson, JJ: (1956-1940) British physicist. Director of the Cavendish Laboratory 1884-
1919. Succeeded by Ernest Rutherford. 1906 Nobel Prize for Physics for the discovery of 
the electron.
Thomson, George Paget: (1892-1975) British physicist, son of JJ Thomson. Chair of 
MAUD committee 1940-1941. 1937 Nobel Prize for Physics with Clinton Davisson for 
the experimental discovery of the diffraction of electrons by crystals.
Tizard, Henry: (1885-1959) British chemist. Chair of the Aeronautical Research 
Committee responsible for developing radar.
Truman, Harry S: (1884-1972) American President 1945-1953.
Tully, Grace: (1900-1984) private secretary to President Franklin D Roosevelt 1928-
1945
Tuve, Merle: (1901-1982) American physicist. Began working at the Department of 
Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institute, from 1926. Founding director of the Johns 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory from 1942-1946 where he worked on the 
development of the proximity fuse during World War II. Returned to Carnegie Institute 
where he was appointed Director of Department of Terrestrial Magnetism in 1946.
Urey, Harold: (1893-1981) American physical chemist. 1934 Nobel Prize for Chemistry 
for the discovery of deuterium (heavy water).
Walton, Ernest: (1903-1995) Irish physicist. 1951 Nobel Prize for Physics with John 
Cockcroft for their pioneering work on artificially accelerating particles. In 1932, 
Cockcroft and Walton were first to split the atom by artificial means. Returned to Ireland 
in 1934.
Wilkins, Maurice: (1916-2004) New Zealand-British physicist. 1962 Nobel Prize for 
Medicine along with Francis Crick and James Watson for the discovery of the molecular 
structure of DNA. Undergraduate at Cambridge University tutored by Mark Oliphant. 
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Graduate student at the University of Birmingham. Transferred to Manhattan Project as 
part of Oliphant Group at University of California, Berkeley, in 1944.
Wilson, Robert: (1914-2000) American physicist.
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Scientific glossary
Alpha Particle: A positively charged fast-moving particle comprising two protons and 
two neutrons emitted from a nucleus during radioactive decay.
Atomic Bomb: Explosive device. A fission bomb uses either enriched uranium or 
plutonium at critical mass to start a chain reaction.
Atomic Structure: Each element is made up of atoms. Each atom is made up of an equal 
number of positively charged protons and neutrons with no charge in its nucleus and 
negatively charged electrons in its outer shell. Hydrogen is the only element without 




Calutron: Device based on scaled-up mass spectrograph and a cyclotron invented by the 
Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley. Used in the electromagnetic 
separation of uranium at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on the Manhattan Project during World 
War II. Gets its name from Cal[ifornia] U[niversity] [Cyclo]tron.
Cavity Magnetron: Vacuum tube capable of generating microwaves of less than 10 cm 
designed by British physicists Harry Boot and John Randall at the University of 
Birmingham in 1940. Enabled the installation of radar sets into ships, submarines and 
aircraft.
Cloud Chamber: An instrument comprising of a sealed vacuum chamber containing 
water vapour. Used to detect charged particles through the condensation trail they leave 
in the chamber. Particles leave different shapes depending on their individual properties. 
Superseded as a detector by the advent of the bubble chamber in the late 1950s.
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Cyclotron: Particle accelerator invented by Ernest Lawrence in 1932. Charged particles 
are accelerated in a spiral path outwards using electric and magnetic fields. Used to 
produce a high-energy beam for experiments into nuclear physics.
Deuterium: Stable isotope of hydrogen containing one proton and one neutron.
Electromagnetism: The study of electromagnetic force. One of the four fundamental 
forces along with gravity, strong force and weak force. Holds atoms and molecules 
together. 
Electromagnetic Separation: Based on mass spectrometry. Charged particles can be 
deflected in a magnetic field based on their mass and will follow separate paths. The
separated isotopes can then be collected. Mark Oliphant managed to show separation of 
lithium isotopes by this method in 1934. See: ML Oliphant, ES Shire & BM Crowther 
1934, ‘Separation of the isotopes of lithium and some nuclear transformations observed 
with them,’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, A, vol 146, no 859, pp. 922-929
Electron: Subatomic negatively charged particle.
Heavy Water: Made up of deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen. Approximately one in 20 
million water molecules is deuterium.
Hydrogen: Chemical element. The simplest element comprised of one proton and one 
electron. 
Isotope: An atom with the identical number of protons as an atom of an element but with 
a differing number of neutrons.
Klystron: Linear vacuum tube invented by Russel and Sigurd Varian in 1937. Used to 
generate microwaves.
Lithium: Chemical element.
Mass Spectrograph: Instrument used to detect isotopes based on their relative mass 
through the use of magnetic force on a moving charged particle.
Neutron: Subatomic particle with no electric charge.
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Nuclear fission: A process of radioactive decay which occurs when the nucleus of a 
heavy element such as uranium splits into radioactive isotopes emitting neutrons and 
generating large amounts of energy. When a U235 nucleus combines with a slow neutron 
it divides (splits) with great energy emitting fast neutrons. These neutrons may then 
collide and be captured by other U235 nuclei which in turn divide starting a chain 
reaction which continues for as long as sufficient U235 nuclei are present releasing a vast 
amount of explosive energy. Discovered by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in December 
1938 and theoretically interpreted by Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch in January 
1939.
Nuclear fusion: A process which occurs when nuclei of light elements such as deuterium 
bond together producing large amounts of energy. Nuclear fusion is the process which 
powers the Sun. Discovered by Mark Oliphant at the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge 
University, in 1932. See: ML Oliphant, P Harteck & Lord Rutherford 1934, 
‘Transmutation effects observed with Heavy Hydrogen,’ Nature, vol 133, no 3359, pp. 
393-428
Particle Accelerator: A device used in experimental physics to accelerate particles to 
very high speeds through the use of electric and magnetic fields. Beams of high-energy 
particles can then be directed onto targets for use in experiments.
Plutonium: Chemical element.
Proton: Positively charged subatomic particle.
Radar: Also known as Radio Detection Finding (RDF). Method of detection using pulses 
of high-frequency electromagnetic waves.
Radium: Chemical element.
Synchrotron: A particle accelerator capable of accelerating particles to extremely high 
energies in order to emit X-rays and then to keep them in constant orbit at close to the 
speed of light in order to deflect beams of X-rays for use in various experiments.
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Thermonuclear (Hydrogen) Bomb: Uses fission to heat hydrogen isotopes (tritium or 
deuterium) in order to create fusion reaction which emits vast quantities of neutrons 
which in turn set off a chain reaction. Theory based on hydrogen fusion reaction first 
discovered by Mark Oliphant at the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge University, in 
1932. See: ML Oliphant, P Harteck & Lord Rutherford 1934, ‘Transmutation effects 
observed with Heavy Hydrogen,’ Nature, vol 133, no 3359, pp. 393-428
Thorium: Chemical element.
Tritium: Radioactive isotope of hydrogen first discovered by Mark Oliphant in 1934. 
See: ML Oliphant, P Harteck & Lord Rutherford 1934, ‘Transmutation effects observed 
with Heavy Hydrogen,’ Nature, vol 133, no 3359, pp. 393-428
Uranium: Chemical element. U235 and U238 are isotopes of uranium. U235 is 
responsible for nuclear fission of uranium and was used to fuel the atomic bomb.
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A dissonance
in the valence of uranium
led to the discovery
Dissonance
(if you are interested)
leads to discovery
…
a stain at the bottom of the retort
without weight, a failure, a
nothing. And then, returning in the 
night, to find it
LUMINOUS
William Carlos Williams 




Princeton University, New Jersey, July 
In his office at the Palmer Laboratory Harry Smyth put his feet up and leaned back in his 
chair. He could do with a break he thought to himself. He had spent the best part of the 
past eighteen months working on a manuscript with a mouthful of a title, A General 
Account of the Development of Methods of Using Nuclear Energy for Military Purposes 
under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945.0F1 It had been a 
mammoth task made even more difficult by all the security arrangements necessary for 
him to complete the ‘top secret’ job. Three shifts of armed guards had kept watch on his 
office day and night. Hell, Smyth ruminated as he looked out through the bars of his 
office window, the report even had its own military courier and travelled separately 
whenever he had needed to go to Washington.1F2 Now, finally, the completed report was 
safely in the hands of its commissioner, General Leslie Groves, and, presumably, the 
government printer. 
In Washington, William Shurcliff, the report’s copyeditor, was frustrated. 
‘[Harry Smyth] seems not to have heard of topic sentences,’ Shurcliff complained to 
anyone who would listen.2F3
There had been some talk when the report hit the desks of those in the know that the 
United States was giving too much away. Groves was adamant that the report contained 
no secrets.
‘Similar instruction was given to people going west years ago,’ Groves told the doubters, 
‘when they were told that they should go to a water hole about 30 miles away and that if 
it was dry they should go to one about 10 miles beyond that.’3F4
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Groves’ frontier metaphor satisfied the Missouri born-and-bred, President Harry 
Truman. Sitting at his desk in the Oval Office at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, he signed the 
order for the release of Smyth’s report ‘for radio use after 9 pm on Saturday, August 11, 
and for newspaper use on … Sunday, August 12’.4F5
On August 6, at the regular Monday morning White House press briefing, assistant press 
secretary Eben Ayers delivered ‘a darned good story’ to the waiting press gallery.
‘Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important 
Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It had more 
than two thousand times the blast power of … the largest bomb ever yet used in the 
history of warfare … [You’ll have to wait for the report] so you won’t ball it all up,’ the 
press secretary told them, ‘It’s a big story.’
‘It’s a hell of a story!’ a reporter shot back.5F6
…
In London, at the offices of the Daily Express, Harry Chapman Pincher answered a call 
from his boss, Lord Beaverbrook.
'Your headline for tomorrow [is] “The bomb that has changed the world.” And you've got 
to keep the story going for at least a fortnight.’ 6F7
Chapman Pincher replaced the telephone receiver back on its cradle wondering just how 
he was going to be able to write a story on something so new that he knew absolutely 
nothing about it. He thought about who he could call before dialling the operator and 
asking to be connected to the University of Birmingham’s Professor of Physics. 
‘Why don't you get hold of that report?’
‘What report?’
‘The Americans have published a report telling the whole story. There's a copy of it at the 
Tube Alloys headquarters. If you go there and say I sent you they might let you see it.’7F8
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Sitting quietly in the reading room of the Directorate of Tube Alloys in Old Queen Street, 
Chapman Pincher could not believe his luck. The entire history of the atom bomb project 
was laid out in 200 cream-coloured pages on the desk in front of him. He knew a scoop 
when one fell in his lap and this scoop was sure to lead the paper. Racing back to 120 
Fleet Street, the reporter bashed out a front page story.8F9
…
George Thomson stepped his umbrella along Horse Guard’s Parade on his way to his 
office at the Ministry of Information. With a nod to the top-hatted doorman, Thomson 
mounted the steps of the Grand Hall staircase.  Almost as soon as he entered his office 
his secretary began taking calls. As the morning edition of the Daily Express hit the desks 
of the editors of its rival newspapers all wanted to ask the British Government’s Chief 
Press Censor the same question: was it safe to copy the Express’ story? The following 
day, furious cables began spitting their way down the teleprinter from Washington to 
Whitehall demanding to know whose big idea it was to leak the top secret Smyth Report a 
week before the official launch. The Foreign Office also relayed their displeasure sending 
Thomson into damage control. Despite his best efforts pleading ‘with Fleet Street’s top 
brass … not to pursue atomic matters,’ Beaverbrook would not play the game and was 
proving Thomson’s biggest headache.9F10 Chapman Pincher, writing undercover with the 
byline ‘Express Science Reporter,’ continued with his daily bomb scoops; the only 
journalist in the world with access to its history for the first week after the atomic bomb 
was launched on the world. 
…
Back in Washington DC, Mary Lou Kerst was expertly twirling the platen knob which in 
turn wound a sheet of paper around the carriage of her typewriter. Since arriving at the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters in January 1943, fresh from Crete, 
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Nebraska, via Union Station and a very crowded taxicab, Kerst had spent ten hours a 
day, six days a week at her typewriter.10F11 Half her time was spent transcribing agents’ top 
secret reports on possible spies and saboteurs and collating them into files. The rest of 
her time was spent re-inking the much-used typewriter ribbon and disentangling the 
jammed-up keys of the old Underwood Universal. Turning her head the FBI secretary 
scanned the teletype report on the top of the neat pile next to the machine before joining 
in with the ding clickety-clack hum in the room.
‘A reliable informant of the United States Government overheard a remark made by an 
unidentified individual in an unidentified group to the effect that some of the group knew 
about the atom bomb from an Australian scientist before it was publicly announced. The 
informant learned of the alleged leakage from a sub-source who was “allegedly a former 
communist agent with some contacts in United States communist circles” … The 
Australian atomic scientist passed on everything he knew about our Atomic Energy 
Programme, including the “set-up in New Mexico.”’11F12
Carefully removing the sheet of paper, Kerst sent the typescript for sorting into a brand 
new file.
1980
University of California, Berkeley, April  
As the bus wound its leisurely way up Strawberry Canyon past the Cal Memorial Stadium 
on its way to the top of Charter Hill it shuddered. Stewart Cockburn drew his breath in 
sharply as he realised the bus was passing over the Hayward Fault Line. As the bus 
driver engaged a lower gear, it occurred to Cockburn that he had, perhaps, overreacted. 
When the bus reached its destination, Cockburn took a moment to take in the view across 
the valley at the San Francisco Bay. He could just make out the Golden Gate Bridge 
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through the mist and, just maybe, Mt Tamaulipas. He checked his watch as he mounted 
the steps to the lobby of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. 
‘Thanks for seeing me. I know that we haven’t much time.’
‘I’ve got about a half hour before my next appointment.’
‘Right, right. Well, let’s get started then.’
Cockburn placed the tape recorder on the desk in front of him and pressed the start 
button.
‘Interview with Dr Luis Alvarez for the Oliphant biography.’
Across the desk, Alvarez fixed the Australian with a steel-glint gaze.
‘I expect Oliphant had an enormous effect on the war effort of this country but—‘
‘But?’
‘But I haven’t been able to detect that Oliphant had anything to do with it, or even 
interacted much with those responsible … the names I remember were Frisch and 
Peierls.’
‘They, of course, were in Oliphant’s lab.’
‘Everyone was very laudatory about him, but what did he do? I’ve never been able to find 
out what he did. If Oliphant was an entrepreneur of science, he wasn’t a very good one … 
After the war I visited Birmingham when Mark was there—the first proton synchrotron 
was an absolute disaster. I kept saying to myself, what a miserable machine. Why’d he do 
it? Why did a guy like Mark Oliphant get stuck with it? Because that’s what separates the 
men from the boys in physics—you have to plant your flag in the field and say, ‘Rally 
round, boys, we’re gonna make it out there!’ You have to build something big and it’s got 
to be good. There it was in Birmingham, White Oliphant Number One.’12F13
…
In his hotel room after dinner, Cockburn replayed the tape. An old-school journo, he’d 
started his career as a copy boy at the Adelaide Advertiser at the age of 16 including a 
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stint during the ‘50s as Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies’ press secretary. 
Cockburn considered himself a tough guy—after all he was not afraid to trade punches 
with anyone who got in his way in pursuit of a good story. He’d come across some pretty 
aggressive characters in his time. Alvarez though, was in a league of his own; there was 
something that he couldn’t quite put his finger on. Cockburn thought that he would add a 
postscript before he sent a copy to his colleague, David Ellyard. He needed some kind of 
scientific metaphor that he could use to describe the meeting. He flipped a page over in 
his notebook, and made a note. 
‘Alvarez fairly glows with aggression ...’
…
Cockburn looked across the desk at Ellyard. What was needed was to find a path through 
the conflicting accounts. He leaned back in his chair and clasped his hands behind his 
head. 
‘I was pretty stunned by the brutality of [Alvarez’s] statements about Oliphant … I don’t 
think anyone endorsed [them] … One of our dilemmas is to know how incestuous the 
American scientific world is … the Emeritus Professors of Berkeley would probably take 
their collective cue to some extent from McMillan and Alvarez, their two Nobel 
prizemen.’
Ellyard shuffled the papers in front of him.
‘Well, Harvard staunchly defended Oliphant. The consensus was that “That’s Luis!” 
Denis Robinson pointed out to me that Berkeley was a tremendous drain on the physics 
budget of the whole country for a long time. He said that Harvard was always jealous of 
Berkeley because Berkeley was getting it all.’
‘Okay, well we have to decide to what extent does Alvarez lead the opinion of his 
colleagues and to what extent we make allowances for his pugnacity and contempt.’
‘I like Lofgren’s view—he’s more balanced.’
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‘Yes, but he’s younger than Oliphant and perhaps more impressionable.’
‘Kamen also commented on Alvarez’s ego.’
‘I think,’ Cockburn said as he swung his chair back to Earth, ‘we ought to record the 
duly edited opinions of each side and let the reader come to his own conclusions.’13F14
…
2012
Covent Garden, London, June
‘It’s been sold out for weeks.’ 
I am sitting in the front row at the Donmar Warehouse waiting for the curtain to rise on 
Jack Thorne’s new version of Friedrich Dürrenmatt’s The Physicists.
‘I bought my ticket months ago,’ the German guy on my left tells me. 
I took a chance and bought my ticket at the door; it seems I have the last available ticket. 
I decide that my luck in getting to see this production on my first night in London is a 
very good omen. I am at the start of my quest to trace the journey of my subject, 
Australian physicist, Sir Mark Oliphant. As the house lights dim, a familiar story begins 
to play out onstage. Johann Wilhelm Möbius, also a physicist, has locked himself away in 
an insane asylum to keep the world safe from his discovery.
‘A new energy … do you think humanity is ready for such advancement? For such 
power?’ 
Möbius must protect society from this fantastic but potentially dangerous new knowledge 
by separating his thoughts from those who would use them.
Where Bertolt Brecht’s Life of Galileo in 1945 blamed the physicists for abrogating their 
social responsibility in unleashing the atomic bomb on the world, Dürrenmatt, writing in 
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1961 at the beginning of the construction of the Berlin Wall and on the eve of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, is ambiguous on the question of the guilt of the individual scientist. 
‘The content of physics is the concern of physicists, its effect the concern of all men,’ 
Dürrenmatt said, ‘Each attempt of an individual to resolve for himself what is the 
concern of everyone is doomed to fail.’14F15
Möbius cannot halt the desire for progress; his stolen invention is released to the world: 
‘What was once thought can never be unthought.’15F16
When physicist Maurice Goldsmith began his biography of British Left-wing scientist and 
social reformer, JD ‘Sage’ Bernal, he found he was blocked by Bernal’s well-meaning 
friends.
‘They seem to me to wish to perpetrate, and perpetuate, a portrait of you as a hero of our 
time,’ Goldsmith wrote in a posthumous note to his subject, ‘before which we must stand 
and suspend judgement.’16F17
A similar obstruction, though with an opposite warning, confronted me. 
‘Oliphant,’ I was told by an eminent historian of science, ‘was not much of a scientist. A 
failure, in fact. Canberra still can’t forgive him.’ 
The warning, if it was one, reminded me of something once said by Irish playwright 
Samuel Beckett.
‘I’m not interested in stories of success,’ Beckett said, ‘only failure.’17F18
Just as Goldsmith discovered when writing his biography about Bernal, the comment 
about Oliphant has the opposite effect. Instead of warning me off, I’m even more 
intrigued to uncover my subject. It seems Mark Oliphant, like Bernal, is a controversial 
subject. After the Second World War, he opposed nuclear weapons research despite 
having been responsible for spurring the Americans into developing the atomic bomb. 
His actions, like that of Durrenmatt’s Möbius, in the end, proved futile. In the postwar 
world it was too late to stop the nuclear arms race. ‘Science,’ as one Manhattan Project 
physicist put it at the beginning of the Cold War, ‘had been bought by war, on the 
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instalment plan.’18F19 Mark Oliphant’s long crusade against the bomb, beginning in 1945 
and continuing until his death in 2000, is dismissed by my harbinger. 
‘He got himself caught up with the “ban-the-bomb” hippy movement,’ I’m told. 
…
‘A story has been thought to its worst possible conclusion when it has taken its worst 
possible turn,’ Dürrenmatt said. ‘The worst possible turn is not foreseeable. It occurs by 
coincidence.’ Looking back, the clash between nuclear scientists and security forces in 
the aftermath of the atomic bomb seemed inevitable; the ideals of the ‘communism’ of 
science and the interests of the state seem irreconcilable. Three months after Hiroshima 
Mark Oliphant warned the British public of the coming Cold War. 
‘Russia could have the atomic bomb within … five years,’ he said, ‘Britain [needs] to 
play [its] part in holding the balance between the unbridled extremes of American 
capitalism and Russian Communism … Will England be big enough to seize the 
opportunity?’19F20
The scientists had long ago lost control of their invention. Oliphant’s calls for restraint 
fell on deaf ears. The politicians were no longer listening. They’d passed the task onto the 
security agencies. 
‘Oliphant always had a somewhat naïve Left incline,’ one of Oliphant’s British 
colleagues once said of him, ‘he still had that shining belief that so many top intellectuals 
had … that Marxism was the answer, and … he held to that youthful mystic belief … this 
was something for which the Far Right did not forgive him.’20F21
Veiled accusations that Oliphant was a Soviet spy surfaced throughout his postwar 
career. Even after Oliphant’s death in 2000, Cold War warriors were still prepared to 
sling arrows towards him.
‘Oliphant,’ one wrote ‘almost certainly did not mind if [his] work ended up in KGB 
hands.’21F22
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I take the tube from Paddington to Hammersmith before switching lines to the District 
and Piccadilly with Dürrenmatt’s questions pricking my conscience. I get off at Kew 
Gardens and walk down Ruskin Avenue. Inside the National Archives, armed with a 
notepad, a pencil, a camera and a stack of files, I begin my search not really knowing 
what I am looking for. Time passes quickly as dates, names and places long forgotten and 
once secret documents begin to reconstruct the past and show, as physicist Werner 
Heisenberg puts it, that ‘science is quite inseparable’ from all-encompassing ‘[h]uman, 
philosophical and political problems.’22F23
Like Oliphant’s former biographers, I need to retrace Mark Oliphant’s steps. I need to 
travel back to the University of Birmingham where, in 1939, Oliphant and his team 
developed the world’s first microwave radar and where, in 1945, Oliphant began 
constructing the world’s first synchrotron particle accelerator; the ancestor of the Large 
Hadron Collider. I need to visit the hallowed halls of the Royal Society overlooking St 
James Park and within shouting distance of Buckingham Palace where, in 1940, French 
intelligence told the British scientists that the Germans were building an atomic bomb. I 
need to stand on the hill overlooking the San Francisco Bay above the university at 
Berkeley where, in 1941, Oliphant first told Ernest Lawrence about the possibility of an 
Allied atomic bomb. But first, I need to go back to where it all began, to the Cavendish 
Laboratory, Cambridge University, where, in 1927, Oliphant arrived fresh from a seven-
week voyage across the ocean from Australia, wide-eyed and unworldly. Here Oliphant 
enthusiastically joined in the program inventing apparatus to produce atomic 
transformations by directing ion beams to hit targets made from lithium, beryllium and 
other elements. These machines would one day be co-opted to produce the world’s 
greatest bomb. 
‘We had no idea that this would be applied to make bombs,’ Oliphant once said. ‘Our 
interest was just curiosity about the structure of the nucleus of the atom.’23F24
The beginning of a boy’s own adventure in atomic physics …
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Chapter 1: The Beginning
1927
Cambridge University, England, October
The start of the Michaelmas term; the Virginia creeper covering the medieval stone walls 
of Corpus Christi College had already begun to turn red. The rain fell steadily; it had 
been raining more or less nonstop since the beginning of summer. Turning up the collar 
of his tweed jacket, Mark Oliphant—tall, broad-shouldered, with dark, film star curls 
who had just celebrated his twenty-sixth birthday —walked briskly down Bene’t Street 
before turning down Free School Lane. He reached the archway to the Cavendish 
Laboratory as ever larger drops of rain began to fall again on the cobblestones. Oliphant 
stood in front of a Victorian Gothic gateway with massive oak doors. He took a moment 
to wipe his wire-framed spectacles on the back of his sleeve. Above the gate a carved 
statue of the former Chancellor of the university, the Duke of Devonshire, watched 
silently from its niche in the Ancaster stone façade. 
Inside the archway Oliphant traversed a small foyer crammed full of bicycles. A porter in 
an old-fashioned Eton collar and cutaway jacket directed him upstairs. On the next floor 
he found himself in a long gloomy corridor lit by a dust-covered skylight and bordered 
on both sides by still more bicycles. A multitude of damp raincoats hung suspended from 
iron hooks. Negotiating his way along the narrow hallway he arrived at the office of the 
director of the Cavendish Laboratory, Ernest Rutherford.24F1 He joined two other 
prospective students on the wooden bench outside the office nervously waiting to be 
interviewed. 
‘The Professor will see you now, Mr Oliphant.’ 
A watery sun failed in its attempt to penetrate the dirty window to illuminate the room. 
Drops of water ran reluctantly down the grime-covered glass forming small blackened 
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pools merging occasionally to continue a gravity-induced descent down the dusty wall to 
the floor.25F2 An old-fashioned roll top desk piled high with books and papers rested on a 
square of grimy carpet. Stacks of books and papers formed a citadel surrounding the 
desk, all covered in a grey shroud of dust and ash. Through a haze of smoke, the 
professor signalled to Oliphant to sit. Rutherford, large, red-faced with thinning fair hair 
and a considerable verdant moustache covering his top lip— reminded Mark Oliphant 
less of a Cambridge Don than ‘of the keeper of the general store and post office in the 
hills behind Adelaide’ where Oliphant had grown up.26F3 Oliphant scanned the small office 
searching for a chair before eventually removing a pile of books from a stool.
Holding a match to his pipe sending miniature volcanic eruptions of ash and smoke 
across the desk, Rutherford glanced at the recommendation from Professor Kerr Grant, 
University of Adelaide, on his desk.
‘Mr Oliphant possesses an altogether unusual aptitude for the technical side of physics … 
[However] I do not wish to give the impression that he is a mere technician. On the 
contrary, his knowledge of theoretical physics is both wide and thorough … he tells me 
that he has been reading the very difficult papers of Schrödinger and others on the new 
‘Wave mechanics’ of atomic processes.’27F4
Brushing ‘red hot grains of tobacco’ from the paper and from his waistcoat, Rutherford 
leaned back in his chair and appraised the student in front of him.28F5
‘What is it that you plan to do?’29F6
Mark Oliphant broke into a cold sweat and wondered if he had made the right decision. 
With gloom descending, he hesitatingly gave an outline of his proposed research.
‘I thought that I could do some work on the effects of metals on bombardment by 
positive ions, if you thought that would fit well into the program of the laboratory?’ 
‘Nice to see someone who has a few ideas … I see you have your wife with you.’
‘Yes.’
‘Well, you must bring her to tea to meet Lady Rutherford.’
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‘Thank you Professor.’
‘Now you'd better go around and make yourself familiar with the laboratory … meet 
some of the boys.’ 
‘Which boys, Professor?’
‘[Y]ou'll find J J in the Garage … you'll find Aston next door … Make yourself known.’ 
Oliphant hesitated. He was about to ask the Professor where the ‘Garage’ was exactly, 
when Rutherford issued a last command.
‘Now, don’t be diffident, Rutherford boomed, ‘tell them I sent you.’30F7
In a large basement laboratory—the Garage—work tables were piled high with dusty 
glass tubing, flasks, beakers and copper wire. It seemed to Mark Oliphant that the 
equipment ‘had grown continuously since J J Thomson discovered the electron thirty 
years previously, each year new experiment being added, and nothing ever removed or 
cleaned.’31F8 Oliphant introduced himself to a neatly dressed, tall, lean man with thinning 
hair and a toothbrush moustache.32F9 John Chadwick, stared at the newcomer over the top 
of his spectacles. 
‘Oh yes. I’ve been expecting you.’33F10
Later that afternoon, Mark Oliphant strolled through the streets of Cambridge searching 
out the landmarks he had read so much about—the river Cam, the Mathematical Bridge, 
King’s College Chapel—before heading back to his digs. 
On Sunday Mark and Rosie wandered down the river path along the Backs before 
strolling past pretty houses lining the route along Queen’s Road. At Rose Cottage a maid 
wearing a lace cap and apron announced their arrival.34F11
‘Hello my boy!’ 
In the drawing room eminent professors conversed animatedly with lowly postgraduate 
students. Lady Rutherford corrected ‘any lapse in pronunciation, especially of botanical 
terms’ as she poured the tea.35F12 Among the guests was another Cavendish researcher, 
Peter Kapitza. Kapitza had arrived in Cambridge in 1921, ‘thin, unhappy, unknown, 
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looking like a “tragic Russian prince,”’ in grief over the death of his first wife and their 
two children from scarlet fever and the Spanish Flu.36F13 When Rutherford informed him 
that there were no new research studentships available, Kapitza had posed a question. 
‘What is accuracy of Cavendish measurements?’ 
‘Roughly ten percent. Why do you ask?’ 
‘Well, if one additional student less than ten percent of total thirty is within limits of 
experimental error?’ 
Rutherford’s loud, booming laugh could be heard through the corridors of the Cavendish. 
Kapitza had gained his place.37F14
An hour after the Oliphant’s joined the gathering in the drawing room, their hosts 
inquired whether their guests would like to see the garden. After suitable admiring 
comments regarding Lady Rutherford’s delphiniums, Mark was led firmly to a door in 
the garden wall where Mary Rutherford thanked her guest, shook his hand and Oliphant 
departed. Meanwhile, the Prof escorted Rosie around the flower beds.
‘Now my dear, physicists’ wives must ensure that their husbands have no household 
tasks, so that they can be free to devote themselves wholly to their work.’38F15 Rosie 
assured the Prof that she would follow his advice before joining Mark on the other side 
of the garden wall. Making the most of the Indian summer, they wandered back along the 
river among the drifts of autumn crocuses. 
On Christmas night snow began to fall without sound obliterating the landscape. Familiar 
landmarks disappeared under a sea of soft white. Thin panes of ice rested on the surface 
of the river. As December moved into January snow fell relentlessly, accumulating in 
drifts of up to 15 feet tall.39F16 Roads were blocked and downed telephone lines excised 
villages and towns from the rest of the world. 
In the evenings, Mark and Rosie slipped quietly past their landlord’s door to avoid a fine 
for being out after curfew. Crossing the street, they joined the gathering at a rambling, 
four-storey house opposite. Oliphant’s Cavendish colleague Patrick Blackett ‘entertained 
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with … films depicting the wonders of the Soviet Union’. While the glory of the 
collectivization of Soviet agriculture may have made for a dull evening on its own, 
Blackett and his wife Constanza, also known as ‘Pat,’ were glittering company.40F17 A
‘favourite haunt of … Bohemian academics,’ the guests included many members of the 
Left: luminaries such as J D ‘Sage’ Bernal, Joseph Needham, J B S Haldane, Julian
Huxley, Hyman Levy, Lancelot Hogben and John Maynard Keynes.41F18 Of the ‘200 
brightest scientists [in Britain] under the age of 40,’ scientist and writer CP Snow 
claimed, there were ‘five … Communists, ten fellow-travellers, fifty left of centre, 100 
passively sympathetic to the left, the rest neutral’ with only ‘five or six on the eccentric 
wings of the right’.42F19 Blackett was a Fabian socialist: a movement committed to the 
breakdown of capitalism through non-violent methods. Mark Oliphant, whose parents 
were both Fabians, enthusiastically joined the conversation at the Blackett’s soirees 
which was inevitably a discussion of politics.43F20 Oliphant continued his debating at the 
lab. 
‘Rutherford,’ Kapitza said, ‘held progressive political views.’44F21 Nevertheless Oliphant’s 
arguments were too left for the Prof. 
‘All Oliphant’s Shavian ideas derive from the New Statesman,’ Rutherford thundered.45F22
Oliphant’s ‘loud voice, and … hearty laugh’ could be heard ringing through the corridors 
of the laboratory.46F23
‘The Prof,’ he conceded, ‘was not so far from the truth.’47F24
1931
University of California, Berkeley, November
Professor Ernest Orlando Lawrence sat at his desk writing a quick note to his old friend, 
fellow physicist, Merle Tuve, at the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie 
Institute, Washington, D C. 
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‘The proton merry-go-round is behaving beautifully. I am absolutely certain that we will 
experience no difficulty in going right up to five million volts or more.’48F25
Lawrence then felt the need to temper his optimism by imploring Tuve to ignore any 
wild rumours he may have heard.
‘It has been brought to my attention, much to my sorrow … that there has been broadcast 
over the country … that we are attempting to transmute base metal to gold etc. I’d like to 
wring the neck of the reporter … responsible for this … I do hope my friends in the East 
are not holding this against me.’49F26
‘It’s high time for [you] to … stake out a territory,’ Tuve had advised him a few years 
previously, ‘[There’s] a lot of yeast going by reason of the Heisenberg-Schrödinger-
Bohr-Pauli-de Broglie yeast … The [ground’s] well prepared for a great many people to 
be interested in doing these things by artificial voltage sources.’50F27
At around the same time that George Gamow arrived in Cambridge, Lawrence left Yale 
for California with the dire predictions of his Eastern colleagues that he was heading into 
the ‘unscientific climate of the West’ ringing in his ears.51F28
A tall, strapping, blond-haired, blue-eyed son of Norwegian immigrants, Lawrence 
crossed the old frontier in a Reo Flying Cloud convertible in September 1928. He 
planned his attack as he flew along Route 66. He needed to develop a means of 
‘accelerating charged particles … to energies measured in millions of electron volts’52F29.
At the university Lawrence moved into the Men’s Faculty Club sheltered in a copse of 
gigantic redwood trees just a short stroll from the Physics Department. 
Lawrence’s basic principle of using a magnetic field to circulate ions back and forth 
within hollow semicircular electrodes was sparked by an article by a Norwegian 
engineer, Rolf Wideröe. Lawrence had come across Wideröe’s paper in a German 
electrical engineering journal.53F30 Although he could not read the German text, Lawrence 
worked out Wideröe’s theory through analysing the accompanying diagrams. Lawrence 
then came up with an idea for an apparatus. In room number 329 in Le Conte Hall, 
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Lawrence managed to build a small prototype machine—the proton ‘merry-go-round’—
and gave it a new name: the cyclotron. By 1931, Lawrence’s latest cyclotron, developed 
with the help of a graduate student assistant, Stan Livingston, was housed in the 
university’s ‘high speed corpuscle laboratory’: an old, wooden, clapboard-sided, two-
story building at the back of the physics department. Lawrence renamed his new lab the 
Penetrating Radiations Laboratory. The new name didn’t stick; it was soon rechristened 
the ‘Rad Lab’. 
In August 1931, on a visit to the East Coast, Lawrence received a telegram from his 
secretary.
DR LIVINGSTON HAS ASKED ME TO ADVISE YOU THAT HE HAS OBTAINED 
1,100,000 VOLT PROTONS STOP HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT I ADD 
‘WHOOPPEE!’54F31
Later at the Rad Lab, Livingston, ‘with Lawrence looking over [his] shoulder, tuned the 
magnet through resonance. As the galvanometer spot swung across the scale … 
Lawrence … danced around the room with glee’. The news spread through the lab; the 
researchers were soon demonstrating ‘million-volt protons to eager viewers’.55F32 The 
Berkeley Rad Lab was beginning to get noticed. 
‘The place on the coast where things are really going on is Berkeley,’ a colleague wrote 
back to Cockcroft in Cambridge, ‘Lawrence hopes to have six different particle outfits … 
On paper this sounds like a wild damn fool program, but Lawrence is a very able 
director.56F33
All that Lawrence needed to do now was to hook up some counters to record results. His 
old friend from Yale, Don Cooksey, would be bringing some counters to Berkeley in the 
summer.57F34
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Chapter 2: The Split
1932
Sorbonne, Paris, February
Jean Perrin, Professor of Physical Chemistry, had recently introduced the de l'après-
midi—the charming British habit of Monday afternoon tea and colloquia. Brewed over a 
Bunsen burner in the laboratory, the Sorbonne scientists drank coffee from laboratory 
glassware amid talk of all things scientific.58F1 In January discussion centred on the latest 
French success—Madame Curie’s daughter Irène and her husband Frédéric Joliot had 
just published the results of their experiments on ‘the anomalous behaviour of certain 
radiations emitted in the transformation of beryllium by alpha particles’ putting forward 
their hypothesis that gamma rays of much higher energy than had been observed before 
were acting on protons in the nucleus.59F2 Irène warmed her back against a radiator as Fred 
ferried questions.
‘[T]hat Englishman Chadwick,’ Fred told his colleagues, ‘has ideas that they are neutral 
particles of the same weight as protons.’ 
Fred’s revelation was immediately followed by ‘general laughter in the room’.60F3
When the French news reached Cambridge Chadwick, who had spent the best part of the 
last few years searching for the elusive neutral particle, found the Joliot-Curie’s proposal 
‘electrifying’. He didn’t believe it.61F4 Rutherford was also incredulous. 
‘One must believe the observations, the explanation is quite another matter.’62F5
Chadwick was ‘convinced there was something new as well as strange’ in the French 
results.63F6 A few weeks later, in Kapitza’s rooms in Trinity College, Mark Oliphant heard 
an unusually relaxed, slightly drunk Chadwick announce that his twelve year quest to 
discover the neutral particle had resulted in success. Shouting to be heard above the 
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cheers of his Cavendish colleagues, Chadwick requested ‘to be chloroformed and put to 
bed for a fortnight’.64F7
‘We have been working hard during the last few months … [and have] had to speed up 
the pace of our experiments,’ Fred Joliot wrote to a colleague when he heard the news, 
‘for it is annoying to be overtaken by other laboratories which immediately take up one’s 
experiments.’65F8
Joliot graciously conceded that this particular race was won by the Cavendish. 
‘Chadwick has, by the way, published the very attractive hypothesis that the penetrating 
radiation … is composed of neutrons.’66F9
…
At the Cavendish laboratory in April, Ernest Walton wriggled into in the small wooden 
hut directly under the accelerating tube of the new machine and waited in the darkness 
for a 125,000 volt beam of protons to be fired at a thin foil target made from very light 
lithium. Walton, with just a few millimetres of lead covering the outside of the hut 
protecting him from the intense radiation, counted flashes where the photons struck a 
zinc-sulphide screen. Rutherford, with much huffing and puffing, insisted on squeezing 
into the tiny hut. 
'Those scintillations look mighty like alpha-particle ones,’ Rutherford shouted, ‘I should 
know an alpha-particle when I see one for I was in at the birth of the alpha-particle and I 
have been observing them ever since!'67F10
The flashes exploded onto the screen showing disintegration of atoms by artificially 
accelerated particles releasing large amounts of energy for the very first time. Cockcroft 
and Walton had confirmed Albert Einstein’s famous equation E=mc2: E for energy, m for 
mass, c for celeritas—Latin for swiftness—the speed of light squared.68F11 Rutherford, 
‘afraid that the news would spread like wild fire through the physics labs of the world’ 
told the researchers to keep their results secret until they were published.69F12
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‘[The Prof says that] no lurid accounts should appear in the daily papers,’ Walton wrote 
to his fiancé in Dublin, ‘Rutherford is very anxious that we should get the credit … 
before other people start to get a move on … We know that people in the States are 
working along similar lines … He is not fond of American physicists in general on 
account of their tendency to do a great deal of boasting about very little.’70F13
At afternoon tea at the Cavendish library, another of the Cambridge researchers scribbled 
an equation on the blackboard:  p + 7Li
‘Have you heard that Cockcroft and Walton have done this?’ he told the stunned room.71 F14
Cockcroft and Walton relayed the results of their experiments in a letter to Nature:
‘The brightness of the scintillations and the density of the tracks observed in the 
expansion chamber suggest … that the lithium isotope of mass 7 occasionally captures a 
proton and the resulting nucleus of mass 8 breaks up into two alpha particles, each of 
mass four and each with an energy of about eight million electron volts. The evolution of 
energy … is about sixteen million electron volts per disintegration, agreeing 
approximately with that to be expected from the decrease of atomic mass involved in 
such a disintegration.’72F15
A reporter cornered Rutherford at a Royal Academy banquet and coerced the Prof into 
hastily proofing his story. 
‘This information is generally correct,’ Rutherford scrawled across the paper. 
The single headline ‘Science’s Greatest Discovery’ ran across the front page of the
Reynold’s Illustrated News. The report that followed it turned out to be ‘one of the 
biggest scoops in the history of Fleet Street’.73F16
Journalists began to arrive at the Cavendish to observe Cockcroft and Walton’s 
accelerator in action.
‘In the darkened hall, switches were thrown,’ the Daily Herald told its readers. ‘The
generators warmed, with the hum of a gathering storm. There was the throb of the pumps 
as they sucked the air out of the vacuum tubes. Lightning crackled and flashed as the 
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high-tension spheres sparked. A tall glass pillar glowed with a luminous blue haze.
Presently there was a clicking sound, and a counter, like a mileage recorder in a motor-
car, began to clock-in the fragments of the splitting atoms …
“Where are we going from here?”
“Who knows,’ replied Rutherford. ‘We are entering no man’s land.”’74F17
1932, Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Washington, DC, April
A year before Cockcroft and Walton’s discovery, Lawrence’s old friend Merle Tuve had 
driven to Princeton ‘and hauled back … on [his] car’s rear bumper … two “desk model” 
Van de Graaf generators’.75F18 When the news broke that the Cambridge researchers had 
disintegrated lithium, Tuve and his colleagues, Larry Hafstad and Odd Dahl, were just 
adding the final touches to their brand new full-size Van de Graaff. Tuve knew all about 
‘Gamow’s theory of barriers … that you could tunnel through the barrier with a certain 
limited probability … [and] that it should be possible to go through the potential barrier 
and enter the nucleus, [however, having] fabricated [the machine] from June till October 
… there it [had] sat’.76F19 Tuve and his two-man team had not tested their machine on 
targets. When the researchers did finally test it, ‘sure enough, alpha particles’.77F20 A week 
after Cockcroft and Walton split the atom, Tuve’s team confirmed the observations. The 
story caused a sensation although not everyone was happy. 
‘To the Editor,’ the Hollywood cowboy Will Rogers wrote to the New York Times, ‘The 
world was not bad enough as it was; now they go and split the atom. That’s the last 
straw. We expect the Democrats to split and the country to split over prohibition, but we 
always felt that the old atom would remain intact.’78F21
…
At the New Haven Lawn Tennis Club, Connecticut, at his ‘bachelor’s luncheon’ in 
celebration of his impending marriage to the daughter of the former Dean of Yale 
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Medical School, Molly Blumer, Ernest Lawrence  heard the news. Not long afterwards a 
telegram flew back across the country to the startled team at the Rad Lab.
COCKCROFT AND WALTON HAVE DISINTEGRATED THE LITHIUM NUCLEUS 
STOP GET LITHIUM FROM CHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT AND START 
PREPARATIONS TO REPEAT WITH CYCLOTRON STOP WILL BE BACK 
SHORTLY79F22
Lawrence cut short his honeymoon to race back to California.
‘[With his] atom smashing machine working at a fraction of [its] abilities,’ Science 
News-Letter reported, ‘Professor Lawrence has confirmed the Cavendish Laboratory 
work on lithium’.80F23
Despite Livingston having mentioned Gamow’s hypothesis in his 1931 doctoral thesis, 
Lawrence believed that the Berkeley researchers ‘did not know very much about nuclear 
theory’.81F24 Lawrence was despondent: ‘the first “miss” at Berkeley,’ Alvarez reported, 
was a big one.82F25
‘[Cockcroft and Walton have] disintegrated lithium with only a few hundred thousand 
volts … perhaps [Berkeley’s] efforts to obtain very high voltages [are] hardly 
worthwhile.’83F26
In Leningrad Gamow contemplated Lawrence’s dilemma. The difference between the 
Americans and the English, he thought, was that the Americans were gadgeteers and, as 
such, were ‘absolutely not interested in the results’. Lawrence was only interested in 
making his cyclotron ‘bigger and bigger … He just didn’t give a damn what the nuclei 
do; he just wanted to smash them. So he did.’84F27
1933
Nant Gwynant Valley, North Wales, January
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With the hood folded back in order to accommodate Mary Rutherford’s ‘passion for 
fresh air’ despite having rugged up against the cold with ‘woollens, greatcoats, gloves 
and goggles,’ Mark and Rosie froze in the back seat of the Rutherford’s convertible on 
the 250 mile journey from Cambridge to Wales. Finally the little car entered a rugged, 
windswept valley at the foothills of Mount Snowden. The Nant Gwynant valley was the 
sort of place where Cambridge academics regularly left their ivory towers to ‘voluntarily 
[live] under the sort of conditions [they] condemned capitalism for imposing on its 
exploited toilers’.85F28 The Oliphants were holidaying at Celyn, the Rutherfords former 
Welsh farmer’s cottage. Mark and Rosie clambered up and down the rough and stony 
tracks ‘enjoying the scramble and the wonderful vistas’.86F29 On long slow walks up and 
down the valley and later as he and Oliphant worked a crosscut saw blade through logs 
for firewood as the weather set in, Rutherford outlined a new joint project.
‘I would like you to work with me in this particular field of Cockcroft and Walton. I 
want to exploit it as fully as possible. You should give up the work on positive ions and 
set up a second accelerating system. What do you say?’ 
‘Of course, Professor.’ 
‘Well, I suggest that I leave it up to you to decide the design of experiments and the 
running of the equipment.’87F30
Back at the lab, Oliphant immediately began planning the new accelerator. The idea was 
to build a simpler version of the Cockcroft-Walton apparatus: a low-voltage accelerator 
with a beam intensity of 200,000 volts—much less than Cockcroft and Walton’s but with 
greater accuracy following Gamow’s theory and ‘with an improved form of canal-ray 
tube, giving 100 micro-amperes or more of protons’.88F31 Oliphant cadged equipment and 
cajoled the lab’s technicians George Crowe and Jimmy Edwards to help him. Oliphant 
then organised his postgraduate students into a team: Alfred Kempton, Bernard Kinsey, 
and a physics research student on a scholarship from Rhodesia, Reinet Maasdorp, joined 
Oliphant in setting up the equipment.89F32 Reinet, one of the very few female students at the 
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Cavendish, was required to carry a card stating that she was ‘a fit and proper person’ 
before she was allowed to enter the library.90F33
The researchers tinkered away building the new machine in a basement laboratory. 
Machine parts were scrounged from the Cavendish store’s collection of junk including 
glass cylinders rescued from petrol pumps and equipment salvaged from ancient x-ray 
machines. Oliphant convinced Rutherford to buy a state-of-the-art diffusion pump and 
transformer from Metro-Vick.91F34 The radiation emanating from Cockcroft and Walton’s 
accelerator ‘was so intense that the bones of Oliphant’s hand could be revealed on an x-
ray screen, held … almost anywhere in the room.’92F35 Ignoring complaints from
Rutherford about the extravagance, Oliphant commissioned a local builder to construct a 
solid brick wall to separate the researchers from the new machine. Despite his 
precautions, Oliphant accidently came into contact with the generator one day. A 
thunderous crackle rang out closely followed by an intense flash. Oliphant hurtled across 
the room, out cold. He woke up a few minutes later to find a distraught researcher 
bending over him wringing his hands. 
‘My God! What have I done? Have I killed him?’
Ten thousand volts of electricity had passed straight through Oliphant’s body apparently 
without causing any lasting damage apart from a large hole burnt through the sole of his 
shoe.93F36
With the machine finally running, Oliphant secured a new prototype automatic counter 
from a Cavendish colleague, Charles Wynn-Williams.94F37 The researchers no longer had to 
spend long hours manually counting flashes; they were now able to be recorded on a strip 
of photographic paper. The new counter—six biscuit tins connected to the ionisation 
chamber—‘worked incredibly well’ eliminating the tendency to count hallucinatory as 
well as real disintegration flashes.95F38 Late one afternoon after a long day, the Prof arrived 
in the lab. Oliphant, wanting to delay developing the film until the following morning, 
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tried hard to conceal the photographic record from Rutherford until they had completed 
processing. 
‘I don’t know why I am blessed with such incompetent colleagues! I can’t understand it, 
here you have exciting results and you are too damned lazy to look at them.’96F39
Dripping ash and sparks from his pipe and with a trickle of fixing solution running down 
his jacket, Rutherford pulled a pencil stump from his pocket and attempted to mark the 
sodden record.97F40 The developer was spent; interpreting the record proved impossible. 
Impatiently pulling the coil from Crowe’s hands, it fell onto the dirty stone floor. 
Rutherford stormed out of the lab. At Conduit Head Road later that night, Oliphant 
received a call. 
‘Is that you Oliphant? I’m er, sorry to have been so bad tempered tonight. Would you 
call in to see me … in the morning?’ 
At Newnham Cottage the following morning Rutherford was repentant. 
‘Mary says I’ve ruined my suit. Did you manage to salvage the record?’98F41
In London on March 10, Rutherford delivered the regular Friday Evening Discourse 
lecture at the Royal Society and presented the first results of the new accelerator.
‘In a special form of accelerating tube devised by Oliphant in the Cavendish Laboratory 
… protons, after being bent by a magnetic field, bombard a target of about one 
centimetre in area … it has been found possible to obtain in the detecting chamber at 
least a thousand times the number of particles observed by Cockcroft and Walton.’99F42
1933, University of Hamburg, Germany, April
At the Institut für Physikalische Chemie, Austrian Jewish physicist, Otto Frisch, ‘didn't 
take [Adolf Hitler] at all seriously’ when he first came to power. ‘Well, chancellors come 
and chancellors go, and he will be no worse than the rest of them,’ Frisch thought.100F43 He 
was looking forward to working with Enrico Fermi in Rome over the next year courtesy 
of a grant supplied by the American Rockefeller Foundation. An announcement by the 
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new Reich Chancellor changed his plans. The new Law Against Overcrowding in 
Schools and Universities restricted the number of Jewish students. Frisch ‘was very 
disappointed and … rather disgusted’ when told by the Rockefeller agent that, due to the 
situation having changed in Germany, they were withdrawing their offer as Frisch ‘no 
longer had a job to come back to.’101F44 When Nazi students began rioting and Jewish 
professors were sacked from their posts, Frisch realised that his days were numbered. 
‘Nowadays the task of the universities,’ the rector of the University of Frankfurt 
announced, ‘is not to cultivate objective science, but soldier-like, militant science, and 
their foremost task is to form the will and character of their students.’102F45
In Berlin on May 10, on the Opernplatz Berlin’s Gauleiter, Joseph Goebbels, celebrated
as thousands of ‘degenerate’ books were thrown onto bonfires. In London, Nature, added 
its view to the growing unease felt by the rest of the world at the news coming from 
Germany:
‘While Germany may … lay down such regulations for  … admission to her academic 
institutions as she may deem fit … it is a matter of concern to the whole scientific world 
that a number of workers … be they Jews or any religious or political groups whatsoever, 
are deprived of the opportunities they have hitherto employed in adding to the sum total 
of scientific knowledge—researches by which the whole world has benefited—
irrespective of nationality … the scientific world [has] an international obligation to 
ensure that everything possible is done to receive the continued benefit to science of 
these displaced workers.’103F46
…
In a café in Vienna, Sir William Beveridge, Director of the London School of 
Economics, read about the dismissal of Jewish colleagues from German universities in 
the morning newspaper and thought it outrageous. By May, Beveridge had managed to 
persuade Rutherford to stand as president of the newly-formed Academic Assistance 
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Council (AAC) whose mission it was to organise a ’rescue operation’ to help displaced 
scholars find refuge out of Germany. 
‘I believe,’ the newly-elected president optimistically declared, ‘that as the academic 
distinction and scientific qualifications of the wandering scholars become known, the 
problem will solve itself.’104F47
Tess Simpson climbed the stairs to her new office—an attic room in Burlington House 
donated by the Royal Society—and settled into her new position of assistant secretary of 
the Academic Assistance Council (AAC). Simpson paused only to remove her coat and 
take off her gloves and reflect that though the surroundings weren’t much to go by, she 
was determined to get on with the job. Fluent in French and German, ‘Miss Simpson,’ 
whose parents had arrived in the UK as Lithuanian Jewish immigrants under the name 
‘Sinovitch,’ then began typing letters to refugees needing her help.105F48
Otto Frisch could not believe his luck when he was offered a grant of £250 by the British 
AAC. Frisch wrote immediately to Patrick Blackett and not long after, arrived in England 
to spend the next year with Blackett who was now Professor of Physics at Birbeck
College in London. When his grant came to an end Frisch left to take up an offer to join 
Niels Bohr at the Institute of Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen. Frisch wrote to his 
mother in Austria that she need not worry about him. 
‘Hitler won't be able to do anything to me because the dear Lord Himself had taken me 
by the waistcoat button and invited me to work with Him in Copenhagen.’106F49
Frisch taught himself Danish in a month but was disappointed that over the following 
five years he did not use his new skill as often as he had thought he would at the Institute 
on Blegdamsvej; he was not the lone German in Copenhagen. Bohr had founded the 
Danish Committee for the Rescue of German Intellectual Workers. As many scientists as 




1933, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, November
When first appointed as the new president of the ivy-league university in May, reporters 
were told by his mother that James Bryant Conant, descendent of Mayflower Puritans, 
would not ‘get excited’.108F51 The former chemist would ‘compound his formula for running 
the university, and then stand over it while it develops into substance’.109F52
‘[There is],’ the new president speculated, ‘quite an argument in and about Harvard 
[about Mussolini who] at least supposedly [makes] the trains run on time and [throws] 
ruffians and radicals into prison camps.’110F53
In September, the ‘hard driving, businesslike’ Conant told the Board of Trustees, that
Harvard would be declining an offer of grants to place refugee scholars. 
‘[It would] not help the cause of American science [to permit] imported foreigners,’ 
Conant told the Board, ‘the best chance of a brilliant, intellectual future in America is to 
give every opportunity to our young men to develop. If we fill the important positions in 
our universities with imported people of middle age, we are striking a blow at the 
prospects of every young man in that branch of academic life.’111F54
‘As a matter of policy,’ the New York Times stated on the new president’s announcement, 
‘Harvard … would not make a place on its faculty for any man because he was an 
émigré, or as a protest to the Nazi removal of educators from German universities.’112F55
Before his change of career to war correspondent, Ed Murrow, joined the brand new 
Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars formed to emulate Britain’s 
AAC. The situation in the US was delicate, Murrow explained to his counterpart in the 
UK.
‘We over here have debated at great length the advisability of undertaking a general 
public appeal similar to yours in England. So far the decision is against it … we have 
considered it unwise … to publicize too widely our activities on behalf of displaced 
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Germans … There is a tendency to consider the matter as a Jewish problem … a latent 
anti-Semitism … is increasing very rapidly over here.113F56
In London, at the Royal Albert Hall in front of a crowd of over 10,000, Rutherford 
appealed for funds for the AAC. 
‘Our contribution in this emergency,’ Rutherford said, ‘must be mainly a financial one, 
combined with the provision of temporary refuge in our universities and other learned 
institutions for some of the distinguished scholars, scientists and others who find 
themselves faced with destitution and complete collapse of their academic careers.’114F57
Sharing the stage with the Cavendish director, Albert Einstein, delivering his first public 
lecture in English, informed the crowd that as a ‘man, a good European and a Jew,’ he 
could do no less than defend ‘”intellectual and individual freedom,” without which “there 
would be no Shakespeare, Goethe, Newton, Faraday, Pasteur or Lister”’.115F58
‘How can we save Europe from a new disaster,’ Einstein asked the audience, ‘It is only 
men who are free who create the inventions and intellectual works which, to us moderns, 
make life worthwhile.’116F59
Less than a week later Einstein left Europe for good bound for New York and a new life 
with ‘no butlers [and] no evening dress’ at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton.117F60
…
In Belgium, at a hotel in Bruges, a manager ambled between tables chatting with patrons 
and offering tips on the very best places to visit in the city. Stopping at one of the tables 
where a tall man wearing glasses breakfasted with an older man who, judging by the 
family resemblance, was obviously his father, the manager asked if his guests were 
enjoying their stay. When his guest answered his inquiry in an Australian accent the 
manager remembered an alert the hotel had received in the late afternoon of the previous 
day. Geoffrey Oliphant, seriously ill with meningitis, died before his father and 
grandfather made it back to Cambridge. A few days later a small group gathered in the 
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chapel of St Giles and St Peter’s just a short walk from Conduit Head Road. A tiny coffin 
was interred next to one bearing the Cockcroft’s infant son, Timmy, surrounded by 
former Cambridge scholars eternally resting among the wild mint and ivy. Elizabeth 
Cockcroft, who had been through this nightmare, took Rosie under her wing. As students 
moved into their digs and the Michaelmas term got underway, Mark Oliphant channelled 
his grief into work.
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1980
University of California, Berkeley, April
Stewart Cockburn gazed at the collection of rocks and Venus Fly Traps spread about the 
office of the former director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and wondered what 
he should make of them. 
‘That’s a fine collection you have, Professor.’ The Emeritus Professor followed 
Cockburn’s gaze around the room.
‘Most come mainly from the Anza-Borrego desert—it’s a couple of hours from San 
Diego. I like to go hiking there; it has an extraordinary fossil record.’
‘I’ll just begin the tape. Interview with … Edwin Mattison McMillan for the Oliphant 
biography.’ 
‘I cannot remember just when I first met Mark Oliphant … He became … a close friend 
of Ernest Lawrence … I spent a day with him in Birmingham in 1949 when I was on my 
way to a conference … I stopped in England and made a sort of grand tour … I did work 
on radar for a while during the war. I had heard about Mark Oliphant’s magnetron, but 
it was only later that I found out it wasn’t Mark Oliphant personally.’
‘It was Randall and Boot.’
‘I know that now. Mark Oliphant was in a highly excited state. He was preparing to go to 
Australia. He was full of joy and glee at going off to his new responsibilities there. In the 
meantime there were two projects going on in Birmingham.  One was the cyclotron … 
The other was … Oliphant’s synchrotron. They were both in the same building and were 
in a condition I can only describe as absolute squalor. It was untidy. It was dirty. There 
were tired, exhausted people trying to make these things work. And at that point I must 
say I formed a very bad opinion of Oliphant—’
‘Could I interrupt briefly here? The decision that he should go to Australia was one 
taken after negotiations between the British and Australian Governments three years 
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previously. He had himself asked … to stay in Birmingham until his work there was done 
… So he did try to stay after Australia wanted him.’
‘Perhaps I was being a little unfair.’
‘But the important thing is that was your impression at the time.’
‘Here was this powerful man who had got these other scientists together to work with 
him … and I couldn’t see how the synchrotron, especially, was ever going to work … I 
believe both of those machines were eventually made to work …’
‘What are my colleague and I to deduce from all this? …’
‘My feeling about Mark Oliphant is that he is a dilettante … I think the only good physics 
he did was way back at the beginning under Rutherford, but of course then he had all the 
resources of the Cavendish and their experience behind him, and essentially all Mark 
Oliphant had to do was plan the experiments and take the data … I had a letter once 
inviting me to support a nomination for a Nobel Laureate for Oliphant for the discovery 
of tritium. I did not submit a letter in support.’
…
In his hotel room, Cockburn realised that he had not managed to get a straight answer to 
the question at the centre of the research. Cockburn scribbled a note to Ellyard
‘It would be worth finding out about any contact … particularly any discussion of 
particle accelerators between McMillan and Oliphant. I haven’t managed to get to the 
bottom of perhaps the most important thing … the synchrotron idea and whether 
Oliphant has received adequate recognition for his contribution.’118F61
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Chapter 3: The Slip-up
1933
World’s Fair, Chicago, May
At 9: 15 on a late spring morning along the banks of Lake Michigan a beam of light 
transmitted ‘forty years ago from the star Arcturus’ lit up the tower of the Hall of Science 
and heralded the opening of the ‘Century of Progress’ Exposition.119F1 Scientists, the press 
declared, would discuss the ‘latest hunt for “big game” in the impenetrable “jungle” … 
the nucleus … in the “darkest Africa of matter”’.120F2 To Luis Alvarez, even more 
impressive than the ‘Sky-Ride’ cable car traversing the fantastic modern metropolis that 
had risen up between 12th and 39th Streets or the 10-foot-tall mechanical man ‘lecturing’ 
visitors as they passed, Professor Ernest Orlando Lawrence’s presentations about 
transmuting elements with [deuteron] ‘bullets’ in his atom-blasting cyclotron were the 
most exciting. 
‘Professor Lawrence,’ Time magazine reported, ‘put [deuterons] under a tremendous 
magnet he has, and whirled them … Then, like a boy with a sling shot, [he] slung the 
[deuterons] at atoms of lithium … [knocking] helium nuclei out … Man!’121F3
Lawrence was fast becoming the most famous physicist in the country. Thanks to an 
introduction arranged by Alvarez’s sister Gladys, a secretary at the University of 
California, Berkeley, the professor had invited Alvarez to take a look at the exposition 
with him. After touring the various exhibits ‘at a good clip,’ Lawrence suggested he and 
Alvarez headed back to Lawrence’s hotel bar for a nightcap.122F4 The more he got to know 
the 32-year old professor, the more Alvarez was amazed that this ‘first-rank physicist’ 
could be such ‘a regular guy’.123F5 Alvarez decided that night that Professor Lawrence’s Lab
in California was the place to be, but it would take two more years for him to get there.
…
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At the Palmer Laboratory at Princeton as he sat in his office finishing his PhD thesis Ed 
McMillan became aware of strange noises. Japanese beetles ‘came in swarms and … 
settled in the ivy outside [the] little basement window’ where he was working; McMillan 
could hear the beetles crunching the ivy off the walls.124F6 Although he had enjoyed his time 
at Princeton and would miss the various student activities such as cookie rolling down 
the long refectory tables in the dining hall or playing bridge at Andy’s, the local 
speakeasy, he decided to use his National Research Council Fellowship to head back 
home to the West Coast to do some high voltage ‘atom smashing’ with Professor 
Lawrence.125F7 McMillan got off the train at Berkeley and moved into the Faculty Club.
Gilbert Lewis, Berkeley’s cigar-chewing professor of Chemistry, was busy developing a 
method to produce ‘heavy water’—a discovery of a former student of his, Harold Urey. 
Urey had found concentrated hydrogen levels in water from old electrolytic cells. By 
passing the water residues back through the cells, the heavy hydrogen atoms could be 
enriched even more. The New York Times dubbed the new discovery a ‘miracle worker 
of science … an atom-gun’ capable of firing ‘atomic bullets’ into the heart of an atom.126F8
Lawrence had been using Lewis’ heavy water to accelerate deuterons in the Rad Lab’s 
cyclotron since April and declared them ‘the most energetic alpha particles so far
obtained either from radio-active sources or artificially’.127F9 The cyclotroneers were lucky 
to get some of the heavy water as Lewis had been feeding his scarce supplies to a mouse 
which had shown ‘marked signs of intoxication’. 
‘[The] most expensive cocktail … mouse or man ever had,’ Lawrence complained.128F10
For six months, the Berkeley cyclotroneers had sent a deuteron beam spinning around in 
the cyclotron. Livingston, Lawrence said, was ‘disintegrating to beat hell’.129F11 The result 
was amazing; ‘neutrons just poured out … from every target’.130F12 The cyclotroneers were 
unable to measure the full energy of the proton recoils as ‘they had no good method of 
measuring it,’ or any way to determine the angle of emission; the researchers ‘couldn’t 
tell the neutron energy except to know that they were in the million-volt range’.131F13 The 
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same range of protons was observed from every target. Lawrence was ‘finding it a 
dickens of a job to make sure whether radiations are protons or alpha particles or gamma 
rays or the Lord knows what’.132F14
‘I am almost bewildered by the results’ Lawrence wrote to Cockcroft.133F15
Despite his uncertainty, knowing that the Cavendish researchers were looking closely at 
the deuterium experiments, Lawrence rushed to send a letter to the Physical Review
concluding that the deuterium nucleus was unstable.
‘[Deuterons] with energies ranging from 600,000 to 1,330,000 volts have been directed 
against the following targets: carbon, gold, platinum, lithium fluoride, silicon dioxide, 
sodium phosphate, calcium chlorate, copper sulphide and brass … In addition to the 
emission of alpha-particles … we have observed the emission of protons in large 
numbers … Every target, including gold and platinum which could hardly be expected to 
suffer nuclear disintegration, yielded protons … We [put forward] … the hypothesis that 
the [deuteron] itself is breaking up.’134F16
Despite the mice and Lawrence, Lewis had also managed to produce two ‘tiny little 
samples’ of the new compound to send to Cambridge.
‘[Here’s] some heavy water to play with,’ he wrote to Rutherford, ‘in case someone in 
the Cavendish Laboratory would like to experiment on the new projectile.’135F17
Using a beam of deuterium ions converted from Lewis’ heavy water in bombarding 
experiments, the Cavendish scientists found, as had their Berkeley colleagues, that the 
effect was amazing: ‘straightaway a new world opened up [of] atomic explosions … 
terrific in their intensity and number … it was like entering a new realm of star 
watching’.136F18
‘It’s a great show,’ Ralph Fowler wrote to Bohr, ‘who would have thought that anything 
would happen at 100,000 volts?’137F19
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Whatever target was bombarded with the deuteron beam the result was ‘a copious 
emission of [what] appeared to be protons’.138F20 Oliphant, though, did not believe the 
Berkeley hypothesis. 
‘[T]hings [don’t] fit,’ Philip Dee agreed, ‘the energies [are] wrong … [the] calculation of 
the mass for the neutron … [is] wrong … it all look[s] wrong.’139F21
The Cavendish researchers were still sceptical of the Berkeley hypothesis. Rutherford
wrote to Lewis.
‘I noticed Lawrence’s views … but we are at the moment not inclined to view [them]
with favour.’140F22
In his office in the Chemistry Annex at Berkeley—more commonly known as the ‘Rat 
House’—Lewis took a Havana from the permanent store he kept in the cigar box on his 
desk and lit it. The cigar helped him to think and he contemplated Rutherford’s letter as 
he puffed. Piqued at what he and his fellow Berkeley colleagues believed was undue 
criticism, Lewis composed a reply. 
‘Experiments made during the last two days at the Radiation laboratory, and which 
Lawrence will report at the Solvay Congress, show that an enormous number of neutrons 
are produced when [deuterons] strike a great variety of targets. These experiments 
strongly confirm … our theory of the instability of the [deuteron].’141F23
The same month that Albert Einstein left the old world behind him at Southampton pier 
and sailed to the new, Lawrence headed in the opposite direction leaving California to 
travel to Europe to take part in the Seventh Solvay Conference on the ‘Structure and 
Properties of the Atomic Nucleus’. Lawrence was nervous but excited: this was the first 
international conference he had ever attended—he was also the only American invited. 
The entire Berkeley Rad Lab accompanied their Director to the train to see him off. The 




At the Hotel Metropole in Brussels, Paul Langevin, professor of physics at the Collège 
de France, opened the conference announcing simply that Professor Einstein would not 
be in attendance as he had recently left Europe. Without having to spell it out, all the 
attendees present understood the dark clouds behind Langevin’s statement. The 40 or so 
delegates included many of Europe’s brightest stars: Madame Marie Curie, her daughter 
Irène, and son-in-law Fred Joliot had travelled from France; Lise Meitner, Peter Debye, 
Erwin Schrödinger and Werner Heisenberg from Germany; Enrico Fermi from Rome; 
Bohr from Copenhagen; and a large contingent from Cambridge, Rutherford, Cockcroft, 
Walton, Chadwick, Ellis, Dirac and the youngest attendee ever invited, the 26-year-old 
Rudolf Peierls, who, having escaped Germany by way of a Rockefeller Fellowship, 
managed to stay in the England with help from the AAC: 
‘Peierls will] make a very good Englishman,’ Rutherford had declared.143F25
Cockcroft, presenting a paper reviewing the latest achievements of particle accelerators,
ended his report with a comment clearly aimed at Lawrence. 
‘It is rather superfluous,’ Cockcroft concluded, ‘to discuss further the nature of the 
transformations with proton emission until we have more experimental information … 
Our present information does not suffice for prediction.’144F26
‘I particularly want to make some rather extensive remarks on Cockcroft’s report,’ 
Lawrence, miffed, replied.145F27
He then outlined the Berkeley deuterium experiments bombarding targets in the 
cyclotron. The Berkeley experiments, Lawrence told his European peers, confirmed the
hypothesis that the deuteron breaks apart on collision. For Lawrence’s hypothesis to be 
accepted rested on rejecting not only Chadwick’s calculations for the mass of the 
neutron, but also the Joliot Curie’s.
‘This assumption,’ Lawrence wrapped up, ‘implies a lower value … than that of 
Chadwick … the mass of the neutron appears very close to unity.’146F28
Werner Heisenberg looked puzzled. 
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‘There is something I do not understand. Why do deuterium fragments bounce off heavy 
atomic nuclei such as gold and light ones such as lithium with about the same energy? If 
disintegration occurs in the electric field of a nucleus, the yield should decline for heavy 
targets since the deuteron’s penetration, and hence the rate of change of force on it, must 
decrease with increasing atomic number.’
Niels Bohr, suffering a cold he had picked up in Paris, entered the debate. 
‘This being the case, we might suppose that the deuteron splits after entering a nucleus; 
but then the speed of the ejected proton should increase with atomic number, like the 
nuclear Coulomb field, contrary to [your] results,’ he muttered between sneezes.147F29
‘[In our experiments we have] found no neutrons from lithium under deuteron 
bombardment,’ Rutherford stated bluntly. 
‘[The Berkeley conclusion] was energetically unlikely,’ added Chadwick.
‘I must remind you all,’ Lawrence countered, ‘to get these reactions one must have a 
machine capable of accelerating at least 800,000 volts.’
The presence of gamma rays, Lawrence then suggested, would lead to a lowering of the 
neutron mass.
Irène Curie turned to face Chadwick. 
‘What confidence do you [have in the Berkeley results]?’
‘Not quite conclusive,’ the laconic Chadwick answered with a shrug.148F30
…
The first thing Frank Oppenheimer did after arriving in Cambridge and after sorting out 
digs was to rent a bicycle. He then spent the rest of the day and well into the evening 
taking in all the sites his older brother Robert had told him about until he happened to 
turn a corner and was promptly arrested by a policeman for not having a light on his 
bicycle.149F31 The following day he turned up at the Cavendish to find Chadwick waiting for 
him. 
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‘The police are looking for you.’150F32
Chadwick took Oppenheimer to see Rutherford. Instead of the dressing-down that he was 
expecting, the Prof ‘suggested … [that Oppenheimer] look around and talk to a lot of 
people’ to find a research subject he was interested in.151F33 He then invited the new recruit 
to his house for afternoon tea. Feeling ‘slightly terrified’ of the ‘imposing guy’ and 
wanting to make amends for his inauspicious start, Oppenheimer arrived promptly at the 
Rutherford’s for tea the following Sunday only to discover he was a week early.152F34
Eventually overcoming his embarrassment, Oppenheimer settled into his new 
appointment as a research student. One of the first things Oppenheimer learnt about this 
new ‘civilized sort of life’ was that tea time was taken seriously.153F35 Every afternoon tea 
and sticky buns, provided through donations by professors and lowly postgrads alike to 
the ‘bun fund,’ were served in the Cavendish library. All the Cavendish researchers,
including Rutherford, joined their colleagues in the library. Oppenheimer noted that 
‘there was a lot of crosstalk’ among the physicists which meant that he ‘could listen and 
hit upon what was going on’.154F36 Amazingly to Oppenheimer, ‘Rutherford had the idea 
that [researchers] shouldn’t work at night. This was a new idea to Americans who were 
accustomed to working very long hours indeed’. 
‘If you hadn’t done enough work during the day when you were fresh,’ Rutherford told 
him, ‘you should nevertheless adjourn at the end of the afternoon and spend the night 
thinking.’155F37
Oppenheimer was eager to meet all the names and more that he had heard about; 
scientists such as Kapitza, Cockcroft, Walton, Blackett, Dirac and Oliphant as well as a 
constant stream of eminent visitors. He decided that Cambridge ‘was a very exciting 
place’.156F38
One of the first visitors Oppenheimer met was fellow American, Ernest Lawrence. 
Lawrence had arrived in Cambridge a few days after the Solvay Conference. Carefully 
writing the title, ‘Experiments with Energetic [Deuterons],’ in elaborate copperplate 
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script in the Kapitza Club minutes book, Lawrence repeated the conclusions he had given 
in Brussels. The Cavendish scientists en masse immediately began raucous hectoring; 
they did not agree with the Berkeley hypothesis. Their contention was that Lawrence’s 
results were more likely a result of contamination than deuteron disintegration.157F39
‘[Lawrence],’ Chadwick reported to Rutherford, ‘has some bee in his bonnet. [He’s] got 
the wrong explanation.’158F40
The Cambridge physicists assured their American colleague that they would delay 
publishing the results of their experiments with deuterium ‘so as to give Lawrence plenty 
of chance to get in first’.159F41
‘One doesn’t barge into another man’s subject,’ Chadwick explained, ‘and one doesn’t 
go round saying what other people think. You might say what other people were doing 
before they had published it.’160F42
…
As soon as he got back to Berkeley Lawrence roused his cyclotroneers to ‘pour on the 
coal’.161F43 The Rad Lab worked night and day through Thanksgiving firing deuterium at 
targets in the cyclotron.162F44 Lawrence arrived at the lab regularly at 2 am demanding to 
know why the team ‘hadn’t got more data’ to show him. 
‘What’s holding [you] back?’163F45
Investigating ‘sets of carefully cleaned targets,’ the cyclotroneers ‘found that the yield of 
protons from various substances was quite independent of [their] cleaning … and agreed 
in absolute value within a factor of two with [the] earlier measurements’.164F46 An intense 
few weeks were spent working around the clock to gather more experimental evidence 
for their hypothesis. In December, the Rad Lab researchers concluded that the Berkeley 
theory that the deuteron breaks apart was confirmed.
‘I think that by now even Chadwick will have to admit the evidence is preponderantly in 
favour of the instability of the [deuteron],’ Lawrence wrote to Tuve, ‘[We] shall write 
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this work up in detail for publication and I sincerely hope that Chadwick will see the 
point.’165F47
Ed McMillan was not so sure of the result. Lawrence drove the cyclotroneers so hard, he 
thought, and ‘was so frantic that people hardly had time to think’.166F48 McMillan had been 
hanging around with Robert Oppenheimer’s ‘little Bohemian group of people’—the 
theorists—despite them being ‘rather different from societies he been used to’. 
Oppenheimer’s theorists did not have confidence in Lawrence’s hypothesis.167F49
In November the Physical Review published a letter from the Rad Lab.
‘Recognizing that our lower value for the mass of the neutron has profound theoretical 
implications, we have meanwhile continued our experiments with the express purpose of 
proving or disproving the hypothesis of the instability of the [deuteron] … This we have
done … [Our] observations corroborate the view that the [deuteron] disintegrates with 
the release of about 4.8 MV of energy and consequently that neutrons produced in the 
process have a mass of about 1.0006 mass units. … These are the most energetic atomic
projectiles that have ever been produced artificially in the laboratory.’168F50
Cambridge, however, remained sceptical of the Berkeley claims. In London, at the Royal 
Society in December Rutherford gave an account of the state of play.
‘Oliphant and I have observed,’ the Professor told his audience, ‘that the capture of 
[deuterium] by the lithium nucleus of mass 7 results in the breakup of the system into 
two alpha-particles and a neutron. We estimate that the maximum energy of the ejected 
neutron may be as great as fifteen million volts. We have confirmed this conclusion by 
finding that neutrons can be detected in numbers corresponding to this mode of 
transformation using [deuterium] particles of energy about 200,000 volts … [Conversely] 
Lawrence obtained large numbers from lithium with very fast [deuterium] particles, but 
he inclines to believe that most of the neutrons observed in his experiments arise from 
the breakup of the [deuterium] nucleus into a neutron and a proton.’169F51
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Confounded at the lack of acceptance by the Cambridge researchers, Lawrence wrote to 
Gamow to see if he had anything to add to the dilemma.170F52
‘[Well, I could] come to California and try to split nuclei by pure theory,’ Gamow 
replied.171F53
Lawrence did not appreciate the joke. 
‘Cockcroft is hardly justified in his feeling that the evidence he has obtained so far is 
against our interpretation because they have not worked beyond six hundred kilovolts. 
We have never found any evidence of this group of protons … below eight hundred or 
nine hundred kilovolts, and this point I have repeatedly emphasized to him,’ Lawrence 
wrote to Tuve, ‘It is clear that the Cavendish laboratory is not inclined to accept our 
experimental observations … It is, therefore, particularly important that this matter be 
investigated independently in another laboratory … you are the only ones besides 
ourselves who can work … above one million volts.’172F54
The February edition of the Physical Review carried a challenge to the Cavendish from 
the Berkeley Rad Lab. 
‘Oliphant, Kinsey and Rutherford have shown that alpha-particles distributed in range 
continuously to 8.3 cm are emitted from Lithium under [deuteron] bombardment. They 
attribute them to the reaction of the [deuteron] with Lithium to form two alpha-particles 
and a neutron. We investigated the possibility … by comparing the number of recoil 
protons (produced by the neutrons) with the number of long range alpha-particles. We
observed … a ratio so large … it would seem, to rule out this reaction as accountable for 
the neutrons observed.’173F55
‘Chadwick will have to come down off his high horse now,’ Lawrence told Livingston.174F56
…
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At the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Tuve, Dahl and Hafstad carefully checked 
the Berkeley experiments. They were unable to confirm any of the results. Instead, Tuve 
‘found boron contamination every place’.175F57
‘Dear Ernie,’ Tuve wrote to Lawrence at the end of February, ‘we have been having a 
great deal of difficulty in correlating our observations with [yours] … I never have 
encountered quite such a situation as this before … We might suggest that you check 
over your apparatus very carefully … there appears to be a basis for suspicion that at 
least part of your observations are due to … contamination.’176F58
‘[T]hey’re a bunch of liars … What’s the matter with [them]?’ he said to Dahl and 
Hafstad, ‘There’s contamination all over the place.’177F59
Without saying so directly, Tuve politely suggested to his old friend that his results were 
due to error.
‘We understand from your letter in January that your results were agreeing within a 
factor of two of what you originally obtained. Actually we do not trust any of our 
observations as regards yields within a factor of two but between the two laboratories 
there seem to be very much larger factors than this.’178F60
…
Within a week of his arrival in Cambridge from Berlin’s Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute on a 
one-year Rockefeller Fellowship, Paul Harteck, a tall, strapping Austrian physical 
chemist, was setting up electrolytic cells and attempting to produce heavy water supplies 
for the laboratory. 
‘I must take on the production of heavy water at the wish of the high Lord,’ Harteck 
wrote to a colleague back in Germany. ‘If you know anything [about it], write me soon, 
for with the Lord everything must go very quickly … You must hurry since heavy water 
evidently seems to be no rarity in America.’179F61
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Mark Oliphant ‘bombarded everything he could think of,’ before recovering the precious 
deuterium gas laboriously removing the ‘muck’ and grease it had picked up and sending 
it through the equipment again and again.180F62 He was finding that interpreting the results 
was proving difficult. The researchers could distinguish from the ionisation produced 
between particles with one charge of electricity and particles with two charges. 
Eventually Oliphant found that there were two sorts of reaction taking place. The new 
reaction seemed to be producing a new type of hydrogen: hydrogen of mass 3. In 
addition, neutrons were being produced and opposite these neutrons, doubly charged 
helium atoms appeared. All three groups of charged particles seemed to originate in the 
same process. Rutherford wrote to Lawrence again in March.
‘Oliphant and I have been particularly interested in the bombardment of D[euterium]
with D[euterium] ions, and am enclosing a note from Oliphant giving an account of our 
results.’181F63
Oliphant outlined their findings that deuterium was sticking to the target and then 
causing a secondary reaction when bombarded with the deuteron beam. 
‘We suggest, very tentatively, that your results may be explained as due to the 
bombardment of films of D[euterium] and of D[euterium] compounds.’182F64 Instead of 
breaking up as the Berkeley hypothesis suggested, it seemed that the collision between 
the deuterium beam and the deuterium target, Oliphant suspected, caused the deuterium 
nuclei to fuse together.
…
In Washington, Tuve suggested to Hafstad and Dahl that they should sit on their results a 
little longer.
‘Let’s wait for [Berkeley] to announce [the mistake]. We don’t want to wash someone 
else’s linen.’183F65
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Lawrence, however, did not take the bait. Instead, Lawrence continued announcing new 
‘results’. Furious, Tuve wrote to Lawrence.
‘[We’ve] reached the astounding conclusion that we [are] unable to check a single one of 
the observations which you have reported … There is no way of evading the question 
much longer and it is preferable to us to make a … statement in the Physical Review
rather than let the fact … be disseminated by the grape-vine route. I must say that we 
have certainly not enjoyed the position in which we have been placed. Once in a lifetime 
is once too often.’184F66
Lawrence still refused to concede that his lab may have made an error.
‘[It] would seem,’ he wrote, ‘that you are overstating things a bit with the remark that 
you are unable to check a single one of our observations.’185F67
In June, Tuve attended a symposium of the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science at Berkeley. Lawrence outlined the latest research at the Rad Lab without 
mentioning the discredited deuteron disintegration theory. Tuve was incredulous at the 
Berkeley whitewash. He unleashed his anger at Lawrence.
‘[By your reckoning], this would make [the DTM] guilty of incautious and premature 
criticism of the results of others plus [we’d have failed] to retract such criticism in an 
adequate and proper way.’186F68
When the summary of the meeting appeared in Science the following month submitted 
by the Berkeley Rad Lab, there was still no mention of contamination.187F69
In August Science published a correction from Tuve.
‘It is clear that numerous interested readers of Science construe the report … for the 
recent Berkeley meeting to mean that we have quietly (and hence improperly) withdrawn 
our previously announced conclusions … that spurious effects have been present in their 
observations, due to various contaminations … The conclusion expressed in the … report 
… that all results to date can be fitted together to make a “consistent picture” … is … 
one for which I am not responsible, and to which I do not subscribe.’188F70
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Tuve felt shattered by the whole situation. Having imagined that ‘everybody was 
supposed to be idealistic enough to clean up his act before he goes into publication,’ 
Lawrence, Tuve thought, ‘trying to get more and more support for bigger and bigger 
magnets’ was loathe to admit an error. 
‘[Lawrence’s game],’ Tuve realised, ‘[was playing] up to the money boys.’189F71
At the Rad Lab Lawrence ‘was very sober’ when he finally conceded Oliphant’s 
contamination conclusion was confirmed by Tuve. 
’We [have] allowed our enthusiasm to carry us along too fast,’ Lawrence told his team. 
‘[W]e should be much more careful in the future in analysing our results before we 
publish.’190F72
Lawrence then lambasted the researchers for not taking enough individual responsibility. 
‘You are all going along with the group too much. In the future we must have more 
individual work and less teamwork.’191F73
Ed McMillan had come to a different conclusion.
‘[We’re]more ignorant than we really [need] to be; if we’d just stopped to think, think a 
little bit instead of running around with a brass hammer, we might have gotten there 
sooner.’192F74
Having made up his mind at the Century of Progress Exposition, Luis Alvarez had made 
it to Berkeley from Chicago with a PhD on cosmic rays; he was not going to be held 
back by the fact that he had ‘essentially no knowledge at all of nuclear physics’.193F75 He 
had settled into the Men’s Faculty Club and had spent his spare time at the Varsity soda 
fountain where, like most of Berkeley, he could hang out and ‘nurse along a generous 
slice of cake and a small coke for hours’ for just 15 cents.194F76 Nevertheless, the dressing-
down by Lawrence was particularly upsetting.
‘[We’re nothing more than] high-class plumbers,’ he said.195F77
Livingston decided that he had had enough. The pace was taking its toll; he ‘had no free 
time … working most every night until midnight, all weekends and holidays … [and all] 
71
under the pressure of Lawrence’s dominating personality’196F78 Although he ‘liked the guy 
enormously and all that’ he thought that he had become ‘an ignoramus’ when it came to 
nuclear physics spending all his time on engineering.197F79 Livingston left Berkeley for a job 
at Cornell. 
…
Meanwhile, in a basement lab at Cambridge, Mark Oliphant and Rutherford’s lab 
assistant, George Crowe, were busy painstakingly splitting a sheet of mica, only ‘a few 
square centimetres in area … [with] a stopping power equivalent to only 1.5 mm of 
air’.198F80 Crowe mounted the mica on a brass mesh grid and installed the grid in the 
accelerator. The experiment gave the same result no matter what was bombarded with a 
deuterium beam: ‘a long range group of protons and a short range group of … tritons,’ a 
new type of hydrogen of mass 3.199F81 But there was a puzzle that the researchers could not 
find an answer to: some other reaction was taking place due to the observance of ‘a 
group of particles which clearly carried a double charge and alpha particles, in numbers 
equal to the protons and tritons.’200F82 Rutherford and Oliphant spent the afternoon creating 
‘hypothesis after hypothesis, going back to the records again and again and doing 
abortive arithmetic’.201F83 At six o’clock Oliphant left the lab and spent the rest of the 
evening mulling over the results. 
‘[I can’t] make head or tail of it,’ he complained to Rosie.202F84
At three o’clock in the morning, the telephone rang. Rosie ran downstairs to answer it 
worrying that it could only be bad news. 
‘The Professor wants to speak to you.’
Mark scrambled out of bed. 
‘Do you know Mark; I think I know the answer to that problem of ours. I think they’re 
helium of mass 3. Not only have we got hydrogen of mass 3, we’ve found helium of 
mass 3!’  
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‘But Professor, how? What reasons can you have for that?’ 
‘Reasons!’
‘Nothing on Earth can make two plus two equal three!’   
‘Reasons, Oliphant? I feel it in my water!’203F85
Oliphant arrived at Newnham Cottage the following morning with a draft of a letter to 
Nature. The deuterium (hydrogen) nuclei had fused to create a helium nucleus. 
Rutherford took a pencil stub from his jacket pocket and scribbled alterations. 
‘Take it straight to Miss Stebbing and ask her to type it up.’204F86
‘The discovery of heavy hydrogen is one of the half-dozen greatest achievements in 
physical science in recent years … but hard on the heels of this discovery comes a 
conjecture by Lord Rutherford … Dr M L Oliphant and Mr P Harteck, that there is a 
third form of hydrogen,’ The Times declared, ‘The experimenters consider it too early to 
draw definite conclusions, but favour the suggestion that the [deutons] united to form a 
helium nucleus which broke up into a proton and the suggested new hydrogen isotope. 
Another possible reaction leads to production of a helium isotope of mass 3 and a 
neutron.’205F87
In America, Berkeley read the news from Cambridge with dismay. So intent on proving 
his deuterium break up hypothesis, Lawrence and his team had witnessed their second 
big ‘miss’ once again courtesy of their Cavendish colleagues. The new phenomenon 
picked up by Oliphant was nuclear fusion.206F88
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Chapter 4: The Spark
1933
King’s Parade, Cambridge, February
On a cold afternoon in February, a ‘tired, shabby, cheerful column’ in ‘broken boots and 
old mackintoshes’ trooped through the slush into Cambridge whistling The 
Internationale.207F1 In the grip of the Great Depression, nearly three million workers could 
not find a job. Students, at first shy and self-conscious, joined the Hunger Marchers as 
they made their way along King’s Parade and, gradually feeling bolder, offered cigarettes 
and joined in ‘singing Pie in the Sky and Solidarity for Ever and the rest of the marcher’s 
songs … [and] shouting “Down with the Means Test”’.208F2 Having followed the marchers’ 
progress from the North, the students had organised a collection of £120 through 
contributions cadged from all the Cambridge Colleges; less than ten years after the 
General Strike this generosity was ‘an unheard-of thing in Cambridge’ among students 
and staff many of whom ‘had never seen the working-class’ before.209F3 At Girton the 
marchers were given food and drink before heading onwards to London.210F4 When the 
marchers finally reached Whitehall, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald refused to meet 
them. 
In London one month later Oliphants’ Cavendish colleague Patrick Blackett, ‘bored with 
people talking about scientists as if they were living in something like a social vacuum,’ 
turned off Great Portland Place and walked through the portico under the statues of 
Prospero and Ariel at Broadcasting House.211F5 Blackett then delivered ‘the “reddest” talk 
ever transmitted’ by the BBC.
‘I believe that there are only two ways to go,’ Blackett told the listeners, ‘ and the way 
we now seem to be starting leads to Fascism; with it come restrictions of output, a 
lowering of the standard of life of the working classes, and a renunciation of scientific 
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progress. I believe that the only other way is complete Socialism. Socialism will want all 
the science it can get to produce the greatest possible wealth. Scientists have not perhaps 
very long to make up their minds on which side they stand.’212F6
…
In the south of England the elder statesman of British physics, Sir Oliver Lodge, sat at 
his desk and gazed at the expanse of Wiltshire greenery framed by the stone-mullioned 
window of his study before returning to the letter he was composing. 
‘Youth,’ Sir Oliver wrote, ‘is pressing forward with undaunted energy into regions which 
would rather have horrified old Kelvin. Even Newton is becoming antiquated. Rutherford 
… is surrounded by a brilliant group of young men in Cambridge … in touch with the 
latest developments on the Continent … Planck, Bohr … and now Schrödinger … 
modernists with a vengeance.’213F7
Other fields were not so accommodating. Sir Reginald Blomfield, former president of the 
Royal Institute of British Architects, held no truck with the new Modern Movement and 
was not going to be held back in saying so. 
‘Modernism,’ Blomfield declared, ‘has invaded this country like an epidemic … whether 
it is communism or not, ‘Modernismus’ is a vicious movement.’214F8
The production department of the BBC decided that a debate was in order. In November 
Blomfield engaged in a cerebral punch-up with British Modern Movement architect, 
Amyas Connell in the studio at Great Portland Street. Sir Reginald launched a salvo at 
the Young Turk.
‘This new architecture is essentially continental in its origin and inspiration, and it claims 
as a merit that it is cosmopolitan: I detest and despise cosmopolitanism.’ 
‘Modernism,’ countered Connell, ‘is an ideology – scientifically based!’215F9
Another ‘Young Turk,’ Cambridge-trained architect Henry ‘Hugh’ Hughes, had 
expedited the arrival of modernism in Free School Lane two years earlier with his design 
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for the Mond Building—a new low temperature laboratory designed specifically for 
Kapitza’s research. Built in Cambridge stone, an image of a crocodile and a portrait of 
Rutherford was cut into the curved exterior wall by sculptor Eric Gill. 
‘The Crocodile,’ Kapitza wrote to Gill, ‘is coming back to Cambridge on Monday and 
has said he is quite willing to let you into his cage.’ 216F10
Gill’s portrait initiated a fracas which rumbled all the way to the House of Commons and 
once again the BBC joined the fray to report on another modernist controversy. 
‘[I]t was all because some people, infected by the Hitler curfew stunt, thought I’d given 
Rutherford a Jew’s nose,’ Gill explained to Kapitza, ‘Of course that’s all nonsense … 
What a lot of frightful balls it all is.’217F11
Cockcroft weighed in to smooth the waters and called a special meeting to consider the 
future of the Rutherford sculpture. 
’This had to be done,’ Cockcroft enlightened Gill, ‘otherwise the conservative people 
would have felt themselves completely ignored and it is a little too dangerous as the 
conservative people are always the most important in this world! … I had to fight hard 
and give lectures on Modern Art … and explain such elementary things as the difference 
between a photographer and an artist … I had not actually experienced this narrow-
mindedness before, but you probably meet with it often.’218F12
The issue remained unresolved until it was decided that Rutherford himself would make 
the final decision on the fate of the portrait. Rutherford demurred.
‘You had better … ask Bohr’s view – he … takes a great interest in modern art.’219F13
‘[I hope] the carving of Rutherford,’ Bohr pronounced from Copenhagen, ‘being at the 
same time thoughtful and powerful … will remain in its place for many years to come’.220F14
‘[T]he old idiot who thought the sculpture was indecent has been snubbed in the H[ouse] 
of C[ommons],’ Gill wrote to Kapitza. ‘The BBC fuss is over’.221F15
On Conduit Head Road, past the Observatory among the flat fields of bucolic 
Cambridgeshire, the modernist movement was forging quietly ahead. Hugh Hughes was 
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busy completing a flat-roofed, white-washed, Corbusier-inspired house commissioned by 
the Oliphants.222F16 Mark and Rosie’s Cambridge friends declared the house suitably ‘avant 
garde’ and in keeping with its bohemian owners who, amongst other eccentricities, were 
vegetarians.223F17
…
In December, Mark Oliphant hurried briskly along King’s Parade to Trinity College for 
the Cavendish Physical Society’s annual Christmas dinner. In the oak-panelled dining 
hall with its portrait of Henry VIII overlooking the proceedings, Kapitza described what 
was to come. 
‘In general one can do what one likes at the table,’ he declared, ‘squeal and shout and so 
on. The whole scene is rather wild.’224F18
As the clock chimed midnight, following the lead of Rutherford and J J Thomson, Mark 
Oliphant joined his fellow Cavendish scientists and stood up on his chair. Solemnly 
linking arms, the scientists warbled ‘Auld Lang Syne’ followed by a maudlin 
interpretation of ‘God Save the King’. Kapitza then spent the next few hours escorting 
his fellow Cavendish colleagues safely home.225F19
‘Englishmen get drunk easily,’ Kapitza observed, ‘Apparently my Russian belly is better 
adapted to alcohol than the English one.’226F20
…
At the lab Oliphant was settling into his new position of physics lecturer. He had taken 
over the task of delivering the atomic physics course from Rutherford when the Prof was 
in London on official duty as president of the Royal Society. Oliphant tried to decipher 
Rutherford’s lecture notes: scraps of paper on which were written perplexing headings 
such as ‘blast method’. 
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‘Rutherford’s lectures cover everything. I need to do an awful lot of reading on areas I 
know nothing about … I have to look it all up!’ he complained to Rosie.227F21
‘Don’t show too many slides,’ Rutherford advised. ‘When it’s dark in the lecture room 
some of the audience take the opportunity to leave.’228F22
Chadwick had delegated his ‘kindergarten’ training course in radioactive methods to 
Oliphant.
‘Give them the most difficult jobs you can think of,’ Chadwick told his successor, ‘the 
sort of things that really make them pull their socks up and learn a little bit more about 
not only how the damn thing works, but how to make adjustments.’229F23
In the ‘oppressive heat under the high-pitched wooden roof’ of the Cavendish Tower new 
students were given radon sources sealed in small glass capsules and instructed ‘not to 
get the stuff on … skin or in … lungs’.230F24 They were then more strongly warned not to 
contaminate the lab and ruin other students’ experiments.231F25 Geiger counters ‘would rattle 
furiously when students blew on them,’ only returning to normal ‘[a]fter a day or two of 
radioactive abstinence’.232F26
Rutherford and Oliphant interviewed the prospective research students. 
‘[You need to find] tasks for research students which [are] worth doing, and yet within 
the capacity of the raw recruit,’ the Prof advised. ‘An extremely good result in the Tripos 
… [is] not necessarily an indication of research ability … Don’t forget that many a 
youngster’s ideas may be better than your own, and never resent the greater success of a 
student.’233F27
John Fremlin, despite not having any particular ideas thought that he would suggest a 
subject that would generate a favourable outcome.
‘I’d like to work in radioactivity.’ 
‘You all say that,’ Rutherford said. ‘Now Dr Oliphant has an experiment on gas 
discharges that you will enjoy.’234F28
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Almost as soon as he arrived at the Cavendish—the ‘centre of physics in the whole 
world’—Eric Burhop, an Australian postgraduate student, threw himself in with Soc-
Soc—the Socialist Society and the Cambridge Socialists’ Anti-War Group (CSAWG).235F29
‘[Burhop was just like his supervisor, Mark Oliphant],’ Rutherford declared, ‘tall, well-
built with a good sense of humour [who] even laughed at jokes about himself. Burhop is 
the most “Australian” Australian we’ve had at the Cavendish.’236F30
Tutored by Oliphant for an hour every week during his undergraduate degree Maurice 
Wilkins thought that he ‘was on the same wavelength’ as his tutor. Oliphant’s ‘hands-on’ 
approach also suited him well.237F31 Wilkins soon found that there were many things to do in 
Cambridge, least of all studying. The British Communist Party (BCP) was popular at 
Cambridge due to its ‘very vigorous anti-Nazi policy’.238F32 Seeing as all the ‘intelligent 
left-wingers [he] knew’ belonged to the BCP, Wilkins thought it ‘natural’ that he also 
join his colleagues John Fremlin, Reinet Maasdorp and Eric Burhop and become a 
member.239F33 He also immersed himself in Cambridge life by joining Soc-Soc where 
Fremlin encouraged him to become a member of the CSAWG.240F34 Around the corner from 
the Cavendish in Snax café on King’s Parade, Oliphant’s students would meet and order 
the ’very good grease-free omelette’ and spend ‘much time drawing attention to the Nazi 
threat, the Spanish Civil War and the acute problems of Indian Independence’.241F35
1933, Savoy Hotel, London, October
Temporarily swapping their lab coats for white tie and tails, six hundred delegates 
gathered ‘to discuss some of the most fundamental problems that faced the physicist’ The 
Times reported.242F36 The guests of the International Conference on Science and Humanity 
enjoyed their dinner as the government’s First Commissioner of Works, Mr W Ormsby-
Gore, thanked them for ‘the material benefits … [they] had brought about in his daily 
life’ such as ‘broadcasting and the modern film,’ before pointedly addressing the German 
Chargés d’Affaires. 
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‘The genius of a really great research worker, like that of the poet, requires spiritual and 
intellectual freedom for its full expression … The great scientists, like the great artist, 
transcend in importance for humanity and for true knowledge the limitations of race or 
political allegiance.’243F37
When the conference sessions opened Max Born, thrown out of his post in theoretical 
physics at Göttingen, took a piece of chalk and turning to a blackboard wrote in ‘huge 
letters … “NUCLEAR PHYSICS”’. He then altered the title to read ‘UNCLEAR 
PHYSICS’ to much laughter in the room.244F38
In the Lecture Theatre of the Royal Institution in front of a packed audience in evening 
dress, Rutherford gave a lecture of the Cavendish’s latest atom-smashing apparatus using 
a tabletop working model demonstrated and designed by Mark Oliphant assisted by 
George Crowe. Oliphant’s ‘portable apparatus, self-contained and complete with 
counting equipment … was a technical tour de force’.245F39 Larry Hafstad, among the 200 
overseas conference delegates, was impressed ‘with the Cambridge people.’ 
‘Especially,’ he wrote back to Merle Tuve in Washington, ‘with their uncanny skill in 
drawing correct conclusions from comparatively few observations’.246F40
…
In the basement lab, Oliphant had begun work on another project ‘following his nose’ on 
a series of experiments aiming to tie up the understanding of the transformations of 
lithium.247F41 With an assortment of student assistants, Oliphant set about devising a new 
method to separate isotopes. Shire and Oliphant came up with an ingenious idea ‘passing 
ionized lithium gas through electric and magnetic fields’.248F42 The equipment was 
assembled and the researchers managed to separate lithium isotopes even though ‘it was 
impossible to collect more than a few tenths of a microgram of either isotope in a single 
run’.249F43 Despite the miniscule amounts collected, the experiment was a success. Their 
report was published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society the same month as the 
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Cambridge conference. The Prof was ‘very pleased’ with the new ‘electromagnetic 
separation’ method as was the scientific press who declared the successful ‘atom 
smashing’ experiment ‘another step in … [the] conquest of the isotopes’.250F44
Oliphant’s students were also experiencing experimental success. Reinet Maasdorp, 
working with two other students and despite receiving two moderately severe electric 
shocks during the experimental process, had two papers published in the Proceedings of 
the Royal Society. Subsequently, she received an invitation to the Society’s annual party 
for published authors. Disappointingly, two days later she received word that her 
invitation had been withdrawn due to the fact that she was a woman.251F45
The situation for women at Cambridge University was similar to the Royal Society
despite Rutherford pressing the university to grant female students the same privileges as 
their male counterparts. Female physics students were required to sit on the front benches 
of lecture theatres ‘for fear their attention might be distracted by too much male 
proximity’.252F46 Female graduates could cite their qualification but could not receive their 
degree in the ceremonies at Senate House. Female students found ingenious ways to 
work around the impediments foisted upon them. Two undergraduate physics students’ at 
the Cavendish, Marie Sparshott and Helen McGaw, outraged that the Cavendish 
‘kindergarten’ training course in machine tool technique was out-of-bounds to them, 
enrolled in the short course offered at the local Cambridge technical college instead.253F47
1935
Rjukan, Telemark, Norway
Leif Tronstad contemplated the request the director of Norsk Hydro, Axel Aubert, had 
received from Tronstad’s old Cambridge professor and thought he had better talk it over 
with his colleague Jomar Brun. Two years earlier Tronstad and Brun had come up with 
the design for the world’s first industrial heavy water plant now operating at the hydro-
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electric complex in Vermork. Rutherford was proposing an experiment to concentrate the 
H3 isotope using electrolysis—the same process that produced heavy water.254F48
‘If ordinary heavy water containing a small quantity of triterium oxide is electrolysed to 
a small volume, it is to be expected that, in all probability, it will become rich in 
[tritium].’255F49
Aubert wrote back to Rutherford that Norsk Hydro was happy to take up the challenge 
and that, in addition, would undertake the experiment and provide any future sample 
‘free of charge’.256F50 In May, Tronstad travelled to Cambridge to discuss the experiment 
with Mark Oliphant. The experiment lasted for nine and a half months. From 43 kilos of 
heavy water, concentrated from 13,000 tons of ordinary water, a final sample of 11cc 
was forwarded to Cambridge. With great expectation the sample was given to Aston for 
analysis in his mass spectrograph.
‘[N]o trace of triterium [can] be found,’ Aston concluded,’ [it] is very disappointing.’257F51
In a follow-up experiment, Reinet Maasdorp and Alfred Kempton confirmed Aston’s 
result—no tritium was detected. 
‘[A] disappointment for both of us,’ Rutherford told Aubert. ‘It’s a striking fact that … 
the D[euterium]-D[euterium] reaction … [gives] rise to large numbers of [tritium] and 
[Helium 3] particles … it does not seem feasible at the moment to obtain sufficient 
quantities of these two interesting isotopes.’
The tritium experiment wasn’t the only dampener on the Cavendish mood; Chadwick 
was feeling frustrated. 
‘[It’s] becoming very difficult to push on without some new equipment,’ he 
complained.258F52
What was needed was a means of accelerating protons or other particles at much higher
energies. What he wanted was a new accelerator. Mark Oliphant and John Cockcroft 
agreed with Chadwick. The Cavendish lab needed one of Lawrence’s brilliant cyclotrons.
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‘[It] will mean more space … more money … It will mean complicated equipment, and 
Rutherford has a horror of complicated equipment … I’m not prepared to quarrel with 
him to get it,’ Chadwick told his colleagues.259F53
Instead, Chadwick accepted an offer of Chair of Physics at the University of Liverpool 
despite never having visited the university. When he first set eyes on the state of his new 
department on Brownlow Hill, he was ‘quite shocked’.260F54
‘The Liverpool laboratory is so behind the times; little oil lamps are being used to 
illuminate the galvanometer mirrors! If you want to push for a cyclotron at Cambridge,’ 
Chadwick suggested to Cockcroft and Oliphant, ‘why don’t we build them at the same 
time to save a little money.’261F55
On his last day at Cambridge Chadwick met Rutherford for breakfast in the garden of 
Newnham Cottage. 
‘I know it’s you who’s pushing the Cavendish physicists towards a cyclotron,’ the Prof 
thundered at his old assistant.
‘Well, I am going to build a cyclotron in Liverpool. I think I’ve got enough money. 
Cockcroft has designed the magnet. I’m ready to begin … But if you build a cyclotron at 
the same time … we shall be able to do it more cheaply.’
‘I’m not going to have a cyclotron in the Cavendish.’
‘I think you’ll have to have a cyclotron. Otherwise the people will not be able to get on 
with the job.’262F56
Oliphant was now the Cavendish Laboratory’s Assistant Director of Research. He and 
Rosie travelled to Europe to celebrate. Sailing down the Rhine from Basel to Koblenz 
they then headed to Italy travelling back through France and Belgium by train, third class 
on ‘hard wooden seats’.263F57 In France, Mark and Rosie joined Fred and Irène Joliot-Curie 
at their villa near Sceaux on the outskirts of Paris. Fred Joliot, like Oliphant, was 
charismatic and an extrovert. He also, just like Mark Oliphant, smoked incessantly. Irène 
on the other hand, was much more reserved, although she had some odd habits. 
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Previously, on a visit to Cambridge as guests of the Chadwicks, Irène would ‘break up 
her bread, and some pieces she would put in her mouth and some she would throw over 
her shoulder much to the consternation of the maid.’264F58
At the Cavendish, Oliphant and Cockcroft pushed Rutherford to build a cyclotron.
‘We need higher-energy particles. We want a high-voltage lab with up to two million 
volts; we want a cyclotron; and we want more space for the Cavendish,’ Cockcroft 
argued.265F59
By the end of June Rutherford gave in; MetroVick was given orders for the manufacture 
of two giant magnets for the universities of Liverpool and Cambridge. The new High 
Tension lab would be expensive and would require extra and substantial funding not only 
for the equipment, but also for a new building to house it. The Cavendish began a 
campaign to raise the money. Rutherford approached the Chancellor of the University, 
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin. 
‘Baldwin,’ Cockcroft mused, ‘was so lazy that he decided he’d do it in one go by going 
to … Austin [owner of the Austin Motor Car Company] … [Austin] produced £250,000 
and in return he was made a Lord.’266F60
Rutherford was still not happy about the direction the Cavendish was taking.
‘[The bequest is nothing but] goddamn worry and trouble,’ Rutherford complained to 
Oliphant, [I’m] damned if [I] am going to spend [my] time in planning a new Cavendish 
… it [will] upset the whole Lab … Cockcroft [will] not do a stroke of work for a year or 
two … a new laboratory [is] unnecessary anyway … thinking [is] more necessary than 
grand surroundings or elaborate and expensive equipment.’
‘Lawrence’s new Lab in Berkeley, California [is producing] results,’ Oliphant argued, 
‘the Cavendish mustn’t be left behind.’
Rutherford ‘blew up … shaking his pipe’. 
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‘[You’ll] spend more time keeping all the gadgetry in operation than in making 
observations,’ he told Oliphant, ‘[I] thoroughly dislike apparatus which [I can’t] 
understand.’
‘Well,’ Oliphant said, ‘the money is there to be spent.’
‘More’s the pity,’ Rutherford thundered back.267F61
1935, Stockholm, Sweden, December
James Chadwick stepped forward and bowed deeply to the King of Sweden. Having been 
presented with the gold medallion for the Nobel Prize in Physics for his discovery of the 
neutron, Chadwick reached for the cheque King Gustav was presenting to him. 
Mortified, Chadwick watched as the cheque slipped from his hand and fluttered to the 
floor of the blue-carpeted stage. The Chemistry Nobel would be shared between two 
scientists. King Gustav presented the Nobel to Irène and Frédéric Joliot-Curie for the 
artificial creation of new radioactive elements.
1936
Eindhoven, The Netherlands, January
Mark Oliphant and John Cockcroft sailed across the English Channel. A little market 
town seemed to draw accelerator builders from their laboratories like a magnet. The 
Cavendish scientists joined the throng making a pilgrimage to the Philips Corporation. 
‘I am glad to say that after a stiff fight … over the price,’ Oliphant told his colleagues 
back at the lab, ‘we will have a trouble-free source of voltage up to 1.25 MV at about the 
end of November, and should be able to get on with some useful work.’268F62
In spite of Oliphant’s optimism, the generator suffered its fair share of teething problems. 
A technician arrived from Philips. Wanting some recognition that he had the equipment 
working, he asked Oliphant to get the Prof to sign a declaration. Instead Oliphant signed 
88
Rutherford’s name. Then, much to the consternation of the Dutch technician, Oliphant 
spat over the signature to represent Rutherford’s dripping pipe before rubbing it with his 
finger to make it look more authentic.
In March, the Dean of the Faculty of Science at University of Birmingham, paid a visit to 
his old friend, Rutherford, to see if he had a recommendation for the appointment of 
Birmingham’s next Poynting Chair of Physics.
‘The university would] spend whatever was necessary to bring nuclear physics to 
Birmingham in a big way.’
Rutherford suggested he talk to Oliphant. Subsequently Oliphant made a trip to 
Edgbaston and although he wasn’t particularly impressed with what he saw, he wrote to 
Chadwick for advice. 
‘It seems to depend on whether this is the kind of post you want,’ Chadwick replied, ‘if 
you want a university chair and a laboratory of your own … then I think arrangements 
can and must be made which should satisfy your obligations to Cambridge and to 
yourself.’269F63
Oliphant thought he would talk the proposition over with the Prof. 
‘Do you mean to say that you [are thinking] of accepting?’
‘Yes, I think I shall.’
‘I am fated to be surrounded by ungrateful colleagues. Chadwick’s gone to Liverpool and 
let me down. Now you’re leaving me in the lurch. If you want to go,’ Rutherford 
thundered, ‘then go and be damned to you!’270F64
Oliphant, miserable, left the room. 
A few minutes later Rutherford arrived at Oliphant’s door. 
‘Mark, could you spare time to talk with me.’ 
‘Of course, Professor.’ 
‘I think you should accept the Birmingham appointment. [We should] talk over the sort 
of programme [you have] in mind and so on. I’ll offer you every assistance.’271F65
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Rutherford saved his vitriol for the next time he saw Chadwick. 
‘You encouraged Oliphant to accept the chair in Birmingham – to leave me.’ 
‘I had no intention whatever of trying to interfere,’ Chadwick replied.
Chadwick, upset at the fight with his old professor, returned to Liverpool ‘feeling 
wretched’.272F66
…
In June, the presidents of Yale, Columbia and Harvard universities informed the 
University of Heidelberg, Germany, that they would accept its invitation to attend 
Heidelberg’s 550th Anniversary celebration. Cambridge, Oxford and Birmingham 
universities declined the invitation in protest citing their disgust at the Nazi purges of 
their university colleagues.273F67
‘The academic world has apparently had its say in England,’ the New York Times
reported. ‘There is now a possibility, however, that pressure will be brought to bear on 
Downing Street in the hope that the latter will enlighten English universities and perhaps 
mention the existence of certain political necessities.’ 
After all, the paper continued, acknowledging that while ‘no direct criticism on the Nazi 
Weltanschauung could occur,’ the university magnanimously was allowing ‘those 
professors who had been expelled because of their Jewish blood … to attend the 
memorial ceremonies if they were registered as not more than one-quarter Jewish’.274F68
‘German scholars,’ Harvard’s president declared with his eye on his university’s 
tercentenary celebrations later in the year, ‘[are welcome] here ... whether they be Nazis 
in their hearts or not.’275F69
When the Harvard tercentenary celebrations rolled around in September, Albert Einstein 
refused to attend. George Bernard Shaw declined the offer of an honorary Doctorate 
stating that if Harvard could celebrate its 300th anniversary ‘by burning itself to the 
ground and sowing its site with salt’ it would give him ‘the liveliest satisfaction’.276F70
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1937 
Burlington House, London, May
In London the Royal Society announced a new Fellow:
‘[Dr Oliphant],’ the citation read, ‘[is] distinguished for his experimental researches on 
the action of positive ions on surfaces and for his contribution to our knowledge of 
transmutations. [He] has been active in the design of high voltage apparatus for the 
production of swift positive ions and has taken a responsible part in experiments which 
show that two new isotopes, hydrogen three and helium three, were produced by the 
bombardment of deuterium by deuterons. He has made an accurate study of the modes of 
transmutation of lithium, beryllium and boron by the action of protons and deuterons, 
and determined the masses of the light elements.’277F71
Another celebration was underway in the registry office of West Maling, Kent. Wearing 
a pretty powder-blue suit, Mark Oliphant’s former student Reinet Maasdorp, married 
fellow Cavendish scientist John Fremlin. 
1937, University of Bologna, Italy, October
Scientists from around the world including eight Nobel winners, converged on the Italian 
city of Bologna to mark the celebrations of the bicentenary of the birth of Luigi Galvani. 
‘Prof M L E Oliphant and Dr J D Cockcroft,’ Nature informed its readers, ‘[will 
describe] recent work of the Cavendish and Mond Laboratories … including a 
description of the new High-Voltage Laboratory … and the recently reported properties 
of liquid helium.’278F72
The city declared a public holiday; troops lined the streets as eminent scholars in flowing 
robes paraded alongside young village girls in traditional costume. The large contingent 
of the Moschettieri del Duce—the Leader’s Musketeers—in their all-black uniforms and 
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polished black jackboots depressed the British scientists. The presence of the Fascists 
made ‘the atmosphere oppressive.’279F73 On October 19, Mark Oliphant received a telegram 
with shocking news; Rutherford had died, the result of complications following a hernia 
operation. Two days later Oliphant and Philip Dee viewed the body of their professor at 
the mortuary in Cambridge.
On Friday, October 21, John Fremlin emerged from Westminster Tube station with his 
new bride in tow. Reinet, wearing her wedding suit, now dyed dark blue, hurried to keep 
up with John as he headed down Abingdon Street towards Westminster Abbey for the 
funeral of Lord Rutherford. The Prof, ‘the first man of science born in the overseas 
dominions to be buried in the Abbey,’ was interred ‘within the ancient walls’ of the 
Warrior’s Chapel alongside fellow scientists Newton, Darwin, Herschel and Kelvin.280F74
‘We have all endured the death of the greatest figure of our age,’ Mark Oliphant said. 
‘We have lost a friend, a confidante, a fatherly adviser. Indeed many of us feel we have 
lost a father.’281F75
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Chapter 5: The Call-up
1937
Barnt Green, Worcestershire, September
In the former Forest of Arden, dark, broadleaf woodlands thrived. Among the brambles 
and ghostly bones of silver birches, bluebells flowered in drifts. On the edge of the forest 
ten miles south of Birmingham and nestled in the lee of the Lickey Hills, a little 
Worcestershire village was split in two by a deep cutting gouged through its centre—the 
track of the Birmingham-Gloucester railway—and by a ribbon of brown water, the 
Birmingham and Worcester Canal. A few miles along the canal, the University of 
Birmingham had appointed a new Poynting Professor of Physics. The new recruit Dr 
Mark Oliphant, The Times reported, planned to build the biggest atom-smasher in 
Europe.282F1 Mark, Rosie, and their newly-adopted infant son Michael, moved into their 
Barnt Green cottage in autumn. Among the willow trees of the former gatekeeper’s 
cottage a eucalyptus would soon push its way skywards.
‘The University of Birmingham,’ a visiting professor described, ‘has the ugliest 
university buildings I have ever seen in my life. The inhabitants of Birmingham console 
themselves by claiming that the University of Manchester is still uglier. This is not 
true.’283F2
The first of the ‘Redbricks’—big, blackened Northern universities—the University of 
Birmingham had grown up along the eastern defences of an ancient Roman Fort near the 
village of Edgbaston in the Black Country.284F3 Mark Oliphant was determined to get down 
to creating a new Cavendish and ‘arrived in his new department like a buccaneer 
storming a galleon’.285F4 The physics department consisted of an L-shaped laboratory, a 
cluttered basement, a small room opening off a cloakroom and a few old First World 
War army huts.286F5 In addition the new Poynting professor would inherit from his 
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predecessor a single laboratory assistant and half a dozen lecturers. To Oliphant’s 
amazement the physics students at Birmingham were being taught classical theory almost 
exclusively; no attempt was made to teach quantum mechanics. The first reform Oliphant 
embarked on was to create a new Chair of Pure Mathematics and persuaded Rudi Peierls 
to take the job; he would be ‘the youngest professor of applied mathematics in Britain’.287F6
Oliphant pressed other Cavendish colleagues to join him at Birmingham.
‘I have been instructed by the Faculty to enquire … whether you are willing to come for 
£475,’ Oliphant wrote to Philip Moon, ‘I may say, privately, that I hope you will ask for 
£500.’288F7
When Rudi Peierls arrived to take up his new position, he was surprised to find that the 
Birmingham physics department seemed to be populated by British eccentrics. 
‘[One lecturer does] not drive a car because he [does] not like the fast speed,’ he told his 
wife, Genia, ‘he [walks] … to the university [choosing] a way which avoid[s] the bus 
routes [as] he dislike[s] the big double-decker buses, which, he [feels, are] top-heavy and 
liable to fall on him.’ 289F8
Another ‘timed the heating of his morning milk with a stopwatch’.290F9 Peierls began the 
transformation of theoretical physics at Birmingham with a series of lectures introducing 
Schrödinger and Heisenberg’s theories to students.
…
Oliphant was beginning to wonder how he was going to cover all maintenance and 
equipment purchases as well as implement any new research projects with the 
department’s meagre funding. How on earth, he thought to himself, was he going to build 
a state-of-the-art cyclotron with greater energy than Cockcroft’s in Cambridge or 
Chadwick’s in Liverpool. He desperately wanted to build a machine greater than 
anything available in England and Europe: a machine to rival Lawrence’s 60-inch 
monster under construction at Berkeley. It would cost at the very least £40,000 to build 
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his giant accelerator. He would also need a new building to house it, research rooms, a 
machine room, a workshop, darkrooms and a basement high-energy X-ray Lab, as well 
as salaries for research workers and additional technical staff. He approached the 
university council with his plans. His plea was met ‘in stony silence’.291F10
‘The needs of the [Physics Department] should have a first call on the generosity of 
Midland industrialists,’ the Councillors eventually responded.292F11
Not to be discouraged, Oliphant next visited every large firm in the area optimistic that 
industry would lend a hand ‘either with donations or cash or … by making parts … free 
of cost’.293F12 ‘Entertained royally’ by management wherever he went, Oliphant returned to 
the lab optimistic ‘that a contribution would follow’ only to be disappointed.294F13 Electrical 
firms, forges and coppersmiths were all happy to take on the work but only as viable 
business propositions. 
‘Business [is] so bad,’ Oliphant was told,’ [we cannot] afford to do anything for 
nothing.’295F14
Remembering that Lord Austin had generously donated funds to Cambridge, Oliphant 
wondered if Austin just might be willing to offer a similar bequest. Invited to afternoon 
tea, Mark and Rosie wanted to make a good impression. 
‘We should probably hide the car,’ he told her.296F15
Parking their ancient Morris out of site of the Austin estate, the Oliphants walked up the 
long, winding driveway. After ‘an interesting chat’ Oliphant thought he would take the 
opportunity to introduce the idea of a donation. Before he managed to broach the subject, 
Lady Austin cut him off.
‘Nobody calls on us unless they want something. I suppose, like all the rest, you are after 
the sugar?’
‘Well, eh! I know your husband is interested in science, and I was hoping—‘
‘We have given away all we can afford. Would you like another cup of tea?’297F16
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Ushered to the door Lord Austin insisted on sending the Oliphants home in his 
chauffeur-driven limousine. Later that night Mark Oliphant cycled the long way back to 
the Austin mansion to collect the Morris. Tying his bicycle to the luggage rack, Mark 
Oliphant thought bitterly that he needn’t have bothered to hide the damn car from the old 
bastard.298F17 The following morning, as the bells on the tower of ‘Old Joe’ rang out the 
hour, Oliphant, feeling despondent, walked across Chancellor’s court towards the 
Poynting building wondering what to do next. A thought suddenly struck him. 
‘Of course! Old Joe Chamberlain!’ he said startling students close enough to hear him. 
The Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was, Oliphant remembered, the son of the 
founder of the university Joseph Chamberlain. Oliphant dashed off an appeal and then 
waited anxiously for an answer. When it finally arrived, the taciturn Prime Minister ‘did 
not give the impression that he could give much help’.299F18 Glumly, Oliphant resigned 
himself to the thought that there was little more he could do. 
In early July 1938, Nature readers were informed that, ousted as a result of the German 
annexation of Austria in March, one of Vienna’s most ‘distinguished men of science,’ 
Professor Sigmund Freud, had taken refuge in London. Alongside this report was the 
announcement of a £60,000 bequest to the University of Birmingham by Lord Nuffield 
for Professor Oliphant’s new physics block.300F19 Nuffield, Austin’s arch rival, owned the 
Morris car company. Oliphant was ecstatic and began planning a celebration for the 
physics department. Before the festivities got underway, however, the bequest was 
subject to an opportunistic appeal by the University’s Pro-Chancellor who wrote to Lord 
Nuffield requesting that the donation be used for general revenue rather than for physics 
specifically. The uproar from the Science Faculty came to a head with ‘some tense 
moments and plain speaking’ from the new Poynting Professor.301F20 The Pro-Chancellor 
promptly resigned. 
With his funding now solid, Mark Oliphant wrote to Lawrence stating that he planned to 
build the largest cyclotron in Europe.
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‘If you think it is possible to go to a still greater size … I should be glad to have your 
advice. I am not deterred by papers which have been written on the maximum energy 
obtainable from a cyclotron, as I feel that the relative corrections can be applied to the 
magnetic field, and, though this will necessarily involve a loss of focussing and a great 
diminution in the amount of beam obtainable, I think it should be possible to get small 
beams with very high energies.’302F21
Oliphant suggested that he may be able to visit Berkeley in person.303F22 Lawrence’s reply 
flew back across the Atlantic.
‘I am delighted to hear that you are planning to build a large cyclotron … As far as I can 
judge we are yet a long way from any practical upper limit … It is good news to all of us 
here that there is a possibility that you will visit us.’304F23
Don Cooksey immediately posted one of his cyclotron ‘cookbooks’: detailed pages filled 
with cyclotron art along with fifteen blueprints. Oliphant was not the only physicist to 
receive a Cooksey cookbook nor was he the only physicist making the pilgrimage to 
Berkeley to see Lawrence’s fantastic new accelerator. All this interest in his machines 
amused Lawrence who predicted a ‘worldwide epidemic in cyclotron construction’.305F24
Mark Oliphant left Southampton Docks on December 10. Less than a week later he was 
steaming across the prairie in a roomette on his way to San Francisco.
…
Martin Kamen arrived in California via a comfortable journey spread out across four 
unoccupied seats of the Union Pacific Streamliner all the way from Chicago, Illinois. The 
gloomy, rainy December day and the fact that he was nursing a cold could not dampen 
Kamen’s mood as he made his way to the Berkeley Rad Lab.306F25 Kamen, a chemistry PhD, 
was immediately assigned to a cyclotron crew. The crew was to carry out 
‘troubleshooting’. A recurring feature of cyclotron troubleshooting was finding leaks by 
gassing: ‘a race between asphyxiation and location of the leak’ for the crew member 
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assigned the job of detecting the gas in the cyclotron chamber. Troubleshooting activities 
also included checking the cyclotron’s electrics housed in the basement under the 
monster machine. As he crawled ‘into [the] murky blackness, often the favourite abode 
of black widow spiders and other bad-tempered creatures,’ Kamen felt around hoping he 
would find the faulty wire before more dangerous wires found him.307F26 In between 
troubleshooting Kamen contributed his chemistry skills to the university hospital by 
producing radioactive sodium. In the twenty minutes or so it took to produce radioactive 
sodium in the cyclotron, Kamen noticed his pocket radiation dosage meter recorded his 
exposure as ‘several hundred daily doses’.308F27 Until Lawrence ordered the installation of 
water tanks as radiation shielding, just walking through the lab when the cyclotron was 
running activated not only ‘silver and copper coins in … pockets, [but also] gold and 
silver fillings in teeth’.309F28 When organisers of the Golden Gate International Exposition 
called on Lawrence to ask if he would set up his cyclotron to smash atoms at the fair, 
Lawrence explained ‘that neutrons flying free … around an exhibition room might settle 
in the tissues of spectators, even render them sterile.’ The organisers ‘hastily retired,’ 
Time magazine reported, and ‘hatched plans to exhibit a model cyclotron with lights and 
noises in which imaginary projectiles would smash phantom atoms’ instead.310F29
Despite the danger, Lawrence’s team of cyclotroneers were passionate about their 
machine. 
‘[Anyone] who spent a mere seventy hours a week [on the cyclotron was] considered to 
be not very interested in physics,’ Alvarez said.311F30
…
At the old wooden laboratory which housed Lawrence’s 37-inch accelerator, Mark 
Oliphant was given a crash course in American cyclotronics. The cyclotron operated 
around the clock; crews kept the machine running in 24 hour shifts. 
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Each crew captain was responsible for keeping the cyclotron running at its maximum 
capacity. Breakdowns were frequent and when the inevitable happened, everyone was 
roped in to work day and night repairing the vacuum system with beeswax and rosin, 
finding leaks and fixing the electronics.312F31 A massive magnet made up of over 200 tonnes 
of iron was being installed for Lawrence’s 60-inch machine in the brand new Crocker 
Laboratory. Lawrence was confident that his new cyclotron would produce a twenty-five 
million volt deuteron beam. 
‘This range of energies is quite an extrapolation beyond our present range,’ Lawrence 
told Oliphant, ‘[and while we] cannot be unmindful of unknown technical difficulties … 
we’re optimistic.’313F32
Lawrence was already thinking of trying to push for an even larger cyclotron, tripling the 
size of the ’60-inch monster’ under construction, with a colossal 184-inch magnet 
diameter.314F33
‘[If you] have too small a magnetic gap,’ Lawrence told him, ‘[it’s] a very difficult job to 
get any decent voltage across the dees … You must spend your money on a magnet—if 
you want to get a decent cyclotron, have a good big gap.’315F34
Despite the theoretical conclusion that any energy above ten million volts could not be 
made to work, Lawrence convinced Oliphant that he would be able to overcome any 
obstacles. 
After long days in the Lab, the cyclotroneers spent what was left of their evenings 
playing billiards, drinking and smoking cigars.316F35 On rare days off ‘human flotsam 
washed up from the storms of the previous night’s debauches [and] could often be found 
in the hushed ambience of the Faculty Club reading room’.317 F36 On Saturday afternoons the 
scientists gathered in Le Conte Hall to drink ‘a little wine and listen to Bach’.318F37 Robert 
Oppenheimer’s students often joined the experimentalists. Wearing grey suits with blue 
shirts and ties, the theorists walked with their feet splayed out like their leader and 
answered questions with ‘”ja, ja” the way Oppie did’.319F38
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The night before Mark Oliphant left Berkeley, Lawrence threw a party. The Berkeley 
team had a lot to celebrate in addition to Oliphant’s successful visit; the Rad Lab was 
still celebrating the California Golden Bears 13-0 Big Game win against Stanford at the 
Rose Bowl. In Oakland, surrounded by tikis, flaming torches and other exotica, the 
scientists spent the night singing ‘Hail to California’ and ‘Come Join the Band’ and 
sampling most of Trader Vic’s 35 different types of rum.
Back east, Oliphant stopped at Columbia University in New York and dashed off a 
glowing letter to Lawrence thanking him for his hospitality.
‘Many things about the cyclotron are now clear, which formerly were hazy … I return 
with a greater confidence and a greater belief in the cyclotron, in physics, and in 
mankind.’320F39
Oliphant then endured a nightmare journey across the Atlantic where, at any moment, he 
expected the imminent sinking of the ship. Safely back in England, Oliphant remembered 
to post his letter to Lawrence and included a pound note to cover a last minute tab picked 
up by Don Cooksey. 
‘Your letter had quite a course,’ Lawrence wrote back. 
Held up by customs in San Francisco as ‘suspicious,’ Cooksey had to convince the 
authorities that the one-pound note did not have any ‘diabolical significance’. The letter 
was eventually released. At a meeting of the University of California’s Board of Regents, 
President Robert G Sproul read out the letter ‘from a distinguished British scientist 
speaking in highest terms of the staff and work of the Radiation laboratory’.
‘Next time I go to the president for an emergency appropriation,’ Lawrence wrote to 
Oliphant, ‘it should be a bit easier!’321F40
Lawrence didn’t waste any time. 
‘[W]e may be able to tap the unlimited store of energy in the atom, and may be able to 
transmute at will one element into another,’ Lawrence wrote to the president of Berkeley 
gilding the lily. ‘It is not unthinkable that a 2000-ton cyclotron will prove to be a new 
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University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, January
Back at the lab, Oliphant was fired up from his visit and immediately got down to 
business erecting his magnet ‘of phantasmic dimensions’.323F42 He told everyone he could 
corner about the ‘New Civilization’ he had witnessed in California and his plan to build a 
similar Colossus in Britain. His 280-ton machine, he told the press, with its ‘13ft. hollow 
cube of steel, with walls 2ft. thick [and] miles of copper wire … wound round it’ would 
facilitate ‘five million volts [to] be sent through the wire, and a foot-long spark [to]l leap 
between the two poles inside the cube. A container holding the element whose atom is to 
be split will be put between the poles. The terrible flow of electricity will bombard it, 
releasing energy and making the substance "artificially" radioactive.’
‘The 38-year-old director of physical science … just back from taking his dog for a walk, 
said [that] "Whatever we find out about this atomic mystery will be developed to the 
healing of human ailments."’324F43
As construction began on the new research building, Oliphant resumed scrounging for 
materials for his accelerator with a renewed passion. His earlier approaches to business 
began to pay off; a 600 KW generator, the magnet steel and the miles of copper wire for 
the magnet coils had been donated or supplied at cost by some of the local firms he had 
contacted. The monster cyclotron slowly began to take shape in the new Nuffield 
laboratory 15 feet underground. 
…
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1938, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, Berlin, June
At the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute soon after the Anschluss, Otto Frisch’s aunt, the adjunct 
Professor of Physics Lise Meitner, was finding her current situation increasingly 
precarious. In the Ladies’ Lounge of the Hotel Adlon the director of the Institute, Carl 
Bosch, gave Meitner the bad news: her application for a travel permit had been refused 
by none other than the Reichsführer of the SS himself—Heinrich Himmler.
‘It is considered undesirable that well-known Jews leave Germany to travel abroad where 
they appear to be representatives of German science, or with their names and their 
corresponding experience, might even demonstrate their inner attitude against Germany,’ 
Bosch read aloud, ‘Frau Prof. Meitner [must] remain in Germany even after she 
resigns.’325F44
It seemed that her dismissal from her position and perhaps even her arrest was imminent. 
Less than a month later Meitner was denounced by a colleague. 
‘The Jewess endangers the Institute,’ Kurt Hess declared.326F45
Hess, Meitner’s next door neighbour, sent a note to the secret police informing them that 
Meitner was about to flee Germany. Noticing its content, a former student of Meitner’s 
managed to delay Hess’ note from being passed on.327F46 On July 13 Meitner ‘left Germany 
forever - with 10 marks in [her] purse’ by way of a spine-chilling train journey across the 
country without the necessary papers.328F47 With the help of sympathetic Dutch colleagues, 
Meitner managed to get past the border guards before travelling on to Stockholm and 
safety.329F48
1938, Heston Aerodrome, Hounslow, Middlesex, September
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stepped down from his plane onto the 
tarmac waving papers at the waiting news crews. Later, standing on the doorstep of 10 
Downing Street, Chamberlain spoke to the waiting press. 
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‘My friends … there has come back from Germany … peace with honour. I believe it is 
peace for our time. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.’330F49
In Paris, Irène and Fred Joliot-Curie along with fellow scientist Jean Perrin, outraged at 
the actions of the British Prime Minister’s appeasement, were worried that their 
government may also accede to Hitler’s demands. The scientists sent an open letter to 
French Premier Edouard Daladier.
‘We are afraid … that our external interests are being entrusted in very weak men … We 
demand that no concession be made to the Italian and German demands.’331F50
1938, Kungalv, Sweden, December
Otto Frisch took the ferry across the Öresund from Denmark to Malmö and joined his 
aunt at a hotel for Christmas. Meitner was puzzling over the results of experiments on 
uranium bombardment conducted by her Berlin colleagues Otto Hahn and Fritz 
Strassmann. 
‘There is something about the “radium isotopes” that is so remarkable that for now we 
are only telling you,’ Hahn wrote. ‘The half-lives of the three isotopes have been 
determined quite exactly, they can be separated from all elements except barium, all 
reactions are consistent [with radium]. Only one is not … Now Christmas vacation 
begins … Before the institute closes we do want to write something for 
Naturwissenschaften … So please think about whether … there is anything you could 
propose that you could publish, then it would still in a way be work by the three of us!’332F51
Hahn and Strassmann did not wait for Meitner’s reply and instead made a puzzling 
conclusion in their paper published just three days later.
‘As chemists we must really say that the new bodies do not behave like radium, rather 
like barium … As ‘nuclear chemists’ …  we cannot bring ourselves to take this step that 
contradicts all previous experience in nuclear physics. There could still perhaps be a 
series of unusual coincidences that have given us deceptive results.’333F52
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‘Barium, I don't believe it,’ Frisch was sceptical. ‘There's some mistake.’ 
Meitner, however, was adamant. Bombarding the uranium with neutrons had resulted in 
two lighter elements and a tremendous release of energy.
‘Hahn is too good a chemist to make a statement like that unless he is very, very sure of 
it.’ 
‘But it's impossible. You can't chip a hundred particles off a nucleus in one blow. You 
can't even cut it across. If you try to estimate the nuclear forces, all the bonds you have to 
cut all at once. It's fantastic. It's quite impossible a single neutron could do that.’ 
‘Couldn't it be this sort of thing?’334F53
Frisch and Meitner looked at the problem in light of a theory Bohr had developed a few 
years earlier that the nucleus of an atom resembles a water droplet. If the uranium 
nucleus is as unstable as a drop of water, Meitner ventured, bombarding the nucleus
caused it to ‘fission’: to split in two halves. Sitting on a log  in the snow-covered woods 
scribbling calculations on scraps of paper, Meitner and Frisch found that according to 
Einstein’s theory, E=mc2, the uranium nucleus had been split releasing energy equivalent 
to one-fifth the mass of a proton—200 million volts. 
‘For now I do not want to tell Hahn about my … hypothesis,’ Meitner stressed to Frisch, 
‘because if it is right and he verifies it experimentally, then for political reasons he 
cannot refer to a written communication from me. When it is published … he can cite it.’ 
Aware of her status as an ‘inferior race’ in Germany, Meitner was pragmatic. ‘Normally,
I am not so concerned about publishing … But in my current bad situation I must, 
unfortunately, think of such things, to show people that I am not completely dim-
witted.335F54
1939
Institute of Theoretical Physics, Copenhagen, January
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Frisch decided to run his and Meitner’s uranium fission theory—that the absorption of a 
slow neutron will cause the uranium nucleus to split—past Bohr. 
‘Oh, what idiots we have been. Oh, but this is wonderful!’ Bohr declared. ‘This is just as 
it must be! Have you and Lise Meitner written a paper about it?’336F55
Frisch dictated a note to Nature by telephone. He then drafted a paper checking its 
contents with Meitner. On the morning of Saturday February 7, Frisch raced to meet 
Bohr at the train station in Copenhagen arriving just as Bohr and his son Erik were 
boarding the boat train to Göteborg. Thrusting two unfinished pages of the draft at Bohr, 
Bohr quickly scanned them before promising not to mention Frisch and Meitner’s 
hypothesis until he had confirmation of their publication. Later, at the Institute on 
Blegdamsvej, Frisch discussed the problem of obtaining experimental proof of fission 
with a colleague, George Placzek. Placzek was sceptical.
‘The idea that uranium should be liable to fission as well as alpha decay,’ he said, ‘[is] 
like dissecting a man killed by a fallen brick and finding that he would have soon died of
cancer—an unlikely coincidence!’337F56
Placzek suggested Frisch try looking for fission fragments in a cloud chamber.338F57 In the 
lab a week later Frisch observed fission pulses from thorium. Frisch then sent two letters 
to the editor of Nature, and a telegram to Enrico Fermi in Washington, reporting the 
results of his experiments into the new phenomena: ‘nuclear fission’.339F58
…
Despite assuring Frisch that he would keep the fission theory under his hat, the discovery 
was so momentous that Bohr had trouble keeping it to himself. On route to America, 
Bohr discussed the results with fellow scientist, Leon Rosenfeld. In New York, 
Rosenfeld caught the train to Princeton with an American colleague, John Wheeler, who 
coerced him into giving a talk at the Journal Club that night. Rosenfeld, not realising that 
Frisch and Meitner’s note had not been published, naturally spoke about Hahn and 
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Strassman’s startling new discovery and Meitner and Frisch’s explanation that this 
‘fission’ was a breakup of the nucleus according to Bohr’s liquid droplet model.340F59 The 
effect of Rosenfeld’s talk on the American physicists was ‘spectacular.’
‘[M]ore spectacular,’ Rosenfeld noticed, ‘than the fission phenomenon itself.’
The Americans ‘rushed about spreading the news in all directions’.341F60 By the time Bohr 
arrived at Princeton having spent a few days sightseeing, the news had begun to spread. 
‘I did not want to talk about this Frisch business before Frisch’s note has appeared in 
Nature,’ a distressed Bohr complained to Rosenfeld. ‘Now you will see that those 
Americans will be the first to publish it.’342F61
Despite his worries, Bohr then spread the news to George Gamow.
‘Bohr … has gone crazy,’ Gamow told colleague Edward Teller, ‘He says a neutron can 
split uranium.’343F62
At George Washington University in Room 105 at 2 pm on Thursday January 19, Fermi 
read out Frisch’s telegram.
THE BARIUM COMES FROM THE URANIUM’344 F63
In an instant the atmosphere turned electric. 
‘Well … It must be splitters. It must be like an amoeba,’ said Fermi.
Merle Tuve, immediately decoding this ‘bomb shell,’ leaned across to his colleague 
Larry Hafstad. 
‘Larry, go out and put in a new filament … Let’s run this experiment tonight.’ Hafstad 
raced across town from Foggy Bottom to the lab in Chevy Chase. By the following day 
Hafstad and his colleagues had results. Tuve immediately relayed the news to Bohr and 
Fermi.
‘We’ve got splitters here. We’d like you to see them.’ 
On Saturday morning in the basement target room of the DTM, Bohr and Fermi viewed 
for the very first time ‘enormous long fat tracks’ of fissioning uranium nuclei confirming 
Meitner and Frisch’s hypothesis.345F64
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‘I had to stand and look at that first experiment,’ an anguished Bohr wrote to his wife 
Margarethe, ‘without knowing certainly if Frisch had done the same experiment and sent 
a note to Nature.’346F65
To his relief, when he returned to Princeton, there was a letter waiting for him with news 
that Frisch had succeeded in publishing the fantastic news.
Luis Alvarez sat in a chair at the Berkeley Stevens Union campus barbershop and read 
the headline on the front page of the San Francisco Chronicle: ‘200 Million Volts of 
Energy Created by Atom Explosions.’ Alvarez scanned the article and could not believe 
what he was reading: ‘German chemists had split the uranium atom by bombarding it 
with neutrons’.347F66 Ignoring the barber’s protests Alvarez jumped up from the chair ‘and 
ran all the way back to the Rad Lab to spread the word’ about fission. Alvarez cornered 
his graduate student, Phil Abelson.348F67
‘I think you’d better lie down on the table,’ he said.349F68
Abelson, who had been seeing x-rays of fission products without understanding what 
they were, realised, as had Alvarez, that they had been ‘within days of making the same 
discovery’.350F69 Alvarez then ‘tracked down Robert Oppenheimer working with his 
entourage in his bullpen in Le Conte Hall’. Listening to Alvarez, Oppenheimer declared 
that the fission reaction impossible. 
‘[I can] prove mathematically to everyone in the room that someone must have made a 
mistake. Do you believe this story? I cannot believe it,’ he said.351F70
Alvarez decided instead to prove it to Oppenheimer. The following day Alvarez 
demonstrated ‘tall, spiking fission pulses’ on the lab’s oscilloscope. Oppenheimer 
admitted he had been wrong to doubt the possibility of nuclear fission.
‘The reaction [is] authentic,’ Oppenheimer admitted, ‘but also … in the process extra 
neutrons [will] boil off that [can] be used to split more uranium atoms and … generate 
power or make bombs … I think it really not too improbable that a ten cm cube of 
uranium deuteride … might very well blow itself to hell.’352F71
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1980
University of California, Los Angeles, April 
As he listened to the scientist sitting opposite, Stewart Cockburn checked his notes. 
‘Dr Martin Kamen … co-discoverer Carbon 14 … plays viola … very nearly became a 
professional musician instead of a chemist … helped create the University of California, 
San Diego campus in the pueblo hills above La Jolla.’
‘You’re right, it’s a beautiful university—incredible Pacific views. I retired a couple of 
years ago, in ’78. It was a good year to retire. Theodore Geisel—you know Dr Seuss? 
Well, he gave the commencement address that year—entirely in verse!’
‘I’ll just get the tape going.’ Cockburn set his tape recorder on the desk between him and
the recently retired professor.
‘If ever there was an anti-Establishment figure it was Mark Oliphant … I first met him 
when he came to Berkeley in ‘38. I think that at first, Oliphant may have felt super 
critical of what was going on at Berkeley because he reckoned we didn’t have a basic 
idea of what physics was all about. We were just big machine operators … We … had 
our own feeling that up to the time of the war we weren’t really doing any science … we 
were indeed just building big machines. I remember Alvarez at one point putting a chart 
on the board showing how many publications were coming out of … Berkeley … and it 
didn’t look very much … very few important discoveries … had come out of Berkeley … 
when … discoveries did begin to flow, the scale factor … was tremendous. When I was 
first there … the whole lab supply needs for two weeks operation could be put on a 
kiddicart. A few years later there were 10-ton trucks running down Strawberry Canyon.’ 
‘Alvarez … was particularly critical of Oliphant.’
‘Alvarez … has always been overwhelmed with himself. I’ve known Alvarez since he was 
a graduate student in Chicago and his egomania has not diminished with the years … 
Remember that when Oliphant first met the people at Berkeley they were still on their 
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way up … they felt there was a certain amount of condescension towards them by the 
people at Cambridge. Some of the criticism of Oliphant derives from American dislike of 
the whole British … attitude. Let’s say this, if Oliphant had been working in Berkeley in 
the 1930s … he would have done the same sort of job as Lawrence … You need luck at 
the right time, as well as mastery of your subject. And Oliphant’s mastery … of physics 
just can’t be doubted … I can’t help wondering what might have happened … if Oliphant 
had the resources of the United States behind him.’
‘There is only one flaw in this theory, of course … at Birmingham his proton synchrotron 
wasn’t very brilliantly designed.’
‘Did McMillan tell you it didn’t work?’353F72
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Chapter 6: The Breakthrough 
1939
Ivry, France March
In a large hangar—the newly established Laboratoire de Synthèse Atomique—Fred 
Joliot was demonstrating the fission of uranium by neutron bombardment to his 
colleagues Hans Halban and Lew Kowarski. The three researchers then began to work on 
the feasibility of producing a chain reaction. By August, Kowarski—a great, gentle bear 
of a man nicknamed ‘Joliot’s little typist’ by the wits at the lab—typed their paper with 
its startling conclusion. 
‘[T]he production of thermal neutrons in the system is more than doubled by the 
introduction of uranium … we conclude that secondary, tertiary, etc. fissions have taken 
place, and we are in the presence of a convergent chain reaction’.354F1
The fissioning of the uranium nucleus by one neutron emits several neutrons in the 
process each of which has the potential to split its own uranium atom. This chain reaction 
started by a single neutron on a number of uranium nuclei worked like an avalanche. The 
energy released would be immense.
At the University of Hamburg a month later Oliphant’s old Cavendish student, Paul 
Harteck, read about the French experiments. Harteck wrote to the head of German Army 
Ordnance.  
‘We take the liberty of calling to your attention the newest developments in nuclear 
physics, which, in our opinion, will probably make it possible to produce an explosive of 
many orders of magnitude more powerful than conventional ones … The country which 
first makes use of it has an unsurpassable advantage over the others.’355F2
115
Harteck was unceremoniously ‘ordered to cease meddling in uranium research’.356F3
Unbeknownst to the hapless Harteck, his colleague Werner Heisenberg was already 
planning a German uranium fission bomb.
1939, Institute of Theoretical Physics, Copenhagen, April
Otto Frisch was contemplating his relative safety and worrying how long it would last. 
He had begun ‘to realise that the whole balance of Europe was tottering … sooner or 
later Hitler would occupy Denmark,’ and Frisch ‘would be back in the frying pan’.357F4 The 
threat of invasion, Frisch felt, was obvious and ominous. War was on its way. ‘What was 
the use of doing any more research,’ he thought to himself glumly, ‘Nothing I [start will] 
be any good’.358F5 When British scientists visited DATE, Frisch networked. 
‘[I have] a fear that Denmark [will] soon be overrun by Hitler,’ he said to Oliphant and 
Blackett. ‘[Is there a chance for [me] to get to England?’359F6 The alternative was bleak. 
‘[Either I will be] compelled in some way or other to work for Hitler or … be sent to a 
concentration camp.’360F7
‘You just come over,’ Oliphant said. ‘We'll find you something to do. You can give a 
few lectures.’361F8
Oliphant was delighted, telling Rudi Peierls of his coup. Peierls wrote to Bohr that he and 
Oliphant were ‘extremely glad to have a chance of discussions’ with Frisch.362F9 Frisch 
‘gratefully accepted’ Oliphant’s invitation for a two-week visit to Birmingham 
circumventing the need for emigration papers. Frisch, as if he were a tourist going on a 
weekend away, packed two small bags and travelled to England.363F10
…
At the research laboratories of the General Electric Company at Wembley in London, 
John Randall, a Lancastrian of ‘non-conformist stock and liberal principles’ whose 
family were ‘regular readers of the Manchester Guardian’ and who was considered 
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something of ‘a dark horse’ by his colleagues, had read of the new Poynting Professor of 
Physics at the University of Birmingham with interest.364F11 Always dapper and smartly 
dressed with a bowtie and a flower in his lapel, Randall was acutely aware that it would 
take ‘many painful [years] for a boy of [his] upbringing to become fully acceptable in the 
smoother south … [and so had taken] every opportunity to do research of basic scientific 
interest … that would be suitable for publication’.365F12 His perseverance had paid off with 
the awarding of a Royal Society Fellowship to make the rare move from industry to 
university research. Randall decided to spend his fellowship at Birmingham ‘where … 
Oliphant … was energetically transforming the physics department’.366F13 In a ‘peculiar set 
of small rooms largely under the seating of a large lecture theatre’ at the top of the 
Poynting Building, Randall began setting up his luminescence laboratory.367F14
Oliphant’s former Cambridge student, Maurice Wilkins, meanwhile, had returned to his 
parents’ home in Birmingham feeling depressed. Having spent the majority of his time as 
an undergraduate putting all his efforts into the CSAWG, his lower second-class degree 
was not enough to gain a postgraduate research position at the Cavendish Laboratory. He 
‘suddenly … had a thought’ and rang his old professor, Mark Oliphant.368F15
‘Randall,’ Oliphant told his former student, ‘is doing interesting things’.369F16
By happy coincidence Wilkins joined an old school friend, Harry Boot, who was already 
working at the lab with Randall. As the threat of war rumbled across Europe Wilkins 
settled into his new position assigned to ‘a rather ludicrous programme helping people 
walk about in the Blackout … [designing] luminescent dog collars’.370F17
Progress on the cyclotron was slow; its construction was beset by small problems 
needing to be overcome and one large catastrophe. Assembling the cyclotron base, 
physicist Robert Nimmo and one of the junior laboratory assistants were pinned down by 
a fallen steel plate. Nimmo had one leg broken and the other ankle dislocated; Hudston 
broke both his legs in the accident. 
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‘Nimmo and Hudston are getting along quite nicely in hospital,’ Oliphant told Philip 
Moon, ‘it seems [Hudston] will be out … and in plaster in about three weeks … Nimmo 
… appears to be fairly comfortable.’371F18
‘I had hoped that by this time I would have news of greater progress,’ Oliphant wrote to 
Lawrence in August, ‘We have been carrying out some further work on the fission of 
uranium and other elements, but … I feel very great doubt now whether it can ever be 
made to produce a chain reaction, unless the uranium … can be wholly or partially 
separated.’372F19
‘[F]rom what I read in the literature,’ Lawrence wrote back, ‘there does seem to be 
evidence that more than one neutron … comes off in fission … There is some question as 
to whether the isotope involved is 235 or 238 … it might be necessary to separate 235 in 
order to really bring it about.. In any case, it is the sort of thing which would be the 
subject of wild rumors.’373F20
1939, Kremlin, Moscow, August
With a wide smile for the cameras, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von
Ribbentrop shook the hand of Joseph Stalin, the ink not yet dry on the the Treaty of Non-
Aggression between Germany and the USSR. In London stories surfaced of ‘Nazi salutes 
in Moscow’s Red Square’.374F21 Left Book Club publisher, Victor Gollancz, called on 
members to resign from the British Communist Party in protest. Oliphant’s former 
students Maurice Wilkins, John Fremlin and Reinet Maasdorp heeded his call and
resigned. 
…
In September, Adolf Hitler announced the beginning of the Second World War to the 
World by sending German tanks rumbling over the border into Poland. Overnight, 
Britain was blacked-out. Road accidents increased, unwary citizens fell from bridges into 
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rivers, and one hapless commuter plunged 80 feet to his death when he stepped from a 
train carriage stopped on a viaduct thinking that the train had reached the station. In 
response the government issued a poster campaign to encourage the eating of carrots in 
order to ‘help you see in the blackout’.375F22 Preparations were made for the impending 
invasion; signposts were removed from the roads to confuse the invaders if they came. 
American war correspondent, Edward R Murrow, broadcast the news to the locals. 
‘That’s going to make a fine shemozzle. The Germans drive on the right and we drive on 
the left. There’ll be a jolly old mix-up on the roads if the Germans do come.’376F23
Despite stiff competition from other university labs such as Cambridge and Bristol 
Oliphant had won a contract to conduct ‘research of a highly confidential character’ for 
the Air Ministry investigating a new type of radio location finding for aeroplanes 
(radar).377F24 The Birmingham coup caused a stir. 
‘Absolute nonsense to send that to Oliphant at a regular university,’ Oxford University’s 
Clarendon Laboratory complained. ‘We should have it.’378F25
An unlikely group of researchers who ‘had no real experience in radio at all’ were 
inducted into Oliphant’s radar program. The Birmingham scientists marvelled on the 
power of ‘the Fixer’ to overcome all obstacles. 
‘Oliphant is a big man in every sense. He … think[s] big and sell[s] his ideas,’ Wilkins 
mused. ‘He’s managed to secure the most interesting problem in war research on 
offer.’379F26
‘Oliphant won us the contract,’ Randall speculated, ‘through sheer personality and 
pressure.’380F27
The researchers were thoroughly briefed by their director. What was needed was a device 
small enough to be fitted into the nose of a fighter aircraft with a beam narrow enough to 
find German bombers at night. This would require a reduction of the wavelength of the 
radio beams to ten centimetres. The only practical method, Oliphant told them, would be 
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‘through the use of high-power generators of microwaves that could be focused and 
projected over long distances’.381F28
‘[Y]ou should [all] get away for a while before you begin the next year’s work. The visit 
to Ventnor [will] provide you with a real holiday atmosphere … and at the same time 
with an interesting problem to consider,’ Oliphant told them. ‘Would you please not tell 
anyone about it?’382F29
The Birmingham scientists headed to the South East coast to spend the spring and 
summer lounging in a hotel at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight poring over the long range 
radar equipment at the island’s Chain Home station.
…
On the day that Germany invaded Poland—the day that Britain enforced the blackout 
regulations on its citizenry—Hollywood screenwriter Raymond Schrock wrote the last 
scene to his screenplay, Murder in the Air. Screen actor Ronald Reagan was to play 
Treasury Agent, Brass Bancroft. The plot involved Bancroft posing as a Fifth Columnist 
saboteur in order to infiltrate a spy ring intent on capturing America’s ‘superweapon’ 
designed ‘to make America invincible’.383F30 The German Army, Hitler declared in Danzig, 
also had up their sleeve ‘a secret weapon against which there was no defence’.384F31
Meanwhile, in Barnt Green, Worcestershire, Otto Frisch had spent the past few weeks 
staying with Mark and Rosie. Oliphant and Frisch drove over to the Cavendish in 
Cambridge where Frisch revealed nuclear fission to the British scientists ‘with just a little 
bit of uranium perched on the grid of a vacuum tube’.385F32 Oliphant, emulating American 
scriptwriters, scraped together resources and bits of apparatus, cleared out a small space 
at the top of the Poynting Building and suggested Frisch begin some experiments on the 
new phenomena he had so successfully demonstrated.
By the time the last of the Birmingham team arrived back from the South Coast, Britain 
was at war with Germany. Oliphant’s researchers—’seething with ideas’—bounced them 
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around over lunch at the university’s Student Union Caf, where, joined by students as 
well as refugee scientists, all enthusiastically engaged in ‘exciting brain-storming 
sessions about U-boats, and night bombers and all kinds of scientific schemes that might 
help to win the war’.386F33 While the rest of the lab put their faith in a new type of linear 
vacuum tube, the klystron, Randall was having second thoughts.387F34 He mulled over the
problem with Harry Boot. 
’The situation we should ask ourselves is whether the klystron … can possibly give the 
power … required to detect an aircraft at 100 or 200 miles away … the radiation even if 
it were a strictly parallel beam going out from your transmitter would be scattered over 
huge angles and only a small fraction of it would hit the receiver when it came back.’388F35
Sharing a lift to the lab one morning Randall discussed the problem with his director. 
‘If we can modify one of Megaw’s magnetrons,’ Oliphant suggested, ‘the only hope of 
generating high frequencies lies in putting the whole of the circuitry inside the gadget 
itself. [S]ee whether copper cavity resonators could replace the little [wire] loops.’389F36
‘Yes. It might work if we have resonators which open onto the central space.’ 
‘Well, it’s worth trying out,’ Oliphant concluded.
Randall and Boot put their heads together and ‘sketched out very quickly in the course of 
a day or so, a very primitive theory as to how it might work.’390F37
‘It’s alright designing the thing on the back of an envelope,’ Randall told Boot, ‘the thing 
is to get the apparatus to do it.’391F38
…
Rudi Peierls was feeling an increasing sense of frustration at his inability to contribute 
any useful work to the war effort.
‘As you perhaps know, I am still technically, a German subject, and therefore an “Enemy 
Alien,” although I applied for naturalisation in May 1938 … this means that I shall 
probably not be allowed to do any work of national importance,’  he wrote to Edward 
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Appleton, ‘it is hard not to be allowed to help at a moment when people with technical 
qualifications are apparently urgently wanted … [especially as] I have … a more intense 
enmity towards the present regime in Germany than most other people in the country … I 
understand that Oliphant’s department is going to engage in some research work of 
military importance, and it is likely that this will raise a number of semi-mathematical 
questions, with which I could be useful.’392F39
His offer was refused. 
‘I was passed by the Tribunal all right, and that involves in principle, permission to do 
war work,’ Peierls complained to a colleague, ‘However, the Admiralty did not feel, even 
then, that they wanted me to do work with Oliphant’s team, and I have not so far found 
another way of making myself useful except joining the ARS on a part-time basis … in 
due course I shall get a very beautiful uniform, but I think that I might help the country in 
a more efficient way than by sleeping in a fire station.’393F40
Peierls was refused a security clearance to work on radar. Not only was Peierls unable to 
participate in secret work but he was now no longer able to access his brand new office 
in the Nuffield Building. The situation, Oliphant thought, was ‘a bit of a charade’.394F41 He 
decided to circumvent the restrictions by approaching Peierls as if pondering an answer 
to a purely theoretical question.
‘If you were faced with the problem of solving Maxwell’s equations for a cavity with 
conducting walls in the shape of a hemisphere, could you cope with it?’ 
‘Well, it’s an interesting problem. I’ll give it some thought.’ 
At afternoon tea following day Peierls would casually approach Oliphant, ‘I have a 
solution to that problem you gave me.’
The subterfuge was not lost on Frisch. All three scientists knew that Oliphant’s 
‘interesting’ problems were connected with the generation of very short electric waves. 
In other words, Oliphant was posing questions on the development of radar, the ‘secret’ 
project going on in the Nuffield Building. Oliphant, Frisch thought, ‘knew that Peierls 
122
knew, and … Peierls knew that Oliphant knew that he knew. But neither of them let on; 
they both pretended that this was purely an academic mathematical problem that had 
occurred to Oliphant out of the blue.’395F42
In late February, Maurice Wilkins happened to glance out of the lab window and swiftly 
did a double take. Poking out of the roof of the building opposite was a ‘peculiar metal 
horn’ directly above Randall and Boot’s lab.396F43 In the lab it was obvious that power was 
pouring out of the prototype cavity magnetron—vacuum sealed with sealing wax and its 
holes covered with halfpennies—but the researchers had no means of measuring its
output. Randall and Boot lit cigarettes from the beam; car headlights hung on the end of 
the power outlet were burned out trying to measure the energy generation. As each 
successive filament ‘glowed brilliantly and burned out,’ Randall and Boot calculated the 
output at around 400 watts.397F44 The power generated ‘was so extraordinary’ the rest of the 
lab had to see it to believe it.398F45 While the Birmingham physics team watched, Oliphant 
illuminated a fluorescent tube just by holding it in the extraordinary device’s wavelength. 
‘Brilliant!’ their director declared.399F46
Outside the Nuffield Building the researchers covered a barrage balloon with aluminium 
paint and filled it with coal gas to use in a demonstration. A gust of wind suddenly lifted 
the balloon into the air. Mark Oliphant grabbed the end of the rope and he too was lifted 
up. The staff scrambled to grab their professor who was carried 100 metres before hitting 
the ground. When the radar researchers had recovered from the ordeal, in between the 
hourly pealing of the bells, the first echoes reflected back from moving vehicles on the 
ground were heard from the top of Old Joe.400F47
1939, Claremont Hotel, Oakland, California, November
The concierge patiently told the caller that unfortunately, Professor Lawrence was in the 
middle of a tennis match, and so he was not able to bother him. On the other end of the 
line, Lawrence’s secretary, Helen Griggs, butted in. 
123
‘Yes you can bother him. I want to give him [some] news.’ 
Lawrence had just won the 1939 Nobel Prize for Physics for the invention of the 
cyclotron.401F48 The following week the Rockefeller Foundation granted Lawrence US$1.5 
million for his new accelerator project. 
1939, Dundee, Scotland, Boxing Day
Christmas festivities barely over, Denis Robinson, an electrical engineer seconded to the 
Air Ministry’s Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE), wondered why he’d 
been called in to see the boss. 
‘I want you to build … a ten centimetre radar receiver.’
‘Ten centimetres! That’s 3000 megacycles.’ Robinson laughed. He then realised the boss 
was serious. Robinson then heard of the brilliant device invented at the Birmingham lab. 
What was needed was the development of accompanying components—receivers and 
detectors—small enough to make a workable unit.
‘We want you to look after all these people that are coming to us from the universities,’ 
Robinson was told. ‘[T]here are two things I won’t forgive you for—first, if you breathe 
a word to anybody, unless you know that they have been cleared … The second is, if I 
find you wasting time around the labs and can't tell me that what you are doing is going 
to result in some dead Germans, that's it.’402F49
The following day Robinson relocated to the South East coast. He found himself in 
charge of a group of ‘boffins’; ‘an amazing spectrum of people … everything from right 
to left, from proto-Fascists to proto-Communists … all … absolutely determined that that 
bastard Hitler had to be licked.’403F50 Mark Oliphant, Robinson thought to himself the first 
time he met the Birmingham professor, was the most unlike a typical ‘boffin’ that he had 
met so far. The tall, beefy Australian was a ‘bluff, easy-going, good-humoured cynic 
who laughed a lot’ particularly at any request he thought a waste of his time. Oliphant, 
Robinson soon found out, ‘boggled at every bit of paperwork’.404F51
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‘Why is that?’ Oliphant responded when asked to fill out acquisition orders. ‘That’s 
absolutely ridiculous.’ Followed by a belly laugh. 
Robinson was summoned to the Ministry.
‘Robinson, these people of yours are in a terrible state of indiscipline. And I have to ask 
you to do something about it, because the guards at the gate and the stockroom people 
say they can’t cope. There’s a man called Oliphant who keeps on coming back and forth 
through the main gate. He doesn’t have any identity and he comes in with property 
marked “Property of the Cavendish” and he leaves it here and goes out and takes some of 
our property for testing, as he says, and he won’t give rhyme or reason. He says, “the hell 
with all those pink and blue forms; don’t you realize there is a war on?” He just laughs at 
them. Will you please tell this man Oliphant—‘
‘Look Sir, this is one of the great physicists of the country. His lab has produced this 
microwave tube … It’s on 3000 megacycles—‘
‘What did you say?’
‘We really think it’s going to be the answer to the night bomber and putting night 
fighters into the sky—‘
‘Well, for heaven’s sake get him to carry an identity card at the very least!’405F52
The rest of the scientists under Robinson’s care were no more in awe of authority than 
Oliphant; Robinson despaired of their collective ‘extraordinary lack of understanding’ of 
the workings of either the government or the military. One Cambridge physicist 
laconically responded to a ‘rather stuffy’ RAF officer who had tried to exercise his 
authority. 
‘You ask me [if] I don’t know the difference between a Group Captain and a Wing 
Commander,’ Philip Dee told him, ‘I couldn’t care less.’ 
Dee and his small team of Cavendish researchers perfected the efficiency of 
Birmingham’s new cavity magnetron in a dilapidated old stable. Each morning before 
they started work, the physicists tied up the bottom of their trousers to prevent mice 
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running up their legs.406F53 On the Isle of Wight, at the top of the steep slope of St Boniface 
Down overlooking the village of Ventnor, Dee, Skinner, Robinson and the rest of the 
team tested microwave radar over Swanage Bay and detected seagulls flying over the 
English Channel half a mile away.  
In his office in the Nuffield Building at Birmingham Mark Oliphant chatted to Lord 
Rothschild all the time wondering what the purpose of the visit of such a distinguished 
visitor could be. After a tour of the laboratory, Rothschild, who ‘seemed quite happy 
with everything,’ departed. The following day a parcel delivered by special messenger 
arrived on the director’s desk. Shocked, Oliphant discovered the parcel contained a 
prototype magnetron and a note. ‘I suggest you improve your security arrangements. 
Rothschild.’407F54
‘Ah, bugger it all,’ Oliphant later told his team, ‘this is work for engineers now. [Let’s 
go] back to the work on nuclear physics.’408F55
1940 
Poynting Building, University of Birmingham, January
There was, Otto Frisch marvelled, an ‘aura of confidence and calmness’ around Mark 
Oliphant, ‘that nothing could go wrong and everything necessary would be done without 
fuss’ which was unlike anything he had encountered in Germany.409 F56 One afternoon at the 
university, during a heated discussion on a point of theory over tea and buns, Oliphant 
put down his cup.
‘We really must have a blackboard in here, you can’t argue without one.’ 
Oliphant ordered an assistant to locate a blackboard. The assistant came back a few 
minutes later and said he had found one, but it was too large to get up the narrow 
stairway. 
‘Never mind,’ said Oliphant, ‘we can get it through the window.’ 
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He sent another researcher on a mission to locate a block and tackle. It was subsequently 
secured to the roof and the blackboard was hoisted out of one window and into the 
window of the tearoom all within half an hour. Frisch was impressed. Anywhere else he 
thought to himself, particularly in any German institution, such a venture achieved by 
Mark Oliphant in thirty minutes would require ‘days of planning and quite likely some 
paperwork’.410F57
In a small laboratory behind the lecture theatre, Frisch was thinking of Bohr’s hypothesis 
that the rare isotope U235 was responsible for the fission of uranium. To test Bohr’s 
theory, Frisch would need to separate the uranium isotopes. Oliphant wrote to Sir Henry 
Tizard requesting some uranium oxide for Frisch to begin his experiment.411F58
‘I am told that you have refugees in your Laboratory,’ Tizard wrote back to Oliphant, 
‘and it just occurs to me that perhaps it is a little hard on the English physicists who are 
interested in the same problem but who are now deeply engaged on war work, if the 
refugees get a good start on them by being in the fortunate position of being able to 
devote their time to pure science. However, I suppose that one should not grumble.’ 
‘[I]n my opinion,’ a furious Oliphant snapped back, ‘it is much more important that work 
of this nature should be done than that any question should be raised about whose effort 
is employed to get the answer.’412F59
In the freezing winter, sitting in ‘a club chair up close to the gas fire, [wearing his] winter 
coat and [with] the typewriter in [his] lap,’ Frisch was writing a report for the Chemical 
Society on the latest advances in nuclear physics.413F60 In his report Frisch included Bohr’s 
contention that a really violent explosion would not be produced even if it were possible 
to assemble a large mass of uranium able to sustain a growing chain reaction which, in 
any case, would be far too heavy to be transported. Peierls had also been thinking about 
chain reactions. After reading a paper by Francis Perrin, he spent some time deliberating 
critical mass, reworking Perrin’s formula for calculating the amount of uranium needed 
to start a chain reaction. Peierls wrote up his results in a short paper, but before sending it 
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off for publication he thought that he would show it to Frisch. Frisch and Peierls 
discussed the problem late into the night.
‘Suppose someone gave you a quantity of pure 235,’ Frisch said, ‘what would happen if 
one could produce enough uranium 235 to make a truly explosive chain reaction 
possible? How much of the isotope would be needed?’414F61
Peierls made the calculations; the two scientists were ‘staggered’ by the results.415F62 A
kilogram of U235, approximately tennis ball size, would produce 80 neutron generations 
in less than four millionths of a second. The temperatures and pressures reached would 
be enormous. Frisch and Peierls stared at each other and realised that an atomic bomb 
was possible. 
‘Even if this plant costs as much as a battleship,’ Peierls said, ‘it would be worth 
having.’416F63
Frisch felt as though he and Peierls ‘had caught an elephant in the jungle by the tail and 
… did not know what to do with it. But [they] knew it was an elephant’.417F64
‘Bloody hell!’ Oliphant, his hands gripping the edge of his desk, looked up from the 
paper Frisch and Peierls had just shown him. Declaring the calculations ‘absolutely hair-
raising,’ Oliphant asked the two scientists to write up a memorandum urgently but to tell 
no one else.418F65
‘The attached report concerns the possibility of constructing a ‘Super-bomb” which 
utilises the energy stored in atomic nuclei,’ Frisch and Peierls wrote. ‘The energy 
liberated in the explosion of such a super-bomb is about the same as that produced by the 
explosion of 1,000 tons of dynamite. This energy … will … produce a temperature 
comparable to that in the interior of the sun. The blast … would destroy life in a wide 
area. The size of this area is difficult to estimate, but it will probably cover the centre of a 
big city.’419F66
Oliphant delivered the memorandum, ‘On the construction of a “Super-Bomb” based on 
a Nuclear Chain Reaction in Uranium,’ to Tizard. 
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‘I have considered these suggestions in some detail and have had considerable discussion 
with the authors,’ Oliphant wrote in his cover letter, ‘I am convinced that the whole thing 
must be taken rather seriously, if only to make sure that the other side are not occupied in 
the production of such a bomb at the present time … I hope you will not think this a 
hare-brained scheme. It may well turn out to be impracticable, but in any case it is put 
forward with sincerity by Frisch and Peierls, and with considerable belief by myself.’420F67
At his office in Shell Mex House on The Strand, George Thomson was sceptical when he 
heard about the proposal.
‘Oliphant,’ Thomson told Cockcroft, ‘has raised the question of the possibility of 
apparating the isotopes of uranium … [to] produce an atomic bomb. He seems to think 
this is feasible though I am doubtful. Tizard has suggested a small committee and we 
would like your help … The suggestion is that it might be worth starting a small scale 
separation to see how it goes. We should probably … co-opt a chemist.’421F68
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Chapter 7: The Head Start
1940
Institut du Radium, Paris, March
Irène Joliot-Curie sat at the bench in the basement lab composing a letter to her children, 
Hélène and Pierre, who had been evacuated to relatives in the country. 
‘[T]here are a few Metro trains … There are no buses,’ she told them. ‘Everywhere 
windows are painted in blue to prevent lights being seen at night, and sticky paper is put 
on the large windows. I have seen groups of children being evacuated … carrying on 
their clothes a large ticket with their destination on it, looking like little parcels walking 
by themselves.’422F1
At the Collège de France , working in the gloom of the painted-over windows, research 
continued despite the appearance of guards in military uniforms, fire-fighting materials, 
gas masks and a warning that ‘everything [the scientists] learn in the performance of 
their duties constitutes a secret’.423F2 Scientists had been on notice for most of the previous 
year by a directive stating that ‘foreign workers would be notified later on that the 
laboratories will be closed to them from the moment mobilization is announced until the 
authorities make a decision concerning their fate’.424F3
‘[O]ne cannot talk long with anybody in Paris without coming upon a mood of deep 
pessimism,’ a visiting American wrote back to Don Cooksey at Berkeley. ‘After two or 
three conversations I have felt so dispirited as to mediate a prompt return home.’425F4
Lew Kowarski had a sinking feeling that the situation in France was hopeless. He 
convinced Joliot and Halban that something should be done about protecting the heavy 
water from the Germans. Kowarski again sat hunched over the lab typewriter, this time 
composing a letter to the French Minister of Supply, Raoul Dautry. 
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‘We believe the bulk of the world’s stock of heavy water is now kept at the Norwegian 
factory,’ Kowarski wrote. ‘We would need the whole of this stock.’426F5
A few days later Dautry quizzed Joliot.
‘Now, who knows about [the heavy water]?’
‘Nobody.’ 
‘But you know.’
‘Yes,’ said Joliot. 
‘And your collaborators.’ 
‘Yes.’ 
‘Who are they?’ 
‘Oh, well, they’re both French citizens. One is called Halban.’ 
‘Where was he born?’ 
‘In Germany. The other is called Kowarski.’ 
‘Where was he born?’ 
‘Russia.’ 
‘That’s bad, you know.’ 
‘What do you mean, it’s bad? I completely vouch for them.’ 
‘If anything goes wrong … leakages will be suspected; and your collaborators will be 
immediately singled out.’ 
‘That’s easy,’ said Joliot. ‘Put them in prison for the duration of the operation.’ 
‘In prison? Why should they go to prison?’ 
‘If I tell them,’ Joliot replied, ‘they will go.’ 
‘Well, that’s perhaps excessive. Let’s send them to some residence where they could be 
under close supervision—on an island.’ 
‘All right,’ said Joliot. ‘Different islands preferably. Halban has a delicate health. We 
must send him to the Southern coast.’
‘Let’s send him to the Cote d’Azur somewhere.’ 
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‘Kowarski,’ Joliot said with a gleam in his eye, ‘needs a bracing climate. We will send 
him to an island off Brittany.’427F6
Halban ‘having the manner of Eric von Stroheim was … immediately suspected of 
everything,’ and was subsequently placed under house arrest. Kowarski, given the run of 
his island, ‘hired a bicycle and … rode in all directions, having ideas about the slowing 
down of neutrons and a few other things’ and spent the rest of his time reading Gone with 
the Wind in its entirety. He returned to Paris refreshed from his ‘vacances’.428F7
1940, Copenhagen, Denmark, April
On a crisp morning at approximately 4.30 am a merchant ship accompanied by an 
icebreaker and two patrol boats docked at the port and deposited a battalion of German 
troops. The commander of the Copenhagen coastal artillery ordered his troops to fire a 
warning shot. The troops, raw recruits on their first active service, could not work out 
how to operate the cannon. On April 9, as the Germans negotiated the Danish surrender 
with King Christian X at the Amalienberg Palace, Luftwaffe bombers dropped 
propaganda leaflets over the city. Copenhagen was successfully invaded using paper 
weapons without a German shot being fired. 
The day after the invasion of Denmark, Mark Oliphant caught the train from New Street 
Station to Euston and the tube to Piccadilly Circus. On the ground floor in the Royal 
Society’s main committee room, Oliphant joined the first meeting of the fission bomb 
committee. A former French bank manager and Deuxième agent—the French secret 
service—Lieutenant Jacques Allier, addressed the scientists. 
‘The Germans,’ Allier said, ‘are believed to be trying to obtain information about work 
being done in France on the U bomb. They are also trying to obtain [the Norsk Hydro] 
heavy water.’429F8
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French intelligence, one step ahead of the Germans, had bought the entire stock of the
Norwegian heavy water—185.5 kg—now hidden in the basement of the Collège de 
France in Paris.
‘[This information] should be kept strictly secret and not mentioned outside the meeting,’ 
Thomson warned the scientists. ‘Dr Frisch [and Dr Peierls] should be informed that 
[their] proposal [is] being considered ... There [is] … no objection to [Frisch’s] 
continuing scientific work on his own lines … [He] should be informed of the 
importance of avoiding any possible leakage of news in view of the interest shown by the 
Germans.’430F9
1940, Collège de France, Paris, June
The ‘phony’ war was over; the Germans invaded France, Holland, Belgium and 
Luxemburg. The first bombs dropped on Paris at the beginning of the working week on a 
Monday. After nineteen days of bombing, France surrendered. As his tanks rolled into 
the French capital, Adolf Hitler gave the city ‘a hurried tourist’s visit, breezing through 
the Opéra, the Champs-Élysées, Sacré-Coeur, Sante Chapelle, and the Place des Vosges 
… lingering a bit at the tomb of Napoleon … and posing for a photograph in front of the 
Eiffel Tower’.431F10
‘Take this one, Hoffmann,’ the Führer told his official photographer, ‘then the next one 
in Buckingham Palace and the next in front of the skyscrapers.’432F11
Just before the Germans arrived, a ragged convoy left the Collège de France heading for 
the Auvergne arriving at a villa in the town of Clermont-Ferrand loaded with an 
assortment of laboratory equipment: amplifiers, Geiger counters, lead bricks, a gram of 
radium, and by far the most precious of the cargo, the Norsk-Hydro heavy water.433F12 At 
dawn ten days later two cars left the villa. In the back of the second car Lew Kowarski 
lay prone over a blanket covering the jerry cans of heavy water in a vain attempt to 
protect the containers from being jostled and bumped as the car inched its way through 
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the tide of refugees all heading towards the coast. In Bordeaux a government official 
‘tore a sheet out of a schoolboy’s copybook’ and scribbled an order for Kowarski, 
Halban and their heavy water cargo to be ferried to England on the British coal collier, 
the Broompark, commandeered by the twentieth Earl of Suffolk.434F13 On board, Lord 
Suffolk, tattooed and ‘looking like an unkempt pirate … dressed in rags, with a very 
picturesque beard,’ limped around the ship ‘with two secretaries, one blonde and one 
brunette,’ treating his passengers with champagne ‘which he proclaimed to be the best 
remedy against seasickness’.435F14 Kowarski, having read P G Wodehouse, accepted 
Suffolk’s behaviour as nothing out of the ordinary for the British aristocracy. 
When the Broompark arrived at Falmouth Harbour in Cornwall two days before Hitler 
invaded Paris, there was, according to Kowarski, ‘a typical British muddle’.436F15 Suffolk, 
brandishing a revolver, engaged in ‘a heated exchange’ with some hapless British civil 
servants who were unsure if the new arrivals were ‘a valuable addition to the wartime 
effort … refugees to care for, or potential spies’.437F16 In the spotless breakfast room of the 
great Western Hotel at Paddington Station, Kowarski and his family, their clothes 
covered in coal dust from their journey over the Channel, sat down to a ‘sumptuous 
breakfast’ laid on by the British Government. Kowarski, due to his ‘knowledge of 
relevant English authors,’ felt that ‘it was very good for the English to know that [he and 
his family] were relatives of a highly respected dentist living in a very respectable 
London suburb.’438F17 He asked the civil servants if it would be possible to relocate to his 
wife’s relatives. After some deliberation, Kowarski concluded that ‘[t]here was nobody 
to decide whether we were to be kept under surveillance or [if we were] free to leave, and 
since there was nobody to decide, we just left.’439F18 Halban decamped to the May Fair 
Hotel. The government, not sure what to do with the heavy water, sent it under guard to 
Wormwood Scrubs Prison. It was then decided to move the containers to Windsor Castle 
to be kept under the watchful eye of the librarian.440F19
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Along with the only known supply of the world’s heavy water, Halban and Kowarski 
brought with them the results of the French experimental program including patent 
applications on behalf of the French government in exile for ‘a generating apparatus for 
Uranium energy’.441F20 The French scientists did the rounds talking to George Thomson, 
Cockcroft at the Ministry of Supply and then on to Birmingham to see Oliphant, Frisch 
and Peierls.442F21 Travelling around England by car with all road signs now removed, 
Kowarski memorised the names of the pubs along the way believing that ‘finding 
ourselves on a main square featuring the White Hart and the Coach and Horses, we 
would know which town it was’. Kowarski needn’t have taken the trouble ‘as the British 
… when they saw a gentleman in a car asking [the] way, even if it was in an atrocious 
German accent … were very affable and told him all the details of where to go, although 
they were not supposed to’.443F22
…
Meanwhile, in a café on the Boulevard St Michel, Fred Joliot met with his former 
student, Wolfgang Gentner. The German Army wanted Gentner to remove the French 
cyclotron to a lab at the University of Heidelberg to begin work on ‘this uranium 
affair’.444F23 Gentner had other plans. 
‘[I’ll] try to come back to Paris. I will do my best, you [must] also [try] to convince the 
people it is best to leave the cyclotron here in Paris and do the measurements in Paris, 
about cross-sections and things like this,’ Gentner told his former professor.445F24
Over the following eighteen months, whenever the cyclotron was up and running, 
Gentner and Joliot acted out a prearranged script.
‘The vacuum is not so very good,’ Gentner would say to Joliot, ‘something happened.’446F25
‘Shut down!’447F26
At Joliot’s order, the main technician would cut the power. The effect was immediate: 
the cyclotron would catch on fire, the copper windings would melt and water would drain 
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from the cooling tubes causing ‘a tremendous mess’.448F27 It would take the lab months to 
get it running again.
Eventually Joliot’s protector was ordered back to Germany. 
‘[You are],’ the German authorities informed him, ‘in too good relations with the 
French.’449F28
…
On the day the news filtered through that France had surrendered to the Germans, Mark 
rang Rosie from the laboratory.
‘You’ll have to take the children to Australia.’ 
‘I won’t go!’450F29
Rosie’s protests were futile, Mark was insistent. On Tuesday July 2, the Oliphant’s drove 
to Southampton Docks. Rosie, carrying 2-year-old Vivian and holding 4-year-old 
Michael by the hand, small, square gas mask cases slung over their tiny shoulders, 
reluctantly walked up the gangway of the blacked-out ship wondering ‘whether she 
would ever see [Mark] again’.451F30. The following morning the ocean liner left in a convoy 
that included a battle cruiser and six destroyers and began its long zigzag to Australia. 
Genia Peierls, having escaped from Germany and realising what would be in store for her 
Jewish family should the Nazis invade Britain, decided to evacuate her children to 
sympathetic colleagues in Canada. Preparing her children Gaby and Ronnie for the long 
journey, Genia attached luggage labels with the children’s details to every item of 
clothing and spent the time before their departure ‘stuffing [them] with wisdom and 
knowledge,’ such as the dangers of constipation.452F31 When the departure day finally 
arrived, Genia recognised the ‘pitfalls’ of her approach when Gaby told her mother, ‘If I 
or Ronnie have not been to the lavatory I must go and tell a sailor’.453F32
…
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Otto Frisch had received a strange telegram from his aunt. Lise Meitner, visiting Niels 
and Margarethe Bohr, had made it back to Sweden in the nick of time before the 
Germans invaded Denmark.  
MET NIELS AND MARGARETHE RECENTLY STOP BOTH WELL BUT 
UNHAPPY ABOUT EVENTS STOP PLEASE INFORM COCKCROFT AND MAUD 
RAY KENT STOP.454F33
Cockcroft was convinced the telegram contained a cryptic message.
‘You will see that the last three words are an anagram for uranium taken. This agrees 
with other information that the Germans are getting hold of all the radium they can,’ he 
said.455F34
Frisch pored over the cable trying to nut out exactly what his Aunt meant by it.
‘U and D may react,’ Frisch suggested, ‘one could get a chain reaction by using uranium 
in combination with heavy water, a compound of oxygen and … deuterium.’456F35 Oliphant 
had a simpler solution. 
‘The cryptic message … seems almost certainly to refer to the uranium problem but the 
number of solutions is unfortunately large. Isn’t it possible for someone to persuade the 
Embassy in Stockholm to obtain a more definite statement from Miss Meitner? If there 
are some real theoretical reasons why … or how uranium should be used, I think we 
should … obtain them.’457F36
The scientists, in honour of the mysterious telegram decided to adopt the codename 
MAUD for their fission bomb committee.458F37 The newly-named MAUD committee 
elected to meet once a month at the Royal Society. Progress was slow. With most 
laboratories already working on defence projects, little time or resources could be spared 
to direct to the fission bomb. Oliphant pushed to convince his colleagues that fission 
bomb development was a worthwhile enterprise. 
‘I … hope that you’ll be able to undertake the general supervision of any work on the 
uranium bomb,’ he told Chadwick, ‘and in particular that you’ll agree [that] … you’ll 
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visit America … If things go really badly with this country there is a great deal to be said 
for investigating any possibility which offers a chance of hitting back from the New 
World.’459F38
‘I’ve heard nothing about your suggestion concerning America,’ Chadwick replied. ‘I 
think we might get a certain amount of help in Canada.’460F39
‘In … California,’ Oliphant said, ‘there’s a huge research organisation … belonging to 
… Shell … This place is staffed almost entirely by English and Dutch … [It’s] just the 
order of magnitude … required … [for] separation of … uranium … the Berkeley people 
would be willing, I am sure, to collaborate on the nuclear side.’ Oliphant had another 
problem on his mind. The government was set on interning foreigners. Oliphant was 
intent on keeping his Birmingham team out of detention. ‘[By the way],’ he told 
Chadwick, ‘the most useful person to you on fission problems would [be] Frisch, but 
there are difficulties on account of the fact that Liverpool’s now a protected area … He is 
a very good fellow.’461F40
‘[Well, if] there[‘s] no longer … room for Frisch in your laboratory … I will try and get 
permission for him to come here.’462F41
In the Birmingham luminescence lab, Wilkins was thinking about the Nazis; they might 
easily, he thought, find a way to make an atomic bomb. After all, there were many 
distinguished physicists in Germany. ‘If I work on war research, it must be something 
big,’ he thought to himself, ‘something which … could defeat the Nazis and bring the 
war to an end.’463F42 He knew Frisch and Peierls were working on an atomic bomb—it was 
the worst kept secret at the university. 
‘[I’d like to] join the team,’ Wilkins said to Oliphant.464F43
’I can give you a job trying to find a method to evaporate uranium metal to separate out 
the U235 if you’d like,’ Oliphant suggested. 
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In the lecture theatre above the luminescence lab, Wilkins assembled long vertical tubes 
in full view of the students. When occasionally the students were excited and stamped 
their feet, Wilkins and Boot raced to readjust and recalibrate the instruments.465F44
…
The first bombs arrived over London in the late afternoon of a warm September Sunday 
and fell steadily every clear night. ‘England gets set for invasion,’ Life magazine told its 
American readers.466F45 In Britain, to help with the national effort Tatler magazine advised 
its readers on ‘visits to the Air Raid Shelter’:
‘It is quite simple … A bag must be kept packed and should contain … a first-aid outfit, 
rubber gloves, air or other cushion, torch, candles or night-light, rubber shock absorbers 
for the mouth and wax ones for the ears … At Marshall and Snellgrove’s there is an 
infinite variety of siren suits from 42s. Some are cut on lines suitable for the older 
woman who is not as slender as she would like to be, while others are destined for the 
youthful figure … the anti-concussion bandeau is also of paramount importance.467F46
‘I'm standing again tonight on a rooftop looking out over London, feeling rather large 
and lonesome,’ Ed Murrow reported to the folks back home in America, ‘on the roof 
across the way I can see a man wearing a tin hat, a pair of powerful night glasses to his 
eyes, scanning the sky … As I look out across the miles and miles of … chimney pots … 
There are hundreds and hundreds of men … standing on rooftops in London tonight 
watching for fire bombs, waiting to see what comes out of this steel-blue sky.’468F47
The Luftwaffe had begun blitzing Birmingham a month earlier and would continue 
bombing the Midlands’ city until April 1943. Amid the bombs and shrapnel ‘fires blazed 
all over the area … By daylight one saw how many houses were still standing, but the 
effect was nevertheless eerie: the absence of … traffic caused a depressing silence amid 
the debris, and one could hear only footsteps crunching on the ubiquitous glass’.469F48
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The university organised an emergency committee to respond to the crisis. The 
committee in its wisdom decreed that female and male students would be separated 
during a raid as ‘they had heard of cases of young men losing self-control in a crisis’.470F49
A basement corridor running the length of the university buildings would be designated
an air-raid shelter. The plan was dropped when the university engineer pointed out the 
danger of locating an air raid shelter in a corridor housing the piping for the university’s 
high-pressure steam heating system.471F50 University staff and students were issued with a 
civil defence handbook. 
‘[G]ases are of three kinds—solids, liquids and vapours,’ the book began.472F51 The local 
police conducted a lecture on air raid precautions. Following the lecture, questions were 
taken from the floor. 
‘What could one do against a direct hit? Was there no way of protecting oneself?’ 
‘I suppose you cannot promise these gentlemen absolute immortality?’ a staff member 
asked.473F52
The physics department prepared a civil defence roster. Each night two students and a 
member of staff, armed with a tin hat, a sand bucket, a stirrup pump and a dimmed torch, 
scrambled over the physics block roof to stop fires getting out of control. A cache of 
tinned food was allocated as a snack for those on duty. Student firewatchers, hungry 
from rationed meals, ‘made the most of it [with] one group … [helping] themselves [to] a 
seven course dinner … the food intended to last a month was gone in five days’.474F53 Gas 
and electricity supplies were constantly disrupted. Despite the several layers of steel and 
asbestos installed to render the roof impenetrable, shrapnel fragments damaged the 
waterproofing to the lab roof resulting in a constant battle repairing leaks.475F54 During one 
of the German raids a 500 lb unexploded bomb landed in the library lodging itself 
between a bookcase and a wall. On fire watch in the lab as the alert sounded, Oliphant 
struggled out of a camp bed in his office still half asleep and groped his way along a 
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pitch black corridor. There was an almighty crash. When he came to Oliphant found 
himself lying among the splinters of wood and glass. 
‘This is it,’ he thought to himself. Finally it dawned on him that the whine of bombs had 
stopped. Gingerly, he sat up and surveyed the damage.  Blood seemed to be running 
down his face from copious lacerations. He carefully surveyed the rest of his body. 
Oliphant then realised in his haste he had stumbled through a plate glass door.476F55
‘So far, except for a few incendiary bombs on the roofs, and one which set fire to our 
ceiling, we have escaped serious damage,’ Oliphant wrote to Lawrence in January. 
‘[However] it is very exasperating … to have work … held up for lack of materials 
which have been destroyed by Nazi bombing.’477F56
Amid the chaos, Oliphant traipsed up and down the country calling on anyone he could 
think of to cajole equipment and resources. Asleep at a hotel in Portsmouth during a raid, 
a German bomb fell into the street below blowing the glass from the shattered window 
into the bedroom. Oliphant reluctantly headed down to the steel bomb shelter. Eventually 
it dawned on him, by a ‘feeling of liquid,’ that his shoes were filled with glass 
splinters.478F57
Standing on a windswept bridge on a freezing night over the Stourbridge Canal lock, 
Oliphant and Cockcroft watched trials of radar-directed searchlights drinking ‘horribly 
sweet cocoa from enamel mugs’.479F58 The trial was abandoned when the air raid alert 
sounded. The scientists headed back to Barnt Green. In thick fog on blacked out roads 
with no signs to guide them, they soon lost their way. After driving in circles for what 
seemed like hours, Oliphant stopped to ask directions from ‘very suspicious’ air raid 
wardens. They arrived at Oliphant’s home well after the sun had risen.480F59
In the university library, Rudi Peierls and his assistant Klaus Fuchs were busy combing 
through piles of scientific journals making a list of all the German scientists who could 
possibly be involved in fission bomb research before sending the completed list to the 
War Cabinet. 
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‘If enquiry shows that some of these men are now working in collaboration in one or two 
places,’ Chadwick advised, ‘we can, I think, infer that the enemy is seriously pursuing 
the MAUD project.’481F60
In London a year later, from his office at the Minimax Fire Extinguisher Company 
Building, ‘C’—head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6—dictated a memo to 
the War Cabinet on MI6’s efforts to track down the German scientists. 
‘Curiously enough, the first named on the list was Professor W Heisenberg of Leipzig. I 
have had a reply through Switzerland that this man was, during the summer of 1939, 
working in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge … I am asking MI5 if they can 
confirm … if the man ever left England.’482F61
1940, New Haven, Connecticut, June
On the northern shore of Long Island Sound in front of family and friends and his Rad 
Lab colleagues, Ed McMillan married Mollie Lawrence’s sister, Elsie Blumer, turning 
his boss into his brother-in-law. Despite this happy occasion, he was steaming when he 
returned to the lab a month later. The credit given to Frisch and Meitner for confirming 
the discovery of uranium fission as was reported in all the newspapers was overblown in 
McMillan’s opinion.
‘It seems to me that … too much emphasis is placed on the contribution of a few 
scientists when … this development … has been the work of a great many people,’ he 
wrote to the New York Times, ‘As a matter of fact, the observation that the isotope 
uranium 235 is the one responsible for the fission … had been predicted theoretically … 
and several physicists had been trying to confirm this prediction. It turned out that the 
particular people whose work is described in your article were the lucky ones to succeed 
in this first … There is a long way to go before the discoveries regarding uranium will be 
of practical value, there [is] … in … your article a little bit of the air of counting one’s 
chickens before they are hatched.’483F62
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Lawrence, meanwhile, was worrying about a far more practical problem. Despite the 
Rockefeller grant, construction for the new cyclotron had barely started. So far his 
requests to obtain a Priority Rating for the lab had come to nothing
‘As interested as I am in what you are doing,’ Van Bush told Lawrence, ‘the cyclotron 
project is not a direct undertaking of the OSRD, it does not seem appropriate that I
initiate proceedings … [for] a preference rating.’484F63
A memo from the university purchasing department outlined the situation bluntly. 
‘[W]e have been bending every effort to secure priority ratings for the laboratories who 
do research work not directly connected with the defence program … More and more 
items are coming under priorities so that we are now reaching a point where it is almost 
impossible to make a purchase of metals, certain chemicals and certain types of 
equipment without the much-needed priority rating.’485F64
Without a priority rating Lawrence knew that the project would come to a complete halt. 
To make matters worse, a push was on by some of the Lab scientists to open a Berkeley 
branch of the American Association of Scientific Workers (AASW). The last thing he 
needed was some complication like unionising. Lawrence ‘collared’ Frank Oppenheimer. 
‘Why do you fool around with “causes,”’ Lawrence asked him, ‘[You] are a cut above 
people who just want to eat and sleep and make love.’486F65
Next Lawrence heard that Robert Oppenheimer had hosted a party at his house on Eagle 
Hill to discuss just such a proposition. Lawrence was determined to rid the project of ‘the 
sort of leftist escapades that had so worried them all in the Berkeley administration 
before the war’.487F66 Fed up, Lawrence had it out with Oppenheimer. 
‘I don’t think it’s a good idea,’ Lawrence told him. ‘We’re planning big things with the 
war effort, and it wouldn’t be right. I want no occasion for somebody in Washington to 
find fault with us.’488F67
‘To hell with Berkeley.’489F68
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Lawrence left Berkeley and headed to New York to cool his temper at the Yale Club. 
Eventually Oppenheimer penned an apology. 
‘[It’s] not so hard to understand if you remember how much more of an underdogger I 
have always been than you. This part of me is unlikely to change,’ he told Lawrence, 
‘[However] I … assure you that there will be no further difficulties … I doubt very much 
whether anyone will want to start … an organization which could in any way embarrass, 
divide or interfere with the work we have in hand … all those to whom I have spoken 
agree … so you can forget it. Have a good trip and come back soon.’490F69
Lawrence was still fuming. All of the staff who had attended the meeting at 
Oppenheimer’s house were now suspect. When he returned to the lab, the director’s 
message rang loud and clear and was not misunderstood by Martin Kamen—joining such 
an organization constituted in the eyes of the Rad Lab director ‘a gesture of personal 
disloyalty’.491F70
‘[I] urge you to get out,’ Lawrence shouted. 
‘[I have] never been in,’ Kamen yelled back.492F71
1940, George Holt Laboratory, Liverpool University, July
Having worked ‘for about 20 hours a day,’ Chadwick had managed to collate the MAUD 
minutes into two final reports. 
‘We have now reached the conclusion,’ the first report began, ‘that it will be possible to 
make an effective uranium bomb … [with] destructive effect to 1,800 tons of TNT, and 
would also release radioactive substances which would make places near to where the 
bomb exploded dangerous to human life for a long period … A plant to produce … 3 
bombs per month … is estimated to cost approximately £5,000,000 … The committee 
considers that the scheme for a uranium bomb is practicable and likely to lead to decisive 
results in the war.’493F72
Chadwick planned to get away to a cottage in Wales for a few days. 
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‘I shall be glad to put off the harness … I am feeling very down. I hope to get in a little 
gentle fishing,’ he told Frisch.494F73
Frisch, meanwhile, was worried about what they had got themselves into. ‘I am a bit 
worried about the amount of work ahead,’ he replied.495F74
1940, War Room, Great George Street, London, August
Deep underground in a labyrinth of offices, meeting rooms, sleeping quarters and a 
canteen, an army of politicians and civil servants went about their business. In the British 
Government’s secret headquarters, the War Cabinet perused the final two MAUD 
reports, the ‘Use of Uranium for a Bomb’ and ‘Use of Uranium as a Source of Power’. 
‘We should like to emphasize,’ the MAUD committee stated, ‘that we entered the project 
with more scepticism than belief … we became more and more convinced that release of 
atomic energy on a large scale is possible … the Germans might well be working on a 
weapon … the lines on which we are now working … would be likely to suggest 
themselves to any capable physicist … [in addition] the fission of uranium might be 
exploited to provide a machine, a boiler, which would release energy … Halban and 
Kowarski’s experiments with heavy water … [conclude] that a nuclear energy machine 
[may] be possible.’496F75
The civil servants deliberated over the astonishing conclusions. The Lord President of 
Council Sir John Anderson, whose hangdog expression resembled a bloodhound’s, said 
what all around the table were thinking. 
‘[I am] quite certain that the production of the first bomb would not, under the most 
favourable conditions, be achieved until long after the dates indicated in the reports.’497F76
‘[I can’t believe that] the physics [is] settled,’ Tizard said.498F77
‘A great deal of work has been done here and in America and probably in Germany on 
this and it looks as if bombs might be produced,’ Lindemann addressed the Prime 
Minister, ‘People … working on these problems consider the odds are 10 to 1 on success 
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within two years. I would not bet more than 2 to 1 against or even money. But … we 
must go forward. It would be unforgivable if we let the Germans develop a process ahead 
of us.’499F78
‘Very close association with the Americans over about 30 years,’ Lord Hankey 
concluded, ‘leads me to doubt whether they will ever join us actively in policing the 
world … this scheme were a joint project carried out in America … might place us in a 
very embarrassing position.’500F79
‘I am strongly of the opinion that we should erect the plant in England or at worst in 
Canada,’ Lindemann said, ‘whoever possess such a plant should be able to dictate terms 
to the rest of the world. However much I may trust my neighbor … I am very much 
averse to putting myself completely at his mercy. I would, therefore, not press the 
Americans to undertake this work … and get into production over here without raising 
the question of whether they should do it or not.’ 501F80
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Chapter 8: The Wager
1941
Prestwick, Scotland, August
Mark Oliphant boarded a B-24 Liberator bomber, known affectionately as a ‘Flying 
Boxcar’— also known not so affectionately by air crews as a ‘Flying Coffin’—for a 16 
hour flight to Gander in Newfoundland.502F1 Previously that month two Liberators flying to 
Gander had both crashed within minutes of take-off. Oliphant’s flight, lost in thick cloud, 
blindly approached the North American coast. With the fuel gauge reading empty, the 
pilot managed to make an emergency landing narrowly avoiding ditching the plane in the 
Saint Lawrence River.
In Washington, DC, at the corner of Connecticut Avenue and Van Ness Street, with 
guards patrolling the newly-fenced grounds in the sweltering high summer heat, Oliphant 
called on Dr Lyman J Briggs, director of the National Bureau of Standards and chair of 
the Uranium Committee, hoping to discover the reason for American silence on the 
MAUD report. 
‘I want to know what’s been decided about the fission project. We’ve been waiting for a 
response.’
Tall, gangling and slow-speaking, the 66 year old, pipe-smoking Briggs kept his cards
close to his chest during the meeting with Oliphant.
‘I can’t discuss it with you “out of channels”.’
Briggs denied having seen any of the MAUD reports, despite knowing they were locked 
in his safe. So far he had shown them to no one, least of all the committee. Briggs had 
decided that the British plan was too big a project with no guarantee of success: the odds 
were against it in this war or in any other as far as he could see. The conclusion of the 
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Uranium Committee less than two months earlier had been that the pursuit of any 
practical application of fission research was pie-in-the-sky.
‘The subject is highly abstruse … the possibility of a successful outcome [is] very 
remote,’ the Committee then declared, ‘with the responsibility of expending public 
money on what might eventually appear to be a wild search … [we] do not feel justified 
… diverting to the work the efforts of scientists in considerable numbers, in view of the 
scarcity of highly qualified physicists for its other important work.’503F2
‘I’m sure you understand, Dr Oliphant, if and when the US authorities wish to consult 
you British about scientific projects they will do so through official channels. If that’s all, 
I’ll have my secretary see you out.’ 
Mark Oliphant left Briggs’ office ‘amazed and distressed’.504F3 He decided to try Briggs’ 
superiors, Vannevar Bush and John Bryant Conant. Oliphant met Conant for dinner. 
Oliphant told the Harvard president that he thought it was crazy that having sent such 
important information to America in the MAUD reports, none of its contents had been 
passed on to the people who could make use of it. Conant listened but was non-
committal. Oliphant’s urgings, Conant thought, constituted ‘gossip among nuclear 
physicists on forbidden subjects’.505F4 Oliphant’s meeting with Vannevar Bush was 
perfunctory. Bush ‘leaned back in his chair, his feet on the desk … puffs of smoke from 
his eternal pipe’ sending signals to the ceiling gave Oliphant a desultory 20 minutes 
before cutting him off in his Yankee twang and ushering Oliphant out of his office.506F5
Despite Oliphant’s Australian accent, to Bush he represented Britain. He was therefore ‘a 
Limey’ and Bush ‘[didn’t] like those guys’.507F6 Neither American scientist seemed very 
impressed with what he’d told them, and, to Oliphant’s rising incredulity, neither 
admitted knowledge of the MAUD Reports. 
‘Oliphant’s behaviour,’ Conant complained later to Bush, ‘does not help the cause of 
secrecy!’508F7
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Oliphant zigzagged across the country visiting laboratories—General Electric, RCA and 
the Bell Telephone Laboratories in New York; the Naval Research Lab, the Office of 
Research and Development, the Smithsonian and the Microwave Committee in 
Washington; the Signal Corps Lab and the Sperry Gyroscope Company in New Jersey 
and the Radio Laboratory in Dayton, Ohio—meeting with scientists, radio engineers, 
army and government officials discussing radar and other developments.509F8At each 
meeting he tried to fire people up about the fast-fission bomb project. In Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Oliphant caught up with Denis Robinson who had been seconded to MIT 
as British scientific liaison to work on producing Birmingham’s cavity magnetron in 
America.
‘I’m going to Schenectady to see the people at General Electric,’ Oliphant told him. 
‘Come with me.’
‘The Four Greats—Langmuir, Dorschman, Coolidge and Hull!’ Robinson was over the 
moon. ‘It’s like going to Valhalla and meeting everybody except Zeus!’ 
After a tour of the labs, the ‘Four Greats’ took Oliphant and Robinson to lunch. Oliphant 
pushed them on the fission bomb project.
‘Look, you’ve got to get ready. I mean, this thing is going to hit you too.’
Their response was not encouraging.
‘You know, we find that from the inception of an idea, even a good one that works, to 
putting it in the hands of the public is ten years for General Electric. That’s for a 
refrigerator improvement or something like that. So you see, there’s nothing that we can 
do for this war.’
Robinson looked over to Oliphant. Oliphant looked ‘fit to chew his nails,’ Robinson 
thought.510F9 Next Oliphant and Robinson took the subway to 116th and Broadway and 
called in to see Fermi at Columbia University. The Italian physicist was also skeptical 
about whether a fast neutron bomb would work. 
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‘The observed spontaneous fission,’ Fermi told Oliphant ‘was just as likely to be U238 as 
U235.’511F10
In Washington, at a dinner party given by Charles Darwin, director of the Central 
Scientific Office of the British Supply Council, Oliphant met the Australian Ambassador, 
Richard Casey.
‘[The] uranium bomb [and the] uranium boiler … [will be of] the greatest possible 
importance to Australia,’ Oliphant told Casey, ‘I am confident … that Australian 
uranium will prove as valuable to the country as oil wells have been to America.’512F11
Casey relayed Oliphant’s startling information back to Australia.
‘[Oliphant] seems to be a man of some note. Darwin speaks of him with great respect.’513F12
Meanwhile, at General Electric, Dr William D Coolidge, one of the ‘Four Greats’ 
described by Popular Science Monthly as the ‘Aladdin of science’ for his invention of 
the ‘magic lamp’ otherwise known as the Coolidge X-ray tube, was having second 
thoughts about his dismissal of Oliphant’s proposal about a fission bomb. He decided to 
dictate a short note to the president of the Bell Telephone Laboratories.514F13
‘With reference to the uranium problem and the possibility of a useful national defense 
application, I was greatly interested in what Dr Oliphant told me,’ Coolidge told Frank 
Jewett, ‘You may well have heard his story on the diffusion method of separating the 
isotopes and his prediction that only 10 kilograms of the pure 235 would be needed for 
the chain reaction … He said that it [has] been estimated that the 10 kg bomb of pure 235 
would be equivalent in explosive effect to 1000 tons of ordinary high power explosive 
and could be used to destroy everything in an area over a mile in diameter. This 
information, so far as I know, [is] not available in this country … I think Oliphant’s story 
should be given serious consideration.’515F14
Oliphant, meanwhile, disappointed that no one was interested in fission research, let 
alone reading the MAUD Report, was not willing to give up. He decided to send a note 
to Lawrence saying he needed to see him urgently. 
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‘I’ll even fly from Washington to meet … in Berkeley,’ Oliphant suggested.516F15
‘I was pleased beyond words to get your note,’ Lawrence replied. ‘It must have been 
quite a trip over in the Consolidated B-24. I am looking forward to seeing you and 
talking about all sorts of things!’517F16
Oliphant caught an 18 hour sleeper flight to California. Above the Berkeley campus on a 
spur overlooking the blue waters of San Francisco Bay with a spectacular view of the 
Golden Gate Bridge and amid the scent of eucalyptus trees, Lawrence and Cooksey 
presented the new 184-inch cyclotron work-in-progress. Berkeley’s fantastic new 
machine would have an energy potential of 100 million volts and contained enough steel 
and copper to build two large destroyers. Lawrence then told Oliphant about the 
difficulties he was having getting enough materials to finish the accelerator without a 
priority rating for the lab for research work directly connected to the defence program.51 8F17
As soon as he was able to get Lawrence on his own and away from any eavesdroppers, 
Oliphant recounted his frustrating meetings with Briggs, Bush, Conant and Fermi. 
Although Lawrence was a member of the Uranium Committee, he had never seen a copy 
of the MAUD report. Lawrence was baffled by the inertia of Briggs. 
‘The problem’s not being pushed but I burnt my fingers in the attempt to right matters, so 
I’ve decided to go on with my own urgent work … and let others worry about the 
uranium.’519F18
Cut off from the S-1 committee, physicists from labs across the US, including 
Lawrence’s Berkeley group, Fermi’s at Columbia, and the scientists at MIT, were 
holding their own open discussions on the problem of fission.
‘[I am] prepared to use all [my] influence to get a real hearing for the problem … [we 
should get] the theoretical work done in England … checked by Fermi and Oppenheimer, 
and the experimental findings discussed, and if necessary mutually checked.’
The following day with Lawrence in tow, Oliphant headed back across the country. In 
New York, the two scientists met with Harold Urey and George Pegram.
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‘[You must] emphasize … the necessity for really prompt and complete exchange of 
information in both directions,’ Pegram told Oliphant, ‘[You must] especially … urge 
that Chadwick and Simon come across at once to make a decision about which of the 
schemes for isotope separation should be proceeded with. [We] need all the information 
[you] possess … and [we] would like to hear this as soon as possible.’520F19
Oliphant’s news came as a revelation to the American physicists. 
‘Oliphant,’ Merle Tuve said, ‘[is] rais[ing] a stink.’521F20
Samuel K Allison, contracted to the NDRC’s cryptically named Section X Miscellaneous 
Investigations, was puzzled. 
‘I thought we were making a power source for submarines!’ Allison was sceptical, ‘An 
energy machine would be working in America within six months, this [will] produce 
[plutonium] more quickly and cheaply than any isotope separation scheme could produce 
235.’522F21
‘[You] must concentrate every effort on the bomb,’ Oliphant told the Americans, ‘[you] 
have no right to work on power plants or anything but the bomb. The bomb [will] cost 
$50 million … Britain [doesn’t] have the money or the manpower, so it[‘s] up to you.’523F22
Tuve was unconvinced.
‘I don’t believe it,’ Tuve told him, ‘I want to do something that relates to this war, not 
something that’s way off in the future. I don’t think the Germans can spend that much 
energy and effort on this kind of a chancy thing; I don’t believe they will. Anyway I’m 
interested in atomic power, but not in explosives … this business of wanting to spend a 
billion dollars—there isn’t room for that in this war.’524F23
In late September, Oliphant squeezed his way past the bomber’s supports and made his 
way to the aft bulkhead. He strapped on his lap belt. The noise of the engines and the 
moaning of the wind made conversation with the only other passenger impossible. 
Instead Oliphant distracted himself by recording the details of the trip in his notebook. 
All up, he had flown 17,250 miles back and forth across North America; the equivalent 
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of traversing the country seven times.525F24 Despite his efforts, Oliphant felt despondent 
worrying whether he had made any impact at all. Stopping at Gander in Newfoundland to 
refuel before flying on to Prestwick, the other passenger, an American, turned to 
Oliphant. 
'Well let's go and have a drink at the bar before we leave.’ 
A pilot wearing an Imperial Airways uniform stood at the bar. The pilot, drunk, swayed 
backwards and forwards on his feet. Finishing their drinks Oliphant and his fellow 
passenger said goodbye to their drinking companion. Arriving at Prestwick, Oliphant 
made his way to the café for breakfast. Sitting at a table was the Imperial Airways pilot 
Oliphant had last seen dead drunk at the bar in Gander. The pilot offered Oliphant a 
chair.
'You know, I can't understand it,’ Oliphant asked, ‘there you were dead drunk in Gander 
and here you are.' 
‘I'm ferrying Mosquitoes across the Atlantic. I can't do it unless I’m drunk.’ 
1941, Sonoma County, California, October
Two weeks after Oliphant returned to Britain, Lawrence, with an eye to acquiring 
funding to ramp up the isotope separation program and to secure a much needed priority 
rating, hosted a campout party at the Bohemian Grove Clubhouse. The guest list for 
Lawrence’s exclusive gathering included five regents of the University of California, 
Navy bigwigs and a major San Francisco shipbuilder. On the same day Lawrence 
entertained his guests alongside the banks of the Russian River, Van Bush met with 
Roosevelt in Washington to update the President on the status of the British atomic bomb 
program. In the Oval Office at the Whitehouse, President Franklin D Roosevelt dictated a 
letter to Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
‘My dear Winston,
157
It appears desirable that we should soon correspond or converse concerning the subject 
which is under study by your MAUD Committee.’526F25
On October 21 the Uranium Review Committee met at Schenectady, New York. Despite 
protests from Conant, Lawrence had brought Robert Oppenheimer with him from 
Berkeley. 
‘I have a great deal of confidence in Oppie,’ Lawrence said, ‘and I’m anxious to have the 
benefit of his judgment in our deliberation.’527F26
Lawrence passed around Oliphant’s MAUD report summary. Oppenheimer was skeptical 
about the British estimates speculating that he thought U235’s critical mass was more 
likely to be 200 times Frisch and Peierls’ estimated one pound.528F27 Lawrence was 
determined that all obstacles could be overcome. 
‘It seems to me,’ Lawrence said, ‘that … everything must be done to expedite the 
uranium program. The stakes … are fantastically high … I should certainly not want to 
be the one who impeded … an all-out effort to get the answers … as quickly as possible 
… there is a tendency to emphasize the uncertainties, and … the possibility that uranium 
will not be a factor in this war … It may not be a calamity if, when we get the answers … 
they turn out negative from the military point of view, but if the answers are fantastically 
positive and we fail to get them first, the results for our country may well be a tragic 
disaster.'529F28
1941, Labour Exchange, Birmingham, November
Winifred Moon sat patiently while ‘a charming young lady’ took down the particulars of 
Winifred’s life so far: how many years she had been married and how many years she 
had worked at the Bank before she married Philip.
‘I shall write that your professional rank is that of shorthand-typist.’
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‘I hope that I shall be allowed to do some work for the Physics Department of the 
University of Birmingham,’ Winifred said, ‘I understand that they are engaged in work 
for the Admiralty.’
The woman slid an envelope across the desk.
‘Is the Physics Department engaged in any of the work listed on the right-hand side of 
the enclosed pamphlet?’
Winifred gave the pamphlet a cursory look.
‘I don’t know what work they are doing as it is secret work. They are very probably 
doing work included on this list.’
Later, Winifred thought she ought to drop a line to Professor Oliphant about her 
interview. 
‘I am typing my letters in order to get in a little practice,’ she told him. ‘Would it 
simplify matters if I don’t receive any remuneration at all? I know my work won’t have 
much cash value.’
‘I feel that it would be only just and proper that you should be paid something, if only in 
order to make you definitely a member of our team,’ Oliphant replied, ‘It would [also] be 
quite proper to describe the work … as “Radio Development” … in any future comment 
if necessary.’530F29
At the Cavendish Lab in Cambridge, Kowarski was unhappy. Halban was ‘becoming a 
dictator’ and, Kowarski felt that his own position had ‘degenerated from being a 
collaborator to becoming a paid assistant’.531F30 Halban had let it slip to Kowarski that 
negotiations were underway for the MAUD committee to be replaced with a new 
committee, the ‘Directorate of Tube Alloys’. Wallace Akers, research director of ICI, 
would be its Chair. Halban would be a member of the new committee; Kowarski and 
Oliphant would not. Kowarski thought that he would discuss the situation with Oliphant. 
After all, the Australian, Kowarski mused, ‘had just visited America [and] … was held in 
high esteem by the Americans, because Oliphant was the first [scientist to carry out the] 
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nuclear physics experiment with separated isotopes a few years before … he was 
personally friendly with Ernest Lawrence, and he knew that the Americans wanted to 
cooperate’ on the bomb project.532F31 When Oliphant next visited Cambridge, Kowarski 
took him aside. 
‘[Akers] deputy would be another ICI man. So in fact,’ Kowarski told Oliphant, ‘the 
“Directorate of Tube Alloys” was to be a front for ICI.’ 
‘But the MAUD Report made very definite recommendations for establishing close 
cooperation with the Americans.’ 
‘Well, the industrial researchers and some of the scientific people … [are] already … of a 
different opinion.’
Oliphant confronted Halban. 
‘The direction of the work [under the MAUD Committee is] inefficient,’ Halban told 
Oliphant. ‘[N]o drive [is] applied to the problem … the Government and its institutions 
are so effete and inefficient that only an industrial firm can handle the problem 
properly.’533F32
Halban’s rumour turned out to be correct. In September Oliphant received a communique 
advising him officially that the MAUD Committee was officially dissolved and that he 
was not to be part of the new ICI-organised, ‘Tube Alloys’ committee.  
‘[I’m] disgusted by the way things [have] turned,’ Oliphant complained to Kowarski, ‘I 
bet they’ll now send a team of British scientists consisting of [Germans like] Simon, 
Peierls, Halban and [ICI] industrialists,’534F33
Oliphant wrote to Appleton.
‘I can see no reason whatever why the people put in charge of this work should be 
commercial representatives completely ignorant of the essential nuclear physics,’ 
Oliphant wrote, ‘[Neither] Akers, Mr Jackson and Mr Perrin … can really understand the 
basic principles of nuclear fission … [In] the United States … as you will know from my 
report, the whole thing is in the hands of non-nuclear physicists and is … being badly 
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mismanaged.’ Oliphant delivered an ultimatum. ‘If the existing decisions are 
implemented I feel that there is very little that I can do to help with MAUD in the future, 
and I must reluctantly resign … from any … responsibilities I may bear … This problem 
is too important to be trifled with.’535F34
Oliphant, still furious, got hold of Chadwick. 
‘I, personally … [fought] hard to get things going and to get Peierls and Frisch accepted 
… I [am now] left off the Policy Committee,’ Oliphant protested. ‘It’s a disgraceful thing 
… [It’s] obviously just to look after the commercial interests of ICI.’ 
‘While I am satisfied with the new arrangements,’ Chadwick said, ‘I am most dissatisfied 
with the way in which they have been carried out … This treatment I consider both 
autocratic and discourteous. I raised this matter [with Appleton] and I hope it will be put 
right very shortly.’536F35
‘I’m thinking of giving up my work with the Admiralty … to organise a completely rival 
show on MAUD,’ Oliphant told him, ‘two or three of the University Physics 
Departments … could go ahead and settle the whole question without reference to a lot 
of interfering busybodies who know nothing whatever about the problems involved … I 
could get a lot of support from other nuclear physics departments in the country and … 
we could do something worthwhile.’537F36
‘[Akers] acts as an official of the Department, not as a Director of ICI,’ Chadwick said. 
‘If the work comes to large scale development, then … It brings both projects under 
government control and it provides intimate collaboration with ICI which is essential.’
‘It’s particularly disturbing to find that it’s the energy machine which is to be pushed 
hard—‘
‘The bomb project is definitely given priority over the boiler.’
‘If [Akers] prioritises the post-war applications rather than push[ing] hard on the bomb, 
something’s seriously wrong … The Americans will … go right ahead with both
projects, and there is little doubt … that … they will achieve both before we’ve begun.’
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‘I do not share your view that “[the Americans] will achieve both projects before [us],’ 
Chadwick said. ‘We are some way ahead and we shall remain ahead.’538F37
‘[Y]ou, in common with many other people in this country, seriously underestimate the 
extent of the American effort … I’ll be surprised if they don’t beat us to the goal in both 
projects.’539F38
Oliphant, still fuming, commiserated with Kowarski.
‘We are now labelled dissidents, you and I,’ Kowarski said, ‘an Australian and a 
Russian-born Frenchman against the whole British Empire about what should be done 
about America.’540F39
In October Harold Urey and George Pegram arrived in England to learn more about the 
British atomic bomb project. Chadwick warned Oliphant to keep a lid on discussions 
with the Americans.
‘Urey and Pegram told me that their visit here [is] a direct result of my agitation in the 
States,’ Oliphant complained to John Cockcroft, ‘[Apparently I’m not to be trusted to 
talk to them alone. Instead we will be monitored by ICI’s] “Gestapo” representatives.’541F40
‘Mark is getting very notorious for outspoken and quite unjustified statements in 
everything and sundry,’ Cockcroft told his wife, ‘“Oliphantic” has been coined to 
describe his statements.’542F41
In January Akers, now head of the new Tube Alloys, committee requested all papers 
connected to the former MAUD committee be returned. Oliphant again vented his anger 
at Chadwick.
‘If it is felt that the return of papers will materially influence the secrecy position I am 
happy … but other things … with which I am associated … so far as I know have never 
under any circumstances leaked out.’
‘The request for the return of the MAUD papers was … decided upon a considerable 
time ago … so that it cannot be regarded as an attempt to muzzle the members of 
MAUD.’
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Oliphant, however, had had enough.
‘Akers informed me … that he was quite certain that nothing could happen in this matter 
before 1944. While this date disappoints me extremely … at the same time it makes me 
far more satisfied that I myself have nothing to do with [it] … We have lost Malaya 
through complacency ... As Akers estimates 1944, and as he is relying on firms such as 
Met-Vick … I know very well that the actual date will be some time in 1946 at the 
earliest! … [M]y period of usefulness seems to have ended. In the future I shall be 
neither critical nor useful.’543F42
1941, Honolulu, Hawaii, December 
A low drone disturbed the usually peaceful sound of rustling leaves as a gentle offshore 
breeze rippled through the palm trees. As the drone became louder its source was 
revealed: 183 Japanese planes were flying in formation towards the islands. Almost 5000 
miles away in Washington, D C, Grace Tully, relaxing at home reading the Sunday 
papers on her day off from her job in the presidential secretarial pool at the Whitehouse, 
was surprised to hear the phone ring. 
'The President wants you right away … The Japs just bombed Pearl Harbor!'
A short time later Tully joined the throng of ‘Secret Service men … news and radio 
reporters … State, War and Navy officials hurrying into the House’ to join the ‘Boss’ in 
his second floor study. Tully manned the phones relaying messages from Admiral Stark 
at the Navy Department to Roosevelt as they came in.  Unable to hear Stark’s messages 
through the noise, Tully moved into the President’s bedroom to take the calls.  Half an 
hour later a chilling message came in from the Governor of Hawaii. 
'My God, there's another wave of Jap planes over Hawaii right this minute.'  
Over 150 Japanese planes repeated the first attack by dropping shallow-water torpedoes 
made by Mitsubishi Munitions at their factory in Nagasaki. As the Japanese planes flew 
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away from the island over 3,500 military and civilians lay dead, dying or wounded. Later 
that afternoon Tully was called back into the Boss’ study. 
'Sit down, Grace,’ the President paused to light his cigarette, ‘I'm going before Congress 
tomorrow. I'd like to dictate my message. It will be short: Yesterday comma December 7 
comma 1941 dash a day which will live in infamy dash the United States of America was 
suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan period 
paragraph … I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly 
attack by Japan on Sunday comma December 7 comma a state of war has existed 
between the United States and the Japanese Empire period end.'544F43
In New York two weeks later, as white-gloved waiters served guests from silver salvers 
under the Tiffany glass ceiling of the grand dining room of the Plaza Hotel on Fifth 
Avenue, the Harvard president began his after dinner speech.
‘The day the Nazi regime collapses will be the beginning of a new era,’ Conant declared. 
‘At that moment the United States must be ready to assume political and economic 
leadership of the world … We are now fighting to defend our American way of life.’545F44
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1980
Exploratorium, San Francisco, April 
Studying the profile of the old man walking at a clip despite his stick, Stewart Cockburn 
thought that there was definitely a family resemblance—you could tell Frank 
Oppenheimer was Robert’s brother. And yet, Cockburn reflected, the brothers couldn’t 
have been more opposite; each taking up his position, one optimist, the other pessimist, a 
wide chasm between them. Inside Oppenheimer’s office, Cockburn placed the tape 
recorder on the nearest available space he could find on the desk in front of him—
between the piles of reports, assorted papers, little cardboard maquettes, and half-filled 
coffee cups. 
‘Shall we start? Okay. Interview with Dr Frank Oppenheimer at the Exploratorium for 
the Oliphant biography. Can I begin by asking you to tell me a little about yourself and 
when you first met Mark Oliphant?’
‘There’s not much to tell. I spent a year in the UK at the Cavendish before the war in 
1934/35. Mark was still there – he hadn’t left for Birmingham. After the war Mark and I 
were in the same position—we wouldn’t take on any work which involved the sort of 
secrecy we were obliged to observe during the war. We also spent a lot of time trying to 
figure out what we do now that we’ve got the bomb. After I wasn’t allowed to work at the 
Rad Lab anymore, I moved to a little place—Pagosa Springs, Colorado, and taught high 
school science.’
‘You had quite a deal of trouble after the war with the authorities here?’
‘[I appeared] before the Un-American Activities Committee in 1949. You know, within 
the scientific community there’s a tradition that anybody who fabricates data is 
completely ostracised. It’s one of the basic tenets of science. I wish it also applied to 
politicians.’
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‘Oliphant also had difficulties—problems obtaining visas, that sort of thing. He’d been 
quite outspoken about banning the bomb and so on.’ 
‘Not all scientists felt as Oliphant and I did. After the war, some of them felt they should 
stop making weapons. Some of them felt they should start making more. Some of them felt 
secrecy was alright. Some of them were just greedy and wanted jobs.’
‘Mark Oliphant was quite clear. He felt it would have been better to share atomic secrets 
voluntarily with Russia … better in the long run for world peace.’
‘That’s right. It would have been. But it was hard to get it done. After all, you couldn’t 
have a Cold War mentality and share secrets.’546F45
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Chapter 9: The Stand-Off
1942
Storey’s Gate, London, February
In his office, Churchill dictated ‘a stiff telegram’ to the Australian Prime Minister John 
Curtin. Curtin ‘was jumpy’ about the situation in Malaya and had passed his worries onto 
the British ‘in blunt terms’. 
‘London [did] not make a fuss when it was bombed,’ Churchill complained to his 
personal physician, Charles Wilson. ‘Australians came of bad stock. [I am] impatient 
with people who [have] nothing better to do than to criticize [me].’547F1
On the day that the British abandoned Singapore and its Australian Army contingent to 
the Japanese, Mark Oliphant made his way along the Strand to Australia House. An 
imposing stone sculpture of Phoebus holding the reins of two great horses flanked the 
entrance. Inside Oliphant brushed past showcases of dusty stuffed wildlife dotting the 
foyer. He was on a mission; he had a proposition for his home country. Two days later a 
cable landed on the desk of John Madsen, Professor of Electrical Engineering at the 
University of Sydney.
OFFER SERVICES DEFENCE AUSTRALIA STOP WILL SEEK RELEASE 
ADMIRALTY AND FLY IMMEDIATELY IF REAL JOB OFFERED STOP 
AUSTRALIA BEST HOPE CONSERVATION FORCES BY NEW METHODS548F2
In Darwin, in the early morning of February 19, against a clear blue sky with an 
occasional drifting white cloud, seventeen heavy bombers, 54 dive bombers and 18 Zeros 
belonging to the Japanese Imperial Army approached Darwin Harbour. The first bombs 
smashed into the busy wharf and destroyed the post-office. For the next 50 minutes,
wave after bombing wave swept over the town before retreating. At midday the Japanese 
bombers returned for a second strike and obliterated the RAAF aerodrome. When the 
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planes finally left, Darwin surveyed the wreckage of ‘Australia’s Pearl Harbour’. The 
bodies of 235 citizens lay in the city morgue.549F3
Mark Oliphant read the news in the evening papers. A few days later Rosie, in Adelaide 
with Mark’s parents, received a telegram: AM BEING SENT TO AUSTRALIA. 
For the next 12 weeks Rosie heard nothing. On May 27 she answered an early morning 
phone call. 
‘Rosie, we’ve docked at Fremantle. I’ll be in Adelaide tomorrow.’ 
The following morning as Mark descended the stairs from the Douglas DC-3 onto the 
tarmac at Parafield Airport Michael, ‘wild with excitement,’ escaped his mother’s grip 
and ran to meet his father. Hanging from Mark’s neck, his seven-year-old son burst into 
tears. 
‘Daddy’s so old!’ 
‘Why?’ 
‘His hair’s white.’550F4
Mark’s dark hair had turned snow white during the two years Rosie and the children had
been back in Australia. The longed-for family reunion was short-lived; no sooner had 
Mark embraced Rosie and the children, he announced that once the plane was refuelled 
he was scheduled to fly on to Melbourne.
In Melbourne, Mark Oliphant stepped down from the Collins Street tram in front of the 
art deco façade of the Trustees Executor & Agency Building. Its present occupier, 
General Douglas MacArthur, had arrived in March having escaped the Bataan Peninsula 
just before the Japanese invaded. He now ruled imperially at his Headquarters for the US 
Army Forces in the Far East and in his new role as supreme commander of the South-
West Pacific area.
‘[We] are prepared to give high priority only to [offensive] forms of RDF,’ MacArthur 
told Oliphant. ‘[We] will not give [our] support … for purely defensive equipment in 
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Australia itself. However, [I] am particularly anxious to obtain … RDF sets … [including 
your] centimetre-wave equipment [which I] regard as essential.’551F5
MacArthur then gave Oliphant a rundown of the equipment he hoped that the scientists 
would be able to provide.
‘[We need] centimetre-wave radar fitted into aircraft, centimetre-wave surface watching 
equipment for convoy and patrol boat protection as an aid to navigation … and also for 
the control and protection of landing barges during landings made on hostile coasts in 
darkness … there [is] a great need for early warning equipment for air-raid defence of 
beaches and airfields. Such equipment must be really portable … it [must] be landed on a 
beach from small boats or barges, or inland from an aircraft, and … erected and in 
operation in the most inaccessible spots in 30 minutes or an hour [at the most].’552F6
Oliphant began making the rounds of the various university laboratories up and down the 
country. He soon realised he had landed in the midst of a turf war between the scientists 
on one side and the Army on the other. Not only was that conflict underway but petty 
rivalries existed between the state universities and the Radiophysics Advisory Board. 
Oliphant channelled his frustration into notes for use in his report. 
‘Personalities play far too large a part in the rather small circle of Australian technical 
effort,’ he wrote. ‘[I]ntense enmity exists between Laby, a very difficult man [the head of 
the physics department at Melbourne university] and Madsen [his Sydney counterpart].’553F7
Eric Burhop, now back in Australia, was pleased to see his old Cavendish supervisor. 
Oliphant produced detailed blueprints of the Birmingham device and a small team of 
researchers, including Burhop and Mark Oliphant’s brother Harry, supervised by another 
ex-Cavendish scientist, Leslie Martin, produced a prototype by the end of May. In the 
same month that two Japanese midget submarines managed to penetrate Australian 
defences and enter Sydney Harbour killing 21 Australian sailors in a torpedo raid, two of 
the new lab’s small team, John Gooden and an undergraduate student, John Symonds, 
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nervously escorted A271L—the first Australian-made cavity magnetron—on the long 
haul by train to the Radiophysics Laboratory at the University of Sydney. 
‘[This is] a highly secret operation,’ Symonds was warned, ‘and a very precious piece of 
gear.’554F8
At South Head the prototype set picked up a ship 45 miles in the distance.555F9
In August, after much cajoling and negotiation, the Valve Laboratory was relocated from 
Sydney to the University of Melbourne to continue developing microwave radar sets. 
Oliphant spent his last eight weeks in Australia organising and directing the research and 
seeking to ameliorate the ‘explosive possibilities’ of the head of the Physics Department, 
Professor Laby.556F10
At Circular Quay in Sydney, Mark, Rosie and their children boarded a dilapidated French 
freighter bound for England. The French ship’s crew—both Vichy-supporting and Free 
French—fought and argued their way on the long journey much to the amusement of 
Michael and Vivian. When the old rust bucket of a ship docked in Durban, South Africa, 
it was declared unfit for passengers. The family finally arrived back at Barnt Green after 
an unexpected two-month African holiday.
1942, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February
As he trudged through the slush across Harvard Yard First Lieutenant John Lansdale 
wondered why the university president had summoned him. Having recently graduated 
from Harvard Law School, Lansdale was now working in Army intelligence: a ‘G-2’ 
man. When he reached the president’s oak-panelled office in University Hall, it didn’t 
take long for the ‘matter-of-fact, down-to-earth’ Conant to let Lansdale know what was 
on his mind. Two things were worrying the president: foreign espionage and ‘the 
scientific instinct to blab about exciting research,’ and there was no research which 
sounded more exciting and terrifying to Lansdale than the research outlined by Conant 
over the next few minutes. 
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‘The United States and Germany [are] … racing to build an atomic weapon,’ Conant 
explained. ‘Whoever gets there first will win the war.’ 
Lansdale’s mission was to find out if the Berkeley physicists were blabbing about this 
secret research. Lansdale also knew that G-2 believed that ‘”the enemy was Russia,” at 
least so far as spying against the United States was concerned’.557F11 Lansdale was interested 
in any loose talk by any ‘fellow travelling’ scientists in particular. After a crash course in 
nuclear physics gleaned while crossing the country on the Union Pacific streamliner, 
Lansdale joined the Berkeley campus disguised as an undergraduate. Over the next two 
weeks Lansdale ‘filled a pocket diary with snippets of atomic gossip’. 
‘[Professor Lawrence],’ the Dean of the Berkeley Law School told Lansdale in the 
Faculty Club one lunchtime, ‘[is] trying to split the atom for use as an explosive.’ 
In Washington Lansdale gave his report. Conant, white-knuckled, gripped the edge of the 
desk. Deeply shocked at what he was hearing, Conant could only manage to punctuate 
Lansdale’s narration with an occasional ‘Oh!’ and ‘Oh my goodness!’ A week later, at 
Berkeley, the Rad Lab physicists were summoned to a meeting at the Faculty Club. 
There, Lansdale, the former undergraduate law student now in a captain’s uniform, 
berated them for their lax security.
‘I’m here to give you hell,’ he told the scientists.558F12
1942, United States Army Services of Supply Offices, Washington DC, September 
Major Leslie R Groves made his way to Capitol Hill. He was looking forward to his 
meeting with General Brehon Somervell, Commanding General of the Army Services of 
Supply. Having overseen the building of the Pentagon, Groves was hoping that his next 
mission would involve active service commanding his own troops. To his dismay, the 
General told him that he would not be leaving Washington anytime soon. 
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‘The Secretary of War has selected you for a very important assignment and the 
President has approved the selection … If you do the job right,’ Somervell said in his 
Arkansas drawl, ‘it’ll win the war.’
‘Oh, that thing,’ 
Groves found it hard to hide his disappointment. He knew Somervell was referring to the 
S-1 project, the atomic development program. Later, at the Pentagon, Major General 
Styer, the Army Chief of Staff, gave Groves the details of his new job.
‘The basic research and development are done. You just have to take the rough designs, 
put them into final shape, build some plants and organize an operating force and your job 
will be finished and the war will be over.’559F13
Groves possessed special talents which was why he’d been singled out to head the 
special project: Groves was ‘demanding … a driver … egotistical … [Groves had] the 
guts to make difficult, timely decisions.’560F14 ‘Blunt and brusque, with the grace of a 
bulldozer,’ Groves was a ‘son-of-a-bitch’.561F15 On September 23, newly promoted to the 
rank of Brigadier General, Groves was officially given his ‘Special Assignment’. 
‘[You are] to take complete charge of the entire … project … to draw up plans for the 
organization, construction, operation and security of the project and … take the 
necessary steps to put it into effect.’562F16
Groves set up the nerve centre of the now renamed ‘Manhattan Engineering District’ in 
rooms 5120 and 5121 on the fifth floor of the impressive, brand new War Department 
Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue. Groves’ first priority was to acquire a safe.563F17
Next, he told his secretary, Jean O’Leary, that he had been reassigned to a new project.
‘If [you] want to come along, I’d be glad to have [you],’ Groves said. ‘I [expect] that this 
[will] be a very quiet and easy job … [you] should be sure to bring along some 
knitting.’564F18
Van Bush’s reaction was not as positive as Major General Styler’s. 
‘I fear we are in the soup,’ he said when he heard of Groves’ appointment.565F19
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Another problem loomed for Bush—collaboration with the British on S-1. Bush was 
being urgently pressed by Britain’s Sir John Anderson to commit to a joint Anglo-
American Tube Alloys project. 
‘[The] fundamental difficulty [with British scientists],’ Conant said, ‘[is that they are] 
essentially [not] responsible to anyone in this country … [There is] no reason for a joint 
enterprise as far as development and manufacture is concerned.’566F20
…
At Berkeley, one of Robert Oppenheimer’s ‘nim-nim-nim boys,’ graduate theoretical 
physicist Rossi Lomanitz, was speculating on the reasons for the apparent disappearance 
of uranium fission as a subject for discussion due to the fact that there had been ‘no 
further news whatsoever about it’.567F21
‘[W]hen something as revolutionary as a process like fission occurs then you expect 
there to be a climate of gathering around and work done and reports to be made on it for 
quite some time to come,’ Lomanitz pondered. Instead there seemed to be ‘a shutdown of 
any mention of it whatsoever … but it was there to draw the inference from without any 
great deal of effort’. After all, Lomanitz thought, if a person was, at the very least, ‘a 
little familiar with the physics, what was being looked upon was separation of the isotope 
uranium-235 from that of uranium-238 … in order to use the 235 to make a fantastically 
powerful bomb’.568F22 Lomanitz also noticed a man in military uniform skulking around Le 
Conte Hall having clandestine meetings with Oppenheimer. 
‘Hey, the braid is back.’ Lomanitz told his fellow nim-nim-nim friends.569F23
Eventually Oppenheimer dropped the subterfuge and let Lomanitz into the secret. He 
invited Lomanitz to join the Manhattan Project. Lomanitz’s first reaction was to refuse.
‘If something with that fantastic an explosive possibility were in the hands of one 
government, even though it might be our government, what might this mean for the 
future of the world?’ Lomanitz told Oppenheimer. 
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‘Do you want to see the Nazis get it and we not have it?’ 
‘No. Of course not.’ Lomanitz took the job.570F24
‘You need to behave yourself,’ Oppenheimer then warned him, ‘[and] not do anything 
wild or foolish … such as make speeches … about the injustice of the world, the folly of 
the war, or any of the things that [you usually shoot your] face off about.’571F25
In Le Conte Hall one afternoon, Professor Lawrence baled up graduate student, Ed 
Lofgren. 
‘I have a job for you.’ 
Lofgren, who had first started working at the Rad Lab during his summer breaks for fifty 
cents an hour, was busy with his final year exams, teaching duties and ‘trying to get a 
start in Cosmic-Ray research … [He] hesitatingly told Professor Lawrence [of] these 
impediments’. 
‘This is important,’ Lawrence told him, ‘the national need is involved.’572F26
Lofgren had noticed that all the experienced lab physicists, people like Ed McMillan and 
Luis Alvarez, had disappeared from Berkeley and had turned up at MIT in Chicago doing 
something hush-hush. Within a few days, Lofgren found himself seconded to Lawrence’s 
lab. Frank Oppenheimer had also been roped in by Lawrence and had already started 
dismantling the 37-inch cyclotron—the magnet, vacuum system and all its other 
components were to be incorporated into a new electromagnetic device to separate 
uranium. Lawrence’s researchers, Frank soon discovered, ‘worked pretty damned hard 
… and slept relatively little’.573F27 Robert Oppenheimer warned his brother to keep his nose 
clean. 
‘[Lawrence] will fire you if you are not a good boy.’574F28
…
In his brand new job as the Manhattan Engineering District’s Chief Security and 
Intelligence Officer, John Lansdale directed his staff that their priority was to uncover 
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security leaks. A secondment of Women’s Army Corp members pored over newspapers 
and magazines for mention of anything atomic-related that might catch their eye.575F29 A
few weeks later, in a basement of an unassuming house in a quiet street in Oakland, 
California, just a few miles from the university, technicians were busy setting up a 
switchboard for operators to listen out for loose talk picked up by bugs and telephone 
taps planted at Berkeley.576F30 Despite his stern talk to the scientists, reports of breaches of 
security landed regularly on Lansdale’s desk. In February the president of the university, 
Dr Robert Gordon Sproul, addressed the winter graduating class. 
‘[Our] school scientists are attempting to solve a secret problem on which the outcome of 
the war may depend. If we solve this problem first, the United Nations will win … If the 
Germans – and we know they are working on it – solve the problem first, they will 
win.’577F31
Within days a missive arrived on Lawrence’s desk in Le Conte Hall from Lansdale’s 
office.
‘One of the leading men of our country has broadcast to the public that the … University 
of California [is] working on a secret project and that the project is so great in magnitude 
that the outcome of the war could hinge on whether the Allies or the Axis developed it 
first. What more information could the enemy ask for?’578F32
Information about the goings on at the Rad Lab continued to leak. On a crowded bus 
travelling along Euclid Avenue, Martin Kamen overheard a shocking conversation. 
‘Oh, X – has gone to Tennessee,’ a woman mentioned to her companion, ‘There is a big 
factory there doing war work with what’s going on at the Rad Lab!’579F33
Other incidents were reported: an attempt was made to steal a briefcase from a scientist 
on a train and two university staff members were held up and robbed on their way home 
from the lab.
‘These incidents emphasize,’ the Area Engineer’s Office advised, ‘that extreme caution 
must be exercised in safeguarding classified information.’
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Lawrence was reminded of exactly what was at stake. 
‘In view of the nature of the work on which you are engaged,’ the Rad Lab director was 
told, ‘it seems necessary to ask you to take certain special precautions with respect to 
your personal safety. It is requested that … you refrain from flying in airplanes of any 
description … you refrain from driving an automobile for any appreciable distance … 
and from being without suitable protection on any lonely road.’580F34
1943
Grand Central Station, New York, January
Leaving the station to walk the few steps to the lobby of the Commodore Hotel just next 
door, Van Bush still felt the need to button his coat and pitch his body against the wind 
howling down 42nd Street. On the day that the US Eighth Air Force launched its first 
strike inside Germany, Bush prepared himself to speak at a ‘get-together’ dinner of the 
American Institute of Electrical Engineers, hoping to head off a revolt sparked by the 
perception that American scientific research was being threatened by a military 
takeover.581F35 What had contributed to this stoush between the military and the inventors 
was directly related to S-1; the ‘Special’. By March Bush had a new problem on his 
hands. Hans Halban had registered patents on behalf of himself, Lew Kowarski and 
Frédéric Joliot-Curie as representatives of De Gaulle and the French Government in 
exile. Bush called on the Commissioner of Patents to discuss the ‘French Problem’.582F36
The French patents were subsequently subjected to Public Law No 700 and declared 
‘secret’—no longer able to be accessed or published in the US. Any further filing outside 
the US would be blocked.  A few months later Bush convinced the members of the S-1
committee that all atomic-energy related contracts needed ‘as much patent control as 
possible [to] reside in the hands of the government’.583F37
‘This,’ Bush said, ‘might take a little pressure to do.’584F38
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The pressure Bush applied paid off. 
‘I wholly approve your patent control policy,’ Roosevelt informed him.585F39
‘The President,’ wrote to Sir John Anderson, ‘has instructed me to acquire … patent 
rights on this subject to as complete an extent as can be readily attained … [in order that] 
discoveries and inventions cannot be practiced at any point within our respective 
countries without government license.’586F40
‘[The Americans are paranoid about the] wily British [obtaining] the secrets and know-
how of the innocent American inventors,’ Akers declared.587F41
1943, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, May
In his office in the Nuffield Building, Mark Oliphant turned his attention to the stalled 
Tube Alloys project.
‘[Here] a few suggestions about isotope separation,’ he wrote to Edward Appleton at 
DSIR, ‘I believe that such considerations might remove the whole project from the 
realms of gigantic chemical engineering and render it a much more practicable 
proposition.’ 
He then outlined a proposal for an electromagnetic separation of uranium using the 
Nuffield cyclotron magnet. 
‘Lawrence … [asserts] that beams of positive ions moving in a strong magnetic field can 
be prevented from spreading through space-change repulsion … [thereby rendering] the 
generation of ion beams of much greater intensity than has … been considered possible 
… Such beams of ions may be sorted out by any of the well-known processes.’588F42
In the Tube Alloys offices in Old Queen Street, Wallace Akers discussed Mark 
Oliphant’s proposition with Edward Appleton.
‘I may say that we [are] all quite definite that Oliphant whole-time would be a most 
valuable addition to our effort,’ Akers said, ‘Oliphant is, as we know, impetuous and 
none too discreet, so that we would not want to let him in on all the secrets of our TA 
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work unless he were properly tied to us … the discussions with Oliphant, in the first 
place, [are] left to Chadwick, as Oliphant is still a little suspicious about the commercial 
element in TA, though I believe he does not regard … [me] with the same distrust as he 
did originally.’589F43
‘[It] would be a very desirable and useful thing for us to have a section working in 
parallel with Lawrence,’ Wallace Akers told Oliphant, ‘I know that he personally would 
welcome an opportunity of cooperation with you.’590F44
‘[I]f I can be convinced that Tube Alloys is … receiving serious attention in this country 
… I would consider doing some experiments along the lines I have suggested,’ Oliphant 
responded, ‘On the other hand, if there is precious little chance of the scheme receiving 
… support … I am not interested … from the personal point of view, the problem 
intrigues me very much, and is just on my lines.’591F45
On Saturday June 12, Chadwick joined Oliphant in his office in the Nuffield Lab. It had 
taken Chadwick hours to travel from Liverpool to Birmingham.
‘What a day … all the world on the move—platforms three or four deep,’ he 
complained.592F46
Oliphant would join Tube Alloys—there was never any doubt—he had been itching to 
resume work on fission since his return from Australia.
‘I hear that Alvarez and others at MIT are transferring to the TA project in the States,’ 
Oliphant told Chadwick, ‘if we had a good British team on the project … not so solidly 
ICI, the question of limited cooperation would never have arisen … it is impossible for 
us to be useful [in America] unless we get down to work at once. If we take up our duties 
later than about the middle of November it will not be profitable for us to go.’593F47
…
Early in September a query arrived at the Tube Alloys office in Old Queen Street.
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‘You will remember that in December 1941 we were told that the Germans were 
obtaining heavy water from a plant in …  in Norway … The Air Staff said that it was a 
difficult bombing target and I cannot find that we have any record of further action in the 
matter.’594F48
Two months later two aeroplanes, each towing gliders, left Scotland heading for Norway. 
Two hundred kilometres from their target, the Norsk Hydro plant, one of the planes and 
both gliders crashed into the Norwegian snow and ice. The survivors, all in uniform, 
were rounded up by German troops, tortured and shot. Four months later, at midnight on 
February 16, an aeroplane again left Scotland heading for Norway. Six Norwegian 
soldiers, including Dr Leif Tronstad, dropped by parachute into south-west Norway and 
trekked to Rjukan 80 kilometres away. After overpowering the Norwegians guarding the 
plant the saboteurs planted explosives and blew up the factory. With the help of the 
Norwegian resistance, the saboteurs escaped to Sweden. The Germans, having found no 
trace of the perpetrators of the destruction of the plant, appealed to Rjukan residents by 
posting leaflets calling ‘for any information received concerning “tall young men with 
fair hair and blue eyes speaking Norwegian”’.595F49
A covert operation was also underway in Denmark under the noses of the German 
occupiers. A family left their home in Carlsberg on an afternoon stroll and headed 
towards the harbour. Reaching a row of houses close to the beach, they ducked into a 
suburban garden shed. Later that evening under cover of darkness they headed towards 
the beach to a fishing boat waiting to ferry the distinguished Professor of Theoretical 
Physics, his wife and sons across the Öresund to Sweden. In Washington a few days 
later, Merle Tuve was summoned to General Groves’ office. Tuve, who ‘didn’t know 
him from Adam,’ wondered what on earth Groves wanted with him. Groves thrust a 
cable at Tuve and told him to ‘interpret … the letter “B”’.
‘Well I think that means Professor Bohr.’
‘Oh, is that what it is?’
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‘Well, I’d take a good bet on it anyhow. Why don’t you assume it’s true and take the 
bet?’596F50
At the central Birmingham Police Station, the Chief Constable composed a memo to 
Special Branch in London.
‘Two Danes … [have] landed in this country from Stockholm … A curious coincidence 
... they were brought to the Aliens Registration Office by Professor Peierls of 
Birmingham University. You will recall that Peierls was formerly German … It seems 
strange that two men, who have arrived in the country so recently, should be associated 
with Peierls ... These two Danes appear to have had a very quick clearance.’597F51
Maurice Wilkins was surprised to notice Professor Bohr at the university, and even more 
surprised when he was introduced to the great physicist by Professor Oliphant. 
‘[Wilkins],’ Oliphant told Bohr with a knowing look, ‘[is] trying to evaporate uranium 
metal.’598F52
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Chapter 10: The Secret
1943
Manhattan, New York, June
In the offices of the Federal Postal Building, on the corner of Church and Barclay, 
planning was underway for the expansion of the S-1 project. One of the first tasks for the 
planners was to render a town invisible. In due course, 60,000 acres of farmland in a 
valley buffered by ridges of the Appalachian Mountains in Tennessee ceased to exist. 
The small city that rose up between the hills could not be found on any map. The 75,000 
men and women contracted to work at this mysterious secret place were greeted at its 
entrance by a sign warning: ‘what you see here, what you do here, what you hear here, 
when you leave here—let it stay here’.599F1
Meanwhile, at 19 West 31st Street, the headquarters of Life magazine, science reporter 
Gerard Piel called in to see his editor. A telegram had arrived from the Office of 
Censorship in Washington. A long list of topics had been proscribed and a gentlemen’s 
agreement between the government and the press barons declared certain subjects 
unmentionable. Among them, Piel was informed, ‘atom smashing,’ ‘atomic energy,’ 
‘radium,’ ‘uranium,’ ‘isotopes,’ ‘critical mass’ and ‘atomic fission’ were all now on an 
index expurgatorious. The hair on the back of Piel’s neck stood up. It was clear ‘that this 
phenomenon [nuclear fission] now had a place in the war effort … There was already 
more than enough in the open literature to give anyone who could read it an idea of how 
an atomic weapon could work and how it could be made’.600F2 Whenever he encountered the 
censors, the reporter was ‘on the alert … to learn how the atom bomb project was 
progressing’.601F3
In the following weeks he discovered that the scientists who had been involved in 
uranium fission work at Columbia had now turned up at MIT in Chicago. Responding to 
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a tip-off, Piel attempted to secure an interview with the exiled Danish physicist Professor 
Niels Bohr only to be told by an exasperated government official that the reporter ‘was 
not “cleared” even to know that [Bohr] was in the country.’ Late one night on a deserted 
Manhattan street, Piel met with a Canadian Government agent who asked ‘in a whisper’ 
what Piel knew about the ‘Manhattan Project’—it was the first time Piel had heard that 
the secret research into the atom bomb had a name. At lunch in the cafeteria of the 
Eastman Kodak building in Rochester, soon after his mysterious nocturnal meeting, 
Piel’s ears pricked up. Pretending to be deeply engrossed in reading the company 
magazine, the Kodakery, Piel concentrated on the conversation underway at the table 
next to him. The gist of it was that ‘one of [the company’s] bright young physicists was 
to be saved from the draft by “going to Tennessee”’. On his way back to the Life offices 
Piel was satisfied that he could now make a reasonable guess at just ‘what the enterprise 
in the hills down there might be’ 25 miles from Knoxville.602F4
1943, La Citadelle, Quebec, Canada, August
In the Officer’s Barracks, Churchill and Roosevelt signed an agreement ordering 
collaboration between the two countries on the building of the atomic bomb. Mark
Oliphant, Rudi Peierls, Franz Simon and James Chadwick arrived in New York before 
the ink had dried. 
‘Mr Akers … without consulting us [has] brought four eminent scientific workers here 
for interchange,’ Van Bush complained to Roosevelt.603F5
‘[T]here [is] a general feeling prevalent in America,’ Conant griped, ‘that the British 
always [get] the best of any deal.’604F6
…
Mark Oliphant and Chadwick climbed out of a taxi on 42nd Street at Grand Central 
Terminal and headed down to the lower level to Harvey’s Oyster Bar. The restaurant had 
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been recommended to Chadwick by Lady Astor. Under the spectacular vaulted ceiling, 
Chadwick ate a dozen oysters; Oliphant, as was usual, ate a vegetarian salad. At the hotel 
later that night, Oliphant awoke to ‘terrible noises coming from the bathroom … where 
he found a distinctly green-faced Chadwick writhing on the floor’.605F7 The following 
morning Chadwick still ‘looked like death’.606F8 Despite his discomfort, he insisted on 
flying on to Washington. On Friday, September 3 on the northeast corner of Lafayette 
Square in view of the White House, Conant entertained Oliphant and Chadwick at the 
Cosmos Club. Chadwick, still suffering the effects of his oyster supper, sipped water and 
picked at his food as Conant  got down to business.
‘I’m not in a position to discuss any details of the S-1 program, but I should like you to 
understand my own personal philosophy about it,’ Conant said. ‘Frankly, in my opinion, 
it was a mistake that your government did not accept our original offer last winter. I hope 
that the arrangements made between your Prime Minister and the President to organize 
the interchange leave no doubt that the intention is to promote the development of the 
weapon for the purpose of it being employed in this war to the joint advantage of both 
our nations.’607F9
‘Of course, we quite agree,’ Oliphant said. ‘As soon as we’re on board we can pool all of 
our information and—‘
‘Well,’ Conant cut Oliphant off, ‘I have no news as to where the matter stands in regard 
to any decisions being made at the White House. However, gentlemen, I feel that there is 
no reason for exchanging information unless it’s demonstrated that the knowledge gained 
by the recipient of the information would indeed help the war effort.’ 
The following day at a meeting of the Manhattan Engineering District Military Policy 
Committee it was ‘recommended that every effort be made to secure the services of Dr 
Chadwick and Dr Oliphant at the special American installation involved in the 
development of the weapon … arrangements for placing Dr Chadwick and Dr Oliphant 
should be made at once.’608F10
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‘Regarding information interchange,’ General Groves made the situation clear, ‘all 
interchange with the British by the leaders of the American group will be carried out 
according to my orders.’609F11
Three days later Chadwick and Oliphant headed down to Foggy Bottom to the New War 
Building on 21st Street at Virginia Avenue, and made their way through the marble and 
granite entrance to the sparkling brass elevators.
‘[General Groves],’ Chadwick told Oliphant, ‘is the dominant personality in the US 
group … he appears … to be a dictator.’610F12
Stepping out on the fifth floor, footsteps echoing across the terrazzo, the two scientists 
marvelled at the replica Greek statuary and impressive mural painted above them. 
‘Liberty or Death: Don’t tread on me’ Oliphant read aloud.
Chadwick raised his eyebrows.
‘Groves,’ Chadwick continued, ‘[only] wants two people … [you] and me. He [is] not 
really interested in any others … But, of course, that [is] not cooperation … It [is] in a 
sense political … [When] I … say Groves … I mean Bush, Conant and Groves.’611F13
Jean O’Leary announced the arrival of the two scientists to the occupants of room 5120. 
Waiting inside were Groves and ‘Mr Smith’—Robert Oppenheimer’s alias. 
‘[I need to explain to you that] all considerations of efficiency or of a scientific elegance
[are] subordinate to [the] necessity of developing a bomb of such power that it will bring 
the war to an end at the earliest possible date,’ Groves told the scientists.612F14 ‘My rule [is] 
simple and not capable of misinterpretation – each man should know everything he 
[needs] to know and nothing else … people [need to] stick to their knitting.’613F15
Mark Oliphant scribbled a note to himself that Chadwick was correct in his summation, 
Groves was indeed a ‘dictator’.614F16 Oppenheimer wanted Oliphant and worked hard to 
convince him to join the trickle of scientists making their way to ‘Shangri La,’ officially 
known as ‘Site Y’: a former boys’ school high on the mesa at Los Alamos, New Mexico. 
‘There are three hundred scientists there already.’ 
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‘Until we’re assured of a supply of fissionable material,’ Oliphant told him, ‘I’ll work 
with Lawrence—‘Mr Jones’—at Berkeley.’
Oppenheimer pressed Oliphant to reconsider. Oliphant suggested a compromise. 
‘I’ll take my team to ‘Y’ in about six months once this project is underway.’615F17
Oppenheimer reluctantly agreed.
‘Gentlemen,’ Groves concluded the meeting, ‘If you all agree, I suggest we retire to the 
Mayflower Restaurant for lunch. As far as I can tell the Cosmos Club is peopled with 
gossips.’616F18
1943, Directorate of Tube Alloys, Whitehall, November
Vera Mayne had not had time to have lunch. The director’s secretary had less than 48 
hours to organise the naturalisation of a number of foreign-born scientists. Apart from 
sending each application to the Home Secretary for approval, Mayne needed to register 
each scientist for National Service and then arrange for the service to be deferred, apply 
for a passport and an American visa. For the umpteenth time, Mayne left her details with 
a person on the other end of the telephone line. 
‘Let me know as soon as possible, Whitehall 1632 Extension 202.’617F19
Two days later a funeral cortege headed towards the Liverpool docks. A number of black 
limousines transported a large collection of British scientific brainpower to a waiting 
ocean liner. Their luggage was unloaded from the accompanying hearse.618F20 The scientists 
made the most of their journey among the opulent interiors of the Royal Mail Line’s 
most recently built flagship, the Andes, as it zigzagged across the Atlantic. Disembarking 
in New York on December 3, the scientists were dispersed around the country. Stopping 
in Richmond, Virginia, before boarding the Super Chief streamliner to Los Alamos, 
Frisch had time to have a look around. After years of deprivation in blacked-out, war-
torn Britain, he was amazed at what he saw; the ‘fruit stalls with pyramids of oranges, 
illuminated by bright acetylene flares’ sent him into a fit of ‘hysterical laughter’.619F21
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The largest group—the ‘Oliphant Group’—crossed the country to California to join 
Lawrence’s team at the Berkeley Rad Lab. En route to the West Coast to join his team, 
Oliphant called in to see General Groves. 
‘I know that it is against your policy, but … a meeting of the diffusion directors with  the 
leaders of the electro-magnetic scheme, and a frank discussion of the present position of 
each method … would make it clear that despite its difficulties the electro-magnetic 
method is an easy one.’620F22
‘[As I said to you once before Dr Oliphant], people [need to] stick to their knitting … 
[By the way, I am] very dissatisfied with the time needed to reach the present state of 
affairs and for British teams to arrive,’ Groves said.621F23
‘Well, negotiations seem to have taken a long time due to a reluctance on your side.’
‘[No] part of the delay was due to [me]. [However] the ICI angle troubles [me] a great 
deal … Akers’ presence is unwelcome … [and In my opinion] frankly, will prejudice the 
success of the Mission.’
‘I might point out, General Groves, that such an attitude on [your] part might seriously 
prejudice our own relations in England with ICI.’
‘[I hope] just that [will] happen. [My position here] … would be very much simplified by 
the complete elimination of ICI from the picture. [Obviously] am not prepared to put this 
in writing and … [will] deny that [I] ever expressed such sentiments.’
‘The whole position is singularly unfortunate but I don’t see what can be done about it.’
‘[Well] if I can freeze them out I will do.’622F24
Mark Oliphant stepped down from the train at Berkeley under an alias, ‘Michael Oliver,’ 
and landed in the midst of a crisis. Since Oliphant’s visit in 1941, Lawrence had 
converted the 37-inch cyclotron to a giant mass spectrometer. Within three months the 
Rad Lab’s brand new ‘Calutron’ had produced 100 micrograms of U235; enough to 
convince the NDRC to underwrite the research program. Six months later, thanks to 
further funding by the Rockefeller Foundation and the constant day and night efforts of 
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the Berkeley cyclotroneers, the 164-inch cyclotron magnet, now also converted to a 
calutron, was turned on for the first time proving the way for a push to construct a 
massive electromagnetic plant in the rich, red mud of Tennessee. Calutrons would be 
used to deflect beams of ionised atoms in a magnetic field accelerated by an electric 
field. By exploiting the difference in the curvature of the paths of U235 and U238 ions, it 
was hoped that this method would enable the collection of a useful amount of separated 
U235 isotopes in a reasonable time period. Back in 1934, when Oliphant had managed to 
separate samples of lithium isotopes ‘too small to be weighed’ by the same method at the 
Cavendish lab, it was hailed as ‘a great achievement’.623F25
Despite the theoretical difficulties in the massive scaling up of such a project, Lawrence 
was convinced the limitations of the electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes 
based on Oliphant’s original lithium experiment, would prove solvable. In theory the 
Berkeley prototype showed that the idea should work; in practice, it was a different 
matter entirely. The idea of taking an instrument that had previously demonstrated 
miniscule amounts of separation in a laboratory and expanding its principle, more or less 
untested with no pilot program, to an industrial scale plant in Tennessee seemed to 
present to most physicists an insurmountable challenge. 
‘Designing and building … such [a] monster,’ Kamen complained, ‘[operated] by 
essentially illiterate hillbillies … more or less on a push-button basis [is] to invite 
invitations to don a straitjacket.’624F26
The Alpha racetracks constructed at Tennessee consisted of multiple calutrons operating 
simultaneously. The first problem arose when it became clear that the enormous 
magnetic forces pushed the vacuum tanks out of alignment. This setback was followed 
by the constant shorting of the Alpha racetracks circuitry. 
‘Things just haven’t worked,’ the Tennessee reps complained to Lawrence.625F27
Frantic phone calls from Tennessee to Berkeley continued to report the shutdown of 
magnets due to mysterious electrical overloads. A brief worry about saboteurs was 
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passed off to nerves. It took a week to identify the cause as metal fragments in the 
transformer oil. Groves arrived at Tennessee on December 14 to find things little 
improved.626F28 Lawrence was so distressed by the failure that he was admitted to hospital 
suffering exhaustion. 
‘I’ve never seen Ernest so completely beaten and depressed,’ Alvarez said.627F29
Mark Oliphant’s first job was to supervise the cleaning and rebuilding of all 48 giant 
magnets.628F30 During the time it took to repair the first Alpha racetrack the 4,800 employees 
contracted by Tennessee Eastman to run the plant had an unexpected holiday spending 
their time watching movies and playing chess and checkers.629F31 At Berkeley it was a 
different story. As usual, the Rad Lab operated around the clock. The physicists were 
working twelve hour shifts, seven days a week ‘to find a means of washing out the 
separation apparatus to recover all the uranium material scattered around in the vacuum 
chamber after a run … reprocess it … and take no more than a day for the whole 
process,’ recycling each Alpha racetrack batch up to forty times.630F32 Numerous technical 
difficulties needed to be surmounted. Groves wondered what the fuss was about. 
‘[If] the maximum loss per cycle could be no more than a few hundredths of one percent 
… [why are you] so concerned about loss?’ he asked the scientists. ‘Uranium costs only 
a few dollars a pound.’631F33
Lawrence broke the ‘embarrassed silence’.
‘If a bit of material has to be recycled some fifty times and as much as a few percent is 
lost each time,’ Lawrence explained, ‘there might be a total loss of as much as 100 
percent. If we do not make essentially perfect recovery, mountains will labor [sic] and 
produce molehills.’632F34
When Alpha eventually sputtered into production it was obvious that the U235 was not 
enriched enough to initiate a bomb. The low-quality material produced would need to be 
recycled many times over to obtain the pure U235 needed. The scientists went back to 
the drawing board; it was decided that a second calutron racetrack system, Beta, would 
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need to be developed to further enrich the Alpha product. Ed Lofgren found himself in a 
team in charge of ‘gunk catching, cleaning and recovery’. Water soluble ‘gunk’ collected 
on the inside of the calutron tanks and had to be removed. In addition, the team needed to 
find a method to scrape out the insoluble ‘crud’.633F35
Travelling back and forth between Berkeley and Tennessee, Mark Oliphant spent ‘long 
hours … eliminating the multitude of teething troubles’ with the Alpha racetracks. 
Languishing on ‘owl watch’ at Tennessee—the ‘dismal’ midnight to dawn shift—with 
little to do, he began ‘speculating about what physics we could do in Birmingham when 
the war was over’.634F36 What he really wanted ‘was to try to obtain bombarding particles 
with greater energy than [the Birmingham cyclotron] would provide’.635F37 He wiled away 
his time making notes and scribbling calculations. The problem with a cyclotron was that 
the ‘maximum energy which could be obtained … was limited by the loss of phase of the 
circulating particles as the energy … increased.’ The other major problem was the cost of 
a magnet. ‘[I[t might be possible,’ Oliphant thought, ‘to decrease ... the mass of the 
magnet by using an orbit of constant radius, and providing only a narrow range of 
magnetic field, the value of which increased as the particles gained energy. If the 
problem of matching the magnetic field, at every instant, with the momentum of the 
particles could be solved, there appeared to be no limit to the energy which they could be 
given.’636F38 In between stints at Tennessee, Oliphant thrashed out his ideas ‘discussing the 
construction of … [a] machine with Lawrence’ at Berkeley.637F39
‘[I’ve] had an idea of pulsing a current through some coils and at the same time pulsing a
frequency modulated RF accelerator.’
‘[T]he idea certainly [looks] feasible in principle,’ Lawrence said.638F40
Oliphant calculated that he could probably build a 1GeV machine ‘for less than 
£100,000.’ This conclusion, he speculated, ‘seemed trivial enough to be practicable.’639F41
He outlined his proposal in a memo to Wallace Akers with a suggestion that Tube Alloys 
could provide the funding. 
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‘I have developed some proposals for new methods for accelerating electrons and 
protons to … very high energies. I am convinced that we can carry out this work 
successfully in the laboratory if we have the necessary backing,’ he wrote. ‘The essential 
feature of the proposal is that particles should be constrained to move in a circle of 
constant radius, thus enabling the use of an annular ring of magnetic field … The 
magnetic field would be varied in such a way that the radius of curvature remains 
constant as the particles gain energy through successive accelerations by an alternating 
electric field … the acceleration is provided by an applied potential rather than by a 
changing flux. In this way it is possible to apply much higher accelerations per 
revolution.’640F42
‘[Your job],’ Akers replied in a terse note, ‘is … the development of nuclear energy and 
… it would be better if [you] confined [yourself] to that task.’641F43
By late January 1944 the Alpha 1 racetrack began producing U235. Over the next 5 
months more Alpha and Beta tracks began operating.642F44 By June the Tennessee 
electromagnetic plant was fully operational despite ‘one mechanical or equipment failure 
after another … short circuits and shortages, breakdowns and breakages … on all 
sides’.643F45
‘I think we have already made some contributions to the project,’ Chadwick told 
Appleton, ‘in particular, Groves and others have told me … how beneficial an influence 
Oliphant has already exerted on the Berkeley laboratory … Groves gave instructions that 
Oliphant was to see anything … he was interested [in] and that he was to be given all 
information. This goes considerably beyond the terms of the agreement, which limited 
him to the EM plant … Oliphant … tells me that Tennessee is quite incredible. 
Everything is on such a gigantic scale that it surpasses all imagination.’644F46
‘I can place at the most ten men,’ Mark Oliphant reported to London, ‘I cannot stress too 
strongly the importance to us of participation [of the British in the project] … its 
implications may be much wider than we had ventured to expect.’645F47
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In Australia, a memo arrived on the Prime Minister’s desk.
‘Oliphant has cabled that Burhop go to America to join special team.’646F48
At Melbourne University government gumshoes arrived to quiz the Registrar.
‘[I know] Burhop well,’ he said, ‘although somewhat “pink,” he [is] intensely loyal … 
evidenced by the energy which he [applies] to his researches, which, when associated 
with the other scientists in Berkeley, may quite likely … considerably shorten the war.’647F49
Scientists continued to arrive in New York en route to the various secret Manhattan 
Project locations. Philip and Winifred Moon were despatched to New Mexico. Maurice 
Wilkins had spent the entire trip in the ship’s hospital wing with the flu. In New York 
‘after years of war-time Birmingham living like troglodytes in the inescapable 
oppressiveness of the blackout’ Wilkins was dazzled by the bright lights.648F50 Amazed to 
see oranges and bananas once again, Wilkins was overcome with emotion when he saw 
them ‘in trash cans’.649F51 Arriving in Berkeley with an ear infection, he spent seven weeks 
in hospital marvelling at ‘the smart hairstyles of the ladies sweeping the floors’ while 
undergoing treatment and having holes drilled in his head.650F52 When he was finally fit 
enough to be discharged, Oliphant drove him around the sights of Berkeley. Wilkins was 
amazed at the proliferation of gum trees having not seen a gum tree since he had left 
New Zealand many years before.651F53 For the first few weeks at Berkeley, Wilkins drifted 
around ‘in a romantic dream where everyone was very cheerful and energetic, and even 
the noisy jukeboxes seemed enchanting’.652F54
The British scientists settled into life in California. Harrie Massey tried to describe the 
paradise they had landed in to colleagues back in the UK.
‘The many delicious flavours of ice cream; the wonders of domestic appliances in [my] 
rented house; the marvellous view over the bay; the Berkeley weather; pool and sea 
bathing; recent purchases of books,’ Massey wrote, ‘The [New York] skyscrapers … 
[were] magnificent and the more I see of them the better I like them.’653F55
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Massey joined Oppenheimer’s ‘nim-nim-nim’ boys in the 37-inch cyclotron lab—
whatever the physicists needed, it seemed to Massey, they got.654F56 An appeal was made to 
the Berkeley Ration Board for ‘a tremendous amount of coffee’ for the lab. The request 
was denied. 
‘Well,’ the lab representative remarked as he was leaving the meeting, ‘the machine will 
be badly affected.’
‘If the machine needs it, that’s another matter!’ 
A recommendation that the Rad Lab ‘be designated as a non-smoking area’ was roundly 
ignored.655F57 An unlimited supply of coffee and cigarettes fuelled the fatigued Berkeley 
scientists and engineers.656F58
1944
Y-12, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 
Gladys Owens finished her coffee in a rush before adding her tray to the stack and 
making a dash for the bus which would take her from the cafeteria in ‘West Town’ to her 
job at ‘Y-12’—the electromagnetic isotope separation plant. She showed her badge to the 
guard at the gate and then again to the guard at the door to the factory floor she was 
assigned to and took her place at her stool in front of the control panel with the rest of the 
‘calutron girls’. Gladys settled in to spend the next seven hours ‘watching meters and 
adjusting dials’. She knew to keep shtum about the work even to the other girls as ‘one 
never knew who was watching and if maybe even someone in the group was instructed to 
report on any conversations’. People who talked too much, Gladys noticed, soon 
disappeared. ‘Creeps’ were everywhere. In the movie theatre, ushers wandered up and 
down aisles shining flashlights at people talking, ‘everywhere you looked [signs] told 
you to keep your mouth shut!’657F59 So it was very disconcerting, Gladys thought, to have a 
nosy professor wandering up and down the floor asking questions. 
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Mark Oliphant was feeling unhappy with the operation at Tennessee; unreliable servicing 
of the machines had led to frequent outages. He checked Gladys Owens’ meters and went 
to speak to the foreman.
‘You do realise that the ratio and output of [the machine] is phenomenal if these readings 
are correct?’
‘Well, the meters were probably wrong. I’ll see that they’re checked.’
‘But you haven’t [found] out why [it] behaves so well?’
‘No, well, as I said, I’ll see that they’re checked.’
Frustrated, Oliphant got in touch with Lawrence.
‘I spot-checked the A track twice … I found only one girl on duty who could be said to 
be both intelligent and alert … [the supervisor in charge] knows less …physics than a 
first year undergraduate,’ Oliphant complained, ‘It may be possible to make a good … 
plant foreman of a man who formerly looked after about 200 operatives in a shoe factory, 
but such methods will not work [here] … Every operation, though boring, needs 
intelligence and application all the time … If the true story cannot be told to the workers, 
is it beyond our wits to invent a reasonable alternative … The more I see of the … plant 
in operation … I become more and more depressed about TEC and the organization at 
the site.’658F60
In June the second Alpha racetrack was fired up. Immediately the ‘insulators broke down 
… and the machine sputtered to a halt’.659F61
Another problem was worrying Oliphant. 
‘[T]he Americans are … a trifle uneasy on the subject of patents,’ Akers had mentioned 
in April, ‘they are not particularly enthusiastic at the idea of the British owning important 
patents in this field.’660F62
‘[There [is] a very powerful patenting section [at Berkeley] grinding out many 
inventions,’ Oliphant confirmed,’ ‘This section so far seems to disregard the presence of 
British personnel.’661F63
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In Washington, the head of the American patent division spelt out the project’s patent 
system to his British counterpart.
‘[A]ny idea of a UK person … worked out in a practical sense after that person reported 
at a US laboratory, should necessarily be patented by the US machinery,’ Captain Robert 
A Lavender explained. ‘This should be the case whether the idea sprung into the person’s 
head before or after joining the US laboratory … all ideas which might be thought to be 
solely UK could be regarded as springing up in an American atmosphere and therefore 
subject to influence by American thought and invention.’662F64
In his office across the hall, Lavender’s deputy, Harvard physicist, William A Shurcliff, 
inked his brand new rubber stamps marked ‘secrecy recommended’ and ‘secrecy not 
recommended’ and wondered which one would get the most use. The criterion to stamp a 
patent application secret was simple enough; if it was ‘hot … [if it] might have an 
atomic-bomb connection … [it was] put to sleep’.663F65 Perusing the Physical Review, the 
Review of Modern Physics and Scientific Abstracts beginning with January 1939, 
Shurcliff had assembled a list of over 1000 names to keep a lookout for.664F66 In between 
searching journals for disclosures of secret information by physicists, Shurcliff turned his 
mind to other pressing topics that were bugging him.
‘It is obvious that sooner or later a vocabulary must be worked out for concepts 
pertaining to fission,’ Shurcliff wrote in a memo to his superiors, ‘Some suggestions are 
made below. By using the words suggested … embarrassments, apologetic quotation 
marks, and cumbersome circumlocutions may be avoided:
Transitive verb:
I fish 25. [’25’ is the code word for Uranium 135]
He fishes 25.
He is fishing 25.
He has fished 25.




Yesterday 1 gram of 25 fished …
25 is a well-known fishant …
25 is fishable.’665F67
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Chapter 11: The Shutdown
1944
Buena Vista Avenue, Berkeley, June
In the hills above the campus, Kamen was also experiencing the ham-fisted performance 
of Grove’s ‘creeps’. He had noticed that his phone was most probably being tapped by 
the strange ‘clicks’ emanating from the receiver. His house was being watched; his 
neighbours happily reported to him that they had been questioned about his activities. 
One miserable wet night Kamen, feeling sorry for his ‘shadowers,’ asked them ‘to come 
in out of the dripping bushes for a drink’.666F1 They declined. 
On Saturday July 1, Kamen caught the train across the Bay Bridge to downtown San 
Francisco. Waiting for him at the Transbay terminal were two members of the Soviet 
consulate, Gregori Kheifets and Gregori Kasparov. Kamen, Kheifets and Kasparov had 
met at a party of a mutual friend: concert violinist Isaac Stern. Kamen played the viola in 
a small chamber orchestra with Stern. The three men, deep in conversation, caught a taxi 
up Powell Street. They did not notice the two G-men following at a discrete distance 
despite the fact that the taxi and the G-men’s car had both made U-turns in a dead end 
street having taken a wrong turn.667F2 Eventually the taxi stopped in front of a reproduction 
of Christopher Columbus’ ship, the Nina, jutting out onto the sidewalk—the iconic 
façade of Bernstein’s Fish Grotto. Special Agent Wagener looked at his wristwatch and 
noted the scientist and the two Russians entered the restaurant at 2.25 pm. Inside, as the 
three men tucked into their abalone steaks, coo coo clams and crab cocktails, the two 
agents sat four booths away and spent the next two hours logging what they could make 
out of the conversation hampered by the noisy crowd and banging cutlery in the crowded 
restaurant. 
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‘Words and phrases which were heard,’ Special Agent Wensel wrote in his report, 
‘“Radiation,” “Military boys,” “Chicago and Seattle,” “Chapman (phonetic) says …,” 
“The Japanese didn’t get ahead of us,” “Truman Committee did a pretty good job,” “R O 
School,” “hitted,” “broke off and neither one of these guys” … Other phrases heard 
were:  “I am very sorry,” “forgive me, but I couldn’t get it all together,” “They are all 
members of …,” “I use the box style,” “It is an English subsidiary,” “When he came 
back from Russia, he was very much impressed.” Following this, KAMEN mentioned 
LAWRENCE … KAMEN was also heard to remark … “The English have a setup,” 
“England and America are against Russia,” … “You start out with the idea that the 
abnormal figure is more sensitive to radiation than the normal, but after a while, it 
becomes less sensitive.” The following phrases were also overheard: “Radio-active 
phosphorous,” “[t]he radiation rays are softened,” “The British have invented a shell, the 
point of which pierces and the gas is released” … shortly before the end of the meeting, 
KAMEN asked, “When will I see you again?” but the answer to this was inaudible.’668F3
Lieutenant David S Teeple, security investigator and General Groves’ chief ‘creep,’ was
proud of his reputation for zeal among Washington circles despite the fact that some 
might have described it as excessive. Scrutinising Agents’ Wagener and Wensel’s report, 
Teeple dictated a memo. 
‘KAMEN’s … [statement] that the “English have a setup” was … “top secret 
information” … KAMEN was explaining … the process which any foreign nation 
starting out … with the benefit of the experiments of the scientists working on the 
Manhattan Project would adopt … In my opinion,’ Teeple concluded, ‘KAMEN has 
committed espionage.’669F4
Martin Kamen made his way from the lab to Lawrence’s office wondering why Don 
Cooksey wanted to see him. Cooksey, ‘looking grey and devastated,’ pushed a 
termination notice across the desk.670F5
‘What’s this?’
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‘I told you not to talk so much in the club, Martin. I told you.’671F6
Kamen’s dismissal caused an uproar. Mark Oliphant, furious at the decision, protested 
loudest to anyone who would listen. Getting nowhere with Groves’ deputy, Colonel 
Nichols, who listened to Oliphant in stony silence, Oliphant then stormed into the lab and 
confronted Lawrence but ‘never got to first base’.672F7 Lawrence ‘refused flatly to write a 
letter either to protest or to find out the real reason for [Kamen’s] dismissal’. 
‘Where there’s smoke there’s fire,’ he said.673F8
1944, Union Station, Ottawa, Canada, July
Mark Oliphant came up the stairs and entered the cavernous, marble interior of the main 
hall. Admiring the architecture, he noticed a familiar figure leaning against one of the 
station’s magnificent Beaux-Arts columns. As Oliphant approached, the man hid behind 
his newspaper. Oliphant pulled the newspaper down.
‘Hello!’ 
The startled agent—one of Groves’ creeps whose office was situated on the floor below 
Mark Oliphant’s at the Berkeley Rad Lab—did not reply.674F9 On ‘owl shift’ one night a few 
weeks later, Oliphant headed to his office to retrieve some calculations. As he got closer, 
he saw that his office light was on. Two of Groves’ creeps were busy rifling through the 
papers in his open safe. Oliphant quietly headed back to the lab. The following day, he 
unscrewed the lock from the safe and changed its combination. The creeps, Oliphant 
thought to himself, were ‘euchred’.675F10
1944, Collège de France, Paris, August 
Across Nazi-occupied Europe clandestine radio sets tuned in to the BBC listening for 
two longed-for coded messages. The first line from poet Paul Verlaine’s ‘Chanson 
d’Automne’ signalled the coming D-Day invasion: ‘Les sanglots longs des violons de 
l'automne’ (‘The long sobs of the violins of Autumn’). As the allies landed on the 
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beaches of Normandy, Irène Joliot-Curie, following a French Resistance guide and 
weighed down with a knapsack full of physics books, walked with her two small children 
over the mountains to Switzerland.676F11 In Paris, Fred waited patiently for the second line of 
Verlaine’s poem: ‘Blessent mon coeur d'une languer monotone' ('That wounds my heart 
with a monotone longing)—the call to arms. In his secret role as president of the Front 
National, the lab director holed up with his assistants in the cellar emptying champagne 
bottles and filling them with a mixture of sulphuric acid and potassium chlorate before 
running the Molotov cocktails onto the rooftops of Paris ready to lob at German tanks.677F12
On August 24 a beautiful sunny blue sky heralded the liberation of Paris. United States 
forces ‘found Joliot waiting for them on the front steps of the University wearing a 
Forces Françaises brassard,’ tired but triumphant.678F13
1944, Le Conte Hall, University of California, Berkeley, September
General Groves arrived at Berkeley on a flying visit. He joined Oliphant and the Rad Lab 
director in Lawrence’s office. Groves’ quizzed Oliphant about an impending visit.
‘Tell me … why has [Lindemann] requested to see other parts of the project?’
‘I suppose,’ Oliphant replied, ‘he wants to get the full picture—‘
‘Well, those parts of the project such as “W” have … not been seen by any of you 
British.’
‘What’s this nonsense about parts of the project which are not to be revealed to the 
British,’ Lawrence asked Groves. ‘It’s crazy the way the American and British scientists 
are being restricted on this job.’
‘I am merely carrying out my orders … Anyway, this visit of Cherwell’s, I want to know 
whether Britain is contemplating starting up its own TA project.’
‘At this stage,’ Oliphant said, ‘I wouldn’t know.’
‘Well, whether America likes it or not she’s bound to make a military alliance with 
Britain after the war. Such an alliance would entail material contributions from the two 
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countries, America contributing 70 per cent and Britain 30 per cent of the total … the 
American Army and Navy will dictate policy on such questions as the new weapon. 
American policy will be to insist that no manufacture of the materials or storage of the 
weapon should be permitted outside the … North American continent. I hardly need to 
point out to you the danger of capture of a manufacturing or storage centre by paratroop 
attack and the grave results of the use of our own weapon against us.’
‘Where would the attack come from?’ 
‘Russia.’
‘Russia! Why?’
‘[As] soon as normal communications between America and Europe are resumed … 
Russia will have full information about the project—‘
‘Through who?’
‘Communist sympathisers among the American and British scientists on the project … 
Russian scientists are fully capable … but … they’ll be handicapped by the … the 
Russian engineers and technologists … America and Britain will have ten years … to 
prepare for the inevitable war with Russia.’
Oliphant could not believe what he was hearing.
‘Who believes that there’s going to be a war with Russia?’
‘I’m speaking for the armed forces and every thinking man and woman in the USA … 
Any effort the UK might make [on atomic energy] must be confined to central Canada.’
‘What about Australia?’
‘Not in Australia or any other part of the Empire. In any case, every possible supply of 
raw materials would be monopolized and controlled by the USA and England.’679F14
…
A few weeks later in Old Queen’s Street, Akers read Oliphant’s report on the remarkable 
conversation with Groves.
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‘[N]otice,’ he told Anderson, the distinction drawn … between members of the American 
armed forces and “thinking men” in the USA.’ 
‘By what channels did this come?’ Anderson said. ‘It’s dangerous.’680F15
‘[Well, you know we] received a cable from Australia [saying that the authorities there 
are] being pressed by Australian physicists on Tube Alloys work in America to send 
other Australians to join them … We told [them] that this general question of co-
operation is a matter of policy which was not in our province.’
‘This will have to be handled rather carefully. We must not give the Australians the 
impression … that we are deliberately keeping them out.’681F16
1944, Storey’s Gate, London, December
Joy Milward sat in the Cabinet War Room in December with her notebook open and her 
sharpened pencil poised ready to take notes of the meeting about to begin between the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Professor of Physics from the University of 
Birmingham who, Joy was surprised to discover, was an Australian.682F17
‘[I would like to be released from the US Tube Alloys program] and also for Nimmo and 
Moon … [Well, I’d like] the whole Berkeley group [to] return to the UK in March,’ 
Oliphant told him. ‘I find myself both disappointed and depressed at the lack of a real 
policy in the United Kingdom for the part we are to play in the future with TA. I do not 
see how we can possibly continue to work with the Americans unless we are prepared to 
put our cards on the table and really say … what we intend to do in the future … So long 
as our post-war intentions [are] uncertain, the US … [will] continue to be suspicious of 
us. Britain (and the British Commonwealth) cannot afford to … allow itself to be forced 
into a position where it can follow its own individual line of attack only with the 
“permission” of [the] USA.’683F18
‘[Well, I agree] that the time [has] come when we must make up our minds about future 
TA work in this country—‘
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‘[We] are already getting drawn into questions of post-war development in the USA,’ 
Oliphant interrupted, ‘[I was] recently [instructed] by Lawrence [to prepare] a report in 
regard to [American] post-war development … for submission to a Sub-Committee 
appointed by General Groves and Dr Conant … [it ] placed [me] in an embarrassing 
position … [The report states that the American] “Government should not merely control
[atomic energy], but should control and foster it on a very substantial scale …
[expansion of atomic energy projects] could be done in the immediately foreseeable 
future.”’684F19
It was time, Oliphant told Chadwick, to head back to Birmingham. 
‘[I have] considerable sympathy for [your] point of view … this [is] part of the wider 
question of post-war TA policy … there [will] soon have to be a frank discussion 
between ourselves and the Americans. First step, however, must be to get our own ideas 
quite clear … it would be premature to raise the specific question of [your] return [at this 
point].’
‘[My] personal opinion [is] … that [we will] have done all that [we can] … by about 
March … [It’s my] strong view that [our] contribution to post-war development should 
be made in this country’
‘I understand that [the Australian] Government is very anxious to get further into the 
Project.’
‘I have had a letter from Sir David Rivett and a telephone call from Mr Bruce … [They 
feel] that the Australian[s] should be brought … into the picture.’
‘[I cannot] believe that, if TA prove[s] to have important industrial applications, any 
country [will] be able to adopt a selfish policy in regard to its exploitation,’ Anderson 
said, ‘however … [our] relations with the Americans [are] such that we [are] under an 
obligation to … strictly … observe secrecy, and [we] are not … in a position to bring any 
other country into the picture. [I have] given [the Australians] some general information 
… I must say, Oliphant, I have found [your] visit … most valuable.’
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‘[Well I am] entirely convinced of the importance of TA and … that a proper 
development effort should be made in this country.’685F20
…
Mark Oliphant arrived back in Washington on the day of the Fourth inauguration of 
President Roosevelt. With all the hotels full of visiting dignitaries, Oliphant stayed with 
Chadwick before heading across the country to Berkeley. Chadwick filled Oliphant in 
about the ‘terrific uproar’ caused by the British decision to let Hans Halban make a trip 
to France where he met with Fred Joliot-Curie.
‘Halban’s visit and what he might have revealed has made a stir of the first magnitude. 
Chadwick is unable to sleep and is very upset,’ Oliphant wrote to Akers, ‘[the] Anglo-
American accord is at a low ebb [due] to British rascality [in letting him go]!’686F21
Oliphant had discussed his own position with Chadwick. Lawrence was pushing for the 
lab to begin developing ‘peacetime applications’ of nuclear research. Oliphant was
worried; Lawrence’s proposed abandonment of the military program had implications for 
the British scientists.
‘According to the terms of the Quebec agreement, as understood by me, we are limited 
very definitely to work only on the military aspects of the … project … [our] position … 
becomes highly anomalous if we begin work here on a peace-time application,’ Oliphant 
told Chadwick, ‘the industrial application of those developments which have been made 
in the USA is left … to the discretion of the President. From the point of view of our 
future relations with USA it is very important that no misunderstanding should arise … 
we [should] have no knowledge of the direction [this] will take in this country.’687F22
‘For the present there is no doubt whatever where our duty lies,’ Chadwick replied, ‘the 
Americans are anxious that we should continue to take part in the Berkeley program
‘[Well, I’ve told General Groves] that [I have] made up my mind to leave the US about 
the end of March … [I] wanted to warn [you] of [my] intentions.’688F23
208
‘I … understand your difficulties—‘689F24
‘[T]he only way … [Lawrence] can run a laboratory is as a dictator … [I’ve] reached the 
end of my patience … even friendship has a breaking point.’690F25
‘[Well it’s] only to be expected from the circumstances under which we are working—
‘691F26
‘What we are doing now only gives the impression that we are trying to muscle in on a 
racket we have been too dumb to develop ourselves.’692F27
‘It is impossible to restrain Oliphant from a distance of 3000 miles,’ Chadwick 
complained to Sir John Anderson, ‘all I can do is to keep things straight with Groves, 
who understands Oliphant’s little ways.’693F28
In room 5120 at the New War Building Chadwick met with General Groves and did his 
best to pour oil over the waters caused by Oliphant’s resignation.
‘[I] am not convinced that there is not enough work for Oliphant in Berkeley,’ Groves 
said, ’[I] would consider the possibility of work in [Los Alamos], [it’s] where [I] wanted 
Oliphant originally … [though] it may be too late for Oliphant to go there.’694F29
‘[There is] nothing to be done but to accept that fact that Oliphant should go back to 
England.’695F30
…
Finally back in his office at the Nuffield Building, Mark Oliphant was thinking about his 
new accelerator.
‘The more I think of it,’ he wrote to Lawrence, ‘the more convinced I am that … [it] will 
work. The only … awkward part … will be the power source … From the engineering 
point of view there is no difficulty whatever … but from the financial … and the priority 
point of view … it represents a grave difficulty.’696F31
Nothing would be done, however, without people. Oliphant urged his colleagues to press 
Groves and Chadwick for their return to the university.
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‘I do not feel that we are justified in spending too much more of our national effort in 
America … there is too much to do here,’ Oliphant wrote, ‘I have had letters from 
Berkeley which tell a doleful tale … men, who are desperately needed here, [are] wasting 
their time on trivialities … because Groves … finds it convenient, for political reasons, 
to tie [them] up … our loyalty is to Britain—not to General Groves! … It is strange how 
the assumption is still made that we can live insulated from the rest of the world … [that] 
we can cut ourselves off from Europe and virtually ignore Russia is indication of the 
stranglehold of American reaction to the policies and actions of this country.’697F32
‘Chadwick has made it quite clear … that … only a few juniors [will] return home in the 
next few months,’ Moon replied from Santa Fe, ‘I am very disappointed, particularly 
because the reasons are political … I’d better stop writing politics—not my line of 
business—although … I’m waking up to the fact that it ought to be everybody’s 
business.’698F33
‘I believe, Oliphant said, ‘we have been sold down the river as a nation.’699F34
In Washington, Oliphant’s plans for Birmingham caused an effect. James Conant 
contacted General Groves. 
‘[Lawrence],’ Conant complained, ‘[is] on the warpath [for funding].’700F35
1945
Little White House, Warm Springs, Georgia, April
Five months into his Fourth Term, the thirty-second president of the United States, 
Franklin D Roosevelt, died of a cerebral haemorrhage. On the night he was sworn in, the 
thirty-third president, Harry Truman, learnt that ‘an immense project was under way’. 
The project, Truman wrote in his diary, concerned ‘the development of a new explosive 
of almost unbelievable destructive power … an explosive great enough to destroy the 
whole world’.701F36
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1945, Chalk River, Canada, July
On VE Day all work on the ZEEP nuclear reactor paused.702F37 Lew Kowarski, enjoying the 
celebrations, suddenly had the thought that he may soon be able to return home to 
France.
‘[As] I [have been] studying various things, [am] I allowed to take notes and take them 
[back] to France?’ he asked John Cockcroft.
‘You should take no written documents.’ 
‘What’s a written document?’ 
‘Well, you know, a few consecutive written sheets. Of course, if you have a little 
pocketbook …[to] write a few words to pin your memories on, a little pocket calendar or 
… diary or something like that, that hardly could be considered as a written document. 
For example,’ Cockcroft said, pulling a black notebook from his pocket, ‘this could not 
be considered a written document.’
Cockcroft opened the notebook. Each page was crammed full of notes copied in 
Cockcroft’s incredibly neat but miniscule handwriting.
‘As you know,’ Kowarski said with a smile, ‘my handwriting can also be quite small and 
quite legible.’703F38
1945, New War Building, Washington, DC, May
General Groves summoned Major General ‘Nick’ Nichols to room 5120. Groves needed 
a deadline.
‘Well, with one final push,’ Nichols said, ‘I reckon we can ship enough 235 to Los 
Alamos on August 1.’
‘[Tell everyone],’ Groves said, ‘they should work until they fall into their graves just as 
the war is over.’704F39
Back in Tennessee, Nichols made a bet with the TEC supervisors. 
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‘[S]ix bottles of whiskey … [says] you can’t make the schedule. Groves says you can’t.’
When he next spoke to Groves Nichols told him of the bet. 
‘I made [it] in your name.’
‘Why not in your name?’
‘Well,’ Nichols replied, ‘they would prefer to take it away from you than from me. 
Besides I’ll probably enjoy drinking some of it.’705F40
‘You’d better be right on this one.’
Nichols ordered everyone to ‘scrape the bottom of every barrel’.706F41
1945, Jornado del Muerto, New Mexico, June
Philip Moon, Rudi Peierls and a small group of scientists, left Los Alamos and drove 
south. The empty, silent desert, framed by the Fra Cristobel and Caballo mountains 
where once Mescalero Apaches hunted, shimmered in the heat. The truck, bumping and 
grinding over the sand and rock, finally arrived at its destination: an unremarkable stretch 
200 miles from Santa Fe. With an audience of scorpions, rattlesnakes and the odd prairie 
dog, the group set and detonated a 100 ton bomb. Mixed in with the explosive was ‘a 
small amount of radioactive material’. Within the blast area the scientists had placed a 
cage of mice. 
‘[T[he only surprising thing,’ Peierls and Moon told Chadwick later, ‘was that [the] mice 
were killed by … [t]he pressure … [we think] British mice [would] withstand [that sort 
of pressure] successfully.’707F42
One month later a larger contingent of scientists and army officials made the same 
journey. Chadwick drove across the New Mexico desert with Ed McMillan. 
‘[Do you think we should we tell the Russians?]’ McMillan asked. 
‘Why should we?’ Chadwick replied. ‘They don’t give us anything.’708F43
At the top of the only structure for miles around, a steel fire watch tower, scientists 
carefully suspended ‘the Gadget’.709F44
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Chadwick watched as ‘an intense pinpoint of light … grew rapidly into a great ball … 
connected to the ground by a short grey stem …the sound of the explosion [rang out] 
sudden and sharp as if the skies had cracked … a long rumbling followed… [its] echoes 
thrown back by the surrounding hills’.710F45 Chadwick had imagined the outcome of the 
project ‘many times … the reality was shattering’.711F46
Two weeks after the Trinity test, Philip Moon was awakened from a deep sleep by a
ringing telephone. 
‘General Groves [requires] a complete report on the radiation situation,’ the Los Alamos 
Medical Officer, Louis Hempelmann informed him, ‘[there’s] no hurry—an hour’s time 
would do.’712F47
In Washington an hour later, Groves dictated a memo to Jean O’Leary. 
‘No damaging effects on the ground are anticipated from radioactive materials [following 
explosion] … we think we could move troops through the area immediately preferably 
by motor but on foot if desired.’713F48
…
In his office in the New War Building in Foggy Bottom, Second Lieutenant Gordon 
Arneson was bored. He had been working at his new job for weeks … and ‘still had no 
idea what it was all about’. All Arneson had been doing so far ‘was drafting replies for 
the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, to send to little old ladies who were complaining 
their sons had not yet made General.’ Eventually Arneson was given something else to 
do: he was to draft a press release for the President on the making of the atomic bomb. 
‘[Start by] assess[ing] the importance of [the] various scientists in the program,’ he was 
told.
It was, Arneson thought, an ‘almost impossible job’; after all, how was he supposed to 
‘assess Hahn … versus Einstein?’ Later, looking over Arneson’s draft, Stimson made a 
suggestion.
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‘[We] ought to give Groves a little more credit.’ 
Arneson was then told to take the draft in person to President Truman ‘come hell or high 
water’. The President was in Potsdam, Germany, meeting with Churchill and Stalin. 
Arneson ‘grabbed the next plane … [sitting] on the envelope all the way’.714F49
1945, Rhyll Beach, North Wales, August 6
On a glorious Bank Holiday Monday, Mark Oliphant was busy building sandcastles with 
Vivian and Michael. As she spread their lunch out on the picnic blanket, Rosie reflected 
that this was the family’s first real holiday together since before the war. Later, when the 
children were in bed, Mark tuned the radio to the BBC 9 o’clock news broadcast and 
heard that the experiment begun in 1940 with Frisch and Peierls’ hypothesis was a
success.
‘Scientists, British and American, have made the atomic bomb at last. The first one was 
dropped on a Japanese city this morning.’715F50
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Professors back from secret missions
Resume their proper eruditions,
Though some regret it;
They like their Dictaphones a lot,
They met some big wheels, and do not
Let you forget it …
In fake Hermetic uniforms
Behind our battle-line, in swarms
That keep alighting,
His existentialists declare
That they are in complete despair,
Yet go on writing.
W H Auden 
‘Under Which Lyre
A Reactionary Tract for the Times




Australian National University, Canberra, July
Stewart Cockburn shuffled through the pile of papers on the desk in front of him. On the 
other side of the desk, David Ellyard pressed his case.
‘The critical issue is whether or not Oliphant really believed that the bomb would 
actually be dropped on people. He says he argued that the bomb should first be used to 
blow the top of Mt Fujiyama.’
‘I believe the old man hedged in his answer to that question.’
‘Well. I think we should give him the benefit of the doubt.’
‘I don’t.’ Cockburn pulled a photocopy from the pile of papers. ‘March 16, 1945. Five 
months before Hiroshima and Nagasaki he writes to Lawrence: “It will not be long 
before we see demonstrated the first fruits of our labours … and although the immediate 
result will be incalculable destruction, we know that in the ultimate analysis this aspect 
will be overshadowed by the benefits wrought for mankind.” It’s clear to me he knew it 
was going to be used on the Japanese.’
‘I still don’t think it proves that he really believed that it would be dropped on civilians.’
Look, we’ve been over this. I don’t blame him for what he did and I don’t think others 
should. I think that everything he did after the bomb - Pugwash, the Peace Movement - it
all stemmed from his guilt complex—‘
I still think where there’s ambiguity we give him the benefit of the doubt. And I don’t 
think it’s clear.’
‘He said he expected me to portray him warts and all and I have no doubt he meant it,’ 
Cockburn said. ‘I am going to assert my seniority on this and overrule you.’716F1
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1945 
Left Bank, Paris, August
Long after the waiters had stacked the cane chairs under the awnings overhanging the 
pavement, the famous philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre remained sitting on a red leather 
banquette inside the Café de Flore at the corner of the Boulevard Saint-Germain and the 
Rue Saint-Benoit. Sartre slid a Gauloise from its box and tapped it on the table top 
before bringing it to his lips. For a few moments he sat motionless while plumes of 
Turkish tobacco smoke drifted towards the café ceiling. Eventually the cigarette burned 
down to his nicotine-stained fingers. He reached for another while simultaneously 
pulling some scraps of paper from his jacket pocket with his other hand. Sartre began to 
write.
‘Today … in this deserted, starving Paris … Peace has not yet begun … The end of the 
war is no more than the end of that war.’717F2
A few days later Sartre took the Metro from Saint-Germain to Champs-Élysées-Marbeuf 
on his way to the Club Maintenant to give a lecture, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’. The 
lecture theatre, already full, was unable to contain the large crowd still trying to enter. 
Inside, audience members fainted in the crush. An hour after the advertised starting time, 
Sartre began to speak.
‘Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself … When a man commits himself 
to anything, fully realising that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at 
the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind—in such a moment a man 
cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility.’718F3
Sartre spoke ‘for two hours without stopping, without notes, and without taking his hands 
out of his pockets’.719F4
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‘We are left alone,’ he said, ‘without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is 
condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless 
at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for 
everything he does.’720F5
Three hundred miles from Paris across the Channel Mark Oliphant heard the echo of 
Sartre’s voice like a sonic boom. His campaign began even before Sartre took the Metro 
to St Germain.
1945, FBI Headquarters, Foggy Bottom, Washington, DC
In the typing pool at 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, Mary Lou Kerst’s Underwood Universal 
was busy clacking out a filing card.
‘OLIPHANT: Possibly Jewish? —No indication 
In USA?—Arrived Aug ’43-Left Sept ’43, Arrived Nov ’43- Left March ’45
In Touch CP Members NY?—In NY 29 Nov ’43 en route Berkeley. Visited NY 3 Jan ’44-
16 Jan ’44. In NY 17 March en route Washington. Visited NY 19 Jan ’45 
Had Knowledge of New Mexico Set-up?—Visited Albuquerque New Mexico 19-21 March 
1944
Met Contact in Jefferson School?—Not known.
Engaged at Berkeley. Numerous visits to Knoxville (Oak Ridge) and Washington. Several 
visits to Canada. 
Left wing views.’721F6
Kerst’s typed-up transcription joined the many others in Mark Oliphant’s fat file in its 
drawer in the Bureau’s main file room.
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Chapter 12: The Shadow
1945
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, September 
Mark Oliphant began his campaign to tell the world the truth about the bomb by venting 
his anger in the press.
‘The statement that America intends to retain the secrets of the atomic bomb means 
little," Oliphant told the readers of the Daily Mail, "There are no real secrets … Britain 
knows practically everything there is to be known.’722F1
The New York Times relayed Oliphant’s message to its American readers.
‘Any secrecy plan is just silly,’ Oliphant  seethed, ‘We know quite well how to make the 
bomb … [The] industrial secrets … are really no more than, say, different methods of 
making electric lamps.’723F2
At the FBI Headquarters in Washington, Special Agent in Charge, G W McSwain 
composed a report to his boss, Director J Edgar Hoover.
‘Dear Sir, the Chicago Tribune contained an editorial pertaining to the atomic bomb:
“Prof. M E Oliphant, a physicist at Birmingham University, England … said … that the 
principles on which the atomic bomb is constructed are familiar to physicists the world 
over … America cannot expect to enjoy a permanent monopoly.”
The office will continue to keep the Bureau advised with respect to developments in this
matter.’
Over the next few weeks Agent McSwain was kept busy at his desk; Oliphant was just 
warming up. 
‘If war ever developed between the USA and Russia, England is bound to be 
obliterated,’ Oliphant raged in the pages of the News of the World. ‘America … [is 
demanding] atomic energy development … should be confined to the American 
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Continent. Effectively, this means that the British Commonwealth would be excluded 
from being anything but a very junior partner … it would mean that the rest of the world 
… [will become] dependent on America for the whole of its industrial and economic 
future … No political jiggerey-pokerey shall prevent a full and open discussion of the 
problem of international collaboration ... atomic energy, which is peculiarly the fruit of 
the genius of … British men of science, shall be used for the benefit of mankind … [not] 
as a pawn in power politics.’724F3
Rosie also found herself pursued by the press having to defend her husband in the pages 
of the newspapers.
‘He feels extremely strongly about the use to which atomic power may be put. I feel that 
way too. All women must.’725F4
1945, University of California, Berkeley, October
General Groves stood on the steps of the Rad Lab and addressed the waiting press, 
assembled guests and faculty members. 
‘The bomb’s overall success was not due to any single person or group, but to American 
teamwork.’726F5
Away from the cameras and newshounds, Groves had a warning for Lawrence.
‘Official declaration of cessation of hostilities with Japan does not in any way alter 
security limitations on release of information on the atomic bomb project,’ Groves told 
him. ‘Loose talk and idle speculation by persons now or formerly connected with the 
project jeopardize the security of the nation and must be controlled.’727F6
Lawrence wasted no time in proposing that the Army maintain its connection with the 
Berkeley Rad Lab. The lab would need US$1 million a year, Lawrence informed 
Groves.728F7 Later, Lawrence and his team celebrated the end of the war (and their funding 
success) in their usual style at Trader Vic’s with a brand new drink, the ‘A-bomb’—rum, 
blue Curacao and dry ice. 
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Molly Lawrence took a sip through the smoke haze bubbling over the sides of the 
glowing blue cocktail. ‘[It’s] ghastly,’ she declared.729F8
1945, Redfoot Lake, Tiptonville, Tennessee, October
Standing on the porch of Linda Lodge, President Truman fielded questions from the 
press.
‘Mr President ... Would it be too long a "bone" as to interpret your remark as meaning 
that the atomic secret would not be shared?’
‘The scientific knowledge that resulted in the atomic bomb is worldwide knowledge 
already. It is only the know-how of putting that knowledge practically to work that is our 
secret.’
‘What I am getting at is, would it apply to letting them in on the know-how?’
‘Well, I don't think it would do any good to let them in on the know-how, because I don't 
think they could do it, anyway … If they catch up with us on that, they will have to do it 
on their own hook, just as we did.’
‘You mean, then, that we will not share that knowledge with our allies?’
‘Just the same as we haven't shared our engineering knowledge, or any of our 
engineering secrets. But so far as the scientific knowledge is concerned, they all know 
that, anyway.’
‘But so far as the bomb secret is concerned, we will not share that?’
‘Not the know-how of putting it together, let's put it that way.’
‘Are you talking on or off the record, Mr. President?’
‘I am talking on the record, Charlie …’
‘Mr President, isn't Great Britain also in on that know-how?’
‘Great Britain and Canada …’
‘Is it true that they couldn't do it themselves?’
‘No, they couldn't,’ the President replied.730F9
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…
At the State Department offices in Foggy Bottom, Washington, DC, a teletype spun 
down the line from Canberra, Australia.
‘We are particularly interested in three cyclotrons for nuclear research, two 40 inch and 
one 60 inch … situated in Tokyo and Osaka. As several exist already in UK and US our 
claim to them should be strongly emphasized … we [request] Army to signal Supreme 
Commander [Macarthur] with a view to preserving … cyclotrons and other equipment 
which [Australian] Scientific Mission desires to investigate for reparations purposes.’731F10
Five weeks after the Australian cable reached Washington, Gordon Arneson had a visitor 
from General Groves’ office. 
‘[This] message [is] to be transmitted immediately to General Macarthur.’ 
‘What’s it about?’ 
‘The immediate destruction of all the Japanese cyclotrons.’ 
‘On whose approval?’ 
‘General Groves.’
‘This is all wrong; it shouldn't be done. First of all, there's really no war potential in the 
cyclotron; the Japanese could never produce an atomic bomb by means of a cyclotron.’
Arneson went to see Major General George Harrison, Stimson’s aide.
‘George, I think this is a big mistake. Why don't you ask … Van Bush … and see what 
he thinks about this.’ 
Unable to get hold of Bush, Arneson urged Harrison to try someone else. 
‘Well … try Oppenheimer.’
Harrison refused.
‘Ah, hell, if this is what Groves wants, let him have it.’ 
Furious, Arneson stormed out of the office.
‘It's a damn foolish thing to do.’ 
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In Japan, Macarthur’s troops dismantled and dumped the cyclotrons into Tokyo Bay. 
When ‘the message went out the Australians erupted.’732F11 Immediately another cablegram 
spat out of the teleprinter in Washington. The Australian Government officially 
expressed its ‘concern with the action of United States military authorities in destroying 
cyclotrons’. 
‘We should like to know to what extent [other scientific equipment] has already been 
removed from Japan by United States authorities.’ 
In Tokyo, unofficially, the Australians confronted the Americans.
‘What the hell is going on here?’733F12
‘I hope this letter won’t provoke one from you belabouring me on the subject of the 
destruction of the cyclotrons in Japan,’ Groves wrote to Lawrence, ‘I have received a 
number as has the Secretary of War. There are many ardent letter writers.’734F13
1945, Royal College of Science, South Kensington, September
The lecture theatre at the Royal College of Science in South Kensington was full. The 
conference, ‘The Social Implications of the Atomic Bomb’ featured many familiar faces: 
Patrick Blackett, ‘Sage’ Bernal, and Fred and Irene Joliot-Curie amongst others. Mark 
Oliphant addressed the audience.
‘With few exceptions scientific men in the past have confined their activities to the 
laboratory. Those, like Professor Bernal, who first called attention to the benefits … [of] 
the application of scientific method to the solution of social problems, were derided both 
by the traditional leaders of public opinion, and by their own fellows. It is unfortunate 
that recent events suggest that … political leaders … are throwing aside the evidence that 
the scientific method really works, in favour of a return to nationalistic bias, of power
politics and of action based on opinions, rather than on verifiable conclusions.’735F14
‘[We unanimously resolved],’ Oliphant told Chadwick later, ‘to continue to make very 
strong representations … to influence the use of the weapon … there [can] be no more 
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secrecy … [Blackett is] appalled by the incompetence and sheer stupidity … of the 
British effort … he regards the Quebec Agreement as a degrading document. He is very 
critical of your views and says that you do not serve as a representative of your country 
… but that you side with Groves.’736F15
In Paris, the British Embassy sent a teletype to Whitehall informing their fellow civil 
servants of the substance of the lectures and that the French were agog with the 
scientists’ latest news.
‘[T]he internationalization of atomic energy has become one of the main items of 
Communist propaganda in France,’ French security told its British counterparts, 
‘Monsieur Joliot-Curie … [says] the secret of the atomic bomb [lies] not in scientific but 
in technical formulae … [Oliphant says] any industrial nation could discover these 
formulae in six months. It was therefore not only criminal but pointless to try to preserve 
the secret.’737F16
1945, House of Commons, Westminster, October
With a nod to the Speaker, Captain Raymond Blackburn, representative of Birmingham 
King’s Norton, checked his notes a final time before launching a small bombshell at the 
unsuspecting members before him.
‘The right honourable Gentleman, the Member for Woodford, and the late and greatly 
beloved President of the United States came together, in deadly secrecy, to an agreement 
in Quebec in September, 1943, on this subject of atomic energy … the terms of this 
agreement left the development of the peace-time use of atomic energy by this country 
very much to the discretion of the President of the United States.’738F17
‘The honourable and gallant Gentleman [shows] … that some breach of trust … [has] 
occurred, when he referred to the secret agreement signed by President Roosevelt and 
myself at Quebec in 1943,’ the member for Woodford, Winston Churchill responded, 
‘Let me say that, so far as I am concerned … this is a matter for both the British and 
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United States Governments … Neither of them has the right to publish without the 
consent of the other, and it would be very wrong for anyone to try to force their hands.’
‘May I point out that I did not make the suggestion that I knew of any secret agreement 
or that a leakage had occurred? I said that it was apparent from the Smyth Report … that 
some such agreement must, in fact, have been entered into.’
Churchill was not willing to concede the point.
‘I took great pains to read carefully what the … Gentleman said in his very eloquent and 
able speech,’ Churchill said, ‘it [is] … quite clear … that there has been … a breach of 
confidence.’
In Birmingham, Oliphant voiced his wrath. 
‘British scientists,’ Oliphant declared to a packed audience, ‘haven’t got the guts to make 
a declaration against the bomb. They’re so tied up with the Official Secrets Act they’re 
afraid that if they open their mouths they’ll land in jail … perhaps I will find myself in 
jail but I feel these things have to be said.’739F18
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the New York Times reported the Birmingham professor’s 
anger at the incumbent political leaders to its readers.
‘We have now come to an impasse … where we have … [to] face up to the fact that 
within a quarter of an hour of war being declared the cities of this country … will be laid 
in ruins.’740F19
In London in his study at Number 11 Downing Street, the new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Hugh Dalton, read the memo on his desk concerning ‘the indiscreet talk of a 
certain professor’.
‘The professor … was extremely critical of … the agreement concluded at Quebec … 
The … Agreement … is, of course, a top secret official document.’741F20
‘This is a monstrous abuse,’ the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Anderson 
fumed when he heard, ‘and incidentally a clear breach of the Official Secrets Act.’742F21
…
228
1945, Oval Office, White House, Washington, DC, November
President Truman sat at his desk. Behind him, to his right Stood Prime Minister Atlee; 
Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King stood to his left. Reporters and photographers 
found whatever space they could in front. The president then read out a statement.
‘Representing, as we do, the three countries which possess the knowledge essential 
to the use of atomic energy, we declare at the outset our willingness … to proceed with 
the exchange of fundamental scientific information and the interchange of scientists and 
scientific literature for peaceful ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate … the 
basic scientific information essential to the development of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes has already been made available to the world. It is our intention that all further 
information of this character that may become available from time to time shall be 
similarly treated … We have considered the question of the disclosure of detailed 
information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy. The military 
exploitation of atomic energy depends, in large part, upon the same methods … We are 
not convinced that the spreading of the specialized information regarding the practical 
application of atomic energy, before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal, and 
enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations, would contribute to a constructive 
solution of the problem of the atomic bomb. On the contrary we think it might have the 
opposite effect. We are, however, prepared to share, on a reciprocal basis with others of 
the United Nations, detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of 
atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for 
destructive purposes can be devised …. And this document is signed by the three of us. 
That's all.’743F22
1945, Washington University, St Louis, Missouri, December
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Martin Kamen was still ruminating on the strange events of 1944 wondering ‘just what 
kind of a bill of goods was sold to [Lawrence] … and what … various friends in the lab 
were thinking’ about it all. As far as he could make out, ‘there was a strong disposition, 
at least on the part of the security people and certainly General Groves’ to believe him 
‘capable of evil and traitorous acts’.744F23 Kamen had spent the past year trying every 
avenue to get a job only to find each tentative appointment withdrawn. Finally an offer 
came for an associate professorship in the medical school of Washington University 
running the cyclotron program. The year in the wilderness hadn’t dented Kamen’s vitriol 
towards the Army. 
‘Government locusts [are still plaguing scientific institutes],’ he complained to an old pal 
at Cornell. 745F24
‘It will be a happy day in this laboratory,’ his friend wrote back, ‘when … the damned 
Army goes away. I am convinced that General Groves is the most boring and frustrating 
of all people. I hope his wife puts pepper in his soup.’746F25
One thousand kilometres away on the fifth-floor of number 950 Pennsylvania Avenue in 
Washington, DC, the director of the FBI, J Edgar Hoover checked his diary to see that he 
wasn’t going to be interrupted for the next half hour. He needn’t have; he knew in precise 
detail his daily schedule as he transcribed the meticulous records himself. He then 
dictated a message to his personal secretary, Helen Gandy, to send to the Bureau’s St 
Louis Field Division.
‘Furnish by return teletype when Kamen will be interviewed’.747F26
In St Louis, Special agent-in-charge, Herb Moss sat at his desk and loaded a sheet of 
paper in his typewriter. He checked his notes as he began to type.
‘Pursuant to an invitation … [Kamen] … voluntarily appeared on March 26.’748F27
The grilling had lasted for several hours. Each answer Kamen gave was checked against 
a thick dossier. 749F28
‘Tell us again if you will, Dr Kamen, the events of July 1, 1944.’
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‘I met Kheifets and Kasparov … We had dinner at Bernstein’s Fish restaurant on Powell 
Street … near the cable car turnaround.’
‘Okay. What did you talk about?’
‘I recall telling a story that Dr Mark Oliphant had previously told me that the British had 
encountered a very effective anti-tank gun weapon used by the Germans, and that the 
British later decided that the Russians already had considerable knowledge of this 
weapon.’
‘Why did you feel that it was necessary to give the Russians this information?’
‘Look. The reason I related the story was just to illustrate my opinion that closer liaison 
should be had between Russian representatives and English officials. I didn’t think that I 
was providing Kheifetz and Kasparov with any new information.’
‘When did Dr Oliphant give you this information?’
‘Sometime in ’44 when I was still working at Berkeley—‘
‘On the Manhattan Project?’
‘Yes, probably at the Faculty Club. We often used to discuss a bunch of stuff over 
lunch.’
‘You mentioned Dr Oliphant. Did the Russians mention to you that they knew of any 
other … British scientists who were over here at that time?’
‘They did say that some British scientists were known to be here—‘
‘You didn’t stop and think that just maybe they were fishing? Seeing as you’d already 
mentioned Oliphant.’
‘I can’t be sure but I think they already knew about the British scientists being here.’ 
‘Can you remember what it was specifically that they were asking about?’
‘Look … it was a long time ago … I don’t believe that I gave the Russians any 
information which could in any way be construed as a violation of security regulations. 
That’s the real deal fellas. That’s all of it.’ 
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Herb Moss wiped the back of his hand across his brow. The worst part of his job, it 
seemed to him, was typing up these damn reports. 
‘Kamen disclaims any knowledge of “know how” formula for military use of atomic 
energy.’750F29
In the Department of Justice building in Washington, Helen Gandy knocked on the boss’
door.
‘I have a memo here for you, Mr Hoover, sir. It just came through.’
‘It seems unwise for the Bureau to interpose any objection to the departure from the 
United States of Martin David Kamen. Kamen has been completely at large since … [his 
dismissal] in 1944 … he could have given all information in his possession to a thousand 
agents in that time. I think it makes us look rather ludicrous to try and keep him from 
leaving … we should notify … the State Department of his background … Any action to 
restrain his departure should be initiated by  … [them] not by the Bureau.751F30
Hoover picked up his pen and made a note at the bottom of the page. 
‘I agree.’
1946
Nuffield Laboratory, University of Birmingham, January
When the September edition of the Physical Review landed on his desk three months 
earlier, Mark Oliphant, with shock and disappointment, had read Ed McMillan’s 
proposal for the new accelerator Oliphant had invented on owl watch in Tennessee in 
1943. McMillan had christened the proposed machine, ‘the synchrotron’. Oliphant, still 
under the constraints of the British Official Secrets Act, had been unable to publish 
anything. 
‘Construction of a 300-Mev electron accelerator ... at the Radiation Laboratory of the 
University of California at Berkeley is now being planned,’ McMillan’s note stated.752F31
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Oliphant was glum; he was feeling the strain of scrounging supplies. The construction of 
the original 60-inch cyclotron, still the largest in Europe, in limbo since the beginning of 
the war had restarted. The 1 MeV (1000 million electron volt) proton accelerator was still 
in the planning stage. However, progress was slow. Materials and labour were in short 
supply. Oliphant was struggling to get allocations. Requisitioning took time and 
paperwork. He had also reluctantly come to the realisation that funding a new building to 
house the synchrotron would be ’quite impossible’ due to the postwar shortages.753F32
Instead, the new accelerator would need to be dovetailed in the only space available 
alongside the cyclotron in the Nuffield Research Lab—close to the wall on one side and 
the edge of the cyclotron pit on the other. 
‘I am in difficulties,’ he complained to Chadwick. ’I’m fed up … Prices are absurdly 
high … the Ministry [bureaucracy] … is so big and cumbersome that nothing gets 
done.’754F33
John Fremlin had kept in touch with his old Cambridge professor. It seemed logical, 
Reinet had told him, to ask Oliphant if there were any jobs going. Fremlin had arrived at 
the Physics Department on August 15 for an interview only to find it deserted. 
Eventually he managed to contact Oliphant at home. The whole department had taken an 
impromptu holiday to celebrate V-J Day. 
‘How would you like to help with the cyclotron construction? I can employ you as a 
Research Fellow,’ Oliphant said.
‘I’ll be earning a grand £750 a year!’ John told Reinet.755F34
Reinet, pregnant and with toddler David in tow, trudged around the various housing 
agencies on a fruitless search to find accommodation in Birmingham. Luckily, Genia 
Peierls’ ‘daily woman … mentioned a couple of old ladies’ who had rooms to let.756F35 The 
Fremlins moved from London in October. A few weeks later, convalescing in a ward of 
the Dudley Road Hospital after a miscarriage, Reinet sat in bed surrounded by ‘formulae, 
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paper, pencils and a book of log tables … performing … calculations and tabulating 
results’—a human computer for the Birmingham cyclotron.757F36
Oliphant had applied for a £200,000 grant for the proton synchrotron project—the 
Department offered only £140,000. On hearing the outcome from their director, the 
researchers gathered in the university caf for ‘a gloomy lunch’ until another group of 
researchers nearby, celebrating at a table ‘strewn with empty beer glasses,’ informed the 
physicists that the celebrations were due to the approval of ‘their application for £20 to 
buy rabbits’.758F37 The Birmingham grant was not without strings; it caught the attention of 
competing scientists worried about the indications of the new era of bureaucratic 
oversight.
‘[Oliphant’s] grant … is redolent of “red tape”,’ Lindemann complained to Blackett, ‘the 
idea that all appointments, rates of pay, etc., should be the subject of approval of DSIR, 
that every single purchase in excess of £100 should also require approval … not to 
mention the fact that DSIR reserves the right to terminate the grant at any time all seems 
not only unnecessary, but definitely deleterious to progress.’759F38
…
In London, Mark Oliphant walked down Grosvenor Place towards Gas Industry House. 
As he entered the lobby he reflected on the irony of the particular group of scientists he 
was joining—all of whom had contributed to its birth—meeting to discuss the 
implications of the atomic bomb in a building whose façade was decorated by medallions 
of Vulcan sending out his messengers with fire to the world. Inside, Oliphant joined 
many of his Cambridge and Birmingham colleagues including Patrick Blackett, ‘Sage’ 
Bernal, Harrie Massey, Otto Frisch, Philip Moon, Eric Burhop and Rudi Peierls. Burhop 
took down the minutes of the newly-formed Atomic Scientists Association (ASA).
First up, Oliphant, Peierls and Moon set about drafting a response to the United States 
proposal to the inaugural United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). 
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‘British atomic scientists should take some action,’ the scientists proposed, ‘to try to 
ensure that enlightened politics are followed in connection with the control of atomic 
energy so that this outstanding scientific achievement will not prove an unparalleled 
disaster to the human race.’760F39
‘[I] hope that [the ASA] will be able to do more effectively what a few [of us] have
endeavoured to do,’ Mark Oliphant told his colleagues. ‘The task of enlightening public 
opinion has made some of us unpopular … in official circles.’761F40
Oliphant entered the debate on the American proposal for the control of atomic energy in 
an article published in Nature.
‘The problem of reconciling a proper care for the security of the United States with 
essential handing over of information to the new body is solved in a manner … 
eminently reasonable from the American point of view, but which may not seem so free 
from danger to the USSR,’ Oliphant suggested. He then issued a warning. ‘[A]n atomic 
arms race [may result] if political dilatoriness and self-seeking lead to stalling tactics and 
lack of agreement.’762F41
‘[I worry that the] connection to the Association of Scientific Workers [will] only 
antagonize certain people,’ Peierls told Chadwick later, ‘[the combination of] a trade 
union for scientists … [and] scientists [acting] as unbiased experts … [will] not mix.’763F42
Chadwick, who had refused the offer to join the ASA, was scathing.
’I should not neglect to warn you of the dangers of extravagant statements and 
unbalanced views which may be put out by some members of the Association.’764F43
The ASA’s memorandum, published in The Times, affronted the civil servants who were 
of the same mind as James Chadwick. 
‘[The idea that the United Nations should have the] capacity to act as a sort of super state 
and … override the Governments of sovereign states [must be rejected],’ the Foreign 
Office complained, ‘[this only highlights] the common weakness when scientists launch 
out as prophets in the field of international politics.’765F44
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‘Oliphant and his circle [are] running a campaign by writing articles in [the press] … so 
that pressure may be brought to bear on the [British] Government to proceed as 
independently as possible of America,’ the civil servants bristled.766F45
Sir John Anderson was equally dismissive.
‘[I fail to see the need for] conscience-smitten atomic scientists [to enter] quixotically 
into the unfamiliar field of politics.’ 767F46
In St James Street, London, in a building ‘camouflaged by a large “To Let” sign,’ MI5 
noted the new organisation.768F47
‘Information has been received that the Association of Scientific Workers have now 
formed the Atomic Scientists’ Association with the object of securing political, covert 
control of this new weapon.’769F48
…
On the 6th Floor of a building in Pitt Street, Sydney, the Deputy Director of the 
Australian Attorney-General’s department, having scanned the morning newspapers on 
his desk, composed a memo for the Director in Canberra.  
‘[T]he Sydney Daily Telegraph … states that Professor Mark Oliphant, Dr EHS Burhop 
and Harrie Massey, all Australian-born scientists at present in England, have expressed 
their dislike of certain aspects of the Atomic Energy Bill ... Oliphant … said that he felt 
so strongly about the matter that he may be forced to make a public demonstration of his 
feelings. According to reports, Oliphant was largely instrumental in having Burhop 
included amongst the scientists engaged in special wartime projects. Burhop is a 
suspected Communist.’770F49
1946, New War Building, Washington, DC, February
General Groves was stewing over a problem: he needed to head off a challenge by 
Congress to wrest the atomic bomb from military control.  America ‘must have the best, 
236
the biggest, and the most’ atomic bombs he told anyone who would listen.771F50 In room 
5121 Jean ‘Major’ O’Leary typed up her boss’ memorandum for the Secretary of State.
‘There is a general feeling that the United Kingdom played an important role in the 
development of the atomic bomb. This is not the case … Turning over to the British of 
stockpiles of raw material, as well as information on our scientific and technological 
developments of the past four years, will materially alter the atomic energy situation … it 
seems a mistake to weaken the hands of the United States … by strengthening the hands 
of any other nation including Great Britain.’772F51
In October, Groves made his way to the Capitol Building. At the Senate Special 
Committee on Atomic Energy, General Groves addressed the members of the House.
‘The War Department will always have a vital interest … in atomic energy,’ Groves 
said, ‘in the field of practical administration and operation the Army can furnish 
invaluable assistance … It is necessary to protect America’s tremendous investment in 
atomic research and development and insure that this development will go steadily 
forward … about US$500 million yearly will be required to keep the Project going.’773F52
‘General Groves, [could] scientists interested in the problems of world-wide atomic 
energy controls … be given access to the pertinent information available in other 
branches of the Project?’774F53
‘[T]he material is too voluminous and the Army too busy,’ Groves replied, ‘[I] do not see 
the necessity for any scientists testifying before the Congress to be fully informed in all 
aspects of the atomic power problem.’775F54
Groves was losing the fight. President Truman was favouring a bill for civilian control of 
the atomic energy program.776F55 Some lateral thinking was called for. On February 16, 
Drew Pearson—Washington’s ‘No 1 gossip columnist’—broke his latest syndicated 
story courtesy of a little information from Pearson’s ‘confidential source’.777F56
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‘[A Canadian spy ring] confronts the USA with the most serious … crisis since Pearl 
Harbor … [some of the spies],’ Pearson claimed ‘[had already left the US with] plans of 
the atomic bomb … [and] samples of the metal from which the bomb is made.’778F57
Three days later the Canadian authorities arrested 22 ‘suspected’ atomic spies. On his 
Sunday night radio show on February 24, Pearson began with his usual lead. 
‘Although it will be denied …’ 
Pearson then announced to his 10 million listeners across the country that Professor Mark 
Oliphant of the University of Birmingham in England had been arrested in connection 
with the recent Canadian spy hunt. 
‘Oliphant alone of the British,’ Pearson informed his listeners, ‘knew all about the 
bomb.’779F58
Across the Atlantic in the early hours of the morning, Mark and Rosie sat in their Barnt 
Green kitchen nursing cups of tea. The incessant ringing of the telephone had made it 
impossible to sleep. Journalists had been ringing throughout the night to find out if there 
was any truth to Pearson’s revelation. Each inquiry was met with a booming laugh. 
‘[Pearson’s] contention that I alone of the British know all about the bomb was just 
funny,’ he told Chadwick the following day.780F59
Britain had welcomed in the New Year with snow which fell continuously covering the 
hedgerows in country lanes; rivers froze and villages were marooned in a sea of white. 
The Army, as if still fighting an invasion of enemy forces, attacked it with flame-
throwers. The British public ‘shivered in … exhausted overcoats while blizzards swept 
through the country again and again’.781F60 The temperature gauges hovered around three 
degrees—the worst winter recorded since 1814, compounded by a nation-wide fuel 
shortage. The Government announced that electricity supplies to industry in the 
Midlands were to be suspended; householders were luckier, but ‘would have to make do 
without electricity daily for three hours from 9 am and two hours from 2 pm’.782F61
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In London, Harry Chapman Pincher headed towards the black vitrolite-façaded building 
at 120 Fleet Street. He had been to see the good professor at Birmingham who had come 
up trumps as usual. 
‘Research vital to Britain’s development of industrial atomic power has been held up for 
six months by lack of equipment known to be held in Government dumperies … 
Professor Oliphant … one of Britain’s foremost nuclear physicists and atom bomb 
researchers … said, ‘Atomic physics is based on work carried out in British universities. 
But since the war ended we have not been able to restart our researches. We need radio 
and electronic parts which we know are locked up in Government storehouses. Nearly 
six months ago the universities applied to various Ministries for the equipment. But we 
have had nothing yet. We are stymied.’783F62
Pincher’s story was added to a growing stack of clippings doing the rounds of civil 
service desks in Whitehall.
‘Now [Oliphant’s] complaining that atomic research in the universities is being held up 
by the Government,’ John Anderson’s personal secretary complained.784F63
1946, Savoy Hotel, The Strand, April
Among the clipped British accents of the diners in the Grill Room, flat Australian vowels 
could be heard punctuating the soft murmur of conversation. Australian Prime Minister, 
Ben Chifley, the Australian Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, Herbert Cole 
‘Nugget’ Coombs and the Australian Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs, 
Dr Herbert Vere ‘Doc’ Evatt were entertaining Birmingham’s Poynting Professor of 
Physics. Oliphant enthusiastically described his latest venture, the Birmingham Proton 
Synchrotron. Chifley began the evening by asking Oliphant to serve as Evatt’s chief 
scientific advisor at the inaugural United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Evatt 
would be the first Chair; another Australian scientist, George Briggs, would also be 
advising. The politicians then sounded Oliphant out on a proposition to create a new 
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Australian national university. Oliphant, if he accepted the position offered to him, would 
be the university’s founding director of the Research School of Physical Sciences. 
‘No, I’m not coming back … it’s just too far out of the mainstream of physics.’
‘We’ll have an aeroplane at your call. You can go where you like,’ Chifley told him.785F64
Oliphant promised he would consider the idea.
After Oliphant left the Savoy, the politicians discussed the proposition.
‘It’s going to cost a whole lot of money,’ Coombs said.
‘You get Oliphant,’ Chifley replied, ‘I’ll persuade Cabinet.’786F65
‘He was absolutely at his spellbinding best,’ Coombs told colleagues back home later. 
‘We were all ga ga.’787F66
…
Back at the Birmingham lab, the plans for the synchrotron were slowly starting to take 
shape. The giant synchrotron magnet would be built on a reinforced concrete raft resting 
on 30 piles driven down 15 feet into bedrock. The magnet plates would rest on bridge 
rails laid onto the concrete with a reinforced concrete anchor around the base of the 
magnet to prevent any excessive movement.788F67
‘[I have been] bogged down beneath buff-coloured forms, lecture notes, correspondence 
concerning equipment which is all exported to keep us fed, and answers to accusations 
that I had betrayed confidences by my actions in the struggle for decency over atomic 
energy,’ Oliphant wrote to Martin Kamen, ‘Australia has asked me to serve as technical 
advisor … on the Atomic Energy Commission … I expect to leave for New York in a 
few days. If I can wangle a trip across to the West Coast …I’ll try to go via St Louis … I 
have at last got some money … for my 1000 MeV scheme … My mouth waters at the 
tales I hear of the progress at Berkeley … If I can arrange it would you accept an 
invitation to visit UK next session … A few weeks of your time and experience would do 
much to remove some of the lethargy which attacks us after the war.’789F68
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Despite offers from Oxford and Cambridge universities, Rudi Peierls had returned to his 
old job at Birmingham and was ‘looking forward to the collaboration with Oliphant on 
his new plans’.790F69
‘Dear Uncle Nick,’ Peierls wrote to Niels Bohr, ‘After long deliberations … I finally 
decided to stay in Birmingham. My chief reason is that I like the spirit of the place.’791F70
Bohr approved of Peierls’ decision.
‘It was a great pleasure to hear from your letter that you are … able again to concentrate 
on general scientific problems … with Oliphant.’792F71
Postgraduate students were beginning to arrive in the lab—many from Australia and 
New Zealand including the two students who had carried the first Australian-made cavity 
magnetron to Sydney in 1942, John Gooden and John Symonds. Enough students, in fact, 
to form a cricket team to play against the British researchers. The students got their first 
taste of physics research in England as labourers pile driving holes into concrete with the 
aid of a jackhammer to be rewarded by a small barrel of beer each time a ‘mammoth task 
was completed’.793F72 The researchers were amazed at the ideas-generating capacity of their 
professor: at each planning meeting, Oliphant would come up with new proposals: ‘his 
rate of production of useful ideas was exceptional’.794F73 The Birmingham director spurred 
on his team. 
‘Physics is fun!’ Oliphant chanted.795F74
…
Stan Livingston was making a trip over to England ‘for the specific purpose of finding 
out what Oliphant was doing’; he had heard on the grapevine about Oliphant’s ‘billion-
volt ring machine’ and he wanted to see the monster for himself.796F75 Livingston was 
planning an accelerator for the brand new Brookhaven National Laboratory. He had been 
‘surveying the possibilities’ of accelerator building: ‘he could outdo Berkeley with a 
600-700 MeV synchrocyclotron,’ he thought. In England, Livingston was amazed at the 
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state of the country; the rationing and the constant blackouts felt as though Britain was 
still at war. In Birmingham, Oliphant gave Livingston a tour of the Nuffield lab. In a 
meeting in Oliphant’s office, Livingston and the Birmingham researchers discussed the 
merits of the machine’s design. 
‘[The main improvement would be to include] field free regions or space to incorporate 
some,’ the physicists told the American, ‘we [have] no space [to do this here].’797F76
Back in Bayport, Long Island, Livingston ditched his plans for a synchrocyclotron and, 




Bevatron, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, April  
Standing on the platform overlooking the great accelerator Stewart Cockburn gazed, 
incredulous, at the size of the massive machine on the floor below. Ed Lofgren laughed at 
Cockburn’s reaction. 
‘It takes a monster this size to smash atoms. There was some article in Popular Science 
that I remember when it first ran: “’10,000-Ton Cracker for Invisible Nuts”. We all 
found it pretty funny. A year after we got it up and running, we found the antiproton—
Paul Dirac predicted the existence of antimatter at Cambridge twenty years before we 
found it—we beat Birmingham in that race. We had the machine first so we found it 
first.’
‘Berkeley beat Birmingham by a year, I think.’
‘An auspicious occasion, the first beam—April Fool’s Day 1954.’
‘April Fool’s Day!’
‘Yeah. You’re looking at 9,500 tons of iron, 225 miles of wire, 2,400 vacuum tubes. It 
cost the government 9.5million bucks.’
‘That’s more than MLO had even if you combined Birmingham and Canberra!’
…
In his office the director of the Berkeley Accelerator Division answered Stewart 
Cockburn’s questions.
‘When I was a student MLO had a reputation as one of the great young men of science. I 
first met him when he came over from England in ‘41. He talked to us about what it was 
like in England—the air raids, the war work. He put us in touch with what was going on 
in the world. One of the distinctive things I remember was that he was a link to this upper 
level of scientists. He made time to come around and poke into what the workers were 
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doing. I remember hearing things from him about what was going on in other parts of the 
country.’
‘And you thought he was a considerable physicist in his own right?’
‘Oh, yes indeed,’ Lofgren said. ‘He came up with ideas—he was bubbling with them in 
fact. We had large technological problems all the time because we were pushing known 
technology to the limit. MLO was a continuous source of ideas and of encouragement.’
’His nickname was “The Fixer”’
‘Is that so? You know, Lawrence was one of the few men who could make large and 
daring extrapolations. MLO was another such man.’
‘When MLO arrived then, you were at what stage?’
‘The 37” cyclotron was dismantled and its magnet was used to make a prototype mass 
spectrograph … the ‘Calutron’ … we were continually making modifications to see if we 
could increase the output. And every improvement seemed to bring a host of new 
problems.’
‘At the peak, how many people were working here?’
‘I’ll … take a guess and say 1500.’
‘An increase by a factor of 10!’  
‘We worked like hell … We believed the Germans were ahead of us … MLO was one of 
the people who helped keep up the spirit.’
‘There are those who are very warm about him and others who are very critical. I have 
to try to decide whether those who are critical are in any way jealous … One feels he has 
warm feelings about humanity. I think this is why people like him so much. I also think 
that MLO’s effective career in research in front line physics probably ended in England 
and I’m trying to find out why …I haven’t made up my mind—it’s very difficult for a 
layman to make judgments—‘
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‘I don’t know if it’s helpful for me to refer to Lawrence? In the latter part of his career 
he had a project which was a flop—many people criticised him severely for it. It was 
known as Mark 1– Materials Testing Accelerator.’ 
‘The MTA?’
‘That’s right. It was started in early ’55 … See, in the early ‘50s there was a perceived 
shortage of uranium. So the idea was to build a very high current accelerator which 
could make the abundant 238 isotope into a useful fissionable isotope. The project was 
discontinued, partly because the accelerator worked only marginally. But the real thing 
that ended it was that new uranium deposits were discovered. All it needed was to 
establish a bounty which led to the discovery of new deposits—all the old prospectors 
[saddled up] their mules and went off into the hills.’
‘I suppose many millions of dollars would have been committed to this project of 
Lawrence’s.’
‘Yeah – tens of millions of dollars.’798F77
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Chapter 13: The Stakeout
1946
The Bronx, New York, June 
On her first trip to America, Lise Meitner ‘was swept away by a round of receptions, 
meetings, awards, lectures … honorary degrees’ and courted by Hollywood producers 
who wanted her to make a cameo appearance in their movie. 
‘[The Beginning of the End is] nonsense from the first to the last,’ Meitner wrote to Otto 
Frisch, ‘It is based on the stupid newspaper story that I left Germany with the bomb in my 
purse … and more along the same lines.’ 
Meitner brushed off the scriptwriters. 
‘I would rather walk naked down Broadway,’ she told her nephew.799F1
In England, Mark Oliphant boarded the luxurious BOAC Lockheed Constellation for the 
long haul to New York and the inaugural United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 
deliberations. Oliphant was looking forward to the flight: it made a welcome change from 
flying across the Atlantic perched on a wooden bench in an unheated bomber. The trip 
began badly. Evatt had a phobia of flying and had spent the journey terrified. Landing in 
New York Oliphant, Briggs and Evatt were met by Evatt’s assistant, Paul Hasluck, and 
escorted to a waiting Cadillac. Evatt ‘blew the top off his head’ haranguing Hasluck over 
the size of the car.
‘[It’s] undignified for [me] to be riding around in something of this sort, whereas the 
Representative of Uganda or somewhere [is] driving around in a great big limousine,’ 
Evatt thundered.
Oliphant began to wonder what he had signed up for. Briggs was pessimistic.
‘The signs [are] not promising. The US [has] appointed elderly financier Bernard Baruch 
and his coterie of ‘Wall Street thugs’ as its representatives.’800F2
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The British delegation was equally unimpressed.
‘Bernie Baruch [is] a dreadful type of talking American,’ Sir Alexander Cadogan said. 
‘He’ll be quite impossible to deal with.’801F3
Negotiations between Baruch and Evatt, who felt Baruch was undermining Evatt’s 
position as chair, were proving toxic. Mark Oliphant spent his time acting as Evatt’s 
‘errand boy … carrying material and messages’ between Baruch and the head of the 
Russian delegation Andrei Gromyko trying to negotiate a compromise between the 
American and Russian positions on control.802F4 Refusing to meet with Evatt in the chair’s 
office, Baruch arranged a meeting on a bench in Central Park. Pulling out his hearing aid, 
Baruch ‘[held] the microphone in front of Evatt’s face [and] adjusting the volume … 
settled back to listen’. Before Evatt had finished his argument, Baruch turned the hearing 
off.803F5 Oliphant accompanied a furious Evatt back to their hotel. The wily, Wall Street 
banker, whose investments included uranium mines, soon made his position clear. 
‘[The British are] always playing footie-footie with the Russians,’ Baruch stated. ‘[The 
United States can] get what she wants if she insists on it. After all we’ve got it and they 
haven’t and won’t have it for a long time to come.’804F6
On June 14, at the Hunter College Gymnasium, Baruch, whose father had fought for the 
Confederate army during the Civil War, began his address. 
‘We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead,’ he said.805F7
Baruch’s proposal ensured that the US would remain the sole possessor of atomic 
weapons. American production of atomic weapons would only cease when systems for 
international control were in place. In addition, there would be no veto effectively 
guaranteeing an American monopoly through its allies on the Security Council. The night 
before the Russians were due to give their response to the American proposal, Baruch and 
the American contingent entertained the Australians with dinner at the Stork Club 
followed by ringside seats to see the Joe Louis and Billy Conn World Heavyweight 
Championship fight. At Yankee Stadium Mark Oliphant watched Joe Louis retain his 
250
crown by knocking out his opponent in the eighth round. The fight, Oliphant thought, 
seemed like a depressing metaphor.
‘The Russians [will] never accept the Baruch plan,’ Groves ‘gleefully’ declared. ‘And 
since America [will] agree to no other, America alone [will] have nuclear weapons for a 
long time.’806F8
On June 19, Andrei Gromyko left the Soviet Consulate on East 61st Street and climbed 
into a black Cadillac waiting at the kerbside. Arriving at the Hunter Gymnasium, 
Gromyko took his place at the podium. Understanding only the occasional word, Mark 
Oliphant waited for the English translation.
‘One of the fundamental elements of the existing situation is characterized by the absence 
of any kind of limit to the production and application of atomic weapons,’ Gromyko told 
the audience, ‘Russia demands as number one priority that all existing nuclear weapons 
should be dismantled.’807F9
Oppenheimer immediately got hold of Oliphant. 
'For heaven's sake get your boss to say something in favour of the Russian proposals 
because that is wonderful … Matter of interest—a bit of classified information … At the 
present time there are only three nuclear weapons in existence … It would be half an 
hour's work to take them apart … it'd take us another half hour to put them together 
again. So we've got nothing to lose.’ 
Oliphant went down to the floor of the General Assembly to talk to Evatt.
‘Oppenheimer … and I both believe that the Russian proposal should be considered very 
seriously. Will you please make a statement to that effect?’
'No, no, no, nothing of the sort, we might want to use them against them.’808F10




1946, Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands, July
Marooned in a lagoon in the South Pacific a fleet of captured warships manned by a crew 
of pigs, goats, guinea pigs and rats, some dressed in protective clothing, awaited their 
fate. The world’s fourth atomic bomb obliterated the ships and their animal crew. 
‘Professor Marcus Laurence Elwin Oliphant, top-ranking atom scientist,’ was listed in the 
publicity material as an official observer.810F12 Unfortunately for the organisers of the Bikini 
spectacle, the eminent Australian professor did not show up.
‘I am not going,’ Oliphant told the press, ‘The scientists have done their job. It is now 
purely a matter for the military.’811F13
When the American authorities released the details of the Bikini tests, Oliphant used the 
published data to calculate the potential radiation released. He passed his calculations 
over to Doc Evatt for use as background information in the ongoing deliberations of the 
UNAEC. The report caused a furore. 
‘[Oliphant has] revealed secret information without authority!’ the Americans 
complained. Despite pointing out that the information came from published sources, the 
Americans ‘persisted in their accusation’.812F14
…
Mark Oliphant again joined Fred Joliot-Curie on the podium along with former United 
States Vice-President Henry Wallace at the Institute of World Control of Atomic Energy 
in Washington to vent his anger at the UNAEC deadlock. 
‘[The sittings of the AEC were run as] a grand spectacle … so theatrical and artificial 
…that the atmosphere was completely alien to the reasonable discussion of any serious 
topic, let alone the fate of mankind,’ Oliphant told the conference. ‘I am not a politician, 
and the problem is political … it seems to me that the logical thing would have been to 
try to reach a compromise.'813F15
The Americans were unimpressed. 
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‘Reputable physical scientists,’ the New York Times decreed, ‘had let their emotions and 
political sympathies outweigh their judgements.’814F16
1946, FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC, July
On Pennsylvania Avenue, Mary Lou Kerst unstoppered the cork from the bottle of 
NuType Typewriter Cleaner. Daubing the liquid on the page, she blew on it until she was 
satisfied that the paper was dry before resuming typing.
‘Oliphant, together with Joliot-Curie (French atomic scientist and admitted Communist), 
Henry Wallace, Phillip Morrison (an admitted Communist Party member), and Carroll L 
Wilson, were speakers at the Institute of World Control of Atomic Energy in July, 1946, 
at Washington, D C … It is believed desirable that we continue our policy of discreetly 
following Oliphant’s activities while in the United States.’815F17
A few desks down the long line from Kerst, another agent’s report was being transcribed.
‘[Professor Ernest Orlando Lawrence] has been a friendly and cooperative contact of the 
San Francisco Office for the past several years.’816F18
…
In the Oval Office on August 1, flanked by a phalange of senators including the Act’s 
instigator, Senator Brien McMahon, and with the official photographer on hand to record 
the solemnity of the occasion, President Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act. 
‘[T]here shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of 
atomic energy for industrial purposes,’ the Act stated, ‘[This includes] all facilities, 
equipment, and materials for the processing, production, or utilization of fissionable 
material or atomic energy; all processes and technical information of any kind, and the 
source thereof (including data, drawings, specifications, patents, patent applications, and 
other sources) relating to the processing, production, or utilization of fissionable material 
or atomic energy … The term “atomic energy” shall be construed to mean all forms of 
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energy released in the course of or as a result of nuclear fission or nuclear 
transformation.’817F19
‘I am interested to know that you intend to send one of your men to Berkeley,’ Oliphant 
wrote to Chadwick on hearing the news, ‘Skinner swears that all alien visitors are banned,
though I find this very difficult to understand in view of the composition of Lawrence’s 
present team.’818F20
A week later, Oliphant had an answer from the director of the Berkeley Rad Lab.
‘Lawrence writes that no visitors are permitted at the Berkeley Rad Lab—even you and 
I!’819 F21
1946, Élysée Palace, Paris, November
The late afternoon sun cast the shadows of the glorious mansions lining the rue de 
Faubourg Saint-Honoré. Retrieving a gilt-edged invitation from his breast pocket, Mark 
Oliphant made his way to through the cour d'honneur. In the opulent interior of the 
palace, the First President of the Fourth Republic, Vincent Auriol, welcomed his 
distinguished guest to the reception marking the commemoration of the tenth anniversary 
of the death of Lord Rutherford. Later in the evening, under the gilded domes of the Great 
Hall of the Sorbonne, more than two thousand people listened to tributes to Rutherford 
presented by the world’s most notable scientists. Mark Oliphant again joined Joliot-Curie, 
Bernal and Blackett, amongst others, on the podium. The conference reconvened at the 
Collège de France the following morning to hear ‘a discussion on the international and 
social implications of modern science’.820F22 A glittering evening reception was held in the 
salon of the Maison de la Pensée Française. 
Despite its popularity, judged by the large crowds who attended its public events and the 
many notable scientists present, in Washington the conference was denounced as 
communist propaganda. At the FBI headquarters typing pool the delegates’ attendance 
was carefully recorded and filed. At the Special Branch office at London’s Metropolitan 
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Police headquarters, a note arrived from an informant who had attended the Paris 
celebrations notifying the authorities that one of the delegates had declared that ‘the 
atomic bomb secret was a question of technical formula which … could be discovered by 
an industrial country in six months.’821F23 The eminent scientist had since returned to his 
Midlands university.
1948
Northolt Airport, Ruislip, Middlesex, January
In a large RAF hangar, Lew Kowarski was being interrogated by British customs. 
‘[I have been on] scientific business at Birmingham University,’ Kowarski told the 
officer, ‘to inspect [Professor Oliphant’s] new cyclotron.’ 
‘[A] discreet search,’ the officer reported, ‘revealed a quantity of manuscript.’822F24
‘[We] do not put his name forward as a particular suspect,’ Special Branch informed MI5 
when they received the H M Customs report, ‘but he does seem to me to be a good 
example of the sort of foreigner who has been closely associated with the project, and 
who is now working under a Communist master … Professor Joliot-Curie … [That] 
Kowarski is a Communist runs counter to every opinion of him, but if you can identify 
“Tess” Simpson it may be possible to draw some conclusion.’823F25
’Miss Simpson,’ the follow-up MI5 report declared, ‘is … employed by the Society for 
Visiting Scientists, 5 Burlington Place … Source has no definite proof …[however] he 
describes her as certainly being a strong Communist sympathiser.’824F26
1948, Old House Office Building, Washington DC, September
In room 226 of the elaborately decorated French Second Empire building next door to the 
White House, the House Committee on Un-American Activities was busy interrogating 
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witnesses subpoenaed to appear before its investigation into ‘Communist Infiltration of 
the Radiation Laboratory and the Atomic Bomb Project at Berkeley’.
‘[The committee] has a very special responsibility,’ the Chair explained to the packed 
room, ‘It functions to permit the greatest court in the world—the court of American 
public opinion … to evaluate the merit of many … who either openly associate and assist 
disloyal groups or covertly operate as members or fellow travellers of such 
organizations.’825F27
Martin Kamen sat at the long desk in front of the committee members and relived the 
whole Bernstein’s Fish Grotto saga: the same old questions were asked to which he gave 
the same old answers. This time though, the grilling was conducted under the glare of 
flashlights and over the constant whirr of the multitude of cine-cameras. Eventually the 
session wrapped up but not before a final question.
‘You have something to say to the witness, Congressman Thomas?’ 
‘Yes I do, Mr Chairman … I can’t make up my mind, Dr Kamen, as to whether you were 
duped by the Russians you met that night at Bernstein’s Fish Grotto, or whether you are 
just a damn fool.’826F28
‘While Kamen had numerous friends in Communist and radical circles,’ the committee 
stated in its conclusion the following day, ‘there is no evidence connecting Kamen 
otherwise than casually with … the Communist espionage apparatus.’827F29
‘Dr Martin Kamen,’ the press announced, ‘a scientist who was dropped from the atom 
bomb project during the war … denied he was ever a communist or had divulged atomic 
secrets.’ 
The freshly-elected representative for California, Richard M Nixon, gave eager reporters 
a different spin on the committee’s conclusion. 
‘[T]here [is] no question that Kamen [gave] secret information to the Russians.’828F30
Across the Atlantic in Westminster, a Member of Parliament stood in the House of 
Commons.
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‘Would … the Labour Government … set up a House Committee on Un-British 
Activities along the lines of the US?’
‘No Sir!’ the Deputy Prime Minister replied.829F31
‘Britain,’ Lewis Strauss, Chair of the American Atomic Energy Commission declared, ‘is 
far to our left and therefore may give away the secrets to the communists, some of whom 
already sit in Parliament.’830F32
1949
Washington University, St Louis, Missouri, June
Martin Kamen was so swamped with new projects that he didn’t have time to think about 
the FBI business. Apart from lectures on tracer chemistry techniques, there were clinical 
research teams needing his expertise in various experimental research projects, as well as 
papers to write. He had also accepted a proposal from Mark Oliphant for a stint as a 
visiting professor in Australia. 
‘I’m delighted that you are coming to Australia,’ Oliphant wrote back, ‘It seems very 
likely that I will accept the post of Director of the School of Physical Sciences [at the 
Australian National University] … I hope that I can persuade you to remain in Australia 
with me as Professor of Radiochemistry. You will find Australia singularly alert in some 
fields of science, indifferent in others and comatose in a few.’831F33
Kamen applied to the State Department for a passport. The passport arrived promptly 
followed by another summons downtown. This time Kamen was questioned for six hours; 
the FBI agents quoting from the secret recording of the conversation at Bernstein’s. 
Kamen spent much of the time arguing about the ‘numerous incoherencies and … 
nonsense’ contained in the transcript.832F34 When the interview finally finished, Agents Moss 
and O’Connor invited Kamen to join them for dinner at a nearby restaurant on the 
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Bureau’s expense account.833F35 Days later Kamen’s newly acquired passport was 
confiscated from his travel agent. 
On the fifth floor of the Winder Building on Seventeenth Street in Washington, DC, Mrs 
Ruth B Shipley determined—not for the first time—that no communists were going to get 
past the gatekeepers in her department on her watch. She made this promise to herself 
while standing in a certain position next to her office window on a particularly worn 
patch of carpet. Here, Shipley had a view of the White House. This visual reinforcement 
helped to steel her resolve and encourage her unyielding and constant vigilance against 
appeals by undesirables. Despite the 250-plus staff under her, the Chief of the US State 
Department Passport Division took great pride in the fact that every single application 
was submitted to final scrutiny by her eyes alone. Looking up from the letter she held in 
her hands, Shipley gazed at Number One, Pennsylvania Avenue before returning to her 
desk. After carefully pressing a stamp on a red ink pad, she transferred its message to the 
paper: ‘passport denied’. Shipley placed the letter in a bulging, buff-coloured folder in her 
out-tray, where, in due time, it would be filed along with 12,000,000 others just like it in 
the bowels of the building—the old Civil War dungeons. Martin Kamen duly received a 
letter from the Chief of the Passport Division. 
‘[It] is not in the best interests of the United States that you go abroad at this time,’ 
Shipley advised.834F36
…
Back in room 226 of the Old House Office Building Frank Oppenheimer was being 
grilled by the Commissioners who wanted ‘names’.
‘I do not wish to talk about the political ideas or affiliations of any of my friends.’835F37
‘I think the witness should be warned of the penalty of his refusal to answer without 
sufficient grounds,’ Nixon said.836F38
258
‘The people … I … [know are] decent-thinking and well-meaning people … I know of no 
instance where they have thought, discussed, or said anything which was inimical to the 
purposes of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.’837F39 Oppenheimer, frustrated, 
made his point clear. ‘[D]uring the war I knew of no Communist activity, nobody ever 
approached me to get information and I gave none and I worked very hard and I believe 
made a valuable contribution.’838F40
Minneapolis Star reporter Joseph Alsop, sitting shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the 
press pack, scribbled notes for the front page. The brother of the country’s most famous 
physicist was about to be exposed as a ‘Red’. 
‘[Frank Oppenheimer],’ Alsop wrote, ‘[obviously a] bohemian [judging by his] 
excessively ostentatious sideburns … [is] as silly about politics as he is clever about 
science … [he believes] that men grow virtuous because one wants them to … [he] 
obviously suffers from idealism almost in the way that so many of the Congressmen’s 
favourite lobbyists suffer from gas.’839F41
‘[It’s] only fair to let the record show that General Groves knew all along that Frank 
Oppenheimer had been a Communist who had broken clean before he went to work on 
the atomic bomb. And,’ added a former FBI agent now HUAC investigator, Louis B 
Russell, ‘Dr Oppenheimer’s loyalty was vouched for by an outstanding scientist.’840F42
‘His brother Robert,’ Russell later told reporters.
Forced to resign from the physics department of the University of Minnesota, Frank 
Oppenheimer sold a Van Gogh— First Steps (after Millet)—and moved to a cattle ranch 
in Colorado. 
‘[I have had] a plea from Oppenheimer ask[ing] for forgiveness of his wrong doings [and 
requesting a passport],’ Ruth B Shipley told Hoover, ‘he [says] he [has] mended his 
ways.’ 
Shipley, who commanded absolute authority over the issuing of passports and was not 
subject to any judicial review, refused the request.841F43
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1949, House of Commons, Westminster, September
Just after midnight, Winston Churchill addressed the Prime Minister inquiring whether he 
wished to make a statement on the recent suspected detonation of a Russian atomic bomb.
‘No, Sir,’ Atlee replied. 
‘Is my right honourable Friend aware that the atomic energy establishments in this 
country work on normal Civil Service hours, and is he satisfied that our own research is 
being pushed forward with sufficient energy, in view of the apparently feverish 
development elsewhere?’842F44
1950
Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, DC, New Year’s Day
On Constitution Avenue, electric ’eyes’ able to detect objects ‘heavier than birds, 
hailstones, or leaves’ whirred and flashed from the roof of the headquarters of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. One hundred guards ‘trained in judo tactics and marksmanship’ on 
the lookout for enemy agents wanting to steal American atomic secrets, patrolled the 
building.843F45 In the soundproofed conference room, Ernest Lawrence, having successfully 
negotiated his way through the security checks, presented his proposal for his greatest 
accelerator ever to the General Advisory Committee. Lawrence’s behemoth—the 
Materials Testing Accelerator (MTA)—would cost over US$100,000,000 to build and 
would have a unique feature which would make it irresistible to the military, the Berkeley 
director informed his audience, the new machine would produce copious amounts of 
neutrons.
‘If we had a hundred grams of neutrons a day, we could kill all the people we want to 
without causing physical destruction; we can disrupt the great populations of Europe [and 
in the process] we can avoid destroying Paris or London if they were occupied.’844F46
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When the last committee member had left the room, security staff removed all the 
notepads—‘not only the sheets that had doodles or notes … but also sheets [with] the 
slightest impression of a pencil mark’—to be burned under supervision in the building’s 
incinerator.845F47
…
An ‘Emergency’ cable arrived at the British Joint Services Mission’s Washington office
from the Foreign Office.
‘Klaus Fuchs] arrested on following charge … [he gave] information relating to Atomic 
Research … to an enemy,’ Makins instructed, ‘you could … say that the matter is sub 
judice and that you cannot comment … it appears that F has been an active agent since 
1942.’846F48
The following morning Fuchs’ arrest was splashed across the front pages of the morning 
papers. A return cable arrived in Whitehall.
‘[W]e … want to know what steps were taken … to clear Fuchs … [Hoover claims] that 
… the fact that he had not been [notified] … might … enable persons … involved in the 
espionage system to leave USA before he [can] nab them … There is nothing much we 
can do about all this nor … do we want to get involved in an argument with Hoover.’
‘Hoover [is behaving] like an elderly and temperamental prima donna,’ the civil servants 
informed London, ‘anything we can do to keep the FBI sweet would be helpful.’847F49
Two weeks after Fuchs arrest, President Truman announced that America would proceed 
with the development of a Superbomb—a hydrogen fusion bomb based on the deuterium 
fusion reaction Oliphant and Harteck had discovered in Cambridge in 1934.848F50
1950, McLure Hotel, Wheeling, West Virginia, February
The Junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, mounted the sweeping staircase 
and made his way to the Colonnade Room to address the annual Lincoln Day meeting of 
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the Ohio County Republican Women’s Club. McCarthy’s ‘homey’ speech seemingly 
lacked ‘any oratorical fireworks’.849F51 In any case, the Ohio County Republican women 
missed the explosive impact of the incendiary thrown by the senator. 
‘While I cannot take the time to name all of the men in the State Department who have 
been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring,’ McCarthy 
declared, ‘I have here in my hand a list of 205 that were known to the Secretary of State 
as being members of the Communist Party and who, nevertheless, are still working and 
shaping the policy in the State Department.’850F52
When McCarthy arrived at Stapleton International Airport in Denver, Colorado, the press 
was waiting for him. Urged to name names, McCarthy protested that he had left the list in 
the pocket of his other suit. 
‘Gentlemen, if the Secretary of State will call me in Salt Lake City, well, I’ll be glad to 
read him the list.’851F53
When he arrived in Reno, Nevada, two days after his Wheeling speech, McCarthy sent a 
telegram to the President. 
THE STATE DEPARTMENT HARBORS [sic] A NEST OF COMMUNISTS AND 
COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS … FAILURE ON YOUR PART [TO ACT] WILL 
LABEL THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY … THE BEDFELLOW OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNISM 
‘[T]his is the first time in my experience … that I have ever heard of a Senator trying to 
discredit his own Government before the World,’ Truman wrote in reply, ‘I am very sure 
that the people of Wisconsin are extremely sorry that they are represented by a person 
who has as little sense of responsibility as you have.’
Washington reporters knew the whole list thing was a bluff.
‘Jeez, Joe can’t find a communist in Red Square,’ United Press reporter George Reedy 
said, ‘he doesn’t know Karl Marx from Groucho’.852F54
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‘Joe [is getting] away with murder,’ William Theis correspondent for the International 
News Service agreed with Reedy. ‘He’s like a kid in a candy store … people [are] ready 
to believe anything about communism.’853F55
…
At Berkeley, one by one, the theorists had left the Rad Lab. Some had been hauled before 
HUAC and subsequently blacklisted. Others had left for jobs elsewhere citing the Loyalty 
Oath and the ‘high-handed position’ of the Berkeley Cold War warriors, Lawrence and 
Alvarez.854F56 The last Berkeley theoretical physicist to leave, Emilio Segrè, left after an 
argument with the director. Segrè objected to the war footing the lab was pursuing. 
‘[You are] unpatriotic, lazy, selfish, and God knows what,’ Lawrence roared.855F57
1950, Washington University, St Louis, Missouri, December
Martin Kamen was still having no luck with the State Department Passport Office.  
‘I think [Shipley’s] information stems from the time I was General Groves’ official goat,’ 
Kamen told his lawyer.856F58
Oliphant had written that the Australian Government had approached the State 
Department on Kamen’s behalf. 
‘I hope something comes of it,’ Oliphant wrote, ‘[Here in Britain] we are passing through 
a period of acute activity on the part of security officials … [due to the] unfortunate 
Fuchs incident … we are in the midst of just about the dullest of election campaigns … I 
fear that the return of … Churchill might very well lead to the sort of damn thumping 
[which] precipitates trouble.’857F59
Kamen made another request for a passport to take up Oliphant’s invitation to the ANU. 
‘I would be in Australia for about six months,’ Kamen wrote, ‘It is hard for me to see 
how such a venture would be other than in the best interests of the United States.’858F60
Once again Shipley refused his application.
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‘Your application for a passport … to travel to Australia … for the purpose of lecturing 
… has been considered … it has been alleged that you were a communist; that you 
imparted confidential government information to foreign agents and that you were 
dismissed from the Manhattan Project for security reasons. The Department, therefore, 
does not believe that you are entitled to the protection of this Government … and is of the 
opinion that your travel abroad would be to promote the communist objectives … the 
Department desires to receive from you a sworn statement as to whether you are now or 
have ever been a communist … Sincerely yours, Ruth B Shipley, Director, Passport 
office.859F61
In April the US Government released a report. ‘For Soviet espionage to be successful,’ 
the report stated, ‘requires three conditions: a trained scientist … access to information 
about the American-British-Canadian [bomb] project … and a willingness to sacrifice his 
own country on behalf of Russia.’ The reason that scientists were so prominent in the 
spying game was their ‘almost diseased yearning to remold [sic] the world after the image 
of their own work in physical science,’ the report informed its readers.860F62
1951
Grosvenor Square, Mayfair, London, June
In his office at the American Embassy, the FBI’s legal attaché in London, John 
Cimperman, forwarded a request to the British Security Service. 
‘[I]n view of the derogatory information developed to date concerning Drs Marcus L E 
Oliphant, Harrie S W Massey, and Maurice Hugh Frederick Wilkins, these three 
individuals, together with Burhop, appear to be the most likely suspects [considered to be 
one of the Australians accused of espionage] … determination of … the friends, 
associates and contacts of these individuals … together with their places of residence and 
activities, is of prime importance.’861F63
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At number 21, The Ridge, in Surbiton, Surrey, Eric Burhop’s neighbour peered through 
the curtains of her front room and watched Burhop drive off in the direction of the village 
‘returning within half an hour with a box of plants’. 
‘[He] was later [seen] dressed for gardening,’ her report stated, ‘and shortly began 
planting out.’862F64
In Park Lane, a double decker bus lurched to a stop. ‘Curzon Street! MI5,’ the conductor 
shouted up the stairwell. A group of embarrassed young women stepped down from the 
bus to walk down Curzon Street to the supposedly ‘secret’ headquarters of MI5, 
Leconfield House.863F65 In ‘The Gristery’ on the sixth floor, Mrs Evelyn Grist distributed the 
various telephone intercepts and agents’ reports waiting to be transcribed among the 
debutantes in her charge.864F66 Subsequently each transcribed report would be added to its 
relevant security card index.
‘Maurice Wilkins undoubtedly held extreme left-wing views … it appears certain that he 
voted Labour in the last General Election … He comes to [University] College every 
morning with a copy of ‘The Times’, which he has apparently read on the journey … he 
is a caricature of a Scientist … His only outside interest is Non-Representational Art … 
Informant says that if he … still holds extreme Left-Wing views, he must … put on an 
extremely studied act.’865F67
‘Eric Burhop is a Doctor of Physics … He is acquainted with practically everyone in 
Britain who is engaged on atomic research … Since his arrival in this country Burhop has 
displayed openly pro-Communist sympathies in the form of press articles, public 
speeches and similar activities … There can be little doubt that he is a crypto-Communist 
… the Australians were more than ready to withdraw passport facilities from Burhop, but 
Burhop has already obtained a UK passport.’866F68
Upstairs, the Security Service officials contemplated the FBI’s latest request and 
composed a reply.
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‘[N]o evidence of current espionage or information that might confirm the hypothetical 
identification … with the source of the leakage … to the Communists in New York … 
[has come] to light,’ A F Burbidge dictated to his secretary, ‘there is no information on 
any of them received … to cause us to re-examine any of their cases ... Such a re-
examination would in my view be worthwhile only if more information concerning the 
original source of the allegation … were forthcoming.’ 
‘[Well,’ Burbidge said to his colleagues, ‘I doubt whether this [will] have … the effect of 
dissuading the FBI from making their present requests.’867F69
Days later, Curzon Street received a response from the American Embassy.
‘The information … came from a sub-source,’ Cimperman wrote, ‘the alleged former 
Communist agent … could not recall any specific details, comments or the source … a 
subsequent interview … failed to produce additional information.’868F70
Burbidge, raising an eyebrow, surmised the American reply for his fellow British 
intelligence officers, ‘‘[I]t would appear that the sub-source only possessed “hearsay” 
information.’869F71
1951, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, July 
The Chancellor of the university, Anthony Eden, conferred the honorary degree of Doctor 
of Science on the Former Poynting professor of Physics, Mark Oliphant. Oliphant had 
been in Britain for 23 years, 13 of which he had spent at Birmingham, Eden informed the 
large audience gathered to farewell the Australian professor. 
‘[Professor Oliphant will be sorely missed],’ one of the speakers, Professor Hood Philips 
said, ‘this unit of mental energy [had] inherited the spirit of his master, Lord 
Rutherford.’870F72
At the end of the formalities, the audience erupted in a ‘tremendous’ standing ovation, the 
newspapers reported.871F73 A few days later, at Tilbury Docks, Mark, Rosie, Michael and 
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Vivian took a last look at England before boarding the ocean liner heading to Australia. 
Before the ship sailed, Howard Florey, seeing the family off, had some advice. 
‘Well, [I know] what you’ll find when you get to Canberra,’ he told Oliphant, ‘A hole in 
the ground and a lot of promises!’872F74
1951, Circular Quay, Sydney, Australia, August 
The Orcades sailed through the heads into Sydney Harbour under blue skies. The 
temperature was bracing for the average Sydneysider, but spring-like for those passengers 
arriving from Britain having survived the coldest winters on record. Mark, Rosie and the 
children stepped off the gangplank at Circular Quay to another phalanx of waiting press. 
The Oliphant’s had been interviewed when the ship had docked at Fremantle and in 
Adelaide. Once again the family resigned itself to fielding questions from reporters.
‘If I had my way, atom and hydrogen bombs would be banned,’ Oliphant told the Sydney 
Morning Herald, ‘I hope neither are ever produced or used in Australia. I … wish [these 
bombs] had never been made.’873F75
The ‘charming, genial’ professor was ‘a delight to talk to,’ correspondent Stewart Moyser 
told the readers of The Argus.
‘What advice can you recommend if an atomic bomb is dropped?’ 
‘Run!’874F76
‘Even if the Russians used the atomic bomb we should not use it,’ Oliphant told the 
Hobart Mercury, ‘[it’s] a dirty rotten way to kill people.’875F77
When the family eventually arrived in Canberra, conditions were less than ideal. 
Construction of the new house they had been promised had barely started. The family 
moved into the art-deco ‘grand old dame’ Hotel Canberra replete with tennis courts, a 
bowling green and a croquet lawn. It would be the Oliphant’s home for the best part of a 
year. The situation at the new university was even worse: so far the university comprised 
of a single ancient army hut.
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1951, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
Howard Florey’s parting words to Mark Oliphant at Tilbury Docks were proving 
prophetic. Oliphant was feeling frustrated at the multitude of problems besetting the new 
university. Construction was at a standstill: even if the university managed to procure 
materials, it was impossible to find labour or housing.
‘I am rapidly making myself very unpopular with the administration, members of which 
are apt to take every suggestion or criticism as a personal insult,’ Oliphant wrote to 
Howard Florey, ‘Progress is worse than disappointing … it is all rather heartbreaking … 
The housing situation is very bad and I think everyone coming out from England must be 
prepared for some bad shocks … the idea still persists that it is a great privilege to be a 
member of the University—a privilege for which all the world is scrambling … I [am] 
toying more and more with the idea of a move [back to England] and I think I would go if 
a good job came along … I came here to do scientific work and not to be an expediting 
clerk. There is a conference in Chicago … [that] I would rather like to go [to] … At 
present … I have nothing else to do which is even remotely connected with being a 
physicist!’876F78
…
In St Louis Martin Kamen was also experiencing frustration. Despite numerous requests 
the State Department continued to refuse his application for a passport.
‘I’ll try to get action from this end but I fear that cooperation won’t be good,’ Oliphant 
wrote to Kamen in July, ‘The Menzies Government has adopted a policy of outright 
outlawing of the Communist Party which goes further than anything that has happened in 
the USA … I hope to bring my wife with me to the conference in Chicago in September 
and if dollars permit will certainly call and see you all. Progress with our buildings is 
disappointingly slow … [I] have had to adopt an old motto—‘Non illegitimes 
268
carborundum’—don’t let the bastards grind you down! … It might well be adopted by 
you!’877F79
In early September, in the newly-built Virginian mansion a few doors down from the 
Australian Prime Minister’s residence, ‘The Lodge,’ the American Ambassador, Peterson 
Jarman, approved a memo to be relayed to the US State Department requesting further 
information on the delay in processing Professor Oliphant’s visa. A message in return 
from the State Department informed consular officials that the Department ‘declined to 
make any statement on the delay’.878F80 When the news began to filter through to the 
Canberra press, the university was inundated with reporters. 
‘I don’t understand it at all,’ Oliphant told them, ‘[I am] packed and … ready … [to] 
make a quick dash to Sydney to catch [my] plane for the United States … so far [my] visa 
hasn’t arrived. If it does not come by early tomorrow morning [it] will be too late.’879F81
Two weeks after the Chicago conference ended the State Department issued a statement.
‘The American State Department … [sends] its regrets to Professor Marcus Oliphant that 
his US entry visa was not available in time to attend a recent scientific conference.’880F82
In London Chapman Pincher once again scooped the Daily Express front page lead 
courtesy of the former Birmingham Poynting Professor of Physics, now at the Australian 
National University.
‘Professor Oliphant barred from visiting America’,’ Pincher’s story informed readers, 
‘security officials do not suggest Professor Oliphant has any Communist affinities, but 
they point to his repeated public criticisms of the way the Americans have handled atom 
projects.’881F83
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The Statue of Liberty Speaks …
in 1901 …
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send those who are homeless, tempest-tossed, to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door. 
In 1941 …
‘Give me your battle lore;




Penney and Chadwick; all of Freedom’s brains
Will scarce suffice to guard my golden door.
In 1951 …
Now that I’ve licked the world and drained your store
Of knowledge, I might have to spurn
The scientists I welcomed here of yore;
The times are changed; besides those guys might learn
Something from me! I slam the golden door.882F84
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